


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
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
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
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
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
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SECRETARY'S NOTES.

I.—Council.

Lieut.-General Sir H. C. Sclater, K.C.B., the Adjutant-General to the Forces, has been appointed a Member of the Council, vice the late Major-General F. D. V. Wing, C.B.

The following Members of the Council, both of whom offer themselves for re-election, retire at the Anniversary Meeting on Tuesday, March 7th, 1916, having completed three years' service :—

Admiral-of-the-Fleet Sir A. D. Fanshawe, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.

Major-General Sir T. Fraser, K.C.B., C.M.G.

II.—Anniversary Meeting.

The Anniversary Meeting will be held on Tuesday, March 7th, 1916, at 3 p.m., in the Crypt of the Museum (entrance: Public Entrance to the Museum). The Council will present their Annual Report, and the election to the Council of new Members and other business will take place.

III.—Temporary Alteration of a Bye-Law.

A proposal, which has been unanimously passed by the Council, will be brought before the Annual Meeting for confirmation, to the effect that Chapter III., paragraph V., of the Bye-Laws, which reads as follows: "Members joining after the 3rd March, 1900, pay as follows :—

(1) Annual Member, £1 1s. od.; entrance fee, £1 1s. od.,

(2) Life Member, £15,"

shall be suspended for the time being; the proposal being that the entrance fee at present, £1 1s. od., shall be in abeyance, and the Life Membership temporarily reduced to £10 or by two instalments of five guineas each.

IV.—Membership.

The Council beg to report that during the past year *only* 55 officers joined the Institution (against 107 in 1914). There were 123 withdrawals and 270 deaths (of which 66 were Life Members), making a decrease of 338 on the year. It is greatly to be regretted that the Membership should have shown such a large falling off, but this is chiefly owing to the war, as no less than 321 officers who were Members of the Institution have either been killed or died of their wounds since the commencement of the same to the end of December, 1915. The Council trust, however, that the Members will assist in introducing new Members during the coming year.

The details of Members joining were :—

Regular Army	40
Royal Navy	9
Territorial Force (including Yeomanry)	3
Special Reserve	2
Royal Marines	1
Total	55

The total number of Members on January 1st, 1916, was 5,000.

V.—Officers Joined.

The following officers joined the Institution during the months of November, December, and January :—

Second-Lieutenant H. W. H. Bothamley, 9th (Reserve) Battalion,

Royal West Kent Regiment.

Surgeon A. C. Shaw, R.N.
 Second-Lieutenant A. J. B. Clayton, 6th Dragoon Guards (S.R.).
 Captain H. F. Stacke, Worcestershire Regiment.
 Captain H. R. S. Brown, D.S.O., East Yorkshire Regiment.
 Captain E. J. Stourton, East Riding of Yorkshire Yeomanry.
 Lieutenant H. H. Folker, M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P. (London), R.A.M.C.
 Second-Lieutenant H. Godfrey, A.S.C.
 Lieutenant E. Kaye-Parry, R.E. (S.R.).
 Captain F. W. Walker, Hampshire Regiment.
 Captain E. S. Hurlbatt, 7th Battalion, Manchester Regiment (T.F.).
 Lieut.-Colonel G. Friend, Military Knight of Windsor, 3rd Battalion,
 West Yorkshire Regiment.
 Lieutenant G. C. S. Ferguson, I.A.
 Captain T. N. C. Nevill, 6th Battalion, Manchester Regiment (T.F.).
 Major B. W. Lidington, Royal Marines.
 Lieutenant C. G. Wells, R.E.
 Captain G. W. H. Batho, R.G.A.
 Lieutenant J. C. B. Callender-Brodie, Scots Guards.
 Lieut.-Colonel H. F. A. Pearson, I.A.

VI.—Journal.

As it is not possible to hold any lectures in the Theatre, the question of the regular issue of the JOURNAL will largely depend on contributions received from Members and others.

VII.—Payment for Contributions to the Journal.

It is notified that the Council of the Institution have with much pleasure decided to offer some remuneration to Members (and to Non-Members) for accepted contributions to the JOURNAL. A sum, not exceeding £30 per quarter, has been for this purpose placed at the disposal of the Library and JOURNAL Committee.

VIII.—Distribution of the Journal—Members' Addresses.

Owing to the war, Members' addresses have become so uncertain, and are so constantly changing, that punctual distribution of the JOURNAL is quite impracticable, and many Members must fail to receive their copies. As a matter of fact, a great many copies of the last number have been returned to the Institution through the Post Office, "Addressee not found." It is notified, therefore, that any Member who does not receive a copy of the present issue can be supplied by applying to the Secretary, and giving an address.

IX.—Members are reminded that the Council can accept no responsibility in the matter of letters and telegrams addressed to them at the Institution, there being no arrangements for the reception and forwarding of Members' letters, etc.

X.—Additions to the Museum.

(6777 The following shells, etc., from the Gallipoli Peninsula, viz. :—
 to 6783)

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- (2) English 18 pr. Q.F. cylinder.
- (3) Turkish shrapnell shell.
- (4) French 1 pr. cartridge case.
- (5) Two Turkish hand grenades.
- (6) Barbed wire.

Given by Captain N. W. Wingate-Saul, A.O.D.

The attention of Members is drawn to the Museum Purchase Fund.

The amount taken at the Museum Public Entrance during November was £75 11s. 6d.; December, £70 6s.; January, £87.

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**THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR, WITH REFERENCE
TO THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1914-1915.**

PART I.—STRATEGICAL PRINCIPLES.

WANT OF CLASSIFICATION.

ON the first and second pages of the "Field Service Regulations" for the British Army may be read the following:—

"The fundamental principles of war are neither very numerous nor in themselves very abstruse, but the application of them is difficult and cannot be made subject to rules. The correct application of principles to circumstances is the outcome of sound military knowledge, built up by study and practice until it has become an instinct."

To compile a grammar without mentioning the alphabet; to write a text-book on chemistry without enumerating the elements; to publish a revised edition of Euclid and forget the definitions, is to be guilty of somewhat serious omissions; nevertheless, throughout the 434 pages of this text-book on the science and the art of war, a truly wonderful work, no further mention is made as to what these principles are, in spite of the fact that concise and carefully thought out comments on their application exist in abundance. It seems a thousand pities that, following the above paragraph, a list of these fundamental principles has never been set down, as well as a list of the most frequent conditions, factors or circumstances which affect and govern their employment.

Had this been done, I imagine that not only would this book, well named "The Soldier's Bible," have proved of greater value to soldiers as such, but it might also have proved of some value to civilians generally, and to those politicians in particular who control our armies and whose outbursts of strategy have landed us time and again, not only in this war but in many a past one, in positions where, out-numbered and hampered, we have only saved our skins by what are now known as "brilliant strategical retreats."

There is no military virtue in being out-numbered, far from it; for a general to allow himself to be so, for a government to place a general in such an unenviable position, is, without exception, the greatest of military blunders, the greatest because it is the most stupid. Again and again we read and have read, and shall continue to read as long as the principles of war are neglected: "After sustaining violent attacks delivered by the enemy in *overwhelming numbers*, the . . . Division succeeded in retiring to a strong position." or, "The Division is reported to have fought well against very heavy odds, and it was largely due to the gallantry of the troops that the withdrawal was successfully accomplished." Imagine what this gallantry would have meant had these odds been reversed or even equal.

The man in the street breathes freely; it was not the fault of his general, or of his army, or of the Cabinet, or Government which he had helped to elect; no, it was all the fault of that malicious enemy, who, unchivalrously, taking advantage of our weakness, had massed two men against our one.

To the man in the street, to our Downing Street strategist, and, the pity of it, to some of our soldiers as well, "overwhelming numbers" acts like some Circean spell. Little do they realize that, as the charms of Circe turned men into swine, ignorance of the principles of war turns men into reckless gamblers, who, blinking through the twilight of events, risk heavy losses by imagining that in battle there is something heroic in being out-numbered—a sporting chance; and then ultimately delude themselves into believing that it is the right, the privilege of the British Army to strive valiantly against the heaviest odds in order to make good their blunders in strategy.

Heavy odds have sometimes to be accepted, but they are never willingly sought, not even in single combat, for such an act is to abrogate reason, to insult valour, and to invert the will to live, the instinct of self-preservation. There may be something puerilely heroic in a little schoolboy fighting a big schoolboy when forced to do so by still bigger boys—seldom is he given a choice—but a time comes when we should put away boyish things, and in war a time comes when we must if we desire victory. Do not let my opponents castigate me with the blather that Waterloo was won on the playfields of Eton, for the fact remains geographically, historically and tactically, whether the Great Duke uttered such undiluted nonsense or not, that it was won on fields in Belgium by carrying out a fundamental principle of war, the principle of mass; in other words, by marching on to those fields three Englishmen, Germans and Belgians to every two

Frenchmen. Incidentally, Moore's School at Shorncliffe, and not King Henry the VIth's at Eton, aided, indirectly though it may be, yet materially, in the gaining of the victory.

THE PRINCIPLES AND THE CONDITIONS WHICH GOVERN THEM.

The prevailing ignorance on this subject having been touched upon, I will now turn to the principles themselves, which with ease may be written down on one side of a postage stamp; and if consulted before any plan is decided on, or any order is issued, will, like some magical talisman, assure if not unlimited success, at least something very far from a continuity of strategical retirements brought about by overwhelming opposition.

These fundamental principles are:—

1. The principle of the objective.
2. The principle of the offensive.
3. The principle of mass.
4. The principle of economy of force.
5. The principle of movement.
6. The principle of surprise.
7. The principle of security.
8. The principle of co-operation.

In themselves these principles are inanimate formulæ, and to vivify them the following conditions, which govern their application, must always be carefully considered:—

1. The condition of time.
2. The condition of space.
3. The condition of ground.
4. The condition of weather.
5. The condition of numbers.
6. The condition of moral.
7. The condition of communication.
8. The condition of supply.
9. The condition of armament.

Now that we have arrived so far, all that remains to be done is to take the above eight principles, the above nine conditions and show, that not only is "the correct application of principles to circumstances the outcome of sound military knowledge, built up by study and practice," as the "Field Service Regulations" so truly state, but also the logical outcome of a series of equations, between principles and conditions, which have nothing to do with instinct, but which require a little reason, a little common-sense, a little imagination, a little judgment, a little determination: in fact, the ordinary qualities which are to be found in any moderately good soldier.

To begin with, I would impress upon the reader that no one of the above eight principles, which I believe to be the leading ones in the science of war, is of more essential value than the others; that no plan of action can be considered perfect unless all are in harmony; that none can be considered in a state of harmony unless weighed

against the conditions which govern their application, affecting them beneficially or adversely. Seldom can a perfect plan be arrived at, because the fog of war seldom, if ever, rises, but it is an undoubted fact, and all history stands at my elbow to prove it, that the general who trusts in the principles of war, and trusts in them all the more strongly as the fog of war thickens, stands a better chance of winning than the general who does not. Further, that if this general can add to a logical application of these principles that flash of imagination, that vivid second sight, which pierces the obscurest situations, he will prove himself a genius, and will ultimately be placed amongst the great captains of the world's history. Though, however, imagination cannot be rapidly cultivated, the principles of war can be adhered to as are the principles in all the sciences by even the most indifferent of workers.

If the principles of chemistry are maintained, if the principles of physics are maintained, if those of legislation, finance, navigation, engineering, and even of ordinary every-day business are maintained, all of which sciences are set in more or less constant surroundings, surely is it not necessary for us, in the science of war, when the surroundings are unstable, to hold fast to the sheet anchor of principle rather than to be tossed about in a tornado of doubt lit here and there by the lightnings of supposition?

Taking, now, the principles in turn, I will attempt briefly to explain them. I do not intend accentuating them by chapter and verse from the history of war, though examples, which would support my assertions, will at once spring to the mind of anyone moderately versed in the campaigns of the world's great generals. Instead, I will occasionally refer to passing events, in spite of the mists which at present enshroud them. Possessing no secrets and avoiding back-stair gossip, I must be excused if my intimacy with the intricacies of our now numerous campaigns is not of a press censor's intensity. Broadly speaking, I take it, our main purpose in this present war is that of self-preservation, and consequently the destruction of the military power of Germany which threatens it. Incidentally it may be to prove the right of small nations to live under their own laws, the right of Ulster to object to Home Rule or of the Irish Nationalists to object to English control, for these and such like to the politicians.

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE OBJECTIVE.

The principle of the objective has already intruded itself upon us: our objective being the destruction of the military strength of the Central European Powers, and not expeditions against Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Bulgars, and other unmentionable barbarians. Destroy Germany and the rest is destroyed in her destruction. This, at any rate, is a simple if a difficult objective.

We may think out this problem as we will, but the fact remains, that if we carry fire and sword round and round the globe for a century, the war will not be won unless German military power is destroyed. "There are many good generals in Europe," once said Napoleon,

"but they see too many things at once. I see the enemy's main force and I destroy it." The enemy's main force is our objective if the conditions render this main force attackable. Here we get a duality—the enemy and ourselves—in other words, action and reaction, and with these all the seventeen principles and conditions above enumerated at once manifest and form.

Our objective, therefore, is that force of the enemy's troops the existence of which is essential to his self-preservation as a nation. The enemy is at A, we are at B, does the line joining these two points give us our direction? Yes and no. Yes, if the seven remaining principles are not adversely affected by our moving in this direction, and if the nine conditions permit us doing so: no, if otherwise. We, however, cannot discard this direction off-hand, even if we find that some of the principles are difficult to apply: but what we can do is to test each possible line of advance until we arrive at the line of least resistance, bearing in mind that the principle of the objective aims at the destruction of the enemy's main army.

Now, if the enemy is not at A, a point or area, but is instead stretched along a frontier of some four or five hundred miles in extent, with one flank on the sea and the other on a neutral or friendly state, as the German army is at present, the solution of our problem becomes an exceedingly difficult one, and as difficulties increase so should we the more carefully apply our principle.

Our plan of action should aim at the following:

To advance against the enemy's main force (objective), with the intention of destroying it (offensive), with the greatest numbers possible (mass and economy of force), with the least friction (co-operation), and in the shortest possible time (movement), so that we may take him unawares (surprise), without undue risks to ourselves (security).

Let us consider the above, supposing that the enemy is marching towards us with two or three million men on a frontage of several hundred miles.

The principle of the objective lays down that we have got to destroy the enemy's main force. Which, then, is his main force? This is our first difficulty. A hundred years ago the main force was centred on a main base, which was connected to the projected theatre of war by a few main roads. Though, as now, this base could be changed, the roads could not: for even the good roads were bad and the indifferent practically impassable to large bodies of troops followed by heavy transport. Where the problem was once simple it has now become complex, for not only are most of the country roads, as well as the main high roads, in Western Europe in good repair, but the enormous network of rail and water-ways, as well as the general introduction of mechanical transport, render an army independent of any one base. Yet it must be remembered that the larger an army becomes the more vital do its communications grow. Further, that the enormous armies of the present day, from their initial deployment, cover the whole of their communications, consequently these are most difficult to attack or to threaten.

The direction of the objective, that line of least resistance to ourselves and of greatest friction to the enemy, cannot now be gauged by merely seeking out the enemy's main force and engaging it to its greatest disadvantage. The enemy's main army is, so to speak, everywhere, forming a gigantic phalanx, with a frontage of several hundred miles. Our objective therefore can only be discovered after a minute and careful appreciation of the conditions which govern the application of its principle. I will now turn to these.

THE CONDITIONS.

First of all there is the condition of space, which carries with it that of position. The enemy is along the line A—B: our object is to destroy him: how can we best do this? Either by defeating him directly, that is in open battle, or by disorganizing him so that his army is converted into a mob. The first method is brought about by attacking him, the second by manœuvring him into an impossible position, such as is generally brought about by threatening his lines of supply or by cutting off his means of subsistence. In modern warfare the second is a doubly certain method of destroying him if it can be accomplished. The "if," however, is considerable, for, as I have already shown, a modern army covers its front much more thoroughly than an army did before the period of National Service. To surround a nation and to starve it out by means of a hedge of bayonets, in other words to lay siege to it, is so tremendous an undertaking, so costly, that well may any nation discard it, if, being superior in numbers to the besieged, a direct attack is rendered possible.

A direct attack may be made in two main ways: by engaging a flank and rolling up the front, or by penetrating the front and rolling up one or both of the flanks thus created. The second method is more effective than the first, because, whilst the first rolls up an army on itself, that is on its own reserve, the second rolls up part of an army away from the remaining part, and so enables a preponderating mass of men to be thrown against each part in turn.

The first method is a difficult one when the flanks of an enemy's forces rest on impassable barriers, such as do those of the German armies in the west. It was to overcome a similar difficulty that the Germans invaded Belgium, for by doing so they turned the French left flank. The second one is simpler and surer, if numbers and armament allow of its execution, but an extremely dangerous one to attempt if the enemy has unlimited ground to fall back in and consequently room to bend without breaking, as the Russians had in the summer of 1915.

Whichever of these grand tactical methods is attempted, the first two ruling conditions are time and space, which in their turn depend on ground, weather, communications, and supply. It is no good attempting a move if time is insufficient, any more than it is if space is. In 1915, in Gallipoli, time was against us, for by the time we had bombarded the coast fortresses of Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale and had landed our force, the Turks had concentrated in sufficient numbers

to pin us down to within a few miles of the beach. Space was also against us, for we had no room to manoeuvre in, and manoeuvre is essential to a force which seeks to advance rapidly. The Salonika landing is essentially similar, though outwardly very different. Time again depends on ground and weather, and space, more often than not, on supply and communications. In the winter of 1914-1915 the Germans had checked the Russians in the east, and on the northern part of their western front the British were extended, like a thick band of taut elastic, to breaking point, with no reserves, and with their base to the flank of their probable line of retreat. These months were some of the wettest on record: the British line was waist deep in mud: the conditions were truly appalling: yet it was the mud of Flanders which saved this thin line from annihilation in spite of its swearing. Had Flanders been a dry, open plain in place of a swamp, it is not too great a supposition that the war would have been over by the summer of 1915. In the winter of 1914-1915 time and space, as well as numbers, armament, and supply, all favoured a German victory in Flanders, but the Germans could not advance, they could not bring into operation the principle of movement, because of the rain and the mud; any offensive in this direction was all but bound to failure.

Consider, now, supply and communications; these two conditions affect the sorting out of the true objective from the numerous seemingly easy ones which beguile the soldier from the line of least resistance. Thus, it is no use launching an offensive against some chosen objective if supply is rendered impossible, either on account of our transport being unsuited to the theatre of war, or on account of want of railway communications, or on account of an insufficiency of ammunition to render the attack operative, as the present war has proved time and again. In our Mesopotamian campaign the difficulty of supplying a larger force than the one which won the battle of Ctesiphon was probably the main cause of our retirement to Kut-el-Amara. The difficulty of communications in the Balkans and through the Rhodope mountains, and the unsuitability of our transport to the communications which exist, or do not exist, rendered a rapid campaign in this direction impossible.

The remaining conditions, numbers, moral, and armament, are self-evident in their effect. It is seldom wise to challenge an enemy with half his numbers, or to carry out an operation with an insufficient reserve, neither is it wise to pit untrained troops against trained, or unsalted against salted. In this respect the greatest mistake of all is to keep back our least experienced troops as our reserve, supposing that the termination of a battle is an easier operation than its commencement. Though, admittedly, circumstances were exceptionally difficult, yet the fact remains that at Loos we threw in our least experienced troops last and failed. I imagine that, in spite of the numerous unknown difficulties of this battle, the Duke of Wellington showed greater generalship at Waterloo when he placed his least experienced soldiers—the Belgians—in the front line, in spite of the fact that at Loos we attacked, whilst at Waterloo we stood on the defensive until the Prussians came up. His selection should not be forgotten. If

there is one fact which military history accentuates it is this: that the *coup de marteau*, the culminating blow of the battle, must be delivered by veteran troops, a corps d'élite, the men of which, having passed through the rough school of the line—trenches, skirmishes, outposts, fatigues, and bivouacs, are relegated to the reserve for decisive operations. Such a corps should wear a distinctive uniform, and should be looked upon as the Old Guard of the army. At the present moment we have not such a corps, except, perhaps, for the Guards' Division. What I cannot help feeling we require is, a reserve of *at least* a quarter of a million veterans, perfectly trained in field warfare, which, when once the front of the German line is pierced, will pass through the gap, and, because of the perfection of its training, will render reorganization on the part of the enemy practically impossible.

As to the last of our conditions—armament, the whole of this war furnishes examples of its importance, the uselessness of any objective without the proper weapons and without a sufficiency of ammunition. The old order is again upon us—corps and army artillery reserves, mortars, catapults, grenades, helmets, shields, daggers, and bludgeons come into daily use, reviving memories of the past and pointing to the value of studying mediæval and even ancient warfare.

From the above I think it will be seen that there are considerable difficulties in selecting the best objective, and once selected, still greater ones in changing it should conditions have been misjudged.

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE OFFENSIVE.

The next of the principles on our list is the offensive. Will the objective we have selected enable us to apply this principle? if not, then our objective must be discarded, for the offensive is essential to war. It, however, must not be forgotten that the offensive does not necessarily mean a period of continuous attack. At the beginning of this present war the Germans were enabled to assume the offensive, that is, they seized the initiative before the French, which simply means that they forced the French to do something they did not wish to do—namely, to fall back. The initiative, once lost at Mons and in the Ardennes, was regained on the Marne, on account of the Germans abusing the principle of movement by too rapid an advance, which prevented them carrying out the principles of mass and security. This initiative was again lost by us after the battle of the Aisne, on account of our inferiority in numbers, and because of bad weather and an insufficiency of armament. Once lost and the time of the year rendering an early renewal of it unlikely, it would have been folly to have violated the principle of security until numbers enabled the Allies to put into force the principle of mass. Now, at the beginning of 1916, the paramount influence of this principle is on the wane. The offensive is looming large behind it, and when numbers, armament, supplies and weather render the principles of mass, movement, and the offensive practicable, security, in the form of trench warfare, will be forced into the background.

Just as the principle of the objective depended on our nine factors, conditions or circumstances, so also does the principle of the offensive,

for an offensive cannot be carried out successfully unless these are in its favour.

THE PRINCIPLE OF MASS.

Given sufficient numbers, almost all things are possible: but seldom is an army in such preponderating strength that it can squander its numbers to make good its deficiency in skill and its neglect of the principles of war—for, as Virgil says, “it troubleth not the wolf how many the sheep be”—numbers are not everything.

In 1914 Germany, being for the time superior in men, arms, and munitions, could have won the war had she methodically put in practice the principle of mass. She had gauged the situation rightly—by making France, the first of her adversaries able to mobilize, her objective: she could crush her by advancing through Belgium: England for a year could not intervene to any great extent: Russia, the last able to mobilize, could be dealt with later. Belgium was not worth her consideration, for being a small nation she had no right to exist; as for the rest of the world it must be German by predilection, as it was not German by birth—such was Teutonic fatuity.

She assumed the offensive, and, according to her elastic conception of honour, justifiably swept through Belgium: nevertheless she violated the principle of mass by not advancing a little more slowly and so bringing along with her another four or five corps. Her advance through Belgium was a surprise to the French, not because they did not expect it, but because they could not meet it. She herself was surprised by the rapidity of the Russian mobilization, and whilst feverishly pushing her troops on through France she nervously glanced over her shoulder at the approaching Russian hosts. She was seeing too many things at once. Had she, instead of doing what she did do, harmonized mass and movement, whilst putting into action the principles of security and economy of force on her eastern front, that is, had she fought a delaying action against the Russians with the intention of gradually falling back to the fortified line of the Vistula, long before the Russians could have crossed this line, which is immensely strong, she could have dealt a decisive blow against France. Instead, she assumed a strong offensive in the east, in spite of the fact that the principle of the objective required every man she could spare in the west. The Russian advance on Allenstein, whilst she was surprising another, surprised her; it confused her; she met it in mass and won the great battle of Tannenberg: thus by destroying Samsonoff's army, did Germany save Europe from German domination.

THE PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMY OF FORCE.

The correct distribution of mass is known as economy of force, a principle of particularly difficult application by an unmilitary nation like our own, which sees so many things at once. Its first great violation in this war was, curiously enough, as we have just seen, not perpetrated by ourselves, but by the Germans, the most military race the world has ever seen: who, by neglecting to use it as the

balancing principle between the principles of mass and security, won a battle and lost a campaign. We ourselves, at home, soon followed suit, and our War Office having set the ball rolling by landing the Expeditionary Force in France, our Admiralty, our Foreign, our Colonial and our India Offices, apparently not to be left in the cold, either engaged in, or demanded, minor operations all over the globe, until at length we found ourselves fighting some ten or twelve distinct campaigns, two of which, the Gallipoli and Mesopotamian expeditions, have absorbed hundreds of thousands of men. Had we held fast to the principles of war such a squandering of power would have been impossible. Rightly our objective was in France, for here was the German main army. Here the war began, and here, unless I am much mistaken, will the decisive blow be struck. To conduct great campaigns elsewhere is pure folly, unless by doing so we can force the Germans and Austrians to support the Turks with more men than we are sending against them. We cannot play fast and loose with the principles of war, and by doing so we have already reaped the punishment we deserved. If we had stuck to the principles of the objective (France), and had left unviolated the principles of mass and economy of force (Gallipoli and Mesopotamia), we should not have failed as badly as we did in 1915. Three hundred thousand more soldiers in Northern France would have turned the battle of Loos into a decisive victory. South, the French would have advanced east of Arras, and further south still they would have advanced north of Champagne. Ultimately, it is not too impossible to suppose that at the close of 1915 we should have been wintering in lines about Brussels, or even Liège, with Germany in panic. As it was the autumn offensive petered out and the Germans seized the opportunity, offered by approaching winter, to invade Serbia, and we to dance again to her pipe by landing a force at Salonika, where for months, as there was no possibility of it assuming the offensive, we have further weakened our numbers at the decisive point. Serbia could have been saved, but only by a victory in Northern France; after October, 1915, the Flanders mud forbade it: as it is she is destroyed, and we are engaged in yet another campaign to reconstruct her, forgetting that our objective is not the reconstruction of any state but the destruction of the German Empire.

Sea power and command of the sea are colossal assets, yet sea power is also a great seducer from the principles of war. In the early days of the Napoleonic wars we sent troops to Ferrol, Copenhagen, and even to Monte Video; to-day we are repeating this doubtful strategy by our Levantine and other exploits.

THE PRINCIPLE OF MOVEMENT.

Turning, now, to our next great principle, movement, let us see what this really entails, for the word is somewhat vague, if not misleading.

Movement does not necessarily mean continued motion or rapidity. Its aim is rather flexibility with the ultimate object of pushing forward, consequently it may be kinetic as well as dynamic. Being one of

several principles it must work in unison with the remainder. It is very easy to abuse, either by an excess or a deficiency in its application. Of all the principles it is perhaps the most difficult to judge, estimate, or control, for it is most sensitive to the ruling conditions of the moment. A storm of rain, a fog, a cloud of dust, a demolished bridge, a defective telephone, a lame horse, a punctured tyre, a badly-written message, a submarine in the Channel, a delayed supply column, or a bent railway line, all these, and many other unforeseen events, may bring the most brilliant manœuvre to an unfortunate termination. The initial movement of the Germans through Belgium was magnificent, but too rapid, it threw the German right wing in the air, it left it, as it spent itself, in insufficient strength to meet the conjoint attacks of the French and British. The British retreat was an equally magnificent performance and a more successful one, considering its numerical inferiority, for, though it was carried out at almost racing speed, it left the army undemoralized, and, in the early days of September, 1914, still in a position to turn and attack. Again, the Russian advance into East Prussia was a notable feat of arms. The German advances on the Bzura, during the winter of 1914-1915, were a mistake, for the "fifth element" ruled all decisive movement out of action. Their advance in the spring of 1915 was a brilliantly executed manœuvre. They imagined that mass, backed by rapidity, would destroy the military power of Russia: similarly we thought that Paardeberg would destroy the Boer will to continue the war: yet in February, 1900, the South African War was only beginning. The Germans, fortunately for us, had failed to learn the one outstanding lesson of the years 1899-1902, namely, that a determined people, backed by an unlimited country to manœuvre and retire in, cannot be beaten in a few weeks by mere drill-square tactics—for the destruction of such a nation takes years. The year 1812 was the forerunner of Napoleon's destruction: the year 1915 will probably have so exhausted Germany's resources that her downfall will date from her crossing the Vistula at Warsaw. In the autumn of 1915 Germany made another brilliant advance, this time through Serbia, with the apparent intention of ultimately invading Egypt. Her advance met with little obstruction, her overthrow of Serbia was complete, nevertheless, no decisive advantage has been gained, because the conquest of Serbia had little or no reference to the principle of her objective, namely, the destruction of the French and British armies in the west. If carried to its ultimate issue the threat against Egypt can but cause the Allies to further disintegrate their forces and so prolong the war; it cannot win it, for decision does not lie in Egypt. If it be attempted it should fill us with the greatest encouragement, for a nation to be reduced to such an avowal of impotence as to be forced to abandon her true objective in order to replace it by speculative hopes of indiscretion on the part of her antagonists, is to declare herself tactically bankrupt.

Again, to destroy Russia does not necessarily terminate the war, and the destruction of Serbia has in no way brought this end in sight: but to destroy France or England, or both together, does terminate it decisively. Without France the position of England is desperate,

without England the positions of France and Russia are hopeless, for in spite of their millions of men, once withdraw British supply and British gold, and above all the strangling grip of the British Navy, and their power disintegrates like a castle of sand before a rising tide. It is for this reason that England is Germany's most deadly foe, it is for this reason that she hates us and has bruised herself black and blue in the attempt to reach Calais, the seizure of which she imagines will frighten us into defeat.

Germany has brutally debauched the principle of movement, not for want of organization or motor force, but because of her applying movement to unprofitable ends. Should she now attempt an invasion of Egypt with the hope of making us caper yet once again to her piping, she in the act will be dancing to her own funeral march. Three hundred thousand Turks may, or may not, be able to conquer Egypt, but three hundred thousand Turks in Flanders would give her a far better chance of winning this war, for the temporary occupation of Egypt does not mean the ruin of the British Empire any more than the temporary occupation of Poland means ruin to Russia. To supply these Turks she must denude herself of resources, in six months from now these resources will be strained to breaking point.

We, here in France, have scarcely moved a yard in a whole year, nevertheless we have maintained the principle of movement, paradoxically, through its non-application: because, for the time being, General Joffre has realised that the principle of security is paramount.

A man does not run a race of five miles at the same speed that he does one of a hundred yards, neither does he usually win a race by running away from the winning post. If Paris, or London, or Calais, or Bordeaux is Germany's goal, then Cairo is not, then Salonika is not, then Constantinople, Delhi, Moscow, Petrograd, or Vladivostock are not, this is self-evident. We have made the same mistakes as Germany, but we have not as yet made them on so colossal a scale, in this is our hope, in this will probably be our victory.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SECURITY.

Bracketed with movement is security, for without security movement is simple suicide, and conversely, without movement security is to succumb to inanition.

In the old days of long sieges, the besieging force, on driving its enemy into a fortress, sat down before it and dug two lines of circumvallation, one to prevent the enemy from coming out, the other to prevent a relieving force from getting in. To-day we are fighting under somewhat similar circumstances. Our trench line prevents a sortie, our command of the sea a relief. But, as in the old days, a siege could be carried out either by assault or starvation, usually by both conjointly, so can, and is, the siege of the German Empire being carried out to-day. As in former days, more sieges were lost through attempting to starve out the garrison than by assaulting his works, so to-day we run considerable risks if we attempt the former alternative. The longer the siege the more chances do we give the enemy: the shorter, the more do we give ourselves. It therefore behoves us not

to be seduced by an exaggerated sense of our own security. "If you cannot make a man your friend, kill him," said Ghengis Khan, and the more rapidly this is done the more satisfactory will be the result.

To attempt a siege of the entire Central European Empires on a line running from Calais to Basle, Basle to Trieste, Trieste to Salonika, Salonika to Tarnopol, Tarnopol to Riga, and Riga to Calais, is, I fancy, too Cyclopean a siege for even this century of giants—a stupendous dream, but one really due to the indigestion of badly masticated principles of war than to reason and fact.

Security is a shield and not a lethal weapon, and if we look upon it in this light we shall win through with our sword. To abandon our security before we are ready would be to commence the war over again with every prospect of failure. To march on Germany, as we recently marched on Bagdad, would only mean to retire and embark at Havre.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SURPRISE.

Insecurity, or a false interpretation of the principle of security, leads directly to surprise, the principle of which, like a double-edged weapon, is an exceedingly dangerous one in unskilled hands. This principle being mainly a psychological one, is not so intimately affected by the material conditions which more closely affect the others, in fact, it has a power of adapting itself to its surroundings. Thus, though bad roads will hinder the movement of a great mass of men, they will, through having lulled the enemy into a false sense of security, often facilitate the approach of small ones. In 1759 Wolfe surprised Quebec by scaling a precipice. Gibraltar was surprised in a very similar manner. Smallness of numbers, in this and such-like enterprises, is, more often than not, a security in itself. From small enterprises let us turn to greater ones. A man or a nation will often see a thing coming and yet be surprised when it comes. For years we had watched Germany's preparation for war, for years our greatest soldier, backed by the expert opinion of three-quarters of the nation, preached the inevitable result of this preparation: nevertheless the nation was so unparallegedly surprised that it will take us nearly two years before we are on a fightable footing with our chief antagonist.

Ignorance and stupidity are the dam and sire of surprise, and *laissez-aller* its most careful tutor. Ignorance by our Government of our own requirements, of our most likely opponents' aspirations, of the value of modern arms, and of the principles of war, placed us at the beginning of this war in a perilous position. As to arms, two outstanding facts stared us in the face: yet eighteen months ago we were apparently blind to their existence. These facts were: the enormous supply of ammunition quick-firing artillery would require, and the enormous value of the light machine gun as an engine of war. Military history relates one fact right through its course as regards missile throwing weapons, namely, that the weapon which throws with accuracy the greatest number of projectiles a minute is the weapon which will eventually replace the slower missile throwing weapons of the day. As the breech-loader supplanted the muzzle-loader, and as

the magazine rifle supplanted the single-loader, so will the machine gun and automatic rifle eventually supplant the magazine rifle, and as long as the magazine rifle is not supplanted, the machine gun will remain the weapon of surprise. At the commencement of this war we had twenty-four machine guns to a Division, it will be interesting to note the increase on this number on its conclusion. The essence of surprising is preparation and opportunity. For years Germany had prepared; for years England had trusted to *laissez-aller*; for years French aspirations were rather political than military; Russia was in the process of a reformation, the opportunity was at hand, and the German avalanche was launched only to be shattered by the greatest surprise this war has as yet produced—the awakening of the national instinct of self-preservation in the attacked. In all her preparations, in all her carefully thought-out plans, Germany, on account of her dense materialism, her arrogance, her self-sufficiency, her want in the senses of humour and humanity, had failed to see that, in spite of all their differences with her, the instinct of national self-preservation was strong in the blood of her foes, in fact, stronger than in her own, in spite of all her bluster. She had arrayed her phalanxes, equipped them as an army has never been equipped before, trained them as no army has been trained since the days of Moore, had inculcated in the hearts of her people that the Teutonic race was the chosen race of God, and that all means towards its aggrandisement, at the expense of others, was just and righteous; that rape, murder, torture, arson and pillage were the rights and privileges of her soldiers towards the accomplishment of this end. On these she calculated that by springing at the throat of Belgium, like some infernal succubus of the pit, this little nation would stand stark and numbed with fear. Liège was the first bolt fired at her shoddy materialism. Prussian Kultur stood aghast. It, however, was but a momentary surprise, then through the flames of Louvain she swept on, her barbarity would hypnotize France into surrender. The Marne was a ruder shock than Liège, for Prussian Kultur had to renounce the orgy of the sack of Paris. The slow but sure awakening of England from the hundred years' enchantment of her security and the dogged determination of Russia were the rudest shocks of all, for now before her stood the instinct of national self-preservation determined to die fighting rather than to yield. German philosophy had not only been at fault, it had been inverted; forty years of self-adulation and contempt for others had turned reason upside down. This inversion, if we only stand united, will prove Germany's self-inflicted blow through the brain.

In tactics, anything unexpected will surprise a foe. Germany has been clever enough in this respect, for, realizing that war entails different doctrines to those of prize-fighting and cricket, she has not stultified her opportunities by the sporting horror of unfairness, for the last thing the German can be accused of is chivalry—this is historical from Tacitus downwards. She has surprised us with her heavy guns, her flammenwerfer and her gas inundations, and she will no doubt continue to surprise and trick us, but with waning success. We, in our turn, have copied her, but copies will seldom surprise the original

inventor; what we require is originality and creative effort. We surprised Germany at Neuve Chapelle by our concentrated artillery fire, possibly on some other occasion we shall surprise her without it, when she is most expecting it. There are ways and means to the cunning, and the simplest and most obvious are generally the best.

In war, surprise is essential to all the principles, and it is the least governed by passing events, for its inherent virtue is its knack of turning all conditions, however adverse, to its own advantage. If skilfully applied, it, therefore, becomes the canceller of conditions, producing the maximum amount of fear and disorganization with the minimum of effort.

A nation or an army, once it is surprised, loses its balance, its sense of unity and co-operation; each individual becomes seized with an intangible fear, its military power crumbles and disintegrates, and unless some master step in and force a halt, at length this nation or army becomes a mob. The preventative of surprise is security; we have already discussed this principle; also co-operation, which brings us to the last principle on our list.

THE PRINCIPLE OF CO-OPERATION.

Co-operation is a cementing principle which holds all the others together, it is closely related to economy of force, and, therefore, to mass, but it differs from both of these, for whilst mass is the concentrated strength of the organism, and economy of force the dispersed strength which renders the former stable, co-operation, so to speak, is the muscular tension which knits all the parts into one whole, and without co-operation an army falls to pieces. In national wars such as the present, the value of co-operation is enormously enhanced, embracing, as it now does, the whole body and soul of the nation—social, political, commercial and military—in one intricate self-supporting organism. All must now pull together, for present-day wars are the wars of entire nations and not of fractions of nations represented by their armies. We, therefore, find that for us co-operation in war embraces the whole gamut of Imperial existence, which means that one master-hand must control the whole national machinery, so as to reduce the friction which its adjustment by many hands would create. Friction is the antithesis of smooth running, and smooth running is the thesis of success, consequently co-operation in war is essential. Take, for instance, the Government of a nation at war; if there is friction in the Government, there is friction not only throughout the army, but throughout the nation. We cannot serve God and Mammon, we cannot serve two or half a dozen masters, neither can two or half a dozen masters lead and direct us. In the field it is better to have one bad general than two good ones, for duality is the father of friction. If in a Cabinet of, let us suppose, six members, each controlling a great national department, each member strives to conduct the war according to his own particular degree of ignorance in strategy, instead of one objective there are six objectives, consequently no definite objective at all; for the army and the nation are

either distracted by six separate campaigns, or six phases of one campaign. When such a state of affairs arises it is time to declare a dictatorship, and to hand over the national welfare to one man, for dispersion of force in war is to commit suicide whilst temporarily insane. There can be but one main objective, and all subsidiary ones must be reduced to their utmost limit, so as to enable every attainable man, horse and gun being massed at the decisive point. There is no other means of winning a war, and until this is realized this war will not be won. A master-mind must control and all other minds loyally accept his ruling. The nation must understand this, and if it does not, then it is for the master-mind to compel understanding. Strikes, greed for gold, back-biting, and the paying-off of old party scores must cease if we would win. Should we be sufficiently foolish to recommence our social vendettas after the war, well and good, but to-day we are all "Englishmen," and cost what it may, this one word must suffice. "There is your enemy," once said a famous general, pointing with his sword to the serried ranks across the plain, "if you do not kill him he will damned well kill you." Our position with Germany is identical, all we require is the master-mind who will compel authority and will mass force in place of dispersing it.

In a purely military sense co-operation means skill, confidence, discipline, and determination; it means that all will work for the army and not for themselves; that all will work for an order and not for their own ideas; that all will obey and cease improvising means and methods of their own. Co-operation in its widest sense spells military efficiency, national efficiency, imperial efficiency, which, centred on one objective, impels all the life and fighting strength of the nation towards victory. Unfortunately at present we do not possess this co-operation, though we are progressing at such a pace from the chaos of 1914 to bid well gaining it before long.

THE PRINCIPLES COMBINED.

What we require now is to settle our main objective and abide by it; when once this is done, knowing what we want we shall be able to calculate our requirements and plan accordingly. Until this is settled once and for good, all our efforts, all the Empire's striving, all the planning of her generals, and all the courage and determination of her soldiers and sailors, lose direction and evaporate in strategical retreats. Once our objective is settled our strategy is also settled, and until our strategy is settled there can be no settlement of our tactics either.

Our objective definitely laid down, we next turn to the great tactical principle of the offensive. We must weigh the conditions which aid and which hinder it; we have all history behind us to consult, and the lessons of the present war to consider. We weigh all these and from our study extract facts, and from these facts we build our theory, ever guided by our six remaining principles and the conditions which govern their application.

In the offensive mass is our first consideration; overwhelming masses of men, weapons and ammunition at the point chosen for the decision to take place. Thus, primarily, is the offensive enabled to attain its objective. Next we see that no subsidiary operation is sapping strength from the main one, that all are aiding it, even in the most distant regions; in other words, that our economy of force is balanced, that all its efforts are concentrated towards the one objective. Then at the given moment we set the whole machine in motion, wheel moving wheel, and cog biting cog in unhesitating co-operation in order to move the mass and its co-relative parts with the utmost rapidity towards our goal.

Rapidity is the surest means of surprise, that is the taking of our antagonist unawares, of throwing him off his guard, and so reducing him to reorganize his forces in place of attacking us.

The offensive, mass, economy of force, co-operation, rapidity of movement, and secrecy of attack, all carry with them their own security, just as a man will parry a blow with his sword more often than with his shield. Nevertheless, the shield can seldom be laid aside, and each of our movements and halts must be so planned as to reduce the likelihood of surprise to a minimum, and yet so to place us that we can best surprise our adversary.

Ultimately the entire co-operation of the whole Empire and of the Kingdoms, Empires and Republics of the Allies is needed in order to bring this war to a successful issue; and not only the co-operation of those who fight, but those who work, of those who are wealthy and those who are poor, of men and of women, and even of children and cripples, for all can do something in this titanic struggle to end it victoriously. Those who do nothing, or worse, obstruct those who are at work, are not only traitors to themselves, traitors to their country, but traitors to the life instinct of our race, the right to live and to enjoy the lives which are ours: parasites they are, and like vermin should they be exterminated.

PART II.—TACTICAL PRINCIPLES.

THE THREE PRINCIPLES.

In the mind of the civilian, and for aught that, of a considerable number of soldiers as well, there is something vague and mysterious about the words "strategy" and "tactics," and in this there is nothing to be surprised at, considering the manner in which they have been abused during the present war. To the uninformed they usually denote a variety of ill-defined states of action, the strategical appertaining more commonly to politicians, the tactical to soldiers, excluding generals and their staffs. I have recently heard an officer define these two words as follows: "Strategy is the science of war as practised in peace time." "Tactics the art of war which has ceased to be practicable at all."

All these misunderstandings, I believe, are due, not only to a faulty use of words, but to the cabalistic definitions studiously inculcated by army crammers and such-like illuminati.

I will not attempt a definition of either; instead, I prefer to bracket against each a certain number of principles. I have already done this for strategy, and I will now do it for tactics as well; but, first let it be remembered that these two words do not represent two distinct categories of events, but one, one only, which progresses from a plan of action to an accomplished fact.

This being so, it would seem that, as strategy and tactics are inseparable, their principles must be identical. This, of course, is the case, for the eight strategical principles I have already enumerated are just as much a part of tactics as of strategy itself. Yet there is a difference, and it is this: that whilst strategy deals more closely with men physically and with their arrangement for battle, tactics deals more closely with men psychologically and their arrangement in battle; consequently it tends more towards the government of men's arms than their legs, their nerves than their muscles, their weapons than their manœuvres. We, therefore, find that, besides the strategical principles, there are certain further principles which in their nature are more tactical than strategical. These principles are:—

1. The principle of demoralization.
2. The principle of endurance.¹
3. The principle of shock.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF TACTICS.

The first of these principles springs directly from the nature of the first of the two weapons of war, the missile-throwing weapon; the third from that of the second, the thrusting or cutting weapon; the second from that of the employer of these two weapons, the man himself, who, making use of them to break down the endurance of his antagonist wears away his own endurance in the act.

The whole of the art of war, in contra-distinction to the science of war, is centred round these three principles. There are no other weapons save those of missile and shock,² whether they be arrow and spear, musket and pike, or rifle and bayonet. As regards cannon, cannon are only gigantic rifles.

The above principles hold good for all these, and at present there is no conceivable possibility of their not doing so. Weapons change but principles remain. The conditions which govern their application change, and change radically, as science progresses and new inventions are brought to light, blurring our vision and causing us to see things askew. Thus the present war is by no means a new type of war, a war of its own, without relation to other wars, for it is a direct descendant of the last war, and the last war of the war preceding it.

¹ The principle of endurance springs directly from the instinct of self-preservation, the ruling instinct in life. Endurance is the cultivated power man possesses to combat fear and fatigue, and keep them under the control of his will.

² There are, however, certain destructive agents which do not directly fall under either of these headings, such as gas, flaming liquid, mines and inundations. Indirectly they may be placed under "Missiles."

the parent stock being the weapons—missile and shock. It is neither field war nor siege war, but trench war. It is very unlike the Balkan War of 1912-1913, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the Great Boer War of 1899-1902; and yet it is the direct descendant of all these three wars and many others. The difference which exists between it and them is entirely due to the conditions under which these wars were fought and the arms with which they were fought.

GRAND TACTICS.

To-day we find enormous forces, whole nations in arms, fighting on restricted frontiers, and the result is the tactics of the continuous line, as it always has been when it was possible to secure the flanks of an army on impassable barriers. At Marathon (B.C. 490) Miltiades extended his army across a valley, the slopes of which were impassable, and the result was that Darius Hytaspes was forced either to attempt to pierce his centre or abandon the attack. To-day, in the west, we find a similar state of affairs. We must either penetrate the German front or fail.

In spite of all recent changes—railways, range of weapons, wire and explosives, the three tactical principles are absolutely true. War has not been turned topsy-turvy as so many of us think. Time and again have I heard it repeated that, whilst formerly a battle ended with the assault, to-day it begins with one. Such an absurd statement as this would be impossible if the meaning of the tactical principles had been grasped.

Grand tactics has as its goal the accomplishment of the strategical objective of the war, and then, entering more closely into its own realm, of each separate campaign and battle. Its leading idea is a very simple one, namely: that the flank of either an individual or a mass of men is a more vulnerable point of attack than the front. Further, that the two means of carrying out such an attack are: (1) by enveloping one or both flanks; (2) by penetrating the front and so artificially creating two flanks to operate against.

A few years ago a battle opened with a prolonged fire fight, in which rifles were supported by cannon, and it ended in an assault with the bayonet. To-day a battle opens with a prolonged fire fight, in which cannon are supported by rifles, and still it ends with the bayonet. And the difference? Though shock weapons have scarcely changed, missile weapons have and are constantly changing. A few years ago the rifle was the master-weapon, that is, it was the most effective weapon in war, and its superiority lasted as long as the cannon was a slow loading weapon, a slow aiming weapon, and a visible weapon. Directly the quick-firing gun and indirect laying were introduced, the superiority of the rifle began to wane, so that in a very few years the quick-firing cannon had superseded the rifle as the master-weapon in missile tactics; with the result that as the infantry advanced and found that, before they could hope to make any use of their rifles they were subjected to so intense a fire from a hidden antagonist, there remained but two things to do—either

to dig or die; unlike the English soldier, the troops of the Continent preferred to dig. Thus trench warfare, which, in principle, is identical to field. First, the enemy must be demoralized, that is his endurance must be worn down by hurling missiles at him; secondly, his endurance must be broken by assaulting him with the bayonet.

THE STAGES OF THE ATTACK.

If we now turn to the attack, the aim of all tactics, and carefully analyse it, we eventually come to the conclusion that all attacks, outside mere surprisals and skirmishes, constitute four definite acts, namely:—

1. The act of approach.
2. The act of demoralization.
3. The act of decision.
4. The act of annihilation.

The first brings an army from its march formation into its fighting formation, and as the weapons it will first use are naturally missile weapons, this formation will be linear. The second consists in making the utmost use of missile weapons, and so wear away the endurance and moral of the enemy (principle of demoralization) as to enable the third act, the act of shock, to take place, that is, the splitting of the enemy's fighting strength into disorganized fragments (principle of shock). Strictly speaking, the battle here ends, as it is a psychological fact that as men only advance towards the enemy because of their discipline, and because, unconsciously though it may be, their instinct of self-preservation often tells them that it is safer to destroy the enemy than to run away from him (principle of endurance), so does this same instinct tell them that when once the enemy is running away from them it is safer to stand still than to follow him. Though the enemy may be completely demoralized and split in pieces, he may always hope to reorganize as long as he is not pursued and annihilated. This act requires fresh troops, because it is the beginning of a new battle, a battle which has for its objective the destruction of a retiring army in place of an advancing or a stationary one.

The point I particularly wish to accentuate here is that virtually the act of decision completes one battle, and the act of pursuit begins another, and consequently requires fresh troops to carry it out. I shall shortly show that this is an all-important factor in trench warfare.

Comparing the war of to-day with that of a few years ago, we find that, because of restricted frontiers, rapid communications, and enormous masses of men, the act of approach is liable to conclude once the opposing forces are fairly equally matched in numbers. Formerly, when such masses of men were unknown, flanks were readily attackable, now they are not so, for they rest on impassable obstacles. Further, the accuracy, range and weight of modern artillery and the universal introduction of wire entanglements, have made frontal attacks both long and difficult. Formerly, the act of approach took a long time, and the act of demoralization a short; as science

and the science of war progressed, these two times have been interchanged. In the Russo-Japanese War the act of approach to the field of Liao Yang took about six months, and the act of demoralization about six days; now this last act takes months and months, the approach disappears to appear again in a lengthy period of preparation. The act of decision, as in the past, is still rapid when compared to the other two, but, on account of the numerous lines of fortifications, it is lengthening out, for each line has systematically to be attacked. The act of pursuit will also be much slower, for whilst but a few years ago it completed a victory, to-day it virtually commences a new campaign.

When the above tactical principles are considered I can see no essential differences in the attack, though in detail the changes are as variable as the conditions of the day. Hostilities begin with the act of approach, which either culminates in a victory or a defensive trench warfare. If the latter, then the true act of demoralization begins, both sides pounding each other and each other's defences until one side gives way, and the act of decision carries the victor through his opponent's lines. As the vanquished retreats so should fresh forces take up the pursuit, trench warfare giving place to field under the most advantageous of circumstances: for the enemy's troops will already be morally exhausted.

THE STRATEGICAL PRINCIPLES UNCHANGED.

If we now turn to the strategical principles, which are equally tactical ones, we find that they stand unshaken, and that no modern invention has as yet caused them to be amended. A definite objective is as necessary in tactics as in strategy; without the offensive there can be no true fighting; mass in trench warfare is more requisite than ever, and so is economy of force; for as the front of attack is so well defined, and the enemy's communications so multifarious, it is essential that all subsidiary operations should take place in accordance with the timing of the main one. Movement, certainly movement forward, has been temporarily restricted, consequently manœuvre must take place behind the front line in place of to the flank of it, and such operations will chiefly consist in the movements of reserves. Surprise has lost considerably in opportunity, it has become more difficult for the numerically weaker side to surprise the stronger, because surprise now depends on the movement of reserves rather than on the point selected for the decision. In the numerically superior army two or more points of attack may be selected, in which case doubt will be created in the enemy's mind as to the point of decisive action. In this case surprise will be as potent as ever.

Security has been strongly accentuated, and it is due to the thorough application of this principle that the present war is dragging out so long. Co-operation is as important as ever, and more difficult to attain, on account of the size of the contending forces and the untrained and inexperienced personnel from which they are formed. "Men must eat soup together for a long time before they can be called soldiers," once said

Napoleon. This is as true in our day as in his, and some of us should not imagine that a slouchy cap and violet socks are the two chief attributes of the "fighting man." A little knowledge is often a dangerous thing, but "intelligent obedience" is the foundation of co-operation, this should be realized; also that it is easier to draw up a bad plan of campaign than to train a good company; also that it is easier to amend than to originate; to copy than to create; to disagree with than to conform to; to argue than to learn; to talk than to do. One thing in war is at least certain, and this is, that though simplicity of action is often the forerunner of success, simplicity of understanding is too often the winner of failure.

THE TACTICAL OBJECTIVE.

As strategy lays down the objective of a war, so does grand tactics lay down the objective of a campaign, and minor tactics the objective of each subordinate operation. We shall see that whilst grand tactics have in some respects become less complicated, owing to restrictions of movement, the reduction of surprise and the increase of security, minor tactics have become much more complex and also much more formal. In fact, the attack of the smaller units is now more closely related to the old battle-drill of a hundred years ago than it has been at any period since the days of the Franco-Prussian War. This is due to the fact that the gun has ousted the rifle, the weapon of individual initiative.

Now that mass has reasserted itself, and it is only mass which will produce a force sufficiently self-sustaining to break through the enormously strong defences of the day, the actual selection of the tactical objective has become less complex, though its attainment is much more difficult.

To select one main objective has this advantage. It is the simplest method, and, if the conditions permit of its attainment, it is the best. I will now turn to the conditions which govern this selection. The position selected must enable us to have time and space in our favour. Time and space are now so intimately connected with communication, especially railway, that we may chiefly consider them under this heading.

Suppose that in a line A—B a point C is selected for attack, then if the railway organization connecting C with the country on our side of the trench line is more perfect than that on the enemy's side, time and space are permanently in our favour, even if our operations take months of preparation and the enemy is fully aware of our intentions.

With communications we must link supply; this is a most difficult problem. If that section of the enemy's front which is to be pierced is twenty miles in extent, possibly a million men, two hundred thousand horses, and three to four thousand guns will have to be massed. All these will have to be supplied in an area of about four hundred square miles. What this problem means can only be grasped by those who have attempted it. The question alone of supplying such a force renders its existence impossible if the ground is difficult and the weather

bad. Even if the weather is good no ordinary roads will stand the traffic required for more than a short period.

As to numbers, moral, and armament, I need say little. In the past, before the present trench warfare had been elaborated, it was generally considered that, in order to successfully attack a defended position, it was necessary for the attackers to outnumber the defenders by three, four, or five to one. This is still more necessary to-day; and if it were not for the terrific effect of modern artillery, these numbers might have to be doubled or trebled.

Moral is still all important, for only the most confident troops will push through the inevitable slaughter, and then only if supported by an overwhelming mass of artillery.

THE SINGLE OBJECTIVE.

The principle of mass, if considered alone, would suggest that the offensive should be carried out at one spot, as Napoleon was wont to do, and that the tactical objective should be single. The other principles are, however, opposed to this after numbers have reached a certain limit; also several of the governing conditions become more and more adverse as numbers are increased.

I think it is now recognized that it is useless pushing in vast numbers of men on a narrow frontage, for the simple reason that by doing so the principles of security and endurance¹ are so rudely violated as to nullify the result. Armament alone forbids success to such an attack, for if the front of attack is so limited as to permit of it being entirely swept by enfilade and oblique fire, the chances of success are indeed small. Again, if the front is too extended the number of men deployed on it is so enormous that no system of communication could be found adequate for its supply. The conclusion arrived at is, that, even with the immense masses of men which modern warfare requires, there is a limit to the mass attack; this limit, I, somewhat at a hazard, put down at as the number of men required to simultaneously attack a frontage of 20 to 25 miles.

Further, it must be realized that the principles of economy of force, movement, and endurance, coupled with those of surprise and security, do not favour one stupendous assault, which like a magnet will draw towards it every available reserve that the enemy is able to muster.

THE DUAL OBJECTIVE.

If it be possible by two attacks to disconcert the enemy, and under the fog of war thus created to manœuvre a large field army towards the most probable point of penetration, it would appear that the dual attack will prove more effective than the single one.

¹ Endurance here means that the impulse of the advance comes from the leading rank, and that, if through lack of endurance the leading rank will not move forward, it is useless attempting to push it on by the massing of troops behind it. If the endurance of the leading rank is exhausted this rank must be replaced.

It is an undoubted fact, as I have already pointed out, that, according to the conditions under which the attack is contemplated, there is a limit to the number which can be advantageously employed at one spot. Any number exceeding this limit is a violation of the principle of economy of force, any number falling short of it of mass. Therefore, any number in excess of the maximum required should be utilized for the purpose of drawing away the enemy's strength from the point chosen for the decision. The danger of such a detachment is that it introduces a complexity, and consequently requires high leadership and expert staff work.



Two attacks if closely united virtually become one attack in spite of the fact that they may be separated by several hundred miles. Thus, if eventually in this present war Russia, Italy, France, and England attack Germany and Austria simultaneously, the advantage will, in all probability, be greater than if, were it possible, all the forces of the Allies were massed in one area for one stupendous assault.

Under certain conditions it is important to realize that it is sometimes more convenient to attain to the strategical objective by two tactical masses, working in close co-operation, than by one. The


difficulty inseparable from two is the co-ordination of the principles of mass and co-operation; of one, of mass and movement.

THE GERMAN LINE IN THE WEST.

As principles are governed by existing conditions, let us glance at the position of the German line in the west and then consider a possible means of breaking it.

The German western armies form a huge zig-zag running from near Ostend to Noyon, from Noyon to Verdun, and from Verdun to near Basle, the upper half of which constitutes an extensive salient with its apex pointing towards Paris, the lower a re-entrant with its apex towards Metz. The northern extremity of the salient rests on the sea and the Flanders' marshes, the southern on the Ardennes, flanked on one side by Verdun and on the other by Metz. The Ardennes are an obstacle, and though several railways cross them, the natural lines of communication, as far as Germany is at present concerned, run between their northern edge and the Dutch frontier, a small gap, with Liège as its centre. From this point the railways and roads splay fan-shaped westwards. The result of this is that the Germans

have every facility that communication and security can give them. Further, they can reinforce any position of this salient against a single attack more rapidly than can the French and British reinforce a single attacking army. Should, however, a dual attack be made, one from the direction of Arras eastwards towards Namur, and one from near Rheims north-eastwards towards the same place, the communications in the angle formed by the lines of advance of these attacks will be



severed one after another; with the result that the German armies between Arras and Rheims must either fight or fall back. If the latter course is adopted, the continual shifting from one line of supply to another will create such overwhelming confusion that the falling back alone will probably mean to Germany a loss of between three and four hundred thousand men.

I do not intend here to enlarge upon this subject, neither do I intend to point out its further advantages and many dangers. I will, therefore, leave it to the reader to apply to it the test of the eight principles, and so arrive at an estimate of its true worth. All I will say is this: that in the autumn of 1915 a very similar operation was attempted; it failed, probably for want of numbers, and bad weather. Assuming that we one day resume this movement and, as in September, last, the British Army operates against some section of the line A—B, and the French against some section of B—C, let us consider our

requirements as to distribution and mass. Possibly they may be as follows: Two piercing forces, E and G, which will carry out the acts of preparation, demoralization and decision, two pursuing forces, F and H, which will keep the enemy perpetually on the move and prevent him from reorganizing his forces by compelling him to abandon one line of communications after the other. One field army, J, which, manœuvring behind A B C, will pass through one of the two gaps made by E F and G H, and drive forward in an overwhelming attack as the endurance of F and H are beginning to wane, and whilst D and E are being reorganized as the general reserve, which will eventually revitalize J as its endurance is used up.

Whether such a plan as this is either practical or sound I am not competent to decide, neither does it matter much, for my object is not to discuss grand tactics, but the initial act of penetration and the principles which affect it.

It must be understood that I do not intend to write a complete treatise on the tactics of penetration, far from it, but in place I will select certain steps in the attack in order to accentuate the importance of applying the test of principle to each phase of our operations.

THE OBJECTIVE IN TRENCH WARFARE.

In an attack, and more particularly still in an attack of penetration, against a strongly defended area of ground, it is not only necessary that all ranks should know the main objective of the attack, namely, the piercing of the enemy's line, but also the objective of their particular part in the attack. Our first task, then, is to limit our objective. Our strategical objective is the destruction of the enemy's fighting strength, our main tactical the penetration of his line of defences; this objective may be divided under two headings, primary and secondary.

(A) *Strategical Objective*

(To destroy enemy's military strength).

- | | |
|---|---|
| (B) <i>Main Tactical Objective</i>
(To pierce the enemy's defences at the decisive point). | (C) <i>Subordinate Tactical Objectives</i>
(To withdraw the enemy's strength from the decisive point). |
| (D) <i>Primary Objective</i>
(To capture the enemy's artillery positions). | (E) <i>Secondary Objective</i>
(To pierce the enemy's last line of defence). |
| (F) <i>Subsidiary Objectives</i>
(To capture position by position). | (G) <i>Subsidiary Objectives</i>
(To capture position by position). |

Our primary objective is to capture the enemy's artillery positions, to capture, if possible, his guns, or if this cannot be done, to force

them to withdraw, so that (a) for the time being they cannot fire; (b) that when they again can, they will do so from positions from which they have never registered.

The reason why the enemy's artillery, in place of his infantry, is selected is, that as the gun is now the master weapon, once it is forced to retire the enemy's infantry is forced to retire with it.

Before we can capture these artillery positions we have got to capture a variety of infantry ones; these, therefore, are our subsidiary objectives.

Our secondary objective is to prevent the enemy occupying any prepared defensive line in rear of his first line system, in other words, to complete the penetration of all his defences.

To carry out our primary objective we must be prepared to advance from 3,000 to 5,000 yards, in some cases further.

To carry out our subsidiary objectives, to capture (a) the enemy's first line system; (b) his line of defended posts and villages.

To carry out our secondary objective to penetrate (a) the subsequent lines of defences, usually in rear of the enemy's artillery positions; to be prepared (b) to take up immediate pursuit directly the last line is broken through.

The depth of the area of our objective is not so difficult to arrive at as its breadth. The governing factor in our calculation is, that the front of the attack should be wide enough to permit a considerable force advancing through its centre without interference by hostile artillery on its flanks, once the hostile artillery on the front of the attack has been dispersed.

Supposing, then, that the area of our primary objective is about three miles deep by fifteen miles broad, our next problem will consist in calculating the subsidiary frontages of each division, brigade, and battalion within this area, the breadth of each of which should bear a direct relationship to the difficulties to be encountered in the depth of the area allotted to it to attack. This means that the troops detailed for the piercing attack will not be of equal strength all along the front.

Before these calculations can be made it is necessary to be in possession of the following information:—

1. A complete plan of all the enemy's defences in the area of the objective.
2. A plan, as complete as possible, of the enemy's artillery positions.
3. A large scale map showing the nature of the ground, the lines of communication known to be frequently made use of by the enemy, and features that might delay or throw the attack out of its direction.
4. A plan showing the railways made use of by the enemy and the places at which they may be blocked by bombing.
5. A distribution of the enemy's forces on our immediate front.
6. A distribution of his reserves within 48 hours by rail of our objective.

Once in possession of this information we can calculate with some little certainty the frontage of each attacking unit, also the strength of the pursuing force which will move through the gap made by the piercing attack.

THE LIMITED OBJECTIVE.

As the main objective of the piercing force is limited to the capture of the enemy's last line of defence, so must the subsidiary objectives of each subordinate unit be limited by its capture. The value of limiting each separate capture has, I think, proved its value in this war. On occasions it has been possible to rush, in one assault, several lines of defences, with the result that eventually the assaulting force loses all cohesion, co-operation vanishes, and, at length, power of endurance having been exhausted, a counter-attack drives the attack back over ground it has won but not consolidated; or else, digging in in the salient it has formed, it has countless guns concentrated on it and its losses are appalling. Such an attack as this, an attack on an unlimited objective, utterly fails in its purpose, namely, to capture the enemy's artillery positions, to force the enemy's infantry to fall back, and consequently to open the way for the pursuing force behind it.


In an attack of penetration on an unlimited objective the great danger is the creation of exposed flanks. When reduced to its primal cause, the present system of long entrenched lines has been adopted through the fear of having a flank turned. Therefore, to create, wilfully, attackable flanks by an uncontrolled rush forward demands no other verdict than that of culpable homicide.

The safeguarding of the flanks of the attack is really the key to the whole problem, for not only do we look to our flanks to protect our advance, but if the positions our flanking forces have captured are consolidated, they compel the enemy to form at right angles to his original line, and those of his units which thus form become an easy target to our guns. So important is this question that, in the attack on the grand scale, it will, in future, be necessary to select the area of penetration more with reference to the defending of its flanks than to anything else.

In many places the ground lends itself to the creation of defensive flanks, and if such ground can be found which favours the attack from this point of view, as well as from the point of view of penetration, then the position may be considered as ideal. Ultimately the whole question resolves itself into one of human endurance; and, I believe, that if the infantry is methodically and deliberately engaged in successive echelons, each independent of the other, and yet dependent on each other's success, each working for the primary objective through a series of limited subsidiary ones without break or pause, then a greater endurance will be maintained than by one torrential assault. Further, if the flanks have to be methodically consolidated, it is equally necessary for the frontal lines of defence to be similarly dealt with.

To summarize. Before the battle commences the commander defines the main and primary tactical objectives, allots sectors of attack and, having divided these up into subsidiary objectives, defines

the task of each unit by allotting to it its frontage, its direction, flanks and the limits of its advance. He then launches the decisive attack, keeping in hand sufficient reserves to meet unexpected situations. Once the decisive attack has culminated in the breaking of the line, his true



- AA' = Enemy's line before the attack.
- BB' = Gap made by First Assaulting Force.
- BCC'B' = Re-entrant caused by First Assaulting Force.
- DEFG = First Assaulting Force.
- HD & GI = Holding Attack.
- J = Second Assaulting Force (or General Reserve).
- K = Pursuing Force.
- L = Field Army.
- MM' = Artillery Protecting flanks of penetration.

task as commander begins, and consists in the skill he exercises in the manipulation of his pursuing force and his field army.

By adopting, in the act of decision, a limited objective, he—

1. Controls the battle and reduces disorder to a minimum.
2. Enables each attacking wave to reorganize itself and prevents one wave merging into another.
3. Assures that all ground won is consolidated.
4. Enables reconnaissance to be continued throughout the battle.
5. Protects the flanks of the attack.
6. Facilitates co-operation between the infantry and artillery.
7. Exacts the greatest value from the endurance of the men and the destructive power of their weapons.

As the lines of the enemy's defence have been methodically constructed, so will they have to be as methodically destroyed, the essential difference between field warfare and trench warfare being that, whilst the former is a succession of assumptions, the latter is a succession of certainties. Even with aeroplane photographs it is difficult to learn much about a field army, but of an entrenched army there is nothing easier, for every twist in the trenches can be seen as clearly as a chalk line on a blackboard, and, if we like to take the trouble, we can work out the maximum garrisons of each trench, each bay, each sap head. The result of this is that, whilst in field warfare no limited objective can be given until the enemy is reduced to the defensive, that is until the act of approach is accomplished, in trench warfare it can be selected from the very start, because the act of approach has been already completed.

Looking at field and trench warfare from the point of view of the act of decision alone, I can see no difference save in the quality and quantity of the defence; for both lay down as their objective the enemy and the position on which he intends to stand and fight. It is only the act of annihilation which has no certain limit to its task, for its goal is the utter destruction of the enemy's fighting strength.

PREPARATORY MEASURES.

It is a mere platitude to say that the success of an attack is dependent on the preparation made to carry it out; but in trench warfare success is indeed much more dependent on preparation than on initiative, discipline, skill, or even personal bravery.

These preparations may be divided under five main headings:—

1. The preparation for the artillery bombardments.
2. The preparation of our own trenches and the assembly of the attacking forces which will occupy them immediately prior to the assault.
3. The preparation required in order to cross the area between our front line and the enemy's.
4. The preparation for the capture of the enemy's defensive systems and the advance to his artillery positions.
5. The preparation for the pursuit.

As regards these preparations, I do not intend to enter at length, firstly, because much of the information should not be made public; secondly, because they are so multifarious that no justice could be done to them within the limits of this article.

1.—The artillery must be prepared (*a*) to demoralize the enemy; (*b*) to protect our own troops; (*c*) to maintain a prolonged fire; (*d*) to move forward at short notice.

2.—Our own trenches must be prepared (*a*) for the occupation of the attacking force and their reserves; (*b*) for their advance from the same; (*c*) for their protection during the initial assault; (*d*) for their maintenance after the initial assault; (*e*) for the protection and rapid advance of the reserves; (*f*) for the maintenance of communication; (*g*) for the evacuation of the wounded.

- (*a*) By digging numerous parallel and assembly trenches, each linked up to the front line by a series of communication trenches, the construction of bomb and weather-proof shelters, cook-houses, dressing stations, stores, latrines, etc.
- (*b*) By constructing ladders to get out of the trenches and bridges to get over them.
- (*c*) By artillery support, mines, gas and smoke attacks; the construction of saps for advanced machine guns, blinded saps for forward communication trenches; trench mortar emplacements.
- (*d*) By forming depots, stores, and "dumps" of all stores required by the attackers, such as: ammunition, grenades, rations, water, tools, wire, ready-made obstacles, telephones, cables, sandbags, loopholes, shields, etc.; and the formation and distribution of carrying parties and police posts.
- (*e*) By digging assembly places and shelters; by making ladders, bridges, etc.
- (*f*) By duplicating and burying telephone lines and cables, and the construction of observation posts. By numbering and naming trenches, constructing sidings, picketing trench junctions, and making trenches for "up" and "down" traffic.

3.—By cutting our own and the enemy's wire.

4.—Under this heading will come: (*a*) the allotment of frontages; (*b*) direction of advance; (*c*) protection of flanks; (*d*) allotment of subsidiary objectives; (*e*) means of surmounting obstacles; (*f*) means of overcoming likely checks; (*g*) means of maintaining communication; (*h*) means of co-operating with artillery; (*i*) methods and probable points of reorganization; (*j*) methods of supplying, evacuating, and reinforcing; (*k*) methods of relieving exhausted units.

5.—As the pursuit will require the rapid advance of fresh troops, all means which will enable them to pass over the numerous trenches must be prepared beforehand.

THE ACT OF DEMORALIZATION.

The act of preparation having been completed, the act of demoralization begins. It is no longer carried out as formerly by a lengthy rifle fight supported by artillery fire, but by an excessive artillery fire supported by rifles and machine guns. Just as a century ago an assaulting column would advance, covered by its guns and light infantry, over the 200 yards, which in those days separated the two contending forces, so, to-day, does a similar column advance over a similar distance, covered by its artillery and its machine guns.

The task of the artillery, though in principle the same, has in detail grown very much more complex. It may be sub-divided as follows:—

1. To destroy the obstacles which hinder the advance.
2. To destroy the enemy's trenches, so that he cannot remain in them.
3. To kill and demoralize the enemy's soldiers.
4. To put out of action the enemy's artillery, machine guns, and trench mortars.
5. To place barrages of fire in front of the enemy's reserves.
6. To build up walls of fire to safeguard the front and flanks of the attack. To do so the artillery will have to be stronger on the flanks of the assault than on its centre.

The control of the enemy's artillery is even more important than the destruction of his defences. For, unless it can be kept under, the losses of the assaulting columns will be excessive. As much wire can be destroyed by trench mortars, especially mortars of the heavy type; whenever this is possible these weapons should be used for this purpose. This will release numerous guns for counter battery work.

The bombardment should be methodical and periodical. Methodical, so that ammunition is not wasted; periodical, so that the moment of the assault may be unexpected.

If direct observation is obtainable it should always be employed. For this fine weather is necessary; which is one of the chief reasons why the grand offensive is limited to the summer months. When direct observation is possible, this is where most firing will take place, consequently ammunition must be doubled or trebled for batteries thus observing.

As regards wire-cutting, direct observation is practically a necessity, and when it is possible, breaches should be cut perpendicularly to the front of the assault, otherwise, if cut diagonally, men are liable to lose direction when charging through the gaps.

The primary conditions of effective artillery fire depend on forward observation posts. From these the objectives have to be discovered and their destruction watched. Observation from aeroplane will often have to be resorted to, but it can seldom be depended upon.

Once the assault is launched the artillery bombardment must lift and build up longitudinal and transverse walls of fire, forming, so to speak, an arch, or tunnel of shells through which the assault advances.

For immediate protection the assaulting forces must depend on a cascade of bombs thrown over their heads by their trench mortars, and a hail of bullets on their flanks and front from their machine guns. Their rifles they must not use, except, perhaps, for a volley of rifle grenades just prior to the charge, for, now that the time has arrived for the decision, it is on their bayonets that they must rely.

MACHINE GUNS AND TRENCH MORTARS.

Before passing on to the act of decision I will, for a moment, consider the employment of machine guns and trench mortars.

Only second to the quick-firing guns in effect, and in killing power even its superior, is the machine gun—the most demoralizing weapon of modern warfare. Not only is its power considerable during the commencement of the act of demoralization, but being easy of carriage, it supports the assault throughout. By working it forward and to the flanks it replaces the old light infantry; by leaving it with the line, the grape, canister, and case shot of former days. Both in the defence and the attack it is par excellence the weapon which will destroy and prevent destruction, its only disadvantage being that it cannot be employed for curved fire, this difficulty may, however, be overcome by the use of trench mortars.

Trench mortars are in most armies of three kinds, light, medium, and heavy. As weapons of demoralization their effect is very great, their chief defect, however, being their want of mobility. If the infantry could be armed with a mobile field mortar, that is, one on wheels which absorbs its own recoil, such as the 2.95-inch mountain gun, what with their machine guns they would be fully equipped to meet and overcome both obstacle and opposition, once they leave the zone of their artillery support. At the moment of writing I am of opinion that too much thought is being concentrated on machine guns and grenades, and too little on the construction and supply of mobile trench mortars. At present, if, in the attack, infantry are prevented advancing over a rise, on account of the enemy occupying a trench on the reverse slope, they have to halt and await artillery support, which, in many cases, cannot be given them. With a mobile field mortar they can attack the reverse slope, and under the demoralization wrought by its bursting bombs, can push up their machine guns and gain fire superiority, which once gained should be followed by an assault. The intimate co-operation of machine guns, trench mortars, grenadiers, and sharpshooters will render the attack with the bayonet overwhelming. It is quite time that we should recognize this and abandon the old idea that the rifleman of the line is the true demoralizer. He is nothing of the kind, for to-day he is but the escort of the other arms until the act of decision begins.

THE ACT OF DECISION.

The First Line of Assault.—No two attacks should be the same, each should be sufficiently different to come as a surprise to the enemy. Once confronted by the unexpected, demoralization begins. Besides

novelty, the attack must aim at continuity, it must be driven home without intermission day and night, ever being reorganized, ever being renewed; each echelon of the attack coming into action automatically, and if prematurely exhausted, relieved by another, so that the attack may gradually work forward until the endurance of the enemy is broken down. This means that not only will each successive objective require a separate attacking force, but that besides these forces local reserves will have to be held in hand to succour those sections of the attack which are checked, and to relieve those whose endurance has gone.

The assaulting line should have a depth of one man per yard, so that a collective spirit may be created; and it should, when possible, be preceded by picked riflemen and machine guns pushed out in advanced saps to within 75 or a 100 yards of the enemy's trenches. Each section of the assaulting line should advance at a steady walk to within 75 to 50 yards of the enemy's line, pause, fire a volley of rifle grenades,¹ and charge home.

The distance that the assault has to advance over should not be more than 150 yards, further, it should not be less, otherwise the proximity of our trenches to the enemy's may lead to loss during our own bombardment. It is important that the assault should be carried out in one bound, there must be no halting to take cover between the two lines. As to whether the men should walk or double the whole way is a matter of question. Personally, I am of opinion that, as in the assault, the maintenance of alignment is of the first importance, if the enemy's artillery barrage permit of it; it is best to commence the assault in quick time, officers in front and N.C.O.'s behind acting as *serre files*, keeping their sections together by perpetually closing them on the centre.

Immediately behind the first line of assault should come small parties of flankers, picked sharp-shooters, accompanied by machine-gunners. When the section they are flanking captures the enemy's first line, these should *at once* cross it and work *over the open* towards the next objective, covering the consolidation of the first line and affording the enemy little time to organize resistance in the lines further on. Immediately behind these flankers, or on their inner flanks, should come parties of grenadiers,² whose task is to advance up the communication trenches flanking the riflemen and machine gunners, with whom they must work in close co-operation.

Sections which are held up must be prevented sliding laterally towards gaps through which neighbouring units are advancing, for

¹ I do not know whether such an operation has ever been attempted. Experience may prove it impracticable. If employed, the grenades would, of course, have to be fixed before leaving the starting parallel or trench. The use of these grenades would steady the advance and also cause a thrill of enthusiasm throughout the assaulting force on their discharge and consequently increase their endurance.

² By grenadiers I mean those men who are highly trained in the use of grenades; by bombers, men who are not so highly trained. All infantry should be bombers, but not all bombers grenadiers.

this will cause disorder, and disorder is the worst enemy of the assault. Instead they must halt immediately opposite the obstruction, call up their grenadiers, who will commence a grenade attack on each flank of the uncut wire, and cover the advance of the flankers, who should work round it and enfilade the enemy's trench. Meanwhile, the assaulting infantry will keep up a steady rifle and machine gun fire to cover their wire-cutting men.¹ If, again, any section of the assault is hung up by flanking fire, it should at once rush forward to the enemy's line and not turn to meet it, its flanks being protected as much as possible by its machine guns.

Once the attackers have carried the first line they must at once consolidate it and reorganize, their flankers keeping the enemy opposite under fire, some of their bombers working along the captured fire trenches whilst their grenadiers work up the communication trenches. This is the only way to prevent the first line of assault breaking up into narrow columns, behind which the second line of assault accumulates helplessly. If the alignment is kept and the direction maintained the mixing of units will be reduced to a minimum.

The Second Line of Assault.—Directly each section of the first line of assault has occupied its objective and worked its flankers and grenadiers forward, the second line, detailed to capture the next objective, should be launched; but it should not be sent forward if this has not taken place, because any attempt to aid in the attack of the first objective will only use up its endurance and leave it in an exhausted state to attack the second. If assistance is required it must come from the local reserves.

The second line should be organized like the first, with the following differences. It should be accompanied by a party of bridge and ladder carriers and by extra machine gun sections and mobile field mortars. On reaching the first line it should throw itself down and take cover, and whilst the first line of the assault opens a heavy fire the bridging parties behind the second line should move forward and bridge the captured first line trench. This accomplished, the second line should rise, file left and right, cross by the bridges, extend left and right, and under cover of their mortars and the machine guns of the first line, now advanced, it should assault the enemy's next line of trenches. If these are too far distant for an immediate assault, it should fight its way towards them under cover of machine gun and mortar fire. Thus should the assault wave after wave, each wave passing the other yet preparing the way for the next, continue until the last trench of the enemy's first line system is pierced; the machine guns and the trench mortars working forward as trench after trench is captured, until arriving at the last they establish themselves and repel all counter attacks until the second assaulting force is in position to attack.


Once the second line of assault has gained its objective it should immediately push on its bombers, sharp-shooters, and machine guns

¹ If the obstruction is considerable it may be necessary to withdraw part of the assaulting force altogether and re-open the artillery bombardment.

over the open and its grenadiers up the communication trenches. Meanwhile more bridgemen should be pushed up, and as the second line occupies its objective the third line of assault should be in position behind the first line to advance immediately the screens or flags of the second line are hoisted. Directly the second objective is carried attempts should be made to link up the enemy's sap heads and our own, and so form communication trenches between our old system and the captured one.

Formation of the Lines of Assault.—The formation of the assaulting lines is a matter of opinion. Personally, I should prefer each objective to be attacked by a separate company in line. In field warfare it is usual to attack in depth and eventually build up entire companies into an assaulting line; in trench warfare, as long as the objective is limited, this depth is unnecessary, because the infantry assault is not prepared by rifle fire. By extending whole companies in line these companies are kept intact, and each company having its own particular objective is less likely to become mixed up with the remaining three companies of its battalion; and as long as it maintains its organization it maintains its mobility. To obviate further confusion and to minimise any possibility of men destined to take the second objective seeking refuge in the first, I should suggest that each company should have a distinctive badge, so that an officer of one company could at once see if men of another company had joined his. Such a badge would be very easy to improvise—a black, red, green, and yellow right shoulder strap would easily denote the four companies of a battalion, and a number on the left shoulder strap the battalion to which the man belonged.

COMPANY IN ASSAULTING FORMATION.



A = Sections in single rank, bayonets and rifle grenades fixed, 50 per cent. of men carrying shovels.

B = Platoon leaders.

C = Company colour.

D = Serre files (section leaders).

E = Captain, orderlies, and buglers.

F = Sharpshooters (two sections).

G = Grenadiers (two sections).

H = Machine guns (two sections).

K = Trench mortars (one section).

Local reserves detailed as required.

The first objective would, let us suppose, be allotted to men with red shoulder straps, the second to those with green, the third to those with black, and the fourth to those with yellow. Such a system as this

would, I feel, act as a potent check to the occupation of a trench by men not detailed for its capture; further, it would help in the maintenance of order.

Each company should also be given a flag similar in colour to its shoulder strap, with the number of its regiment in the centre. During the advance these flags would mark the position of the company in the enemy's trenches, and they should be treated with the same respect as the Regimental Colour, it being considered the greatest disgrace to lose them. Not only would they denote where the company was, but they would form rallying points and points of direction. In the assault they might be carried unfurled, the bugles sounding the charge.¹

The General Reserve or the Second Assaulting Force.—As in field warfare so also in trench, the handling of the general reserve is probably the most important and difficult of problems. The general reserve constitutes the true force of penetration, for, up to the time of its advance, the waves of the first assaulting force will have little by little reduced the endurance of the enemy. This endurance, once broken, the general reserve should move forward and make good the secondary objective. It should be composed of perfectly fresh troops, and should be employed in large units and never in driblets.

A clear distinction should be made between the general reserve, that is the second assaulting force, and the local reserves, those troops allotted to rehabilitate and relieve exhausted units. The general reserve is again perfectly distinct from the pursuing force, which is held in hand until this reserve has accomplished its task of penetrating the enemy's defences.

The general reserve should only be advanced when the first line system has been completely or sufficiently occupied and the enemy's second line wire has been cut. At the commencement of the assault it should be kept well back, and, if possible, out of the shell area, so that its endurance may not prematurely suffer. This force should chiefly consist of infantry, as it is intended for shock tactics. It should, however, be allotted horse and field artillery, besides the usual establishment of machine guns and trench mortars. Routes for its advance should be clearly defined, and as the attack proceeds forward positions should be carefully reconnoitred and trenches bridged. Further, it should be fully informed of the progress of the first assaulting force; how many subsidiary objectives have been taken and how many have not. On no account should it be employed to reinforce the first assaulting force, nor should it be halted in the trenches of the captured first line system; if it has to halt at all it must halt in the open.

Time and again during the present war the idea that the advance of the general reserves will push the first line on has lost or ruined a battle. *The impulse to advance comes from the leading troops and not*

¹ Anything which will increase the enthusiasm of the men will distract their minds from fear and consequently add to their endurance and moral.

from those behind. When any line is brought to a standstill the crowding of other lines into it only creates confusion. The narrow frontages, so in vogue to-day, are the best means of creating this overcrowding in maximum, if the commander does not understand that the task of the general reserve is to break through the enemy's last line of defence, and on no account to occupy any other one. Such an occupation leads to its piecemeal employment, and therefore to its destruction as the deciding force of the assault. If any one of the lines of the first assaulting force is prevented from advancing, and it is considered essential for the general reserve to advance, then it must pass through it, and on no account must it halt and lie down with it. If it cannot pass through it, it must fall back or wait until the local reserves, having passed round the flanks of the obstruction, have enabled the firing line in front of it to advance.

The Local Reserves.—The local reserves, as such, have nothing to do with the decision, for they are the revitalizers and supports of the assaulting lines. If an assaulting line is driven back they support it; if it is held up they work round the enemy's flanks; if it is exhausted they replace it. They should be provided with machine guns and mobile field mortars, and should be situated well forward, so that they may at once make their presence felt. Special preparation should be made for them to relieve exhausted units; and as such reliefs will have to be carried out by night, these preparations will have to be most exact and methodical. The correct use of the local reserves is to maintain the endurance of the first and second assaulting forces, so that the pursuing force may reap the advantages gained by all subsidiary attacks, and by passing through the enemy's last line enable the field army to advance.

THE ACT OF ANNIHILATION.

I do not here intend to enter into the detail of the pursuit, for it constitutes a new attack embracing field warfare. All I wish to emphasize is that, however elaborate our preparations may be, however terrific the act of demoralization, and however heroic the assault, all these three acts will be of little advantage unless there is ready at the decisive moment a large highly-trained force, whose endurance has not been undermined. This force must at once take the field, and passing through the gap, obliquely advance against the enemy's communications, and, by forcing him to abandon them one after the other, so widen out the gap that a broad road is made for the advance of the field army.

Once penetration has been accomplished our operations may be summed up under three main headings:—

1. The organization of the original army of penetration for the defence and maintenance of the gap created.
2. The organization of the pursuit for the annihilation of the enemy's army of defence in the immediate neighbourhood of the penetration, and for the widening of the gap.
3. The organization of the field army for the destruction of those remaining forces of the enemy which, on account of the penetration, will be compelled to fall back and accept open warfare.

There is only one small, though important enough operation that I will discuss here, namely, the silencing of the enemy's machine guns during the pursuit. As the enemy's action will be that of a rearguard, it is certain that he will depend for delay more on these weapons than on any other. Are we to surrender our initiative because of them or to watch our men ruthlessly slaughtered by their fire? I believe there is a way out of this difficulty, and, if my suggestion is impracticable, then a better method must be discovered; for we can no longer tolerate the impudence of a whole division being hung up by four machine guns.

There are six means that we can summon to our aid, separately or combined:—(1) artillery, (2) mortars, (3) machine guns, (4) cavalry, (5) massed infantry fire, (6) sharpshooters.

The first and fifth I do not intend to discuss; of the second and fourth, all I will say is, that they are worth considering; of the third, that by means of creating shell holes in the direction of the enemy's machine gun it might be possible to work up machine guns towards it and so silence it; of the sixth, that if artillery fire is not forthcoming, independent riflemen or sharpshooters are the best means to attack these guns, unless they are strongly supported by infantry, in which case a combination of machine guns and riflemen might master the situation.

Suppose that a battalion is advancing, when suddenly from a small wood machine gun fire is opened on it. Further, suppose that artillery and mortar fire is unobtainable, is this battalion to lie down and do nothing? If it attacks the wood it may suffer a hundred casualties, and in the end not capture the gun. Instead, surely it would be better to order up a couple of machine guns, spray the wood with bullets, and under this covering fire push forward sharpshooters, provided with telescopic sights and armour-piercing bullets, to stalk the offender. If advancing at 40 to 50 paces interval, and making every use of the ground, it would be most unfortunate if these sharpshooters suffered many casualties. To hit one or two of them the machine gun would have to keep up a continuous fire on a very small and difficult target, the range of which was perpetually changing, the very thing a machine gunner never wants to do, on account of his ammunition supply and the overheating of his gun. If the gun does not fire, sooner or later one of the sharpshooters will get in a shot; from that moment the life of that gun's team should be reduced to minutes. At the present moment we are training in the trenches scores of snipers—patient, careful, and skilled shots; were these men also trained, when out of the trenches, as stalkers, I feel certain that their services would prove invaluable during the pursuit.

THE VALUE OF HISTORY.

I have written enough to show what I mean by the principles of war; the few allusions that I have made to the present war, in order to illustrate my arguments, may be correct or incorrect, sound or unsound,

for I fully realize that they are based on incomplete knowledge, knowledge which the remote future can alone divulge. They are mere inferences, critical perhaps, but drawn forth from the gloom of a censored press. They are made without hostility or rancour, for I feel that, when the story of the part which the British Empire has played in this great war has been set forth in cold print, the verdict of the world will be that it is the most stupendous part ever played by either a nation prepared for war or unprepared. Where, eighteen months ago, we reckoned our military resources by thousands and tens of millions, to-day we reckon them by millions and thousands of millions. Already the little that is known staggers the imagination; what, then, will the complete history do? Nevertheless, I believe that we, in common with all the other nations, have erred by abandoning the rock of principle for the shifting sands of chance. If this be true or even only partially true, let us cease to stop our ears to the oracle of history, instead, let us follow in the footsteps of the great masters of war whose successes are directly attributable to the maintenance of these principles.

Germany and the destruction of Germany, of her military might, and of her national resources, of her arrogance, of her materialism, her servility and barbarity is our one and only objective; and every seduction which distracts us from this straight path must be banished by the sigil of victory. In her destruction is success, in her destruction is death to her allies.



THE FIRST RUSSIAN FLEET, 1695—1711.

By R. C. ANDERSON, Lieut. R.N.V.R.

BY universal consent the foundation of the Russian Navy is ascribed to Peter the Great. True, there had been a time when fleets from the northern shore of the Black Sea had penetrated to Constantinople, but that was six centuries past, and the Russia of those days had little or nothing in common with the modern Russia dating from the seventeenth century; in fact, it would be as reasonable to include the doings of the navy of ancient Rome in a history of the modern Italian Fleet as to consider these early Russian exploits in an account of the Russian Navy of the sailing-ship age.

The brothers Ivan and Peter became joint rulers of Russia in 1682 under the regency of their half-sister Sophia. Ivan was to all intents and purposes an idiot, and when in 1689 a revolution overthrew Sophia, Peter became in fact absolute ruler, though it was not until 1696 that the death of Ivan made him so in name also. Russia in 1689 had access to the sea in one place only, the extreme north at Archangel, for the coasts of the Baltic were Swedish and those of the Black Sea Turkish. Peter the Great is known mainly for his foundation of the Russian Baltic Fleet, and justly so, but as a matter of fact his first attempts at naval operations took place in the south, and though failure on land rendered them abortive, they were by no means without importance.

After a few years of rest from their struggles for expansion the Turks plunged again into war with Austria in 1683. Their defeat near Vienna by Sobieski, King of Poland, led to a coalition, in which Austria, Poland, Venice and Russia united against the common enemy. The Austrians and Venetians were almost uniformly successful; Belgrade in the north and the whole of the Morea in the south fell into Christian hands; but the Poles made little progress, and two Russian attacks on the Crimea in 1688 and 1689 led only to disaster.

This, then, was the position when Peter decided to attack Azov, the Turkish position at the mouth of the river Don, and his first attempt was no more successful than the previous Russian expeditions to those regions. With an army of over 30,000 men he marched on Azov, and on July 19th the siege began, but a vigorous sortie by the Turks put an end to all chance of a Russian success, and eventually, on September 27th, Peter had to retire. He saw clearly enough that one of the reasons of his failure had been the fact that Azov rested on a secure line of communications by sea, and with this in view he decided on the construction of a fleet sufficient to establish and maintain a blockade of the mouth of the river. Up to now Russian shipbuilding had been limited to three ships destroyed by the Tartars at Astrakhan in 1670

and a few ships built on Lake Pereslavl, north of Moscow, but a galley had been ordered in Holland in 1694, and with this as a pattern the construction of a fleet for the Don was soon in full swing. Twenty-two galleys and four fireships were laid down at Preobrashenskoe, near Moscow, and these, with their Dutch-built prototype, were transported in sections to Voronezh, a town on a tributary of the Don, 250 miles south of Moscow, and quite 800 miles up-river from Azov, while in addition a more ambitious task was attempted in the building of two 36-gun ships at Voronezh.

By dint of tremendous exertions the greater part of this fleet was ready by the end of April, 1696. On May 3rd the storeships and other small craft which had been built anywhere and everywhere left Voronezh for the front; on the 8th the "Apostol Petr," 36, followed. The other big ship was not yet ready, but the galleys were soon able to start; the Tsar himself got under way with eight on the 14th, seven others left on the 21st, seven on the 28th, and the last with the four fireships started down the river on June 4th.

In command of the fleet was Admiral Lefort, a Swiss adventurer who owed his position to his personal friendship with the young Tsar, while the troops were commanded by General Schein, a Prussian. Peter with his galleys arrived on May 26th at Tcherkask, 35 miles above Azov, and on the 29th he moved to Novosergievsk, at the head of the delta, within three miles of the Turkish fortress. He had picked up on his way down the river a galley taken from the Turks in 1695, so that he now had nine galleys at his disposal. He had heard at Tcherkask that two Turkish ships had arrived off Azov on the 25th, and had opened fire on some Cossacks on shore, and seeing that the southern branch of the river was thus closed to him he decided to push on out to sea by one of the northern channels. Accompanied by 40 Cossack boats he entered the middle arm of the river, the Kalantcha, on May 30th, but there was not enough water for the galleys, and they therefore moved to the Kutyurma, the northernmost branch. Here, again, shoal water prevented their reaching the sea, though the Tsar himself went on in one of the Cossack small craft and sighted a Turkish force of 13 ships. On June 1st the galleys were back at Novosergievsk, but in the interval an important success had been gained by the Cossacks. In the morning of the 31st the Turkish Fleet had sent in a force of 500 men as a reinforcement for the garrison of Azov, and that evening they attempted to send in a large amount of stores and ammunition in thirteen storeships convoyed by eleven rowing vessels. The Cossacks attacked at once, took one storeship and burnt nine; the rowing vessels with the three remaining transports reached Azov in safety. The Turkish Fleet began at once to get under way and retreat, but two ships were too slow in their movements and were destroyed, one burnt by the Cossacks and one scuttled by her own crew.

On June 6th Lefort arrived at Novosergievsk, on the same day the galleys entered the Kutyurma again, and on the 7th they reached the sea for the first time. Meanwhile the other divisions were on their way down the river, and by June 23rd the flotilla was complete, though

the "Apostol Petr," 36, had to stay at Novosergievs. for lack of water. On the 25th the Turkish Fleet reappeared. It consisted this time of 6 battleships and 17 galleys, but it was not until July 31st that it made any attempt to relieve the town. On that day it sent in 24 rowing boats carrying troops, but as soon as the Russians moved the landing party was recalled, and the Turkish Fleet put to sea again. Deprived of its support from the sea, Azov could not hold out long, and on July 29th it surrendered.

On the following day the galleys anchored off the town, but on August 6th Peter took them again down the river, and though there was not enough water for them to get to sea he went with the former Turkish galley and several small rowing boats as far as Taganrog, 20 miles to the west. This was the last move of the campaign; the galleys were back at Azov on the 7th, and there they were joined by the "Apostol Petr," 36, but the Russian ships were merely put into winter quarters, and by the end of August their crews had left them for Moscow. Meanwhile operations on the Dniepr had been carried on by a force of 118 small boats, built at Bryansk, on the Desna. Twenty of these had attacked five Turkish galleys near Otchakov, but were repulsed. Proceeding along the coast to Akerman the flotilla took two Turkish merchantmen. Finally it captured 17 Turkish storeships bound for Otchakov.

The years 1697 and 1698 were devoted to shipbuilding rather than fighting. In spite of Peter's absence in Western Europe the construction of ships on the Don and its tributaries was pressed forward with all possible speed. An attack by the Tartars on the Russian galleys in their winter quarters, in January 1697, was repulsed, an action between a number of Cossack boats and some Turkish galleys cost the Cossacks 30 men, a Turkish attack on Azov in June 1697, was beaten off, but a blockade carried on by some 30 Turkish galleys in 1698 produced no fighting, since the Russian Fleet made no attempt to meet them. The Russian galleys were chiefly concerned in a struggle with nature. Several had been damaged by ice in January 1697, and in 1698 they fared even worse. Orders reached Azov in May for the 10 biggest galleys to return to Voronezh; lack of water kept them at Azov till July 26th, and on August 1st they were definitely stopped by the same cause at Tcherkask. There they suffered severely from the weather; so much so, in fact, that by the end of October five had been sunk and three were ashore. All save one were salvaged in the spring of 1699, and in May of that year the nine galleys returned to Azov. The year 1698 ended with the conclusion of a truce with Turkey, to last for two years from December 3rd.

This truce offered an opportunity of exercising the new Russian Fleet at sea. With this in view Peter arrived at Voronezh at the end of March 1699, to see about the equipment of a squadron and its despatch to Azov. In spite of the scarcity of suitable crews he was able to equip a considerable number of ships; he left Voronezh on May 10th with four battleships, a bomb-vessel and four galleys, and on arriving at Azov on June 2nd found there seven battleships from Choper and Panshin, two of the yards nearer the mouth of the river.

The complete squadron was then as follows:—

Battleships:—

“Skorpion”	62 (52)	from Panshin
“Blagoe Natchalo”	34 (36/32)	„ Choper
“Tsvyet Voiny”	32 (36)	„ Voronezh
“Otvorennya Vrata”	42 (36)	„ „
“Sila”	36 (36)	„ „
“Bezboyazn”	50 (36)	„ Choper
“Soedinenie” (or “Unia”)	26 (30)	„ „
“Mercurii”	22 (22/28)	„ Voronezh
“Kryepost”	46 (52)	„ Panshin
“Zvyezda”	— (52)	„ „
“Flag”	— (52)	„ „

Bomb:—

“Mirotvorets”	— (14)	„ Voronezh
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Galleys:—

“Perinaya Tyagota”	24 (27)	„ „
“Zayatchii Byeg”	22 (27)	„ „
“Zolotoi Orel”	— (27)	„ „
“Vyeter”	— (27)	„ „

The “Zvyezda” and “Flag” were not ready for sea, and accordingly the “Apostol Petr” 26 (36) was commissioned. The “Mirotvorets,” “Zolotoi Orel,” and “Vyeter” were also left at Azov, so that the fleet, when it left for Taganrog on July 3rd, consisted of 10 battleships and two galleys. It was commanded by Admiral Golovin with his flag in the “Skorpion”; the other flag officers were Vice-Admiral Kruids in the “Blagoe Natchalo,” and Rear-Admiral Rays in the “Tsvyet Voiny”; the Tsar ranked as the senior Captain, Petr Michailov.

After a stay of more than a month at Taganrog the fleet put to sea on August 15th for manœuvres. Finally, on the 24th, it left Taganrog for Kertch, the Turkish fortress at the entrance to the Sea of Azov; on the 28th it arrived there and found a force of four Turkish battleships and nine galleys. The “Kryepost,” 52, ordered to proceed to Constantinople with an embassy, joined this Turkish squadron on the 30th. The rest of the Russian Fleet left on September 4th, after some mutual civilities, and reached Taganrog on the 10th. From there the ships were sent to Azov for the winter. The “Skorpion,” “Sila,” and “Bezboyazn” wintered at Taganrog, and returned to Azov in the spring. The “Kryepost,” the first Russian battleship to enter the Black Sea, left Kertch in company with the four Turkish battleships on September 7th, and arrived at Constantinople on the 17th; she returned to Azov in June 1700, having wintered at Constantinople.

On July 14th 1700, a truce for 30 years was concluded between Russia and Turkey. Almost at once Peter began hostilities against Sweden, with the object of forcing his way to the Baltic as well as the Black Sea. Still, in spite of the altered circumstances shipbuilding in

the South went on briskly. No fewer than 15 battleships were brought into the Don from the Voronezh in 1702. These were as follows:—
 "Kolokol" 46/42, "Lilia" 36/34, "Baraban" 36/26, "Tri Ryumki" 36/26, "Stul" 36, "Lev" 44/36, "Edinorog" 44/36, "Vinogradaya Vyeto" 58/56, "Myatch" 54/50, "Gerkules" 52/48, "Vyesy" 6,¹ "Razhhenoe Zhelyezo" 36, "Svyatoi Georgii" 66, "Bozhie Predvyedenie" 58, "Tcherepacha" 58/56.

The "Sv. Georgii" and "Razhhenoe Zhelyezo" were sent to escort Apraksin in the yacht "Sv. Natalia" to Azov. He arrived there on June 17th. These two battleships were then sent to sea, together with the "Blagoe Natchalo," 34 and a galley; the "Blagoe Natchalo" went to Kerch and back. In February 1703, Peter visited Voronezh and ordered more ships to be built. Two years later a new yard was founded on the Tavrov, near Voronezh. However, the Swedish war kept Peter busy elsewhere, and it was not until 1709 that he was able to visit Voronezh again. By that time many of the ships were useless, so much so, in fact, that he ordered most of the older vessels to be broken up.

In November 1710, Turkey again declared war on Russia. The new Russian Fleet was in a very bad way; only three ships could be found at Voronezh fit to send down the river in the spring, the "Bozhie Predvyedenie" (or "Predestinatsia") 58, "Gerkules" 52, and "Slon" (or "Olifant") 44, even so the last two were damaged in transit. At Azov, or Taganrog, there were in 1711 19 battleships, but of these only four could be sent to sea. Such ships as could be employed concentrated at Taganrog early in 1711 under Vice-Admiral Krusy. His fleet was as follows:—

Battleships:—

"Merkurius"	28 ¹
"Lastka"	50
"Unia" (or "Soedinenie")	30
"Bozhie Predvyedenie" (or "Predestinatsia")	58

Galleys:—

"Zolotoi Orel"	27
"Vyeter"	27

Snows:—

"Degas"	14
"Falk"	14
"Temlyar"	14

Brigantines:—

"Lebed"	—
"Gus"	—

One Tartan, 4 boats.

On July 12th came the news that the Turkish Fleet was approaching. It consisted of 18 battleships and 14 galleys (or 16 battleships and 16 galleys), besides a number of small craft. On the 30th seven Turkish galleys approached Taganrog, only to retire as soon as the "Soedinenie" 30 and the three snows began to move. On August 2nd the Turks attempted a landing, but were easily repulsed; on the 4th they disappeared altogether.

¹ Built as a battleship, but fitted out as a storeship.

Unfortunately for the young Russian Fleet its fate was already settled. On August 12th came the news of the Peace of the Pruth, by which, as the price of liberty for himself and his army, Peter agreed to return to Turkey all his southern conquests, including Azov and Taganrog. This was the end of the Russian Fleet. At first it was proposed to send three battleships through the Dardanelles to Petersburg; one, the "Spaga," 60, was not ready, so was burnt, and her place taken by two new snows; finally the negotiations failed and the battleships "Predestinatsia," 58 and "Lastka," 50, with the snows "Munker," 14 and "Lizet," 14 were handed over to the Turks. The "Vinkelgak," 48,¹ "Delfin," 48,¹ "Merkurius," 28, and "Taimalar," 14, with the two galleys "Zolotoi Orel" and "Vyeter" went up the river to Tcherkask; the rest of the ships at Azov and Taganrog were destroyed. At the same time the majority of the ships at the various up-river yards, whether complete or incomplete, were broken up. A few, however, remained at Tavrov and were not broken up till 1727.²

Altogether no fewer than 58 battleships had been built on the Don and its tributaries between 1695 and 1711; the first Russian Fleet had been a gigantic failure, not because of its own faults, but from pressure of circumstances.

¹ Built as 62-gun ships, but cut down. They had just reached Azov.

² They were the "Tcherepacha," 58, "Starii Dub," 70, "Sulitsa," 60, "Starii Orel," 82, "Spyashtchii Lev," 70, "Skorpion," (ii) 60, "Tsvyet Voiny," (ii) 60, with two others of 48 guns and one of 24.



RAILWAY TRANSPORT ARRANGEMENTS IN FRANCE.

BY CAPTAIN R. BONHAM-SMITH.

THE conditions of modern warfare are such that the existence, in the area affected, of an adequate system of railways and of the means (rolling stock, trained staff, etc.) for successfully working them, has become a cardinal factor in all military operations.

An army can no longer, as in bygone days, live on the country through which it passes, the enormous numbers of troops now involved render any such primitive method of securing supplies entirely out of the question.

In other ways, also, the character of war has completely changed within the last hundred years. Whereas, formerly, the fighting on either side was (except in the case of sieges) principally carried on by bodies of men furnished with such weapons of offence and defence as they could carry on their persons, now the principal part in the combat is taken (a fact we are slowly realizing) by machines which require a constant supply of material in the form of shells and cartridges to render them of any use, and, to keep up an adequate supply of this material, the possession of railway facilities is essential. The presence of an extensive network of railways within the sphere of operations is also invaluable for the purpose of concentrating troops at a given point for attack or defence, and of rapidly bringing up reinforcements when required.

Russia affords striking instances of what may be accomplished by the skilful use even of inadequate railway facilities, and of the serious disadvantages under which a combatant is placed by possessing a railway system inferior to that of the opponent. The extremely capable manner in which the Trans-Siberian Railway was operated rendered possible the Russian Expedition to the Far East, while, on the other hand, in the present war, the lack of adequate railway facilities in Russian Poland and the great superiority in this respect possessed by the Germans seriously hampered the operations of our Ally.

A fact which has been brought into great prominence during the present war is the remarkably *permanent* nature of a railway, and the practical impossibility of taking effective steps to render it useless to an enemy. A railway would, at first sight, appear to be extremely vulnerable; with its complicated mechanism of signals and points, its telegraphs and telephones, its electrical apparatus for regulating the movement of trains, it would seem as if, in a short time, a whole section could be rendered useless for traffic for a very considerable period. But the fact is that all this complicated apparatus, rendered necessary by the high speed and congested traffic on modern railways, is not really an essential part of a railway at all. A railway, in its essence, consists solely of a specially constructed road-bed along which rails are

laid, and this essential feature—called, appropriately enough, by English railwaymen, the “permanent way”—it is almost impossible effectually to destroy. The most vulnerable point is, of course, a bridge, but even there, unless the line crosses a wide and deep river, a temporary structure can be comparatively easily erected.

It may be thought that the development of road motor transport has afforded a new means of rapid conveyance which might almost replace rail transport. In practice, however, it is found that the motor is valuable rather as a distributing agent than as a means of conveying munitions from the base to the front. The use of motor lorries is limited by the condition of the roads, and, still more, by the congestion of road traffic inevitable in the neighbourhood of military operations. When it is realized that it would require some 150 motor lorries to transport the contents of one railway train, it will be evident that, while extremely useful as an auxiliary, the motor cannot replace the railway as a means of military transport. It is true that motor traffic was used to a tremendous extent by the Germans in their dash through Belgium, but in this case the number of troops and quantity of supplies involved were comparatively small, the roads were in good condition, and practically free from other traffic.

The position of the British Railway Transport Department in France is without parallel in the annals of military history. In none of the other wars in which railways have played an important part has one of the combatants been entirely dependent upon the railways belonging to and worked by an allied Power for the transport of its men and munitions. In the South African War, the only other war (as opposed to punitive expeditions against native tribes) in which the British nation has been engaged since the inception and development of rail transport, the conditions were totally different. There we were using Colonial Government railways, worked by an English-speaking staff, and placed, to a great extent, under the control of the British military authorities. In France we are dependent upon transport by railways (some owned by the State, others by private companies) which are the property of an allied nation, over which, consequently, we have no direct control, and which are staffed by French officials who rarely have any knowledge of the English language. The difficulties of the situation are obvious, and they have only been overcome by the exercise of considerable tact upon both sides, and by the great—and, to many people, unsuspected—talent of the French nation for organization.

This paper is an attempt to describe as briefly as is consistent with clearness, the organization and methods of the British Railway Transport Establishment in France, and the system adopted by the French authorities for handling British military traffic.

ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL OF RAILWAY TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT.

The control of all rail transport arrangements for the Expeditionary Force in France is vested in the Director of Railway Transport, who is assisted in the work of general supervision by Deputy Directors.

The railhead stations are allocated to “areas,” according to their geographical position, and an Assistant Director is placed in command

of each area. The bases and stations on the lines of communication are similarly allocated. To each regulating station, base, or other important centre of traffic is appointed a Deputy Assistant Director (D.A.D.R.T.), who also supervises the work of the R.T.O.'s at stations in his district.

The Railway Transport Officer, the individual with whom officers or units travelling in France are most familiar, and who is the guide, counsellor and friend of all those who have gone astray or lost their units or their luggage, is the officer who supervises entrainments and performs the practical (as opposed to the administrative) work of the department.

There is also a staff of clerks, checkers, and railway police. The principal duties of the checkers are to keep a careful record of all trucks, containing material for the Expeditionary Force, arriving at, leaving, or passing through the station at which they are employed; but, in addition to these duties, they perform many others in connection with entrainments, etc.

The personnel of the department is composed of two distinct elements: (a) officers with military experience, and (b) officers with technical railway experience. The successful working of the department depends upon the judicious blending of these two elements and the placing of round or square pegs in holes adapted to their shape. It is obvious that an officer with military training is more capable of successfully supervising an entrainment or of undertaking any work which brings him into personal contact with bodies of troops, whereas practical railway knowledge is absolutely necessary in supervising the working at a large shunting yard or arranging the running of trains in conjunction with the French authorities.

The checkers and many of the clerks are also men with practical experience in railway work.

MILITARY CONTROL OF FRENCH RAILWAYS.

During the war, the operations of all French railways over which military traffic passes are controlled by a *Directeur des Chemins de Fer*, who has on his staff a military and a civil representative of each of the great railway systems. Under his orders are two bureaux called *Commissions de Réseau*, one of which controls the northern railway system—this being the line over which the bulk of the military traffic passes—while the second bureau directs the operation of the other great lines. The detail work is delegated to *Commissions Regulatrices*, and they have their representatives at each station in a *Commissaire Militaire*, who is, as the designation implies, a military officer, and a *Commissaire Technique*, who is the Station Master. The *Commissions Regulatrices* are composed of *Regulateurs Militaires* and *Techniques*, the latter being railway officials holding administrative posts.

The *Commissions* control all transport by railway for military purposes, and, in fact, practically all rail transport, military or commercial. The members act as intermediaries between the British Rail Transport Department and the French Railway Staff, and, in theory at all events, all communications between these two bodies are conducted

through them. When it is remembered that they have not only to provide transport for French troops and munitions, British troops and munitions, and, to a small extent, Belgian troops and munitions, but have also to decide how far it is possible to meet the requirements of shippers, traders, and manufacturers without detriment to the military service, it will be realized that their task is no light one.

The capable manner in which the task has been performed, the impartiality with which conflicting claims to consideration are weighed, and the tact and courtesy which mark all the dealings of the officers of the Commission, must have impressed everyone who has taken part in transport operations with the Expeditionary Force in France. There is not the slightest doubt that the cordial relations existing between the British and French officers engaged in rail transport has greatly contributed to the smooth working of these operations.

ROLLING STOCK AND STATION ACCOMMODATION.

The stock of passenger coaches and of cattle trucks on French railways is insufficient to meet the requirements of military transport and at the same time to maintain a reasonable service for civilian traffic; the majority of the troop trains are, therefore, made up of covered wagons (box trucks) for men and horses, and open trucks (low-side or flat trucks) for vehicles, together with a first-class coach for officers. These covered wagons will be familiar to all those who have travelled in France, from the legend inscribed on them—"8 *chevaux*, 40 *hommes*" (8 horses, 40 men)—and are supposed to convey the stated number of *either* horses *or* men.

The horses and mules are not loaded, as in England, across the truck, but longitudinally at each end of it, with their heads towards the centre. This change in method is a great source of annoyance to mules, who, having been loaded across the truck on their journeys in England, have made up their minds that this is the correct way to travel, and that the attempt to load them in any other way is only due to the ignorance of their loaders; they accordingly resist the perpetration of the error by every means in their power, and a mule's resistant powers are considerable!

The head ropes of the animals are tied to rings in the roof of the truck, and a breast rope is fixed across in front of them. They are unharnessed before entraining, and the harness is placed on the floor in the centre of the truck, together with the forage (hay and oats) for the journey. They are thus easily fed en route, and watered (without unloading) at the stations at which a stop is made for this purpose. Two drivers ride in each truck.

Since these covered trucks are not constructed specially for the conveyance of horses, but are intended for ordinary goods traffic, there are no slats across the floor to prevent slipping, and special measures have to be adopted. That most generally in use is to sprinkle a layer of sand on the floor; the sand used for this purpose should, however, be coarse and gritty, as, if it is too fine and smooth it ceases to afford a foothold when wet, and is apt to be washed through crevices in the floor of the truck. Straw has also been tried, and answers well, but

this method is, of course, more expensive, and, on the whole, the number of horses who fall during transit is very small.

The trucks intended for the use of the men are, in some cases, provided with removable benches. Since, however, authority has been given for the supply of straw for the trucks not so provided, the men are undoubtedly more comfortable without the benches. When benches are fixed the men have to sit in a cramped, uncomfortable position throughout the journey, but where they are not provided, they can lie down on the straw. The danger from fire, owing to the occupants of the truck smoking, is practically negligible, as any outbreak would be at once extinguished by the men.

Light is furnished at night by means of a small oil lantern, which only serves to make the darkness visible.

The open trucks are principally remarkable for their extraordinary diversity of size and type, and the Railway Transport Officer has to cultivate a talent for estimating at sight the carrying capacity of a truck in order to avoid, on the one hand, causing unnecessary work to the unit by making them pack their vehicles too closely, or, on the other hand, finding himself with one or more vehicles left over when the train is fully loaded; for it must be noted that as the troop trains are generally made up to 50 vehicles—the maximum load—it is impossible to have another truck added. The railway employés, as in England, are entrusted with the duty of securing the vehicles in the trucks by means of ropes and scotch-blocks.

So far as the writer is personally aware, no special platforms or sidings have been constructed to deal with British military traffic. The entrainment of troops, horses, vehicles, and guns is generally effected at platforms used for ordinary goods traffic, and the presence of quantities of bales and cases of commercial goods not infrequently somewhat hampers the work. Another difficulty is the insufficient length of these platforms, necessitating the loading of the train in two or three parts. In such cases the use of the electric capstans and of the turntables so common on French railways minimizes the inconvenience caused. When only personnel or horses have to be loaded, the operation is frequently effected without a platform, the horses being loaded by means of inclined planes on wheels called "movable ramps" (*rampes mobiles*).

The detraining or entraining of troops at railhead stations is often a difficult matter, owing to the lack of platforms at the level of the truck floors, and sometimes only two or three trucks can be loaded or unloaded simultaneously. Here again, however, the excellent system of turntables greatly facilitates the work.

Speaking generally, the loads of troop trains are heavier, and the speed lower, than those in England.

REGULATING STATIONS.

In the course of this paper references to "regulating stations" will be noticed, so a brief explanation of the term will be advisable.

A regulating station is one so centrally situated and sufficiently well provided with siding accommodation as to enable trains coming

from the various bases and depôts, or from railhead stations, to be marshalled and re-formed. For instance, trucks coming from two or three different bases, but all consigned to one group of railheads, may here be formed into one train. An "advanced regulating station" is one lying between the regulating station and the railhead stations. It usually serves a group of railheads, and acts as an intermediate marshalling station.

The representatives of the Railway Transport Department at such points are usually officers who have had a technical training in railway work and experience of handling traffic, for though the work of marshalling the trains is done through the agency of the French Railway Staff, it is very necessary that the Railway Transport Officer should know what arrangements will be best from a railway point of view.

Regulating stations become of special importance when considerable troop movements are taking place at the front, since it is then the duty of the D.A.D.R.T. or R.T.O. in charge to divert trains of reinforcements, and of supplies or other munitions, to new destinations in accordance with military exigencies.

METHOD OF DEALING WITH VARIOUS CLASSES OF TRAFFIC.

The traffic dealt with by the Railway Transport Department may be classified under nine heads, as follows:—

- (1) Troops.
 - (a) Complete units.
 - (b) Drafts and reinforcements.
- (2) Supplies.
- (3) Ordnance.
 - (a) Ammunition.
 - (b) Clothing and general stores.
- (4) Postal matter.
- (5) Gifts and parcels.
- (6) Returned ordnance, supplies, and gifts.
- (7) Ambulance trains.
- (8) Horses for remount depôts.
- (9) Men on leave, stragglers, prisoners, etc.

(1) *Troops*.—The movements of troops with which the department has hitherto had to deal have been in one of three directions: (a) from the base to the front, (b) from one railhead to another, or (c) small parties or single individuals from the front to the base. The movements here described in detail, as they are typical of all troop movements, are those from the base to the front. These fall under two sub-heads, according to whether they concern (a) complete units, or (b) drafts, details, or reinforcements.

(a) *Complete units*.—The procedure adopted in dealing with a division arriving by steamer transport at a base to be sent to the front will indicate the method of handling any complete unit, e.g., a battalion, squadron, or battery.

Some days prior to the date on which the first units composing the division are expected to arrive at the port, the D.A.D.R.T. in

charge of railway transport work at the base receives a schedule showing the composition of the division and the strength of each unit included in it, and also a forecast of the order in which the units are expected to arrive each day during the landing of the division.

It has been previously arranged between the headquarters of the Railway Transport Department and the Commission Regulatrice how many trains can be furnished each day, and a list of the times at which they will start throughout the twenty-four hours has been furnished to the D.A.D.R.T., to the local Commissaire Militaire, and to the railway officials. Once, therefore, it has been decided at what time the first troops to land can be ready to entrain, the working of the series of trains can be commenced, and, unless any of the series are cancelled through the non-arrival of transports (owing to bad weather or other causes), will be continued until all the troops have been despatched. For example, it may be decided that 12 trains can be run during the 24 hours, that is, they will run at intervals of two hours, and we will assume that the times fixed for their departure are 12 midnight, 2 a.m., 4 a.m., and so on. If, then, the landing of the first unit takes place at such an hour as to enable the first train to be despatched at 10 a.m., the next will follow at 12 noon, the next at 2 p.m., and so on at intervals of two hours, day and night, until all the personnel, horses, vehicles, guns and baggage of that division have been sent forward. In practice, the trains usually leave at intervals of about one and a half hours. Since the loading of a train occupies from two to three hours (four hours is usually allowed), the work is carried on simultaneously at several different entraining points.

Contrary to the practice of English railways, on which the composition of the train is based on the strength of the unit or part of a unit which is to be conveyed by that train, the French troop specials are made up in what are known as "type" trains, and cannot be altered to suit requirements. The composition of these trains has doubtless been based on careful calculations by French military and railway authorities, and is as follows:—

Type Combattant (known as "Type C").

34 covered trucks, 13 open trucks, 1 first class coach, 2 brake vans.

Type Parc (known as "Type P").

24 covered trucks, 23 open trucks, 1 first class coach, 2 brake vans.

The "Type C" is intended for infantry, cavalry, and artillery; the "Type P" for ammunition columns, divisional trains, etc.

The D.A.D.R.T. has therefore to decide, from the information furnished to him, how the units arriving on a particular date can best be fitted into the trains at his disposal (either type of train may be asked for), and at what entraining point they shall be loaded.

When it is remembered that such questions as time occupied in debarkation, order in which the transports will arrive in the dock, unsuitability of certain entraining points for the entrainment of certain units, have to be taken into consideration, and that each unit must be sent to the particular railhead which has been indicated in

the schedule as its destination (a division is usually detrained at three different railhead stations in order to avoid congestion at any one station), it will be understood that the post of D.A.D.R.T. at a base when a division is arriving is not altogether a sinecure. Also, here, if anywhere, it is true that—

“The best laid schemes o’ mice an’ men
Gang aft a-gley.”

For, if bad weather supervenes, the non-arrival of some of the smaller transports and the delay of the others may necessitate an alteration in the whole programme.

The D.A.D.R.T. is enabled to check the accuracy of the forecasts furnished to him by the Embarkation Return, which reaches him some twenty-four hours before the actual arrival of the transports and which gives the names of the transport steamers and the number of personnel, horses, and vehicles of each unit embarked in them. In order to ensure the smooth working of all the arrangements, he keeps in constant touch with the officers of the Naval Transport Department, the Military Landing Officers, and the A.Q.M.G.

The time-tables governing the running of the troop special trains are so arranged that, at certain stations, a halt is made sufficiently long in duration to enable the horses to be watered. At these stations hot coffee is in readiness for the men, and latrine accommodation is provided.

(b) *Drafts and Reinforcements.*—The Officer Commanding Reinforcements at the base dépôt furnishes to the D.A.D.R.T. a daily statement giving particulars of the reinforcements he will require to despatch during the ensuing twenty-four hours, and from the A.Q.M.G. is received a list of the officers, details, etc., for whom accommodation on the trains must be arranged during this period. If the numbers travelling on any one day are small, they are sent to the regulating station or to their dépôts by ordinary passenger trains, or direct to railhead by the daily supply trains, the working of which will be described later. If, on the other hand, the numbers are considerable, special trains are arranged. In some cases, in order to avoid running unnecessary train mileage, two bases work in conjunction and special trains are arranged for their joint requirements.

The reinforcement trains are made up to accommodate the exact number of men travelling, and are usually composed of passenger coaches, though sometimes covered trucks are used. They are so formed that a section of the train can be put off at each of the various railheads to which the men are proceeding, and the first and last vehicle of each section bear special labels. The necessary instructions for the running of these trains are issued by the local representative of the Commission Regulatrice.

(2) *Supplies.*—The conveyance of supplies from the base to supply railheads is effected by daily trains, each train usually conveying one day’s supplies for two or more Divisions. These trains also take small numbers of reinforcements, trucks of gifts, and, in some cases, ordnance.

Fresh meat (frozen) is loaded direct from the ship to special refrigerator trucks, which are lined with non-conducting material; bread comes fresh from the field bakeries at the base; provisions, etc., are loaded as required from the stock in the supply sheds. Forage was at one time loaded in the supply sheds at the base, but is now furnished from a Central Forage Dépôt, which is fed by special trains loading direct from the steamers.

Until early in 1915, the quantity of each item of the supplies was regulated by the daily requisitions of the Supply Officer attached to each Division, but by that time experience had enabled the Supply Department to draw up a fixed scale of quantities, so that the composition of the daily supply for each Division could be standardized. This standardized quantity is called a "type pack." This change enabled more economical loading to be effected, and has this further advantage that, if a Division leaves the district served by a particular railhead, and is replaced by another Division, no diversion of the supply trucks is thereby necessitated, since the composition of each section of the supply train is identical. This, of course, does not apply to the ordnance trucks, if any, on the train, since ordnance can only be packed in accordance with definite requisitions.

So many developments and changes have taken place in the formation of the supply trains that it is difficult to indicate exactly the methods in use. Briefly, the developments were as follows:—

- (1) At first a train of about 36 wagons containing provisions, meat, bread, and forage was loaded for each supply section, which comprised two divisions. Subsequently, owing to the movements of divisions, the section system was found to be unworkable and ceased to exist.
- (2) Then the forage was transferred to a central dépôt, and each train served four divisions.
- (3) Later, the introduction of the "type pack," enabling more economical loading to be effected, the introduction of a bi-daily reinforcement train reducing the number of troops conveyed on supply trains, and the increase in the maximum number of vehicles composing a train-load, rendered it possible to add the trucks containing ordnance to the supply trains.

The work of marshalling the trains at the base now became a somewhat complicated task, trucks containing provisions and bread having to be brought from one shed, those containing meat from another, officers' coach and trucks conveying personnel from a third, ordnance from a fourth, and gifts from a fifth, and the whole having to be marshalled into four complete sections; the result of the reorganization was, however, to enable supplies for a much larger number of divisions to be dealt with at a given base, and to obviate the necessity of running special ordnance trains.

(3) *Ordnance*.—The traffic under this head may be divided into two classes: (a) Ammunition and (b) Clothing and General Stores.

With regard to (a), it is not desirable that the methods adopted for handling this traffic should be described in detail and I will therefore confine myself to class (b).

The stores coming under this head are loaded partly in "bulk," that is, consigned to an advanced *dépôt* for distribution, and partly in "detail," that is, consigned direct to the units requiring them. The advantages or disadvantages of such a method do not come within the purview of a Railway Transport Officer, but it certainly appears to result in extravagance in the use of trucks. Every effort is made, however, by the Railway Transport and Ordnance Departments, acting in conjunction, to economize trucks as far as the method of loading permits, and it must be taken into consideration that ordnance stores, from their varied nature, do not permit of very close packing.

The trucks containing these stores were, at one time, conveyed by special ordnance trains to a regulating station, where the train was split up and the trucks despatched to the various railheads. The more economical method of sending trucks of ordnance on the supply train proceeding to the railhead to which the ordnance is consigned is now adopted.

(4) *Postal Matter*.—The transport of mails is effected partly by passenger train and partly by supply train, a van or covered truck being attached to the trains as may be required.

(5) *Gifts and Parcels*.—"Gifts" include all those articles destined to contribute to the comfort or recreation of our troops at the front, which are sent out by committees, by firms, or by private persons, and which are not consigned to any individual soldier.

In the early days of the war the despatch of these from the base to the front was the business of no one in particular, and, consequently, was neglected by everybody. Harassed officers, anxious to secure means of conveyance for absolutely necessary supplies and munitions, naturally did not want to undertake the business of dealing with cigarettes, books, clothing, and the thousand-and-one other articles which streamed out from home in enormous quantities.

This unsatisfactory state of affairs was remedied by the appointment of Military Forwarding Officers, whose duty it was to deal with this traffic, and also with parcels, too large to be sent by parcel post, consigned to individuals in the Expeditionary Force. These officers were provided with suitable office accommodation, with a staff of clerks, and with such working parties as were necessary. Recently, they have been placed, for administrative purposes, under the control of the Director of Railway Transport, and closer co-operation between the two departments concerned has thus been secured. They receive from the ship the packages coming under the category of "gifts," store them, sort them, despatch them to the proper units, or distribute them as circumstances appear to warrant. Economy of truck loading is effected by sending a large proportion of the packages to a "regulating," or, as it would be styled in railway parlance, a "tranship" *dépôt*. That is to say, at a convenient centre a *dépôt* has been established to which parcels or packages of gifts are forwarded from the base in truckloads. Here they are sorted out and reloaded for despatch to the various railheads.

A daily return is furnished by the M.F.O. at the base to the D.A.D.R.T. or R.T.O., stating how many trucks of gifts will be ready

for despatch that day, and for what destinations, and arrangements are made accordingly.

(6) *Returned Ordnance, Supplies, etc.*—The quantities of damaged vehicles, arms, and equipment collected at the front and returned to the base reach enormous proportions, and depôts have been formed at certain bases to deal with this material, of which a very large proportion is, after careful sorting, available for further use in some form or another. Those who complain about the extravagance of army methods would be greatly surprised could they inspect one of these depôts, and see the careful examination and classification of every description of returned stores, ranging from cartridge cases to boots. Clothing, web equipment, etc., is all carefully washed and disinfected, and then re-issued; harness is sorted out and pieced together in sets; rifles and bayonets are examined by an armourer-sergeant and passed as fit for re-issue, set aside for repair, or condemned as useless. The number of articles set aside as useless for any further purpose is surprisingly small.

All this material, collected at various railheads, is sent in truck-loads by the supply trains returning with empty trucks from railhead to the base, and is handed over to the Ordnance Officers in charge of the above-mentioned depôts.

Returned supplies are rare, and consist principally of those trucks which have been detached at some stations en route, on account of a hot axle or some other defect. These are passed to the Supply Department and either reconsigned or reloaded, as occasion may require.

(7) *Ambulance Trains.*—The running of these trains is controlled by the D.D.R.T.'s, who work in conjunction with the D.G.M.S. and with the D.M.S. of the Line of Communications. The requirements are communicated to the Commission de Réseau concerned, which issues the necessary instructions. The working of all such trains is greatly facilitated by the system of special time-tables, to which reference will be made later on. At a central point in each Railhead Area there is a Garage for Ambulance Trains, and these are drawn on as required. If one Area cannot meet the calls upon it from its own Garage, the D.D.R.T. at G.H.Q. diverts trains to it from another Area.

When the wounded have to be transferred to a Hospital Ship, the train is run on the wharf alongside the steamer, and the transfer thereby effected with the minimum of inconvenience and suffering to the patients.

The rolling stock of these trains consists partly of special coaches built for the purpose in England and partly of ordinary French coaching stock, converted into the component parts of an ambulance train. Some of the special trains sent out from England form complete travelling hospitals, and both in design and execution are fine examples of the skill of the railway coach builder.

(8) *Horses to or from Remount Depôts.*—Special trains are arranged as required for the conveyance of horses and mules from Remount Depôts to the front, from one depôt to another, and from the front to the Veterinary Depôts.

From long practice in loading, and experience in handling horses, the men of these depôts become wonderfully expert in entraining the

animals; even the mules, those most intelligent but obstinate creatures, seem to say, with a sigh of relief, "Here are some men who really understand how animals of our breeding should be handled," and walk passively into the trucks!

(9) *Men on leave, Stragglers, Prisoners, etc.*—The Railway Transport Officer has acquired a reputation for asperity and abruptness of speech, but anyone who will spend a day with such an officer will feel that, if true, it is pardonable.

Everyone connected with the Expeditionary Force who does not know where he ought to go next or to whom he ought to report, comes to the Railway Transport Officer for advice or instruction. Men who hardly know to what unit they belong, and have not the remotest notion where that unit is, or where they left it; men sent for trial for military offences; prisoners of war; every conceivable type of straggler—all must be forwarded to their proper destination by the Railway Transport Officer. Has an officer lost a kit-bag, or has a truck of R.E. material gone astray? The Railway Transport Officer is the person who is expected to produce immediately the missing article! Can it be wondered that he is not invariably suave and urbane?

TIME-TABLES FOR SPECIAL TRAINS.

A most ingenious system is in force on French railways for dealing with special trains. A time-table is prepared, which includes timings for practically the maximum number of trains that it is possible to run over the system. The route followed is indicated by code letters, thus "A X 25" might refer to a train proceeding via Amiens and Paris. These trains are all "facultatif," that is to say, it is understood that they will not run unless specially advised.

If, then, it is required to run a special troop or ambulance train at any given time, it is only necessary for the Commission Regulatrice to see which "marche," as they are called, is available about the stated time, and instructions are issued to all the staff concerned that "A X 25 will run to-day"; without any further advice all concerned know exactly how the running of the special will fit in with that of other trains.

FORMS AND DOCUMENTS.

The administration of the Department is characterized by an entire absence of "red tape," and in no respect is this more noticeable than in the reduction to a minimum of the use of forms and documents.

For any movement of troops or munitions, whether by train loads, truck loads, or as single men or single packages, two documents alone are necessary. The one, entitled the "Movement Order," is required by the Railway Transport Department, the other, the "Ordre de transport," is the authority for the conveyance of the men or supplies as far as the French railway staff are concerned.

The movement order is exceedingly simple and practical. It contains no unnecessary verbiage, but merely records the number and description of men, horses, supplies, etc., the name of the forwarding station, and of the destination. It is signed (a) by the officer authorizing the move, (b) by the Railway Transport Officer at the forwarding

station, and (c) by the officer in charge of the train. A duplicate copy of the movement order is retained by the Railway Transport Officer at the forwarding station. When it is not possible to consign troops or munitions direct to their destination, they are sent forward to one of the regulating stations, and the Railway Transport Officer at that point re-consigns them and countersigns the movement order.

The "ordre de transport," which will be familiar under the name of the "feuille" or "yellow form" to those officers who have recently travelled in France, is a much more formidable-looking document, and a careful study of its intricacies would occupy, for a considerable part of the journey to the front, even an officer fairly well acquainted with the French language! It contains full details of the consignment, is signed and stamped by an officer of the Commission de Gare, by the Chefs de Gare at departure and arrival stations, by the Railway Transport Officers at both stations, and by the "O.C. Train." This document is made out in triplicate, the Commission de Gare retaining one copy, the Chef de Gare at forwarding station a second, while the third copy is carried by the officer commanding train or the senior officer or man of any detachment during the journey, and is handed over to the Chef de Gare at destination.

THEFTS.

With the exception of one particular class of traffic, theft, during transit, of goods handled by the Railway Transport Department is remarkably rare. The exception was the case of the kits of deceased officers, and since, about a year ago, the pilfering of articles from these kits was, unfortunately, rather prevalent, and was the cause of many indignant letters to the newspapers, and, I believe, of questions in the House of Commons, the matter merits more than passing attention.

Many difficulties arose in dealing with these kits. They consist, for the most part, of a class of package which offers the most tempting facilities for pilferage, and which it is almost impossible to secure effectively. No class of package, for example, leaves its contents so open to theft as a Wolseley valise.

It is impossible to ascertain, until the kits reach England, what particular articles have been abstracted, and by that time it is, of course, too late to trace them. Even then it is uncertain at what point in their long journey by wagon, by motor lorry, and by rail, steamer, and rail again, the thefts were committed. Still, there undoubtedly were expert thieves at work during the rail transit in France, and the efforts of the department, aided by the Intelligence Officers, and by the French detective force, were, for a long time, unsuccessful either in detecting the offenders or in putting a stop to the practice.

The kits were sent in sealed vans, the seals were examined at frequent intervals, military police patrolled the yards where shunting was performed, and military escorts travelled on the trains, and yet it was a common occurrence to find, at some point on the journey, a seal broken and the contents of a wagon tampered with. Train Conducting Officers were bombarded with requests for explanation, and had to fill up most elaborate forms, signed and countersigned at each point where a truck passed from the charge of one officer to that

of another, and stating the exact points at which examination of the seals had been made, yet still the trouble went on. The Train Conducting Officer would find the seals apparently intact at one station, yet, on examining them at the next stopping place, perhaps 20 or 30 miles further on, would discover a seal broken, and find that articles were missing from the truck.

The explanation was probably as follows. Covered trucks on French railways have a sliding door at each side, and are provided with a step, which makes it quite possible for an active man to jump on to the truck when the train is going at a moderate speed. The seals consisted of wire passed through the fastening and secured by a piece of lead composition through which the ends of the wire passed, and which was then nipped by a seal press in such a way as to close down upon the wires, and at the same time to receive an embossed mark.

The thief, having gained a footing upon the step of the truck, had only to cut the wire with nippers, open the door, and get inside the truck, closing the door after him. He could then select what he pleased from the packages, get on the step again, replace the seal by twisting the wires—a very careful examination would then be necessary to reveal the fact that it had been tampered with—and drop off the train the next time it slowed down. As the return supply trains, by which the kits in question are forwarded, perform a considerable part of their journey by night, and as a French railway line not infrequently passes down the street of a town, without a barrier to separate it from the ordinary traffic, while checks for signals or for other purposes are of common occurrence, it is evident that there was every opportunity for the thieves to gain access to the trucks.

Various remedies were suggested; one was that an escort should ride in each of the trucks containing kits. Since, however, the kits came from a great number of different railheads, a considerable body of men would have been necessary for this purpose; those appointed for duty would have had every opportunity, without the slightest fear of detection, of themselves pilfering from the kits, since they would have had hours in which to examine the contents and to re-secure the packages; it would have been a matter of profound difficulty to select the escort with such care that no dishonest men should be amongst them; and, if even one or two had been dishonest, the remedy might have been worse than the disease.

Another suggested remedy was to secure all the trucks with padlocks. The advantage of this method was that, although the cutting of a wire seal is a simple matter, it is far more difficult to break open a padlock, and practically impossible to do so when the thief had only one hand available for the work, since he must hold on to the handlebar with the other to avoid being thrown off by the motion of the train.

The difficulties raised by the adoption of this system are due to the fact that a padlock must have a key. If padlocks of the ordinary type are used, having keys of different patterns, the keys for the wagons on any particular train must be conveyed by the officer in charge of that train, and when keys are constantly in transit in this

way they are very likely to get lost or mislaid, or a wrong key may be sent. If, on the other hand, padlocks of the "Linley" type are used, in which master-keys, which will open any of the padlocks of a series, are employed, there is always the danger of a master-key falling into wrong hands.

The method of securing the trucks by ordinary padlocks was eventually adopted, and was, on the whole, successful.

A difficulty which arose in tracing the thefts was due to the decentralization of the railway police. These did not, at one time, form a separate force, but were merely members of the local military police force attached temporarily to the Railway Transport Department. The D.A.D.R.T. or R.T.O. in charge of each station had a certain number of these police under his orders, but as the aim of each particular sergeant or corporal of police was (not unnaturally) to prove that the thefts must have occurred at some other station and not at the one for which he was responsible, the evidence in many cases was very contradictory; further, what happened between stations or at stations at which there was no Railway Transport Officer was outside the sphere of action of any of these local bodies of military police.

This was remedied by placing the whole force of railway police under the command of one officer who was an expert in police work, and thus the duties of the police at each station were co-ordinated and systematized.

The only other form of theft which is worthy of notice was the pilfering from supply or ordnance wagons put off at country stations on account of hot axles or other defects. This was dealt with by arranging for the prompt return of such trucks to certain central points at which adequate supervision could be exercised and instructions given for future disposal. As the officer in charge of the train from which the vehicle was detached immediately wired to the department concerned, a truck containing a duplicate of the contents of the defective wagon was made up and sent on by the next available train.

PERSONNEL OF FRENCH RAILWAYS.

The temperament of the French railway official, whether station-master, guard, ticket examiner, or shunter, merits the careful study of any officer who has to travel in France or to despatch or receive troops or munitions.

The employé, on most of the railways of Northern France is, by virtue of his position on a State-owned railway, a Government official, and is quite conscious of the fact. Adopt towards him a high-handed, domineering attitude, and he at once entrenches himself behind a rampart of "réglements," erects a barrier of "red tape" (or its French equivalent), and the more vigorously the attack is pressed the more impregnable become his defences. But, approach him in a courteous manner, with full recognition of his position and authority, explain your difficulties to him, and ask what he can do in the matter, he capitulates instantly, and is fertile in suggestions for adjusting matters and meeting your requirements.

A few British officers still cling, apparently, to the idea, characteristic of the English traveller of 30 or 40 years ago, that if a Continental railway official does not understand English spoken in a sufficiently loud voice, he must either be obstinate or deficient in intellect, and sometimes do not hesitate to tell him so. Such officers may afterwards be heard enlarging upon the rudeness and stupidity of the French Railway Staff, whereas the fault lies entirely in their own ignorance of the French language and the French temperament.

From the experience gained during nearly a year of railway transport work in France, and many months spent in travel in that country in times of peace, I can testify that, with very few exceptions, the French railwayman is, when handled in the right way, courteous and obliging. It must not be forgotten that France is a much more democratic country than England, having completely swept aside the traditions of feudalism which still affect the relations of class to class in England, especially in country districts.

An English railway official, watching the shunting operations in a French goods yard, with their inevitable accompaniment of shouting, gesticulation, heated argument, and apparent lack of any system whatever, would come to the conclusion that not only would all trains be wrongly marshalled, but that no train would ever leave punctually! As a matter of fact, however, empty trains are set ready for loading at the proper time; loaded trains leave punctually, and, if clear instructions are given, are correctly marshalled. The methods are totally different to those of the English railwayman, the expenditure of energy seems to be enormous, but the results attained are most satisfactory. Delays en route certainly do occur, but these are largely due to the inevitable congestion of traffic in certain areas.

It must be understood that these observations on the temperament of the French railwayman apply solely to the rank and file. The higher grades—inspectors and officials in the Administration Offices—exhibit the same characteristics of clear understanding and prompt decision as are common to the administrative staff of railways in nearly every part of the world.

CONCLUSION.

The contents of this paper are the result of observations during nearly a year's work with the Railway Transport Department in France, during which the writer was stationed at railhead and at three different bases.

The difficulty in writing a paper dealing largely with technical questions is to avoid, on the one hand, assuming that technical matters which may be commonplaces to the writer are within the knowledge of the reader, and, on the other hand, of escaping the commission of the error of underrating the reader's intelligence and using a sort of "reading without tears" style of expression.

The author of this article has endeavoured to steer a middle course between the rock and the whirlpool. If he, on his part, has been betrayed into an error in military terminology, he begs his readers to overlook it, and frankly confesses that his knowledge of railway technicalities considerably exceeds his acquaintance with military nomenclature.

THE DIARY OF FIRST LIEUTENANT
WILLIAM SWABEY, ROYAL ARTILLERY,
28 JULY TO 31 OCTOBER, 1807.

*Edited and prepared for publication by Major John H. Leslie, R.A.,
(retired list).*

INTRODUCTION.

THIS diary was written by First Lieutenant William Swabey, Royal Artillery, during the expedition against Copenhagen in 1807 (July to November), which resulted in the capitulation of that city on 7 September.

The diary is now published by the kind permission of Lady Bowman, wife of Sir Paget Bowman, Bart., and daughter of the diarist.

The following paragraphs give a short sketch of Swabey's career, compiled from notes furnished by his family.

William Swabey was the third and youngest son of Maurice Swabey, D.C.L., of Langley Marish, near Slough, Chancellor of the Diocese of Rochester, and was born in London on 13 June, 1789.

He was educated at Westminster School, joined the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, in June, 1804, and received a commission in the Royal Regiment of Artillery, as Second Lieutenant, on 1 July, 1806.

In 1807 he belonged to Captain J. P. Cockburn's Company, in the 1st Battalion, R.A., which took part in the expedition against Copenhagen.

He served in the Peninsular War, with "E" Troop, R.H.A., from July, 1811, until June, 1813, when he was wounded at the Battle of Vitoria, necessitating his return to England on sick leave. He rejoined the army, however, before the end of the war, and was present at the Battle of Toulouse, 1814, returning to England with the Troop later in the year.

In the same Troop he served in the Waterloo campaign in 1815—retreat from Quatre Bras and battle of Waterloo.

For these services he received the Waterloo Medal, and the General Service Medal (issued in 1847), with clasps for Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca, Vitoria, and Toulouse.

His diary, covering the period of his service in the Peninsula, was published in the "Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution," Volumes XXII and XXIII, edited by Colonel F. A. Whinyates, R.A.

He retired from the army, by the sale of his commission, in 1826, then being a Second Captain, and settled down in Buckinghamshire, where he was appointed a Justice of the Peace and a Deputy-Lieutenant of the county. He also commanded a troop of the Bucks Yeomanry Cavalry.

In 1840 he emigrated with his family to Prince Edward Island, of which his friend, Sir Charles A. FitzRoy (an old Waterloo officer) was then Lieutenant-Governor. Swabey remained in the colony until 1861, and developed such capacity for the management of public affairs that he became, successively, a member of the Legislative and Executive Councils, Registrar of Deeds, Commissioner of Crown Lands, and member of the Board of Education, besides undertaking, latterly, the duties of Lieutenant-Colonel and Adjutant-General of the local Militia. The statute book of the island is full of useful measures which he either initiated or promoted. When the Prince of Wales visited the colony in 1860, Colonel Swabey was one of the two military aides-de-camp to the Lieutenant-Governor who received from His Royal Highness's own hand a portrait of himself, in recognition of their services. Colonel Swabey was entertained at a public banquet in the colony and presented with an address, signed by the heads of departments and many other prominent inhabitants, on the occasion of his return to England in 1861. He was also allowed to retain, for life, the prefix of "Honourable," a privilege limited to those members of Council who (prior to the Union, about 1867, of the North American Colonies) had received their appointments under the sign manual of Her Majesty the Queen.

Captain Swabey married, in 1820, Marianne, third daughter of Edward Hobson, of Somerley, Hants, and of Hope Hall, Lancashire, Esquire, and had a family of eleven children. He died on 6 February, 1872, at Wavendon House, Bucks, and is buried with his wife in the churchyard of Cranfield parish, near Wavendon House, where he had resided for some years.

SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE EXPEDITION.

When in 1807 the British Government learnt that one of the secret articles of the treaty between Napoleon and the Emperor of Russia at Tilsit (7 July) involved the combination of all the fleets of the northern Powers against England, it was determined to take the initiative, and seize the Danish fleet, with or without the consent of that Power.

For this purpose an expedition was prepared with the utmost secrecy, which set sail from Yarmouth Roads on 27 July, having

on board 20,000 men, under the command of Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B. The force reached Helsingör on 3 August, and was there joined by some British troops which had been for some weeks in the island of Rugen, under Lieut.-General Lord Cathcart, who now assumed the chief command.

An attempt to obtain possession of the fleet by negotiation failed, and the troops were consequently landed on 16 August. The construction of siege batteries was to a certain extent impeded by fire from Danish gunboats.

Copenhagen, although strongly defended on the sea-side, was comparatively open by land, and the besiegers were able to complete their batteries and commence a bombardment without the delay usually necessary in the attack on a fortified place.

On 2 September the fire was opened and for four days was maintained against the city, without cessation, 1,800 houses being destroyed and 1,500 of the inhabitants killed.

On the evening of the 5th a flag of truce was sent out. Negotiations ensued and the city capitulated on the 7th, the Danish fleet being surrendered.

The object of the expedition having been thus gained, the whole force was re-embarked and returned to England, with seventeen Danish men-of-war, and naval stores of all descriptions to the amount of 20,000 tons.

Accounts of the expedition are to be found in "British Minor Expeditions, 1746 to 1814," compiled in the Intelligence branch of the Quartermaster-General's Department of the War Office, and published by His Majesty's Stationery Office in 1884, pp. 45 to 57; and in the "United Service Magazine"—one of a series of articles, entitled "Minor Expeditions of the British Army from 1803 to 1815," by Captain Lewis Butler, No. IX., relating to the Copenhagen expedition, appeared in the September number of 1905, pp. 617 to 623.

The table here following gives the details of the artillery portion of the force. It was commanded by Major-General T. Blomefield, R.A. Some short MSS. notes, made by him whilst in Denmark, are extant, and are given between brackets at the end of each corresponding day's entries in Swabey's diary.

Major-General Thomas Blomefield	...	Commanding Royal Artillery.
Captain P. Fyers	Aide-de-camp.
Captain P. Drummond	Brigade Major.
Second Captain E. C. Whinyates	Adjutant.
First Lieutenant R. B. Hunt	Quartermaster.
Lieut.-Colonel John Harding		
Lieut.-Colonel George Cookson		} Field Officers.
Lieut.-Colonel William Robe		

There were eight companies of Royal (foot) Artillery, as shown below. In 1807, companies of a battalion were not numbered, but were always referred to in Orders and in official correspondence by the names of their respective captains.

Bat- talion.	Captain.	2nd Captain.	1st Lieutenant.
1st ...	John May.	Samuel Bolton.	Joseph Darby.
2nd ...	James Pattison Cockburn.	James Pattison Adye.	John Richard Orlebar.
3rd ...	Thomas Franklin.	Thomas Paterson.	Richard Carr Molesworth.
	Charles Newhouse.	George Wilkes Unett.	James Sinclair.
„ ...	Peter Fyers.	Edward Charles Whinyates.	William Augustus Dingley.
„ ...	Percy Drummond.	Charles Freeman Sandham.	Forbes Macbean.
„ ...	Joseph Brome.	William Holcroft.	Richard Burges Hunt.
8th ...	Philip Meadows.	John Wilson Kettlewell.	<i>Hon.</i> Mark Somerville.

In addition to these eight Companies there was a detachment of one Officer, First Lieutenant William Eyles Malings, two N.C.O.'s and 25 gunners, from Captain R. Beevor's Company, of the 3rd battalion; and a detachment of one Officer, First Lieutenant Matthew Lord, and three gunners, who were mustered with Captain Meadows's Company.

The total strength of all ranks was 1,010, made up as follows:—

Staff	5
Field Officers	3
Captains	12
Subalterns	25
Surgeon	1
Assistant Surgeons	4
N.C.O.'s	101
Drummers	15
Gunners	844

These figures are taken from the Monthly Return from Copenhagen, dated 1 September, 1807, in the Public Record Office—War Office No. 17/1729.

The several Companies were all embarked on 29 July, and disembarked in Denmark between 16 and 20 August. In November they had all returned to their respective stations in England.

DIARY.

28—29 July, 1807.

JULY 28.—At twelve o'clock I embarked with Capt. Drummond's Company [see above.—Ed.] on board the "Royal Yeoman" transport. Weighed anchor from Woolwich at four o'clock & dropped down the river as far as Tilbury where we anchored for the night, not being able to make way against wind & tide. We were much crowded, there being nine officers on board the transport. I did not put up my bed, there being no room, but lay all night in my cloak.

JULY 29.—Got under weigh & proceeded to the Nore, where we ran on ground on the Nore sand & were obliged to wait till the tide floated us off, which delayed us till all the other transports were

1st Lieutenant.	2nd Lieutenant.	Designation in 1916, etc.
Peter Desbrisay Stewart. Edward Collyer. Henry Finlay Cubitt. Archibald Montgomery Campbell. Edward Coxwell.	Amherst Wright. William Swabey. Henry Lyons ² . John Wilson. George Thompson.	In 1916, 2nd Battery, R.F.A. Reduced in 1817 and never reformed. In 1916, No. 100 Company, R.G.A. In 1916, 14th Battery, R.F.A.
William Augustus Raynes. Robert Macpherson Cairnes. James Mackonochie ¹ .	John Thomas Fuller. Henry Förster. John Hincks.	Reduced in 1819. Reformed in 1848. In 1916, 7th Battery, R.F.A. In 1916, No. 101 Company, R.G.A. In 1916, No. 65 Company, R.G.A. Reduced in 1819 and never reformed.

¹ In South America.² Killed, 18 August.

29 July—2 August, 1807.

far ahead. We got off at one o'clock and cleared the river, & overtaking Capt. Cockburn's transport (the "Edward K."), I was sent on board to change my transport, & to my great satisfaction found that Lt. Orlebar, Capt. Cockburn's first Lieutenant, was the first for promotion as well as myself, so that in all probability I shall succeed him before my return.

JULY 30.—Began to feel the terrors of sea-sickness, altho' by keeping on deck I prevented its coming to extremities, & soon began to be steady on my legs. Some of the Officers (we were seven in number) were very ill, nor did they recover for some days. We dined on the last piece of mutton & deplored its loss most woefully.

JULY 31.—Mounted my first watch from 4 till 6 in the evening. Found it no hardship at that time of day. Towards evening it blew very hard, with thunder & lightning, & tho' the sailors laughed, I thought it a storm.

AUGUST 1.—Sea ran very high & made us feel a little giddy. We had a North-West breeze which was favourable for passing the North Sea. We dined on the remains of our mutton, & plum pudding resembling what is sold in the streets of London, but we were too hungry to be nice. Towards evening caught some mackerel & a gullet [? mullet.—Ed.]. Watched from twelve till four at night.

AUGUST 2.—Crossed the Dogger Bank, famous for the victory gained by Admiral Jervis over the Dutch Fleet commanded by Van Tromp.¹

Dined on two precious tough boiled ducks, assisted by ship beef. Were not over nice. The women in the ship not having recovered from their sickness were in a deplorable state. I distributed some tea to some of the poorer ones & we all gave them some wine. Weather very fine & our favorable breeze still continuing. Mounted the morning watch from 4 till 8 & rejoiced in having procured a cloak. Supped on mackerel, & received Lt. Thompson from another

¹ The diarist's history appears to be at fault.

2—6 August, 1807.

transport, which increased our number to eight, *viz.*, Captain Cockburn and Lt. Orlebar, of my Company; Captain Whinyates, Adjutant to the expedition; Lts. Dingley & Thompson, of Captain Fyers's Company, & myself & Assistant Surgeon McGlashan. A Portuguese vessel passed, & before he came up, taking him for a Greenlander, we all got letters ready, but on sending on board were much disappointed on finding him bound to Lisbon.

AUGUST 3.—Dined on a couple of fowls & plum pudding & spun out our last loaf in a lamentable manner. At 8 o'clock in the evening land was seen ahead, which proved to be the point called Rovenbergen. The wind fortunately changed & still continued favorable to our passage into the Baltic. A dove flew & lighted on our sails. We hailed the propitious omen & were thankful for our favorable passage.

N.B.—It blew a hard gale towards night & we lost sight of land & were near running foul.

AUGUST 4.—In the morning found ourselves so far to the North-East of the shore that it was no longer to be seen. Dined on roast ducks & were very jovial. Discovered the land about 4 to the southward, & about 6 saw plainly the Skaw, a sea-coast town of Jutland. Observed that it was small & defenceless, tho' regularly built. There appeared to be several fishing boats, which induced us to think if it had any trade it consisted in fish, as the land presented a very barren prospect, unlike the shores of England.

In the evening we began to surmise about our passage thro' the Kattegat, which we expected to go through the next morning, & had not yet met with any of the rest of the party.

AUGUST 5.—Were overtaken by a fleet of merchant ships bound to different ports of the Baltic. Spoke with one from Gottenburg, but gained no intelligence about the other fleet, but as our Commodore continued his course we no longer doubted a favorable passage through the Sound. We had a view of the coast of Swedland [*i.e.*, Sweden. Ed.] all day & distinguished a fortified town called on the map Warberg, apparently a place of some strength, with a small harbour. The shore appeared barren, but in the higher parts of the country there was some appearance of cultivation & much wood.

The wind not being now with us, we tacked & stood towards a rock called the Isle of Anholt. It has no more inhabitants than serve to keep up a lighthouse. Its situation is in the centre of the more western parts of the Kattegat. Our fresh provisions still lasted.

AUGUST 6.—Laboured under an adverse wind & high sea so that we scarcely made any way. However, as the wind got more favorable we got in sight towards 8 o'clock of the false Koll.¹ We were not near enough to form an idea of its population or coast. Understood there was no anchorage for ships. This has been the

¹ Possibly this refers to the wooded headland of Kullen in Sweden, jutting N.-W. into the Kattegat. The meaning of the word "false" is not clear.

6—9 August, 1807.

most boisterous & only unfavorable day we have had. We expect to pass or enter the Kattegat to-morrow.

AUGUST 7.—We passed through the Kattegat between Sweden & Zealand. Both the coasts were most delightfully beautiful, & the harvest looked luxuriant. I believe there is no other place in the globe where the verdure comes so close to the water, growing over the very cliffs. We had a distant view of Helsingör¹ & Helsingborg on the opposite coast. Towards evening we anchored in the Sound, & had a view of Kronborg Castle, which is very strong towards the sea & is said to command the Sound, tho' there is water enough on the opposite coast to sail out of its reach. Helsingborg has a castle but no guns. If they acted properly together the passage would be very hazardous. Towards night I went on shore with Capt. Cockburn & Lt. Dingley. We were kindly received by the inhabitants.

AUGUST 9.—The bay was covered with English ships, so that it was in vain to attempt counting them. I went on shore to breakfast & take a view of the town. We breakfasted at an English tavern & were well charged by the Englishman, tho' the Danes sold everything cheap. The appearance of the Danes is a mixture of Dutch & English. Their houses resemble those we see in the oldest of our Country towns. The women are very engaging and some beautiful. The ladies dress in the French style. Went to see the Hamlets Gardens, where there is a palace of the Prince of Denmark's, & the gardens are much spoken of. They did not strike us Englishmen, though were they better cultivated they might be called pretty, as they command a fine sea view, as well as the Swedish coast. This was the place where the scenes related by Shakespeare were actually gone through. The Danes appear to be when unmolested a set of quiet people & very friendly to strangers. Their honesty is such that they sleep with their doors open, & you walk at all times with freedom into their houses. Many speak English, & I found no difficulty in making myself understood between German & English. The inhabitants are poor, nor did I see so much appearance of merchandise as I expected. They have a Custom House, & we payed high for taking on board what we purchased for little. Their port wine, which is 3s. 6d. a bottle, is good. Claret at the *English* hotel cost 4s. 6d., & hock 3s. There was an English correspondent who almost forced us into his house, & made us take wine & coffee, & they all seemed equally ready to oblige, the very daughters of the citizens waiting on us at supper. We returned on board late in the evening, delighted with our temporary release from the transport. At nine o'clock the most tremendous storm of thunder & lightning I ever witnessed poured down on us. I never remember anything so truly alarming as this. Those who have been at sea at such a time can judge of the awful impression it made on us. We apprehended that all the fleet would be driven from their anchors on shore, but fortunately only one

¹ The "Elsinore" in "Hamlet."

9—12 August, 1807.

was forced from her moorings & brought up again in time. A frigate had her mizen-top mast & her main-top-gallant mast blown down or taken off by the concussion of some other ship. About three the storm ceased, thank God. In Helsingör there is a rope-walk, but no dockyard or any harbour for large ships, or quay to lay close to the shore. Ships ride very safe in the Sound. We saw [] at Kronborg Castle. A Dane told us there are 700 pieces of cannon.

AUGUST 10.—Stayed on board all day, notwithstanding I wished very much to land on the coast of Sweden, as I heard there were Public Balls at Helsingborg, & I was ambitious to have to say that I had been on the Continent of Europe. Lt. Lord¹ dined with us.

AUGUST 11.—We found on getting up that the wind had risen to a storm. We were very apprehensive for Lord Cathcart's safety, who we believed to be on the sea somewhere near the entrance of Baltic. A ship was driven from her anchors, & we were much alarmed at seeing her drive directly towards us, but she providentially brought up. It was so rough that Mr. Lord was obliged to remain with us till the evening. We received orders from the Admiral & General Burrard respecting arrangements in case of landing, & to have three days' provisions cooked, &c. It blew a very strong gale through the night. The fleet luckily rode it out without damage.

AUGUST 12.—I must not omit remarking that the appearance of the Danish soldiers is despicable, as I forgot to insert it in its proper place. We hear from the Swedes that their appearance corresponds with their abilities. I hope we shall find it so, for we are now in daily expectation of something being done, tho' I still have my doubts as to our intentions being hostile, in which opinion I am assisted by an Official Gazette in one of the Helsingör papers, which contains a Proclamation of the Crown Prince, which tells the Danes not to be alarmed at appearances, and assures them that the Courts of London & Copenhagen understand each other, & admonishes them to be quiet. We shall soon see the event as Lord Cathcart is just arrived. Towards the evening a signal was made to form a rendezvous of transports round certain ships, from which we are to receive signals. The command of several divisions of the Army was yesterday arranged as follows:—

[Here it is only necessary to give the names of the Officers detailed to command the brigades² of artillery. For details of the Staff and Company Officers, R.A., see page 66.—Ed.]

¹ First-Lieutenant Matthew Lord, R.A.

² The term "Brigade," as used in 1807, referred to guns only, and not to personnel. A brigade generally consisted of six guns, and when it took the field, a sufficient number of officers and men for its service were attached to it, usually, but not necessarily, a complete company. The "Brigade" of 1807, is somewhat similar to the Field Battery of to-day; the horses and drivers were furnished by the Corps of R.A. Drivers.

13 August, 1807.

To command light 6-pdr. brigades :

Captain Joseph Brome.
 „ Charles Newhouse.
 „ Philip Meadows.
 „ John May.
 „ James Pattison Cockburn.

2nd-Captain George Wilkes Unett.
 „ Thomas Paterson.
 „ William Holcroft.

AUGUST 13.—Stayed all day on board, as two Officers had been on shore & witnessed the preparations of the Danes, who were arming *en masse*. We saw patrols of heavy cavalry on the coast reviewed. No further orders, but believed we were waiting for a wind to go further up. We heard some partial firing off Copenhagen.

Capt. Cockburn went to Helsingborg, & from thence hired a carriage & went to a Watering Place, where there is a spring whose waters are nearly similar to the chalybeate waters in England & other places. This is an inland place, & may be compared to Tunbridge, allowing for the disparity in the progress of society & arts between the two countries. The carriage in which they rode was like an open waggon with four seats in it. The horses were very good, & far superior to those of the opposite coast. Captain Cockburn went to the Swedish theatre, which was very like one of our country theatres fitted up in a barn. The performance was much in the pantomimic style, & as far as a foreigner's opinion (who did not entirely understand the language) he thought it good. It was at least laughable & entertaining. There were many families of Danes the female part of which had fled to this place for refuge from the impending storm. Capt. C. remarked that the women were universally beautiful. At the Watering Place there was a handsome ball room, which is open on Wednesdays & Sundays to gentlemen & ladies, who are admitted without expence. It is kept up by subscription. There are lodging-houses as in England. The scenery is incomparably beautiful, & is a seat of fashion among the Swedes. They have not arrived at that degree of unnatural refinement which in England perverts the course of Nature & turns our nights to day. As to the theatre at Helsingborg, it must not be a standard for an opinion of the Swedish drama any more than our Woolwich theatre can be allowed to be of the English. The party dined at a tavern in Helsingborg kept by a Frenchman, whose cook was an Italian, & whose waiter was a Russian. The latter made many remarks on the liberality of the English. They were regaled with burgundy & paid very little for what they had. The landlord had quite the same idea of them that the Parisian ones have of our milords. The people are robust & industrious. The women share in all the labours. The country appears fertile & tolerably cultivated.

14—18 August, 1807.

AUGUST 14.—Layed still all day, there not being wind enough to disembark the troops. We were highly impatient to be in action, but it was out of our power.

AUGUST 15.—Sailed down towards Copenhagen & saw on our right perhaps some of the most beautiful scenery that ever was beheld—woods, here & there, interrupted by beautiful valleys, with the harvest already cut & vieing in fertility even with England. The houses of the nobility are neatly built, & tho' in grandeur of architecture they do not equal our own, yet the prospects they command are beyond description. There is a country seat of the King's, called the Royal Hunting Box, which stands in the midst of a Royal forest, enclosed for many miles with an ash pailing. We brought up for want of wind in the evening, tho' in full expectation of landing in the morning.

AUGUST 16.—The landing of His Majesty's troops commenced. A few Danish cavalry showed themselves at first, but thought proper to wheel off. The whole of the Army, except three regiments, quietly disembarked with two brigades of light artillery, & proceeded on their march towards Copenhagen at half-past six.

We dropped down within three miles of Copenhagen in the evening, & lay there all night.

AUGUST 17.—A brigade of artillery was disembarked, & many horses & some German Legion cavalry. We were tortured with expectation beyond measure, & were much disappointed at not landing, particularly as the men-of-war bore down on Copenhagen.

Some of our gun brigs sailed boldly under the famed Crown batterys. The troops took possession of two outposts & invested the town. The batterys opened and the Rifle Corps was engaged.

No heavy artillery yet on shore. We were in the most anxious ferment at not being landed. I went to the village we were laying off, & was happy to find the inhabitants unmolested & the soldiers even paying for what they had. This was a sight gratifying to the feelings & character of Englishmen.

Three transports from Rügen were taken by the Danes. One hundred of the German Legion, with their horses, were in them. The fleet was becalmed & could not act. The Danes had row gunboats. They were not able to get out the horses. They set them on fire, after taking out the men, at the approach of a frigate.

AUGUST 18.—Lay still. No news of consequence from the Army. There was a report from the artillery that two outposts with batterys were taken, but it did not prove to be true. This evening the gunboats lay in shore & opened a fire without effect on the left of the Army.

The foundation of a battery on the beach was laid to counteract their attacks. This evening Captain Paterson's brigade of 9-pounders was landed & equipped.

19—24 August, 1807.

AUGUST 19.—Was ordered on shore as a guard to 40 natives & as many waggons & 80 horses, which had been taken full of ammunition by the German cavalry. Had the severe mortification to hear that poor Lyons,¹ of the 9-pounder brigade which landed yesterday, had been shot through the breast by an 18-pound ball from a gunboat.

AUGUST 20.—Was employed in landing stores & horses. We buried poor Lyons in a field near the place where the encampment was marked out. The Danes who were present at this lamentable ceremony shewed great attention & reverence during the service, which was performed by Lord Cathcart's private chaplain in a very feeling manner. My poor unfortunate young friend was a very sincere good fellow, & the last words he uttered were: "Soldiers, you see me die the death of an officer."

To-day the artillery encampment was completed at Säfsjhöide & a Mess established. I was a member of the Committee. Colonel Harding read the General's orders to us, expressing high satisfaction at the conduct of the 9-pr. brigade, which had beat off the gunboats. Captain Meadows and Lt. Hincks were sent to the 24-pounder battery, & were in action before night, as we heard very heavy firing.

AUGUST 21.—The gunboats still continued with the Crown Batteries to resist the attack of two boombs,² eight brigs, two frigates, & six transports fitted up for the occasion, & the battery. The gunboats carried two long 18 & one 24-pounder. Our stores were not nearly disembarked. I slept this night in a tent, & was much annoyed by the insects & wasps which abound in Zealand.

AUGUST 22.—Still continued at Säfsjhöide landing stores. A very severe action with the gunboats. Some of our brigs were shot through & through & lost men. Lieut. Orlebar was ordered with two guns of Capt. Cockburn's brigade to command a road into Copenhagen of [? on.—Ed.] the left.

[Captain Paterson's brigade of 9-prs. drove off the gunboats.]

AUGUST 23.—Still at Säfsjhöide, tho' Capt. May's and Capt. Unett's brigades of 6-pdrs. were gone.

[Lord Rosslyn's corps joined the Army. The mill battery attacked the gunboats in conjunction with the bomb ketches, &c. One vessel of ours blew up, by which nine officers & seamen were killed & nineteen wounded.]

AUGUST 24.—We were at length unexpectedly ordered to join the right wing under Sir George Ludlow. Our road lay by the battery, which was in hot action. Some shells fell very near us on the road. I was mounted & had my canteen & havresac with my saddle, holsters, pistols & cloak on my horse. We passed a guard of the 82nd Regiment which had but just arrived from England,

¹ Second Lieutenant Henry Lyons, of Franklin's Company, 2nd Battalion, R.A.

² An obsolete form of the word "bomb"—a small war vessel, carrying mortars for throwing bombs.

24—25 August, 1807.

where I was obliged to leave my horse, it not being thought safe to allow officers to ride amongst such a shower of shells. As we passed the battery we were stopped by General Blomefield, who ordered me to take twenty men into the battery to relieve such guns as might be tired. I found the battery consisted of four 24-pounders, two 9-pounders, one heavy howitzer. There was an advanced battery of two 24-pounders. They were in high action, & we soon found employment. We used Col. Shrapnel's¹ shells, which we found did not burst so accurately as was expected. Our shot after some time did not reach the enemy, tho' theirs, and particularly their shells, fell among us like hail. We lost a bombardier of my company close to Lieut. Orlebar. After about an hour there was a mutual cessation, when I received a message from Capt. Cockburn, informing me that he was gone on, & I must follow the brigade, which I immediately did, & after a long march arrived at the Palace Royal of Denmark, which was to be my quarter. It was filled with the Guards, & I found Capt. Brome's brigade there. His officers were detached. I saw Forster² in a devil of a stew about thirteen men of his detachment who were to be tried for plundering in the morning.

[The army moved forward to take an advanced position. Enemy's redoubt on the left taken possession of by Sir David Baird's division. A *flèche*³ for two guns, 24 prs., & one 8-in. howitzer, constructed on the right of the windmill battery and a battery for two mortars.]

The Palace of Denmark is situated on a hill commanding a view of Copenhagen, which is very extensive. It has a spacious courtyard and every appearance of grandeur. Unluckily I postponed examining it till the next morning, little imagining that after so much fatigue we should be called up at one o'clock & ordered to get ready. We were attached to the 7th. (I observed from my first action that there are three kinds of men that make soldiers. The first, & the far greater, consists of those who stare at death without consideration; another, of those who have some reliance on their own conscience; & the third, of those who will not allow those thoughts to intrude the suppression of which they think warranted by the responsibility of their duty.)

N.B.—The palace was not built of stone, as Denmark produces none, but is covered with a kind of plaster that has no bad effect.

AUGUST 25.—We were roused at $\frac{1}{2}$ -past one in the morning & ordered to co-operate with the 79th Regiment. The army took up a new position, advancing everywhere much nearer to Copenhagen. We were under arms till twelve in full expectation of an attack, but after that took quiet possession of our new quarters.

¹ Henry Shrapnel, R.A., the inventor of the projectile which in its present-day form is called a "shrapnel" shell. Prior to 1850 the projectile was called a "spherical case shot."

² Second-Lieutenant Henry Forster, of Brome's Company, 8th Battalion, R.A.

³ A field earth-work of two faces, forming a salient towards some object. In plan, it resembles the head of an arrow—hence *flèche*—A.

25—29 August, 1807.

Captain Cockburn returned to the palace, & I remained at Frederiksborg with two nine-pounders. I think I had an escape in their being no engagement this morning, as Sir George Ludlow had placed me immediately under the fire of the whole lines.

This evening I began to know how troublesome it was to be so much among the Staff, being continually reminded to be on the alert, &c., &c.

[Mortar batteries making considerable progress. Ordnance & stores landing & bringing forward to the lines.]

The enemy's gunboats appeared on the right near Amack & cannonaded the guards in the suburbs. Progress made in constructing a battery to protect the right.]

AUGUST 26.—Slept most part of this day, not having any baggage or implements for writing, nobody that I knew to converse with, and no books. Slept all night (as I had been obliged to do ever since my arrival at the army) in my clothes. No fresh provisions to be had.

[The gunboats attacked the left of the position and were twice driven back by the windmill batteries and bomb ketches and gun brigs. One of their boats blew up and several suffered considerably. The enemy attempted a sortie on the left but was driven back.]

At daybreak a battery of four 24-prs., commanded by Captain Bolton and Lieuts. Collyer, Swabey & Campbell, opened on these gunboats, & by nine o'clock drove them off. One was much damaged. Two more guns were added to this battery.

The loss of the "Danae" was Lieut. Zeuther killed, two officers & fifteen men wounded.]

AUGUST 27.—Was turned out by Sir George Ludlow & Genl. Finch at about two in the afternoon to act against three gunboats that had come round to this (the right) side, but could not get within shot, tho' we stayed till it was dark. No provisions. Nothing but potatoes this day. Men inclined to grumble.

AUGUST 28.—The battery which had been constructed on the right sunk one of the gunboats. This battery was commanded by Capt. Bolton. He had two men, both of Capt. Cockburn's company, wounded. One lost an arm, & afterwards died, & the other had a piece of iron shot into his thigh. Two shells fell on the trails of the guns.

Our battery, with ten mortars on the left, & one with five on the right, are to open to-morrow morning, & it is thought a bombardment may force them to capitulate.

[Progress made in landing and bringing forward stores & ammunition and making batteries & communications.]

AUGUST 29.—Was ready, as usual, at $\frac{1}{2}$ -past two. An alarm was given at 8 that there was preparation for an attack on the part

29—30 August, 1807.

of the enemy on the left. We were all ready in ten minutes, but nothing occurring we did not march.

General Ward ordered a breast-work to be constructed for my guns to command a vast extent in front of Copenhagen in case of an attack, which was being over-cautious, as our advanced picquets had driven bodies of Danes over the canal & maintained their post close to the bridge.

The German Rifle Men were attacked & drove their opponents over the canal. I saw one of them, with the greatest coolness in the world, without taking his pipe from his mouth, make a dead shot at a Dane as we would shoot a sparrow. The Germans have behaved extremely well. Some time ago two troops of their cavalry attacked & took 800 stand of rifle pieces, 900 prisoners, & 9,000 barrels of powder.

AUGUST 30.—Completed my battery, which I called "General Ward's whim." It had two embrasures¹ to the flank, & a flank with an obtuse angle. I used sandbags & sods alternately. We received news of an engagement in the rear, in which the force from Helsingör was entirely overthrown, besides our taking 1,500 prisoners, 60 officers, & one General of distinction. I have not yet learnt who was our Commander, and what regiments were engaged. We took some pieces of ordnance & a large quantity of military stores.

N.B.—General Ward had the grace [to thank.—Ed.] me for my exertions in getting the work completed.

I ventured to stroll as far as the palace. I saw some of the Royal apartments, which are very elegant & fitted up luxuriously. The gardens & grounds, in which I stayed some time, are most beautifully laid out, the woods & walks interspersed in the most artful manner, tho' everything was so contrived as to appear natural. Pagodas & summer houses, with water & boats, add much to the scene. I lost my way frequently in the walks. Capt. Cockburn has taken several beautiful sketches of the place, & an extensive panorama from the top of the palace, which commands the city, the harbour & shipping, with a beautiful extent of fertile country.²

I had a Danish horse, with a long tail, sent to me for a charger, & received all my luggage; made up my journal & wrote letters to England.

N.B.—Still living on salt provisions.

¹ An opening in the parapet of a fort or field-work, through which guns are fired.

² Cockburn was an artist of first-rate ability, and much of his work has been published—"Swiss Scenery"; "The Route of the Simplon"; "The Route of Mont Cenis"; "Views in the Valley of Aosta"; "Pompeii Illustrated," etc. The painting here mentioned by Swabey was one of a set of five aquatints, in colours, of views of Copenhagen, published in 1807. It is reproduced as a frontispiece to this number of the JOURNAL. See the "Dictionary of National Biography."

30—31 August, 1807.

[Mortar batteries nearly finished, platforms laid, and two-thirds of the ordnance mounted. New gun battery for six guns near the chalk wharf to be manned by sailors, a corps of whom were landed under proper officers for that purpose.]

AUGUST 31.—Heard the particulars of yesterday's action,¹ which were nearly as follows:—In the morning the videttes of the reserve under Sir Arthur Wellesley, consisting of the 95, 92, 52, 43 [regiments—Ed.] and German cavalry, gave notice of the approach of a very large Danish force. Sir Arthur marched to meet them, disposing his men in an echelon column of regiments, the 92 leading, the cavalry in two bodies on the flanks of the column. The resistance was but short, tho' obstinate while it lasted. The Germans lost some men, & the 92nd a very few. Two German officers were killed, four severely wounded. On the enemy's beginning to give way the cavalry made great havoc. Fifteen hundred prisoners were taken; ten pieces of cannon & a large quantity of ammunition.

A soldier of the 79th, called Barclay Birch, formed the resolution of taking the town himself, & actually advanced beyond his picquet on to the bridge, charging his bayonet, & would have proceeded to attack the whole Danish Guard if he had not been forced back by his Commander. A sortie was made on the left which was put to rout by the 23rd & 4th Regiments. Sir David Baird, who commanded this brigade, had a musket shot that broke his finger & stuck in his stock. I dined with Brigadier-General Ward, & was much flattered by the attention paid me. There were Col. and Capt. Cameron, of the 79th, Captain Bradford, Guards, and Lt. Annesley, of the 7th Dragoons, the General's Aide-de-camp.

We had an armed transport² sunk by the gunboats this day.

[The enemy made a sortie on the right near the citadel before sunrise, and was stopped by a picquet of the 50th Regiment, under the command of Lieut. Light. Sir David Baird slightly wounded in the finger and breast.

The Danish General Oxholm and 1,500 prisoners of war, taken at Kioge by Sir Arthur Wellesley [on the 29th.—Ed.], arrived at headquarters.

The batteries all armed and compleated excepting that at the Chalk Wharf.

The gunboats attacked the in-shore squadron of light vessels, blew up one of them, and obliged the rest to retire. The gunboats & block-ships³ having suffered considerable damage by the Windmill Battery.]

¹ This action actually took place on August 29. The Danes, under the command of General Castenkiold, were in position near Kioge.

² The "Charles," blown up by a shell from the "Trekroner."

³ A ship moored to block the entrance to a harbour.

1—4 September, 1807.

SEPTEMBER 1.—[The mortar batteries being nearly in readiness for opening, the town was summoned. The answer arriving very late, accompanied by a desire to take the pleasure of his Danish Majesty, the reply could not be sent till the following day.

The enemy has for some days fired from the ramparts, outworks, & advanced posts, with guns & mortars on the points of attack, but with little success, excepting the setting fire to many houses in the suburbs, which appears to have been done intentionally, to prevent our approaching under cover of them.]

SEPTEMBER 2.—Capt. Brome came to me with orders to repair to one of the mortar batteries which were to open in the evening. It was on the right & the farthest advanced, 900 yards from the rampart, & contained four iron mortars & two 8-inch brass howitzers.

At 6 o'clock commenced the most terrible bombardment, perhaps, ever witnessed, from 33 mortars & howitzers. The town at about ten was on fire in one place, but it was inconsiderable & soon extinguished. It was pitch dark, & the shots rattled over us in front from the works & in flank from gunboats. Fortunately no one was hurt. We ceased at daylight to fire quick, & continued till twelve o'clock a shot in three minutes.

[The mortar batteries on the right being compleated & reported in readiness, orders were given for opening the whole at $\frac{1}{2}$ -past 7 in the evening, from

40 mortars,
10 howitzers,
30 24-pr. guns.

The bombardment continued without intermission 12 hours, and very little return was made on the part of the enemy. Our fire slackened during the day. The town was set on fire by the first flight of shells, & continued burning in different places the night, but got under in the morning in great degree.]

SEPTEMBER 3.—Began the bombardment again in the evening, tho' not with so much spirit as on the preceding night. The Danes kept up a spirited & well-directed fire, & we began to apprehend that bombarding did not take much effect. There was a slight fire & soon extinguished. We were forced to continue under cover of the battery. Some shells fell among us, & one poor fellow, who was imprudent enough to go to sleep, lost his life at four o'clock in the morning.

[Orders were given for renewing the bombardment from the several batteries at the same hour in the evening, and continuing it for 16 hours at rather longer intervals (so as that each mortar should fire one round per minute) till 16 hours were elapsed.]

SEPTEMBER 4.—Captain Bolton, in the evening, with red hot shot, made a very great blaze in a timber yard, insomuch that we worked our mortars at night by the light of it, & succeeded in

4—5 September, 1807.

making a most tremendous blaze in the city, extending nearly through it.

[Orders were given for continuing the bombardment as quickly as could be done with safety to the mortars, and commencing at the same hour in the evening.

Early after its commencement a timber yard was set on fire by red hot shot from Captain Bolton's 6-gun battery on the right, which burnt with great violence. The town was also on fire in several places & burnt with great devastation. The great church was also in flames, and the steeple fell about $\frac{1}{2}$ -past 3 in the morning. The fire in the town continued burning all the following day.]

SEPTEMBER 5.—The fire defied all their efforts to prevent its spreading, & the steeple of the cathedral fell at night. We kept up a most spirited fire, & the Danes were so sickened they did [not—Ed.] fire a shot. Their city presented a most lamentable sight, & at intervals, when anything fell, we could hear the cries of the multitude.

[We were preparing to renew the bombardment in the evening, when a flag of truce came out to treat for a surrender of the place, when orders were given not to continue the bombardment.]

[Letter from Lieutenant W. Swabey, R.A., to his sister Kate, afterwards the wife of the Rev. W. Freeman, Rector of Hedgerley, Bucks. Swabey was 18 years old on June 13, 1807.—Ed.]

“ The advanced mortar battery before Copenhagen,

“ September 5th, 1807.

“ MY DEAR KATE,

“ I am aware that you will excuse my not writing to any of my dear brothers & sisters when you consider the difficulty & the few opportunities that I have lately had of taking up my pen to write at all. By the date of this letter you will guess that I am in the midst of the roaring of cannon, having a command in the most advanced of our posts, 900 yards from the rampart of Copenhagen. This is the fifth day that I have been here, during an incessant fire, without sleep, being obliged to lay in the rain under the cover of our parapet. The houses which might otherwise have afforded us shelter from the heavy rain we have had, are shot through & through, & are more dangerous to inhabit than our open battery. We have now bombarded the city since the night of the second with great success & credit to our artillery. The very first night the city was in flames—tho' the continuance of the fire was not very long; the second it was again in flames, & the fire raged without ceasing till the next day. The third night it blazed throughout greater part, & is now in flames almost universally. A flag of truce has arrived, & I hope before I conclude this letter to announce the surrender of the capital of Zealand. We are now ordered to discontinue our fire, & I have time to contemplate the horrors of the scene which I have been active in producing. A large city standing on a peninsula, its retreat towards land

5—6 September, 1807.

& sea effectually cut off in an universal blaze, the riches & all the valuable effects of the inhabitants of the whole country gradually consuming. The first emotion that this occasions is pity for its inhabitants, & we then look with horror on ourselves as the source of such a dreadful calamity; nor would I stifle the reflections this produces had not it been principally caused by the inflexible obstinacy of the powerful part of the Danes, who were reminded of our ability & intentions of erasing their capital if they did not accede to our proposals, but nevertheless madly resolved to oppose us till the last drop of Danish blood was shed in defence of their all. We have, however, taken a method of conquering them which has not cost many lives, for they have not dared to oppose themselves to us in the field, & the war, excepting one short action, which terminated in an almost immediate rout of the enemy, has been carried on principally by the artillery on both sides, and, thank heaven, our own has proved itself superior. Our avowed object is nothing but the possession of the Danish fleet (23 sail of the Line), but their obstinate resistance will perhaps increase our demand. This business, short as it has been, might have been ended in a week by our immediately storming, but Lord Cathcart judged it more expedient to take methods which would not be so productive of bloodshed on the part of our own army. General Baird (Sir David) has had a slight wound in opposing a sortie of the enemies. The loss of the artillery as yet is confined to one officer & 15 men; we have only lost one in our battery, which consists of 4 mortars & two howitzers, & is the farthest advanced of any throughout the Lines. I hope & believe our labours are at an end, & that I shall soon return and find Henry and yourself much better. Give my love to all, & excuse the badness of this scrawl, as I am writing in the open air on the top of a shot box. I shall keep this letter till I have an opportunity of knowing the result of the flag of truce.

“Your affte. Brother,

“(Signed) W. SWABEY.

“N.B.—Copenhagen has surrendered.”

SEPTEMBER 6.—We had every [thing—Ed.] in readiness for recommencing at night, but were ordered not to fire, for, indeed, nothing was wanting to increase their inducements to surrender. A flag of truce arrived, we supposed with offers of capitulation. This was welcome news for us, who had been four nights and days without rest or a house to cover us, for it was more dangerous to be in the house behind than in the battery under the parapet.

[A correspondence took place between the commanders during the night of the 5th and the whole of this day, in the afternoon of which Sir A. Wellesley, accompanied by Sir H. Popham and Lieut.-Colonel Murray, was sent in to know their ultimate determination, with directions that if matters did not terminate favorably he should

6—14 September, 1807.

return by the left mortar battery, which, in that case, had orders to recommence a smart bombardment.

Sir Arthur stayed in town all night, and returned in the morning of the 7th with the capitulation finally settled.]

SEPTEMBER 7.—We were not made acquainted with the purport of the flag of truce & received orders to be in readiness.

SEPTEMBER 8.—Remain ignorant till evening, when we were surprised with the joyful news of a surrender.

SEPTEMBER 9.—The troops, consisting of flank companies of the Guards, 78th & 28th, with Captain Brome's light brigade, took possession. The gates were opened to the inhabitants, who thronged into the garden of the house where I was & tore the trees down to eat the fruit, they appeared so hungry.

I understood that more than 1,000 people had been killed during the bombardment, many of whom were women & children.

SEPTEMBER 10.—Obtained Lt.-Col. Cookson's permission to remove my quarters to the palace, but not being able to find a room that was unoccupied, determined to wait till the next morning. The re-embarkation of stores commenced on the left, & the sailors were very active in getting the Danish men-of-war rigged. It was found that the Danes had scuttled all the ships. A working party was supplied by the Guards to get ready the arsenal stores, consisting chiefly of iron guns, cables, masts, gun carriages, & small arms & other naval & military appointments. The poor Dane who inhabited the house that was in the rear of our battery came to see his possessions, but so strange & sudden an alteration had taken place that he scarcely seemed to know where he was. I was extremely gratified in being able to explain to him that it had been as much as possible taken [care—Ed.] of, & that previous to the gates of Copenhagen being opened his garden was untouched.

SEPTEMBER 12.—Went up to the palace in the morning & took up my quarters in a small, dirty room, which formed part of the Royal apartments. The comfort I felt in having my bed to sleep on at night was beyond measure.

SEPTEMBER 13.—I received a message from Sir George Ludlow desiring me to evacuate my quarters, as it was stipulated that no Royal apartments should be inhabited. I found myself under the necessity of being uncivil to some Officers of the Guards, being obliged to turn some of their servants out of a room in which I got comfortably settled in the evening.

SEPTEMBER 14.—Colonel Cookson was so good as to give me a general invitation to breakfast, which I did not, however, think proper to accept, tho' I promised to avail myself frequently of it.

14—18 September, 1807.

Forster returned from the citadel, & we made up a mess between us, for in this palace, which the Danes consider as splendid, there is no kitchen large enough to dress a dinner for a Mess, & we found that none of the Guards lived in that way.

I had heard a great deal said about the Guards being an assuming set of men, who thought it beneath them to associate with other regiments, but I was happy to find myself entirely mistaken in this respect, for I never was among a more gentlemanly set of Officers than they were, in every point of view. I met amongst them Agar, Lord Alvanley, Lord William Russell, Shiffner and Allen, Old Westminster, & of my Marlow acquaintance, West, Ashburnham, & Bowles.

SEPTEMBER 15.—Dined with Capt. Brome & Lt. Cairnes, & met Col. West, of the Guards, with Captain Cameron, of the 79th, whom I had known at my last quarters. We understood that leave was to be granted to go to Copenhagen very shortly, which was very pleasing intelligence, as I began to fear that I should leave Zealand as little acquainted with it as I was when in England.

SEPTEMBER 16.—Understanding that Capt. Holcroft would return to England on account of his ill-health, I thought it a good opportunity of sending some letters I had written. I accordingly rode to the left, where I found he was to be accompanied by James MacLeod,¹ who returned to resume his Adjutancy at Woolwich, & that Capt. Cockburn had left Zealand with the dispatches with a severe liver attack.

SEPTEMBER 17.—I went over the apartments in the palace, which did not at all answer my expectations. The palace, tho' large, I found was miserably divided into small rooms, & the Royal apartments, which form a very inconsiderable part, were the only ones worth notice. They are, some of them, elegantly fitted up in the Danish style, & there are a number of very fine Dutch paintings, with some English prints. The chapel is certainly finely fitted, & the organ is very splendid. There is a beautiful painting of St. Paul's conversion over the altar. In many of the rooms I found English furniture, which seemed to be considered as a great rarity.

The Officers had permission to pass the gates of Copenhagen on producing a passport signed by a Lieut.-General, but few were willing to make the first experiment, as the populace were naturally much incensed against us, & seemed to be little under the controul of the police.

SEPTEMBER 18.—The last battery was dismantled, & we took our nine-pounder brigade to the left for embarkation. We found all the heavy artillery & stores shipped ready for our departure when the prize we had acquired was embarked.

¹ First Lieutenant James A. MacLeod, R.A., who was at this time Adjutant of the 1st Battalion, R.A. He was a son of Major-General J. MacLeod, Deputy-Adjutant-General, R.A.

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SEPTEMBER 19.—Colonel Cookson went to Copenhagen & was quietly received by the inhabitants, but understood that General Peyman, the Governor, had ordered the curiosities of Copenhagen to be shut up, & even prohibited our entrance into some of the hotels.

SEPTEMBER 20.—Was removed to the lime kilns on the left, which I did not find so good a quarter as the palace, tho' there was a tolerable Mess. At night I slept in a room without windows & not separated from the men's quarters. I began to think that I had mistaken in thinking that my hardships were at an end.

SEPTEMBER 21.—Being resolved on moving I found out a garret in a house adjoining the one which the Quarter-Master had provided for me, & found out my old friend Hincks, who took joint possession of it with me, & tho' it was rather exalted, it was clean and kept out the air, so that I began to be tolerably reconciled to my fate.

SEPTEMBER 22.—Went to the dockyard, citadel, & arsenal, which were in our possession. I found the prize was immense, and consisted, besides 18 sail of the line, 23 frigates, and 25 gunboats, of an immense quantity of timber, iron guns, mortars, anchors, cables, small arms, shot, shells, grapplings, & all other naval & military appointments.

The sailors were employed in rigging the prizes, which we found all dismasted in the harbour, & in assisting the army in embarking the stores.

I saw the formidable gun & mortar boats which had so annoyed us. They had, some of them, two guns in each bow & one in the stern; some one ahead & one astern; & the mortar boats had a mortar in the middle. Their guns were chiefly 18-pounders. I saw the praams¹ & floating batteries, which, I understand, will be blown up.

The citadel entirely commands the town & the Crown Battery, so that our possession is undoubted. We have all the guns that defend the harbour & in short, all the guns that can resist an attack.

The citadel is a regular work in form of a pentagon, & its approaches are well defended by out-works. I remarked a method which they had of judging of the necessary elevation of their guns, which I think is exceedingly good. Instead of a scale with a screw they use a wooden scale with the ranges marked opposite the degrees, so that a person who has never been instructed readily knows how to give the elevation for any required distance. They place the wood perpendicularly on the breach, & there is a sight cut to each degree & $\frac{1}{2}$ -degree, &c. They likewise have adopted a plan which probably may be common, which is to have the distances marked on the sides of the guns, to the points which it is necessary to bear on. I think


¹ Large flat-bottomed boats in which guns were mounted.

22—24 September, 1807.

their scale, which I have attempted to represent, is very well adapted tho' capable of improvement.

This was done without instruments or proportion, merely that I might preserve the idea.

SEPTEMBER 23.—It rained exceedingly hard all day, & indeed, there has been little cessation since the 25 of last month. I sent to Genl. Burrard for a pass, with which I promised myself a sight of Copenhagen.



SEPTEMBER 24.—Went in the morning to Copenhagen, but having no one to show me the sights, returned little satisfied with my day's excursion. The external appearance of the houses is not prepossessing, nor could I find any part of the city which seemed to be inhabited by the opulent part of the society, and all the buildings which were worthy of notice were pointed out to me as public ones.

I observed two large squares built of stone which were exceedingly handsome & regular, each side being formed of one house, which was a public building. In the centre of each square was a statue of no inconsiderable estimation. In one was a horseman representing Christian the Fifth, one of their kings, on a pedestal supported by a figure at each corner, which I imagined to be Hercules, Wisdom, Peace & Mars. The other figure was in the same style, but the inscription was in the Danish character, & tho' I stayed at it till I was stared at, I could not define to whose memory it was written. It had likewise four supporters, which I took to be Mercury, Minerva, Neptune, & Mars. I found out the Custom House, which were much inferior in point of size to our own, & all business seemed to be discontinued. I saw likewise the King's stables, which are very fine. I thought nothing of the horses, tho' I could perceive they looked contemptuously at my G.R.¹

The canal runs through the city, & no place can be more adapted to trade than Copenhagen. I observed several churches, which were by no means contemptible, but the cathedral was burnt down by our shells, & indeed the whole city presented a melancholy prospect in the part where the fire had been; it was still

¹ Possibly "George Rex," G.R. being applied to a Government troop horse, branded "G.R." Mr. A. D. Cary, Librarian at the War Office, suggests "Government Remount" as an alternative.

24—29 September, 1807.

smoking. By far the finest building, which was formerly the Royal Palace, was in ruins from some former misfortune. There were likewise many remains to be seen of mischief Lord Nelson had done them [in 1801—Ed.], & it was remarkable enough that at one of the gates there should be a monument to commemorate the victory which they claim on that occasion.

We joined a party & we dined at the Restaurateur, a French hotel, which was, as all French ones are, of the superior order. We feasted on turtle, champagne, & Burgundy, &c., & returned through the gates & draw bridges early in the evening. I left the city with the determination if possible [to procure—Ed.] a guide to show me what curiosities it may possess on some future day. I purchased a plan of the fortifications and an engraving of the statue of Christian the Fifth.

SEPTEMBER 25.—A very rainy day. Several letters were received from England, giving an account of the illuminations in London. At the same moment that we were made happy by this intelligence we received another paper, which contained the *Gazette* account of our disasters at Buenos Ayres.

SEPTEMBER 26.—Stayed at the lime kilns all the day as the weather became extremely wet & unpleasant. We began to be very anxious for news from England, many conjectures being abroad as to our future destination.

SEPTEMBER 27.—Went to Copenhagen to see the Royal Picture Gallery & the Museum. The paintings were chiefly the productions of Dutch masters, &, on the whole, may be ranked among the first collections. I could not procure a catalogue, & the man who attended to show them was so much employed among the number of English Officers that were there, that I had the mortification of leaving the gallery without having gained much information. The Museum, which belongs to the University, contained many curious specimens of art, amongst which were a great variety of orrerys that were used by the celebrated Tycho Brahe,¹ & a great many very nice works in ivory & brass. Its natural curiosities were but few & common. The clock work & all the mechanical things were very superior. The man who showed them was the same that was in the Picture Gallery, & equally without information as to both.

SEPTEMBER 28.—Dined at Fredericksborg with Forster & got exceedingly wet on the road, which is no uncommon circumstance in Zealand.

SEPTEMBER 29.—Went into Copenhagen & purchased a shawl of French silk, of which there is a great quantity, as well as of all other French merchandise. Rode in the afternoon to the palace & walked in the gardens, wishing to take the rare opportunity of a fair day. There were many people, who appeared to be fashionables,

¹ The distinguished astronomer (1546—1601).

29 September—4 October, 1807.

in the gardens, but their appearance was rendered contemptible by an attempt at finery, which was tawdry & ridiculous. People of all ranks seemed to be intimately acquainted & joined in conversation, a circumstance which did not a little surprise me. There were some carriages in the English style, but built of very inferior materials & awkward shape.

SEPTEMBER 30.—Was again kept at home by the rain. The sea ran high, & I was not without apprehension that the ships might sustain considerable damage from the hard gale, which was almost incessant.

OCTOBER 1.—The weather still continued to be disagreeable & the sea ran some way into land, the wind setting hard ashore. Fortunately there was no damage in the fleet. I regretted very much that I did not supply myself with a cargo of books, & found the time begin to be very much on my hands.

OCTOBER 2.—Rode into Copenhagen for the last time (as I intended), having seen all that I could get at, which, indeed, was not enough to gratify my curiosity. I went to the top of the Observatory & took an entire view of the city, which afforded a melancholy prospect & produced a train of thoughts which were not very agreeable.

OCTOBER 3.—Rode with Hincks & Forster to Roeskilde, where is a cathedral which is much talked of, & is the burial place of most of the Danish kings. Its distance from Copenhagen is three-and-twenty-miles. We found the town small & inconsiderable & but poorly inhabited. The cathedral is of brick & the whole building has nothing to recommend it but its antiquity & its Royal contents. The coffins of the kings are superbly fitted up & of an entire different shape from our English ones. Lord Nelson's state coffin, which was so much talked of, appeared to me, after seeing these, of a very inferior order. Christian the Second was the eldest king who laid in this church. The coffins were, many of them, standing in open recesses in the body of the church. The altar-piece was carved in brass & represented different scripture subjects, but, on the whole, was not striking. We dined & slept at an inn, which did not afford the best accommodation.

OCTOBER 4.—We left the road intending to ride to Fredericksborg, which is a Royal seat, but finding it too far, we pursued our former design of returning to Copenhagen through the country. The enclosures were surrounded by stone walls & double ditches, & we found no small difficulty in getting our horses over them. The country was universally well cultivated, & appeared to be divided into small farms of perhaps 30 acres, nor did we see a single house that was inhabited by anybody but the peasantry, who appeared universally happy & free from want; nor could I help admiring a system of dividing the land, which seemed to be so happily exemplified, tho' it gave one no great idea of the boasted riches & population of Zealand. We passed (near Roeskilde) a most beautiful &

4—15 October, 1807.

extensive lake, one side of which was beautifully shadowed by an extensive forest, but on the side we rode there was not a stick to be seen till we arrived at Copenhagen, where the roads are in the Dutch style, ornamented with avenues. On this lake, tradition says, was built the fleet that invaded & conquered England, & our landlord at Roeskilde did not fail to remind us of it. It is said to stretch to the northward until it runs through a narrow river into the sea, & was covered with wild fowl. We were obliged to dine on eggs & bacon at a public-house, but had not the English addition of good ale.

OCTOBER 5.—Went with Captain Bolton to shoot snipes in a marsh, or, rather, bog, which are as common here as in Ireland, & generally found at the bottom of the hills, which succeed each other without end, & are given as the reason for the roads being so few in Zealand.

From the fifth to the ninth the rain prevented my collecting anything worth mentioning except the review of the troops by divisions. We were out on the ninth &, tho' we, for want of guns, went through very few manœuvres, stood long enough in the rain to be completely ducked.

OCTOBER 10.—Rode towards Helsingör to see the Royal hunting seat, which stands in a forest well stocked with deer, which is of a much larger breed than that in England. The house was of a very mean appearance, & so little used that its ruin is approaching. It commands a most divine prospect of the country with the sea, & overlooks the forest, which is filled with fine timber. I did not observe any timber which is uncommon in England, tho' there was no oak. We slept at an inn where a German regiment was quartered, who, I understood, had made great havoc among the deer.

OCTOBER 11.—Dined with Genl. Blomefield. I understood that everything was ready for embarkation, & that we only waited for an order about which various conjectures were formed. I must own I felt confident that we should return home, in spite of the opinion of our expedition not being at an end being almost universal.

OCTOBER 12.—Rode out as usual, but being on duty was not able to visit any new scenes.

OCTOBER 13.—Dined at the palace with Hincks & Forster. The conjectures were various about our future destination, though I entertained no doubt of our returning to England, so much are our opinions influenced by our wishes.

OCTOBER 14.—The regiment was busily employed in the embarkation of stores & horses. Most of the regiments arrived in from the reserve.

OCTOBER 15.—Still employed in the disagreeable duty of embarking stores. Though the Navy certainly merited our thanks for their assistance in getting our guns, &c., on shore, they were on this occasion very remiss.

16—22 October, 1807.

OCTOBER 16.—Many companies were this day embarked, but tho' we were obliged to embark before 12 on the 17th, no boats were sent from the fleet for the purpose, & we were obliged to use our exertions in pressing the boats of the transports, & as I had the working party I was in a continual quarrel with the masters, with whom I was obliged to use force & take their boats from them. We however succeeded [in getting—Ed.] on board the store ships all that was not to be left till the last moment.

OCTOBER 17.—Went to Copenhagen to lay in a sea stock of fowls & turkeys. Embarked with them on board the "Edward," where I found Capt. Adye & Lieuts. Orlebar & Collyer, of the company, and Lieut. Dingley, of Captain Fyers's company.

OCTOBER 18.—This day the city was to have been given up, but the weather was so bad that they could not embark. General Pyeman therefore allowed them another day.

OCTOBER 19.—The remainder of the troops, consisting of the Guards, 4 Regiment, with Capt. Paterson's 9-pounder brigade, embarked without molestation. In the evening the first division of the fleet sailed, but came to anchor near Helsingör.

OCTOBER 20.—We sent on board a Guernsey ship for wine & porter & hams. We understood from its owner that many ships that had come out returned without selling any part of their cargo. I was sorry they had not met with encouragement, as I think them very useful people. Towards evening the weather began to be more moderate.

OCTOBER 21.—In the morning we sailed with the first division. The wind was high but very favourable. The men-of-war saluted Kronborg Castle, but the Danes had not the civility to return it, nor did I blame their indignation, for the sight must have been highly mortifying to them, as they were saluted by many ships that had a few days before been the glory of their fleet. The gunboats we had taken sailed with the fleet, but I must own I was very anxious for their safety, as the wind was high, & they seemed too small to stand the sea.

OCTOBER 22.—Last night, soon after going to bed, we were much surprised by being awaked with a strange disturbance in the cabin, which, as a young sailor, I was by no means able to account for. The noise, however, of the contending elements soon explained the mystery, & the chairs and tables, as if determined not to [be—Ed.] outdone, raged with equal violence & rolled from one side of the cabin to the other. I, who slept on the floor, was not a little alarmed for my safety, & immediately called for a light to put the causes of my alarm under tight lashings, but when they were removed I soon awaked to fresh scenes of horror & disquietude, and distinguished the noise of the waves rushing against the sides of the ship with a clash, which every moment threatened annihilation to our existence, which was a calamity to which I was unaccustomed to. Each foolish levity which want of thought had plunged me into, each

22—29 October, 1807.

vicious habit to which I knew myself addicted, rushed with redoubled force upon my mind, nor did I feel half the dread in the face of the enemy that this unusual scene gave rise to. My imagination was so heated with the pleasing idea of revisiting those scenes in which my soul took so much delight, that a momentary despair seized on my faculties, which after some time melted into a quiet resignation to the decrees of Providence, & I laid myself down with the vain intention of sleeping.

OCTOBER 23.—When I found that the morning had far advanced without the storms having at all abated, it was in vain to think of getting up, & sea-sickness for the first time attacked me. I did actually let go to extremities, but were all too ill to think of getting up, & we lay tossing from one side of the cabin floor to another till about two o'clock, when all my companions got up & were immediately sick. I did not leave my bed till about 6 o'clock in the evening, when I contrived to get on deck, but the servants were all so ill that [we—Ed.] were forced to do without a breakfast, dinner, or tea; though the wind had now abated the sea continued to run very high, insomuch that I could not stand on deck, & the cabin was too miserable to enter.

OCTOBER 24.—After having a restless & almost sleepless night I had the pleasure of finding that the sea, independently of the swell which generally follows a hard gale, had reduced its formidable appearance to a more reasonable aspect. We had our meals on deck on the floor, as it was dangerous to make use of furniture in the cabin.

OCTOBER 25.—We were now in the middle of the North Sea with hardly any wind, so sudden & so unexpected are the changes of fortune that are incident to human nature, even on more considerable occasions.

OCTOBER 26.—The morning on shore would have been divine, but my impatience lamented the calm which but a short time ago I had so completely envied. We this day scarcely sailed ten miles.

OCTOBER 27.—The wind was highly favourable, & though we had separated from the whole of the fleet & were no longer under the protection of a convoy, we made a most prosperous run, & by the observations made found ourselves within 25 miles of Cromer in Norfolk, which we hoped to fetch in the evening, but our master had so mistaken his reckoning that we suffered the incalculable disappointment of remaining day without beholding our dear and wished-for country.

OCTOBER 28.—We made sail still for the Norfolk coast, but were again disappointed & lay to all night, not a little dissatisfied with the master, in whom we had hitherto placed great reliance.

OCTOBER 29.—In the evening we came in sight of England to our great & inexpressible satisfaction. The joy & pleasure I felt on the occasion nothing could surpass but the natural impatience of

29—31 October, 1807.

my temper, which could not think felicity complete till I should land on the wished-for shore. We were obliged to lay to to-night, though I observed some colliers that had been with us proceeded on their course & passed, as indeed every ship of the immense fleet had universally done.

OCTOBER 31.—We had the mortification in the morning to find an adverse wind, & tho' now within a few miles of the Nore were obliged to lay at anchor, as we dared not without a fair wind trust ourselves on such a dangerous coast as Essex.



LETTERS FROM THE PENINSULA DURING 1812-13-14.

Edited by COMMANDER HON. HENRY N. SHORE, R.N.

LIEUT. RICE JONES, R.E., to whom the following letters were addressed, landed in Portugal, March 4th, 1809, and joined the Army, soon after, at Coimbra. During the subsequent operations, including the passage of the Douro, at Oporto, he was on the staff of Colonel Fletcher, the Commanding Royal Engineer, and in close attendance on Sir Arthur Wellesley. During the Talavera campaign he enjoyed the same privileged position; and when the construction of the Lines of Torres Vedras had been decided on, he was employed for several months, during the winter of 1809-10, superintending the work on the western portion. In the ensuing summer he again accompanied his commanding officer to the front, where Sir Arthur Wellesley was preparing to meet Massena's invasion, and was present at the Battle of Bussaco and during the retreat on the Lines. Following in the wake of Massena's retreat, in the spring of 1811, he took part in the first abortive siege of Badajoz, and was present at its capture. He was next attached to the Light Division, and during the remainder of 1811 was on the staff of General Robert Craufurd, whom he accompanied, alone, on many of his hazardous reconnaissances around Ciudad Rodrigo. At the storming of that fortress, he "had the good fortune"—to quote his own words, "to lead the 52nd and 43rd Regiments to a small breach, to the left of the large one." Of this exploit, he supplied, in a letter to his father, probably the briefest and most modest narrative that was penned by any officer who took part in it. He deplored General Craufurd's loss in most affectionate terms; and, incidentally, referred to the fact—little suspected—that this stern disciplinarian "kept one of the best tables in the Army."

Rice Jones having been appointed to the adjutancy, at Woolwich, now returned to England to take up his post. During his service with the Army he had contracted many warm and lasting friendships, both amongst his contemporaries and with officers of higher rank, many of whom continued to correspond with him up to the time of his death, in 1854. The friendly and intimate letters addressed to him as Adjutant—when but 23 years of age—from the seat of war, on matters connected with the corps, by officers who subsequently rose to high distinction, not only show the esteem in which he was held, but contain much that is of interest, not to the casual reader alone, but to the historian. The last of the series is from that distinguished engineer, Field-Marshal Sir John Burgoyne, on the eve of the Crimean War, in which struggle he was destined to play a prominent part.

The difficulty of deciphering many of the letters was considerable. Where the writing was illegible blanks have been left. The spelling of names is according to the originals.

HENRY N. SHORE.

[NOTE.—Lieut. Rice Jones' Diary and letters home, during his service with the Peninsular Army (edited by Commander Hon. Henry N. Shore, R.N.), were published in the *Royal Engineers' Journal* (July, 1912—March, 1913), under the title, "An Engineer Officer under Wellington."]

FROM COLONEL FLETCHER, ROYAL ENGINEERS.

Ciudad Rodrigo, February 4th, 1812.

MY DEAR JONES,—

I take the liberty to enclose an order for £130 on the Agent or Paymaster of Ordnance Pensioners. Who this gentleman is I do not know, but as I have not yet drawn upon him at all, I think it high time I should begin. This relates to the two horses you were kind enough to say you would take the trouble to purchase for me. I think that perhaps something useful and decent might be obtained at about fifty guineas each; but I am not nice, of course, as to a few pounds. There will, however, probably be some other expenses for keep, &c. If they could be bought when it is *known* that horse ships are about to sail, it would save much plague and trouble, and it would perhaps be desirable to embark them in the river; but of this I am not sure. I would wish a plain saddle, that would fit either of them, to be sent at the same time. Should there be any other trifling expenses which the order I have sent will not cover, pray let me know and I will thankfully repay them. But, indeed, I know not how I shall repay you for all the trouble. I am sure you will manage for me about the —(?) for a man to bring the horses out.

I send you an order on Mr. Pink to pay any sums you may expend for the —(?), and pray also fill it up with whatever the —(?) costs you, for which I am much obliged.

God bless you. May every good attend you.

Believe me ever most sincerely yours,

RD. FLETCHER.

FROM THE SAME.

Ciudad Rodrigo, February 25th, 1812.

MY DEAR JONES,—

I feel much obliged by your letter of the 15th. Many thanks for your attentions about the crosses, &c. As to the horses, I am well convinced you will take the trouble to do your best for me. I quite yield to your opinion about not embarking them in the river. As to colour, I confess I like bay or black, or after these chesnut; grey I rather have an objection to. With respect to height, I have no objection to anything not under 14 hands one inch, but had rather

they were 14 and $\frac{1}{2}$, and so on, not exceeding 15; but I think 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ quite as good as any.

I sincerely wish you health and every possible good this world can yield.

Believe me ever, with much regard,

Most faithfully yours,

RD. FLETCHER.

I perceive I began my letter on two sheets of paper. No news: wherefore we hope will soon ——(?)

FROM AN OFFICER OF THE LIGHT DIVISION.

Camp near Badajoz, April, 1812.

MY DEAR JONES,—

In the first place you must not expect any account of the operations of this siege from me. However, in case your Engineer friends have not had leisure to write to you I'll try and give you an outline of the business, not doubting that you have a plan of the place. The attack was carried on from the heights of Almendro, in the Albuera road, and the first parallel within 300 yards, or less, of the Picurina, extending to the right, in front of the eastern face of the Castle as far as to admit of the erection of an enfilading battery against the right face of the bastion of S. Pedro. The other batteries on the first parallel (5 in number) were directed against the Picurina, and the ravelin of S. Roque, and also enfiladed the face of the adjoining bastions, so as to destroy the defences (which, by the way, was not completely done). The second parallel embraced the Picurina, and the breaching batteries were erected between that fort and the town, against the right face of the bastion of la Trinidad, the left flank of that of Sta. Maria, and the curtain connecting the two. The Artillery and Engineers, as far as I can learn or judge, did everything in high style—the breaches were complete. The 4th Division were appointed to the two right-hand, and the Light Division to the left-hand breaches. We went slap at them, and after a most obstinate and bloody contest were obliged to draw off. The *Gazette* will inform you better than I can of the different attacks made, and their success. I shall only confine myself to the melancholy task of recounting what I know of our loss. There are about *sixty* officers of the Light Division killed and wounded. The 52nd have five killed and about 14 or 15 wounded. Your poor friend Jack Jones, Madden, Poole, B——, and another are killed; Gibbs, Mein, Campbell, &c., &c., all wounded. Of 29 officers of that regiment only *four* came off unhurt. Colonel Macleod, Ohara, Taggart, Harvest, Johnstone, 95th, and many others killed.

The breaches were mined, entrenched, and the whole ramparts in such an admirable state of defence, that I do not believe it was *possible* to carry them. Our brave fellows reached the top a hundred times, and were hurled down in sections, by the most tremendous

showers of shot, shells, grenades, and large stones. In short, if hell is as bad as that ditch was, it is a worse place than I took it for. Poor Powys of the 83rd died of his wounds three days ago.

Old Vandaleur has not been with us since we left Portalegre; he has never recovered the use of his arm, and suffers a good deal from rheumatism. Old Beckwith was knocked up the first day. Barnard has commanded the Division during the whole business. He is very well, also Smith, Rowan, Prince Hall, Falstaff, Pointz, Lancastrian John, &c.¹

The Light Division is nothing now but the skeleton of what it was.² Stewart has joined and I am *en second*, quite idle. We are in expectation of moving up to Albuera as soon as we get a little set to right. Soult is coming; but report says, with so few troops as to ensure him a most confounded thrashing. The 7th Division has been playing the devil—shooting a surgeon and paymaster, and two of Graham's horses *by mistake*.

Excuse, my dear fellow, this unconnected scrawl, and believe me (and the beauty who is by my side),

Your most faithful friend,

J. B.

Wood and Shaw are both well; poor Mr. Campbell has had a paralytic stroke and has nearly lost the use of his left side.

A MEMORABLE LETTER FROM MAJOR J. T. JONES, BRIGADE-MAJOR,
AFTER THE STORMING OF BADAJOZ, DEPLORING THE LACK OF A
CORPS OF SAPPERS AND MINERS.

Badajoz, April 29th, 1812.

MY DEAR JONES,—

Two days since in the *Portuguese Gazette* we saw the counterpart of Lord Wellington's despatch relative to the assault of this place, and you may suppose we all feel hurt at finding our exertions have not been deemed worthy of any sort of eulogium, and particularly so as the works were pushed on with a celerity very unusual in an English siege, and finally accomplished the intended object. The truth of the matter is His Lordship is annoyed at the breaches not having been readily carried, and at the great loss of men the Army has sustained; all of which he most justly imputes to us, from our approaches not being sufficiently advanced to have prevented the enemy working at the breaches, nor to afford a good musquetry fire to cover the storming party whilst forming. We cannot deny the truth of the statement, and His Lordship therefore will not praise an operation

¹ A playful allusion to a theatrical performance at Fuente Guinaldo in 1811.

² Sir William Napier, reverting to the terrible losses of the Light Division on this occasion, in a letter to his wife, dated May 26th, 1812, wrote—"This was my home; I knew no difference hardly between it and my mother's house; it is now a desolate, deserted dwelling, and the grave of my friend (Colonel Macleod) is always present to me."

which we ourselves are obliged to confess—imperfect and bad. He has, however, repeatedly spoken in the highest terms of the exertions of the Engineers at this siege, and has even pointedly mentioned his approbation of their conduct. We thus see ourselves, deprived of our due share of character and reputation from the defects of our establishments. I have for many years predicted that the nation will suffer some serious calamity to her armies from the want of a Corps of Sappers and Miners, and that prediction, but for an accident, would have been fulfilled at Badajoz.¹ The operations, as far as the breaches were concerned, or in other words as far as the Engineers were concerned, totally failed, and had not an escalade succeeded in the most unhopèd-for manner, the siege must have been raised on the following morning, and as Soult was at that time within three leagues of Albuera, either a desperate battle must have been fought, or all the stores and artillery abandoned—most probably both. I write this to you in the belief that from your situation you may have the opportunity of quickening the formation of a corps which has been in embryo these last seven years, and from my knowledge that you will exert yourself to the utmost. In God's name do endeavour to impress Colonel Rowley, Chapman, Handfield and other persons in office with the necessity of acting in this measure; years must not again be allowed to roll on. Lord Wellington has written to Lord Liverpool since the last siege to say that his Engineer department is totally inadequate to undertake the most trifling siege for want of a Corps of Sappers and Miners, and that he must in future decline any operation of that nature till such a corps is furnished. Have the goodness to mention this in Pall Mall, that they may be aware of the circumstance.

Marmont has again retired behind the Tormes, and Head Quarters are fixed for the present at Guinaldo. The French exceeded themselves, if possible, in their cruelties to such of the unfortunate inhabitants as fell into their power; murdering the men and violating the women. Colonel Trant's force of militia was a good deal cut up in the neighbourhood of Guarda; the French cavalry came in amongst them as friend, and then cut them up in every direction; the fugitives did not stop till they reached Coimbra. I do not know of any other action performed by the French worthy of relating. Hill's Head Quarters are at Almendrago, and we are here, up to our necks in mortar, and likely to remain. The Colonel (Fletcher) is still very lame and I think it will be a long time before he gets thoroughly well. McLeod and Holloway have moved from Elvas to Lisbon. Emmett will follow in about a fortnight. All your friends here desire to be particularly remembered.

Believe me, my dear Jones,

Very sincerely yours,

J. T. JONES.

¹ To Major-General Murray Lord Wellington wrote, somewhat bitterly, of this business:—"I trust that future armies will be equipped for sieges, with the people necessary to carry them on as they ought to be; and that our engineers

FROM THE SAME.

Badajoz, May 13th, 1812.

MY DEAR JONES,—

After sending off my letter it occurred to me what a terribly extravagant fellow you are, and I have been upon the fidgets ever since, fearing that you will send me out the etc. for a dress coat. Now I beg and entreat, if this letter arrives before you order anything, that you will consider you are providing for a plain, homely man, and not for a buck like yourself, and that you will only order the necessary materials for a frock coat.

Well, here we still are, and here we are likely to be. The breaches, I am happy to say, have an improving aspect, and we flatter ourselves that they will be finished in June, when we hope to re-visit Head Quarters. You may conceive we think it rather a bore being left here; it is worse than the lines. Head Quarters are still at Guinaldo. We are all speculating on what is next to be done; some talk of an advance to Salamanca; some to Seville, and others, more mad than the rest, speculate on a march to Madrid. I, by myself, join with the first speculators.¹ Sir R. Hill has crossed the Guadiana at Merida on some enterprise; the object is kept a secret; but as a pontoon train has marched from Elvas to join him, opinion points out the Tagus as the theatre of action.² Sir T. Graham is in this part of the country, in command of three divisions, the 1st, 6th, & 7th; his Head Quarters are fixed at Portalegre. We all expect a very active summer; it cannot be otherwise if a Russian war takes place. The Spaniards, always sanguine, are eagerly looking to the expulsion of the French; it has given them new life, the recapture of this place. We have not yet heard how the enterprise was regarded in England. Will they make Sir Richard Fletcher a Baronet? He seems pleased with his personal honor, but of course looks forward to something further. His wound, I am happy to say, begins to heal fast.

I shall be glad to hear that you find your situation at Woolwich agreeable to your wishes. You had a fair share of the Peninsular warfare, and it is but right you should enjoy yourself for a time;³ but

will learn how to put their batteries on the crest of the glacis, and to blow in the counterscarp, instead of placing them wherever the wall can be seen, leaving the poor officers and troops to get into and across the ditch as they can." The injustice of this slur will be evident from a quotation from his Lordship's letter to Lord Liverpool, after the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo:—"I would beg to suggest the expediency of adding to the Engineers' establishment a Corps of Sappers and Miners. It is inconceivable with what disadvantage we undertake anything like a siege for want of assistance of this description."

For a complete vindication of the engineering operations at the siege of Badajoz, see Sir J. Jones' "Journals of the Sieges in Spain and Portugal," third edition.

¹ The forts of Salamanca were invested on June 17th.

² Hill's surprise of Almaraz took place six days later, on May 19th.

³ Soon after his return to England—according to an entry in his diary, he bought a curricle and horses, with which he frequently drove up to town from Woolwich.

we cannot yet allow you to domesticate—we must get a few more campaigns out of you yet. However, a pretty girl with a park, &c., might be allowed; but certainly nothing under. I conclude you have many correspondents amongst our officers in this part; I will not, therefore, take up your time with our chit-chat stories—indeed they have naturally lost much of their interest to you, who are so much more agreeably entertained in England.¹

Believe me, my dear Jones,

Most sincerely yours,

JOHN T. JONES.

FROM SIR RICHARD FLETCHER.

Badajoz, July 8th, 1812.

MY DEAR JONES,—

By a letter from my aunt of the 17th of last month, I find there appears to be considerable difficulty about the purchase of horses, so that on the whole I think I will take my chance here if you have not procured me any before you receive this letter.

You will see that I am still in this disagreeable place. I was left to put it into a state of defence, and Lord Wellington wishes me to stay till we are quite sure that all that has been proposed will be completed. I have here with me, Ellacombe, now Brigade-Major, and —, and —; Stanway is going, very ill, to Lisbon to bathe. Jones, —, —, and —, have sailed from Lisbon, on what is termed a secret expedition, so that we are sadly off for officers. This town is just now quite as hot as when you were here, and as we have only a Spanish garrison it is dull enough. You will see Lord Wellington's account of his progress. Sir R. Hill lately expected to be attacked, but the enemy have retired. Between ourselves, I begin to feel this long absence from my family excessively wearing, and I would give the world to get home if I knew how. But of this I see no prospect; though I will try if I find any opening. How will these people which having a —(?) forced on them that has fallen under such a —(?); of this house of six, one remains.

¹ The following entries in Rice Jones' diary are not without interest:—"Woolwich, June 14th, 1814. My cousin J—, being greatly indisposed, remained here last night with M., when the family returned to Algate; drove her there in my curricule, having a delightful drive, and being much interested for her recovery."

June 28th. "Brought my fair cousin from Algate; called at Mr. Yaulls' garden, and selected an elegant little myrtle, which seemed to please J—; much enjoyed the drive with her greatly. The remaining two days passed very agreeably with —, and —, and cousin, as well as the first week of July."

December, Monday 12th. "I ventured a proposal which was, in the kindest manner, accepted, and will, I expect and trust, lead eventually to the consummation of my most sanguine hopes of happiness."

It will give me great pleasure to hear from you now and then if you can find time to give me a line.

Believe me, ever most sincerely yours,

RD. FLETCHER.

[NOTE.—Sir R. Fletcher sailed for England on sick leave on December 21st, and was, in consequence, not present with the army at Salamanca or at the siege of Burgos.]

FROM THE SAME.

Badajoz, August 12th, 1812.

MY DEAR JONES,—

Ten thousand thanks for your very friendly letter of the 22nd of July. I was indeed truly gratified at the account you gave of my children. What would I not give to see them; but, alas, I know not how to arrange the matter. I am indeed most heartily tired of this country in general, and of this place in particular. I am here, solitary and miserable. Stanway is sick at Oeyras, and Ellacombe in the same way at Elvas. Goldfinch goes to Sir R. Hill's Corps—I think with a view to the rank of Brigade-Major, and it is the best situation for him.

You will observe that Lord W. had not mentioned the Engineers in the late actions; how I hate such capriciousness. I can only say I am truly glad I was not there. Sir R. Hill's Head Quarters are at Zafra and all is quiet at —(?) I believe.

We have no English troops, and only a Spanish garrison of 1,500 men. We go to Madame C——'s —(?) when we please, and there our amusements end.

I hope you will continue to write to me frequently. Your letters give me the most sincere pleasure.

Believe me, with the truest regards,

My dear Jones, most sincerely yours,

RD. FLETCHER.

FROM CAPTAIN H. GOLDFINCH, R.E.

CAZUELA, September 4th, 1812.

DEAR JONES,—

As an old campaigner you can well imagine that since we parted in Holborn, up to this period, I have had enough to do in providing all the numerous necessaries, comforts, &c., for a *complete* field equipment such as I can, *gracias a Dios*, say I possess; and the sterling and efficient worth of which my travels since I left Lisbon have enabled me to ascertain. My stud is as good as I (tho' rather high-minded, you know, in this particular), for its extent, could desire it. I have two of the best English horses I was ever master of, and neither of which would

I exchange for any horse I have as yet seen in this army! · Blood (one *thorough*), young, and sound all over; without vice or blemish!! The baggage animals are equally good in their way. What a luxury the portable bed with mosquito curtain is in this hot weather!! Canteens (I have already christened the small saddle bag ones the “*ni plus ultras*”) all *turn out*, and *get on* most admirably.

I am so full of these enjoyments that I have neglected to give you a detail of my motions, which, if I remember, you requested, and I promised to send you. John Bull,¹ whom I found waiting for a fair wind at Falmouth, transported me and a large cargoe of Italian singers, buffoons, merchants, riders—in all about two dozen souls, happily for our comfort, in six days to Lisbon. I was not at a loss for employment in the said city of Lisbon, during the three weeks I awaited there the pleasure of Lord Wellington (God bless him) as to my destination; and eight days after the receipt of my orders I joined Sir Rowland Hill at Zafra. Williams, whom I relieved, set out for Badajoz the day we marched from Zafra (the 28th ult.), as he flatters himself, on his way to Madrid. I asked him about the command at Badajoz, which I think it possible, may bring him up. Wright, whom I have met for the first time, continues with this corps; he is quite recovered from his last hit. Now, can you not fancy something how we stand?

With regard to the interesting state of our military affairs, they are at this moment at that crisis which leaves so wide a field for conjecture, and which at the same time elevates one's hopes so high, that I feel more hesitation than *usual* in speculating on the ultimate consequences of the late *staggering blow*,² so happily thrown in, by the *Grande Lor* (como dicen ahora los Espagnoles, tanto como os—(?) Merceds). My sanguine nature, you know, makes this the more necessary: was I to give vent to the tip-top hopes which now and then occupy my thoughts I should say that Soult would have as much or more trouble to escape from us (meaning by *us* the whole army, which, speaking generally, will, I presume, be occupied in this enterprise), than he had at *Oporto*, especially if the reported defeat of Suchet by General Maitland is true. Our movement by Llerena to La Granja, Apuaga, &c., has, combined with the creditable attack of Cruz upon Seville, obliged Soult to abandon sooner than he probably intended the western part of the country he occupied. I should imagine his forces by this time to be all east

¹ Captain John Bull, one of the most respected and able commanders in the old Post Office Packet Service, during the Napoleonic Wars, is thus referred to in Mr. Norway's book (“History of the Post Office Packet Service”):—“Captain John Bull was exceedingly well known in his day, both as a good seaman and a gallant officer; and in the ‘Duke of Marlborough’ he fought more actions than any other Packet officer, and though he by no means won them all, yet when he was most unfortunate, he emerged with credit. There was a bluff heartiness about him, a breezy contempt of danger, a dogged persistence in carrying through whatever he had undertaken, which excites our admiration even after the lapse of so many years. By his colleagues he was called ‘the Commodore.’” For an extremely interesting account of his many battles, see the work above-mentioned.

² Refers to the victory of Salamanca and entry into Madrid.

of *Cordova* and *Grenada*. The doubt is which way he will attempt (which must be his intention) to form a junction with Jozé, Suchet, &c. We are halted here to-day (seven leagues southward of Medellin), and shall probably await Lord W.'s orders to decide our future course, either to Toledo, or La Mancha, by Almuden and Ciudad Real; as I *apprehend*. I would bet in favour of another general action before many weeks; the last has electrified every soul, *amigos y enemigos*, in the country. It is delightful to see the joy it has occasioned. Adieu; mind you keep your promise about writing.

Yours ever,

H. GOLDFINCH.

FROM CAPTAIN H. GOLDFINCH, R.E.

CORIA, November 30th, 1812.

DEAR JONES,—

I am sending a packet to Chapman from hence by this Packet, and tho' I have not at this moment leisure to *wipe you down* on the score of *sanguine dreams* in the way I shall probably do some day, I do not like to let the opportunity pass without acknowledging two letters that I have lately received from you. The one from the Cambrian mountains left perfect conviction in my mind that some of the fair damsels of your native land had captivated your tender feelings—or what shall I call your known susceptible character. Your second letter half confirms these conjectures. Upholstery is a very useful family-like article to expend loose cash upon. However, be this as it may, I take it as the more civil your favouring me under such circumstances with your office news, and tho' I have hardly time or light to do more than thank you for it at this moment, I cannot refrain doing this much.

Our Head Quarters came in here (I allude, of course, to Sir R. Hill's) a few hours ago from those cursed miserable cold villages on the Agueda that I daresay you know full well—Robleda, &c. The houses of this place, tho' not very magnificent, are an infinite luxury compared to the woods and hovels we have inhabited since we retired on the 15th from the Arepiles. Our retreat, for its duration, was by far the most annoying one in every sense we have ever witnessed with this army—constant rain; bitter cold; no cover; no stores; baggage strayed—in fine, an accumulation of all the miseries you know to be incident to such movements, especially when closely pressed, as we were, from waiting so long at the Arepiles to offer battle, by a superior enemy. I literally, however, have neither light or leisure to tell you more about these matters at this moment, but will give you a fuller account shortly.

I am writing to Chapman concerning both rank and pay, both of which you know as well as our friend C. that I have pretty strong claims to. I hope the great folks about you may think so also. Adieu.

Believe me, Dr. Jones,

Yours very truly,

H. GOLDFINCH.

FROM LIEUTENANT F. STANWAY, R.E.

LISBON, December 20th, 1812.

DEAR JONES,

I have received yours with the enclosure from Private C. Dawkins' wife; he denies having any child, and says his wife is an abandoned woman, who can expect nothing from him. He has lately been tried and flogged for some misdemeanours, and was yesterday tried again for desertion. We are trying to get him transferred to the Navy.¹ He is the greatest vagabond you can conceive. If he remains in the Corps I will do my utmost to get him to allow something to the *interesting creature* you mention.

The detachment of Sappers arrived a few days ago, but in such a miserable condition that it will take two months to get them in a state to take the field.

Sir Rd. (Fletcher) goes home for two months in the Packet tomorrow. The new Sappers appear to be the regular old artificers; by way of a beginning *thirteen* were yesterday tried by a Court-Martial.

Very truly yours,

F. STANWAY.

FROM CAPTAIN H. GOLDFINCH, R.E.

MALHADA DE SORDA, January 12th, 1813.

DEAR JONES,—

I believe I am in your debt. At this season, and from this *delightful* part of the country, you cannot expect anything of the epistolary kind either interesting or amusing.

Tho' I have not your letter by me, I think it was in your last that you said some alteration both in *colour* and system was contemplated for the Sappers; we are at a loss to guess why you are thus making *cameleons* of us. As to the scarlet, I think it appears generally, though not universally, to be liked by *us*, or our Corps;² and I always aver that those who find fault with the facings are devoid of *taste*. The embroidered concern has, I assure you, made a great figure in all my travels since we parted; it is universally allowed to be most handsome; the only *gauche* part of it certainly is the old plain strap to the epaulet; it should be embroidered to match the rest of the coat; the blue velvet would make a handsome ground for it. As a *man of taste* I conclude you will exert your interest to get this alteration adopted.

You ask to be informed how we find the newspapers answer, and whether we find them as useful as expected. Surely the last *querie* does not allude to *establishment* itself; its utility, or rather necessity, cannot, I hope, at this period be doubted. I trust we may not have already deferred it until too late. But Sturgeon and the Staff Corps are making great efforts to rival us in this branch of what *ought to be* our undis-

¹What a compliment to the Navy as a reformatory!

²See further letters on this subject.

puted duty; they have completed the five companies already in this country with ¹*Spanish* recruits (artificers, of course), and expect a sixth company from home. How can they be employed when with the army in the field without intrrenching on some of the duties that ought to be of our Corps? The construction of *bridges* appears to be one at which they particularly aim; in short, I have no doubt that next campaign, if not an active one, unless you send us all possible assistance in men, and unless these men are properly officered and put on a very different footing from what they have hitherto been on in this country, will decidedly rob us of some of those duties which it should be our study to preserve in the Corps.

Chapman has announced my promotion to me by the last Packet, which, as he says, is better late than never. I cannot understand, however, upon what plan or principle, or from what quarter, it was decided that after four years' fagging up hill in this army I should be superseded by an officer of my own rank in the Corps. I own I did not expect to be. *Paciencia!*

Yours very truly,

H. GOLDFINCH.

FROM THE SAME.

MALHADA DE SORDA, January 26th, 1813.

DEAR JONES,—

I have to thank you for your congratulations and kind wishes of the 5th. I was asked to-day at Frenada (where Lord Wellington arrived yesterday from his late triumphal tour)² what date my majority was to be of. I rather liked the question, and hope what I wrote upon this subject some time back to Chapman may be attended with success; at any rate, I feel some consolation in at last getting the step thro' the Marquis' recommendation, which I am advised officially was the case.

I can make allowances for the many distracting gaieties, &c., with which you describe yourself to be surrounded—do you ever drive round that terrible ugly *high wall*, not far from St. George's Fields, in the new curricle? Only take a turn round it with your friend the *Bart.* alongside, and hear what he will say to you! A bloody hand would make a figure on such a vehicle, tho' I doubt your tempting Sir Richard (Fletcher) to follow your example; don't drive too fast!!—this is all my advice.

¹ The changes in organization, discipline, and training, already mentioned, were now about to be carried out; with the result that, six months later, "the company at St. Sebastian," to quote from Sir J. T. Jones, "was the first which entered the field after these great changes, and the men were found useful and intelligent." For a more particular account of "these great changes," see Sir J. T. Jones' "Journal of the Sieges," Vol. II., Note 38, page 346.

² In mid-winter Lord Wellington visited Cadiz, and met with an enthusiastic reception by the Spanish Government.

I heard before your letter arrived of Elphinstone's order to join us, which you may suppose did not afford me particular satisfaction. Talking of justice, &c., in this world is, however, all *my eye* (to use a genteel expression). All I can do and shall do is to persevere in the right road, to the best of my judgment, with conscience as a guide (other pilotage, however, I know is more successful in this world), and if I can reap no other advantage I shall insure that inward peace of mind that I would not part with for aught else fortune could bestow.

We have not a word of news. I saw his lordship at Frenada for a moment this morning; he appears in high health; the result of his late journey will be better known when I write next.

Believe me,

Yours very truly,

H. GOLDFINCH.

P.S.—I have just laid my hand on the enclosed play bill,¹ that will give you an idea of our gaieties and remind you of former times.

VIVAT WELLINGTON.

FROM CAPTAIN H. GOLDFINCH, R.E.

Malhada Ditorda, March 2nd, 1813.

DEAR JONES.—

We have been long without the arrival of any packet, otherwise I should abuse you in set terms for having been so long silent. I have not been in spirits for correspondence or ought else of late. Our life, too, at this season, you know, affords little variety or materials for correspondence; plays and hunting are the order of the day, and hardly anything else is talked of or, *apparently*, thought of at headquarters. I ventured yesterday for the first time to show my only horse (I have had the misery of shooting the completest animal I was ever master of for the glanders) with Lord Wellington's foxhounds, and, tho' *resolved* only to see the burst and not follow, had one of the hardest rides I ever remember. The Duque and all the field, saving some half-dozen great characters (Commanding Engineers,² of course, included amongst the latter, be it understood), were thrown out. We did not kill, but tally-ho'd the rogue, dead tired, just as the hounds ran off on a fresh scent. Various are the deaths and casualties among the sportsmen's cattle. My animal, *Gracios a Deos!* is all the better this morning; he is a *Sir Peter*, and showed himself *thorough* yesterday.

The new detachment of Sappers have arrived this morning; Slade, who commanded them on the march, speaks favourably of their behaviour. We shall be about 200 strong when the 7th Company arrives to-morrow from Badajoz. Lord Wellington is anxious to have as many in the field this year as we can muster. I am about to *expire as Commanding Officer*, and therefore say nothing of the heavy

¹ This interesting document has perished, alas!

² A humorous allusion to himself.

complaints I hear about the clothing, &c., which have been sent to this country—what use are white breeches on service, Sir Adjutant?

I have already given you to understand that we have not a syllable of news—not a word or even conjecture about the campaign; all appear persuaded that we shall not take the field until late this year—until the green forage abounds it will certainly hardly be practicable; all this month will hardly suffice for this purpose.

I know not what my berth will be. Elphinstone is on the road and will arrive in eight or nine days. Is By in the land of the living? I have not heard of him for an age; remember me to him and all my friends at home, and believe me, Dr. Jones,

Yours very sincerely,

H. GOLDFINCH.

FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL J. T. JONES, R.E.

Lisbon, 13th March, 1813.

MY DEAR JONES,—

I have to thank you for several interesting letters yet unanswered. The difficulty of writing in an inclined posture will, I believe, be received as an excuse. I am now recovering rapidly, and I hope to have the pleasure of seeing you by the middle of April; I think of sailing in the next convoy.¹ You must be prepared to see, not the devil on two sticks, but a tolerable likeness of him in a cripple on two crutches. I hope ultimately to be but slightly lame; tho' at present my leg makes an awkward figure sticking out in the air behind me. You would be ashamed to own or acknowledge me if we met in the streets. I shall therefore turn my face aside every dashing equipage I see, in order to spare your blushes; and I shall not be annoyed at your driving past, provided you do not drive over me. By the bye, I have never given you goose for having outraged the modesty of your situation in sporting such a dashing curricule as yours is represented to be. However, you were always a man of superior ideas. I did hope we had talked you into a gig. I intend to set up a taxed cart with a pony to draw it if I remain lame. Don't despise me for it; I will not use it when I come to Woolwich.

Believe me, my dear Jones,

Very faithfully yours,

J. T. JONES.

FROM CAPTAIN F. STANWAY, R.E.

Head Quarters, Ma. da Seveda, March 17th, 1813.

DEAR JONES,—

I was very sorry to hear of your indisposition; I know pretty well what the rheumatism is, and hope you may not experience a return.

¹ He was wounded at the siege of Burgos and sent home on sick leave: see further on the subject.

I am very glad you have persuaded them to now arrange the clothing concern; you well know all our difficulties on that score. I began to think by your long silence that amidst the gaieties of your new berth, you had quite forgot that we still existed here; however, I rejoice it is *not yet* come to that. Poor Sir R——! (Fletcher) I understand you quite astonished him, and that he was afraid to venture his neck with you.

We don't expect to move before May—some say June. The army has not yet recovered the last race. Wright has acquired great credit in throwing a bridge of tressels over the river at Galisteos, without men, means, or tools, only the forced assistance of the carajos of the vicinity.

Ever sincerely yours,

F. STANWAY.

FROM CAPTAIN H. GOLDFINCH, R.E.

Mulhada Desorda, March 31st, 1813.

DEAR JONES,—

I have received your letter of the 16th ult., which I should have acknowledged sooner had I not, like yourself, been somewhat deranged in health for some two weeks past. Tho' cursedly feverish and ill the night before, I did not like to forego the Marquis' party at Ciudad on the 13th for the purpose of investing Sir Lowry Cole with the Order of the Bath. My ride, however, made me worse, and, instead of enjoying the ball and supper, which I was told was wonderfully gay and well arranged, I was obliged to go to bed, and returned the next day to be thoroughly laid up here for a fortnight after. All, however, is now right again, and the physicing, blistering, &c., I had to go thro' have put me in prime condition for opening the campaign, which we will all begin to talk and think of, tho' no one can, of course, know a word of the matter.

[The interesting function, above-mentioned, is thus more fully described by Wellington's biographer:—Instructions reached Lord Wellington early in January, 1813, to invest General Cole with the insignia of the Bath, and he readily assented, on the suggestion of his younger friends, to make the ceremony as imposing and interesting as possible. It was settled that the investiture should take place in Ciudad Rodrigo, and that the ceremony should be followed by a grand dinner and a ball. Now Ciudad Rodrigo happened to be still in a very dilapidated condition. The Hotel de Ville existed, but it was stripped of furniture; and of the better class of private houses, all had been plundered, and not a few were in ruins. The ingenuity of the managing committee succeeded in overcoming these difficulties. Rich damask hangings which had escaped the fury of the spoiler were so arranged in the large room of the Hotel de Ville as to give it the aspect of a brilliantly appointed tent. Into another room chairs, tables and couches were conveyed, borrowed, like the curtains, from the Palace of San Ildefonso. From Almeida, 25 miles off, glass and crockery were brought up. Lord Wellington lent his plate, as did everyone who had a spoon or fork to offer, and the better to provide against accidents, it was arranged that the necessary preparations for the feast should go forward in Lord Wellington's kitchen at Frenada. His cooks laboured from early

dawn, and at three o'clock in the afternoon of a clear, frosty, winter's day, he mounted his horse, *en grand tenue*, with all his orders glittering on his breast. He had 17 miles to ride, and accomplished the distance in two hours. At half-past five the investiture took place, at six the invited guests sat down to dinner, the ball began about nine, and the brilliancy of the scene when Lord Wellington entered, struck him with undisguised astonishment. The band of the 52nd discoursed sweet music. About 40 ladies distributed among 200 gentlemen or more, found their dancing powers taxed severely. The Marquis threw himself into the humours of the occasion like a school-boy: he danced almost every dance, and narrowly escaped a somewhat ludicrous catastrophe.

The wine both at dinner and supper had circulated freely, and about two in the morning a number of Spanish officers, roused by its effects into enthusiasm, insisted upon carrying Lord Wellington round the room in a chair. He suggested that they should begin with the person of the highest rank, and named the Prince of Orange. The Prince was immediately seized, and General Vandeleur, coming up with a view to remonstrance, was seized in like manner. Each was placed in an arm-chair, and hoisted on the shoulders of four bearers. The inevitable consequences soon followed. The bearers had not taken many steps before they with their burdens came down, and amid the shouts of laughter that followed, Lord Wellington made his escape. He mounted his horse, and under the light of a full moon, rode back to his quarters at Frenada.]

This place is at present full of Engineers awaiting the arrival of Sir Rich. (Fletcher)¹ to start us to our several destinations. I know not whether to expect to return to Sir R. Hill or not; it will be hard to be superseded; however, my swallow is already pretty thoroughly practiced with hardships, and it would be a tough bone indeed, after what has passed, that I should find difficulty in digesting;—a solitary sort of consolation that ever springs from injustice.

The army all continue quiet in their cantonments, and we hear or know nothing of the enemy. Some peasants told me the other day that they were all retiring from Salamanca and its vicinity towards Valododid, and that not more than 1,000 men remained at this moment. Such reports, however, you know how far to appreciate. The season here is very backward, and in this wretched neighbourhood, until within this day or two, we have been shivering with cold; no *verde* for our cattle, for which we are anxiously on the look out; I believe, however, on every side of us they are already enjoying this animal luxury; we are certainly, here, on the most sterile and uncongenial spot of all the Peninsula. Do not fail to write if you expect to hear from me.

Believe me, yours ever,

H. GOLDFINCH.

FROM CAPTAIN F. STANWAY, R.E.

Head Quarters, Ma. Sorda, April 7th, 1813.

DEAR JONES,—

I am desired by the Commanding Engineer to represent to you the case of so many of the N.-C. officers belonging to the Company

¹ Returning from sick leave at home.

of Sappers in this country, being at home, particularly the Sergeants, and who are old and infirm men. In consequence of this we experience a great want of trusty N.-C. officers, and it likewise keeps back many fine young men from promotion, and from exerting themselves, seeing no chance of succeeding to the higher ranks. If you can in any way ameliorate this evil, I am sure you will, well knowing the trouble we undergo for want of a sufficient number of steady men to assist us in our operations.

Sir Richard has not yet arrived, but we expect him in a few days. The Head Quarters will move shortly to Guinaldo; the battering train and pontoons are ordered up from Abrantes to Sabugal, and it is thought the Army will move about the beginning of May. Wright has lately distinguished himself by throwing a bridge of tresles over the Alagon at Galistos, with our usual means—*nothing*. He is now putting the post of Bejar in a state of defence. Mas nada de nova. I hope your rheumatism has left you.

Believe me,

Very truly yours,

F. STANWAY.

FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL J. T. JONES, R.E.

Colchester, May 11th, 1813.

MY DEAR JONES,—

I regret much that I had not the pleasure to see you in passing thro' London. I thank you for your kind invitation to Sapper Hall. I shall certainly have the pleasure of calling upon you as soon as I can throw my crutches away; but I have great cause to fear that is an event yet far distant. I have a watch chain belonging to you, the result of a bet made nearly two years since; I shall probably keep it till we meet.

I very much wish to solicit your interest in favour of a Sapper and Miner of the name of W. Dodds,¹ belonging to Burgoyne's Company; he has several times been promised promotion by the different officers in Portugal, and would have been recommended from Burgos had he not been selected to take charge of my carcass, and as he faithfully performed that office, I feel that I ought to endeavour to prevent his suffering by it.

I cannot find a bit of news to send you; nor is it surprising, considering that I never get beyond the garden at the back of the house. I think it very dull, stupid work; I cannot at all reconcile myself to England; to be comfortable here a man must have a carriage or horses, and I have neither. I heard much said in praise of your establishment—so neat—so gentleman-like—so fashionable. I replied

¹ He accompanied his wounded master to Lisbon. See "Memoir of Sir J. Jones Services," also further on.

that it could not be otherwise, as on every subject you had always shown yourself a man of taste and liberality.

Believe me, my dear Jones,

Very sincerely and faithfully yours,

JOHN T. JONES.

FROM CAPT. H. GOLDFINCH, R.E.

Salamanca, May 27th, 1813.

DEAR JONES,—

Among my unanswered letters is yours of the 18th ult.; it reached me the day before we set out from Coria on our march to this place, from which we drove Genl. Vilette and the greater part of his Division yesterday. Mons. V. must either be a perfect num-skull—or, would it, think you, arise from knowledge or want of knowledge?—and entertains a most contemptible opinion of us on such occasions. What think you of his remaining in the town—(a la Soult at Oporto, only that the Tormes and Douro are very different military features) with his infantry, baggage, etc., for hours after the appearance of the heads of our different columns. He had more luck than his conduct deserved in escaping with the loss of 400 men only, half prisoners. I would venture my existence that had it been *vice-versa*—an English party in the town and the French in pursuit—that those only who were blessed with *morenos* (thoro'bred cattle) would have escaped. However, the noble Lord was himself present, *as usual*, among the foremost, and appeared satisfied.

Our corps (Sir R. Hill's) marches to-day to—(?) four leagues from here, on the Toro road. Lord Wellington returns to the main army after to-morrow, which is now under Sir T. Graham on the right of the Duero at Miranda and its vicinity.

I remember you were rather *saucy* last year about my speculations on the campaign, tho' subsequent public information may have proved to you that at the time they were neither partial nor unfounded. *If*, therefore, it was in my power to amuse you in this way at present, I am not quite sure that I should broach another sheet of paper on the present occasion for this purpose. I like to hear your Woolwich news—mind that; and if you approve of my nonsense act accordingly.

Believe me, dear Jones, yours very truly,

H. GOLDFINCH.

P.S.—If FitzPatrick is at Woolwich pray remember me to him, and say I am quite satisfied with, and much obliged to him, for the horse he sent me.

FROM CAPT. F. STANWAY, R.E.

Head Quarters, Castro-Xeres, June 12th, 1813.

DEAR JONES,

We arrived here yesterday after hard marching from Frenada, and having completely taken in the Francaices, who did not expect us this

six weeks; they were assembling at Valladolid for the purpose of hunting Mina and some other Guerilla chiefs, and were afterwards to have met us on the Douro; Zamora, Toro, and some other places being put in a state of defence; they had also a position fortifying near the Ezla; however, the Lord's quick movements have sent them all behind the Ebro, excepting Burgos Castle, which, the Carrajos say, is to be abandoned. Lord W. is gone to reconnoitre it to-day; there is, however, no mention of our going before it.

Sir T. Graham crossed the Ebro yesterday near Frias, and the whole army will in a few days also pass it, so that we expect to have fine fun. The French had orders not to risk anything previous to reaching the Ebro.

The Hussars are to place the name of the cavalry where it ought to be, and they began very well at Morales; the 10th charged three regiments and took above 200 prisoners.

The Sapeur officers are quite delighted with their new dress; whose idea was it making them so gay? Are the men to have the new clothing next year? I wish you would send us a reinforcement of men against we reach Pampeluna; they would soon arrive via Santander, by which route all our supplies are now to come. We have fully 70,000 British and Portuguese, and lots of Carajos armies. The French are 75,000 strong, including all ranks and conditions. Your friend Don Julian¹ sends in prisoners every day. I know of nothing more that can interest you.

Very truly yours,

F. STANWAY.

FROM CAPTAIN H. GOLDFINCH, R.E.

Buden, 7 leagues from Pampeluna, W. or W. by N.,

DEAR JONES,—

June 24th, 1813.

In forwarding a cover to Chapman at this interesting crisis I cannot avoid addressing a few lines to you, tho' your long silence, perhaps, hardly deserves it. I send the Secretary all the particulars of the fight on the 21st that occur to me at this moment as worthy of inditing, together with a sketch, or, rather, souvenance of the affair; all which on your first call in Pall Mall I am sure he will show you; I need not, therefore, repeat it here.

The said battle of *Vittoria* (how happy a spot to conclude our campaigning on, which I reckon to be well nigh the case)! tho' memorable in its consequences was more of a *field-day manœuvre* and *peacable* undertaking than any fight I have before seen. I am surprised, however, to hear our casualties are nearly as numerous as at Talavera—our numbers are, to be sure, very different. On the 21st. the only obstinate work that I could see was with Sir Rowland

¹ Jones, accompanying General Craufurd, attended by a single dragoon, spent the night of August 30th, 1811, with Don Julian Sanchez and his guerillas, who entertained them with dancing, &c.

Hill's party, which by way of a *diversion* and false attack (which purpose it appeared to answer perfectly—they did not cease to pour in reinforcements in our front), had some three or four hours' fighting before the other columns began. We have from 11 to 1200 casualties, independent of Murillo's Division and the Conde de Amarante's (old Silveira who has succeeded General Hamilton in the command of the Portuguese Division attached to Sir Rowland Hill); the latter were not engaged. Murillo and his men behaved exceedingly well; they lost 5 or 600. His division I take to be the best Carrajo one of the day.

Sir Richard Fletcher, I hear, had a graze on the chin; Wright, who is with me, had the coat, shirt, and skin torn from his right shoulder-blade bone, without hurting him materially; he rejoined next day; it was certainly all *but* with him. Reed's horse was shot through the head, and the renowned *Brusher* (as I tell Chapman) hit three times without, however, ending his career.

I am, you see, treating you as one of *us*—giving you all this idle sort of tittle-tattle. My stock of more serious matter I have pretty well exhausted to Chapman. You will, I know, enjoy such anecdotes of your old companions in the field, and only repeat them where they can interest or amuse. My usual good fortune has attended me on this as on all former similar occasions—man and horse all safe and sound; both, however, pretty well done up as to fatigue. My chief, Sir Rowland, has been very civil on this occasion, a la Sherbrooke, which, considering he is one of the most taciturn characters on this side of the grave, I esteem the more.

Yours ever (mind you write me)

H. GOLDFINCH.

FROM CAPTAIN F. STANWAY, R.E.

August 9th, 1813 (San Sebastian).

DEAR JONES,—

I write this particularly to recommend to your care, L.-Corp. Sullivan, who lost a leg the other day; you, perhaps, recollect him; he has acted as a N.C. officer for 2 years, and if promoting him would add to his rate of pension, he certainly deserves it for his general good conduct, and great bravery in the trenches.

W. Dodds is well known for his good conduct by Colonel Jones and others; he lost his leg at the head of a sap; Reid particularly praises his courage and activity under fire.

Pray do what you can for these poor fellows. Corples. Ross and Delacourt have greatly distinguished themselves here; you know them both; I need not say any more.

We commence again at this place in a day or two. Lord W. has not passed the Bidasour yet; his great losses in the Pamplona action has prevented him; our loss was 6,800 men.

Yours faithfully,

F. STANWAY.

FROM THE SAME.

Before San Sebastian, August 24th, 1813.

DEAR JONES,—

Our batteries are completed, the guns are arrived, and we open tomorrow. . . . You have made a mistake in regard to Private Dodds, Jones' friend; you have promoted 2nd Corpl. W. Dodds to 1st instead of him; he is, however, also a very deserving man. Now, W. Dodds, Col. Jones' friend, has, as I informed you, lost his leg, so pray get him promoted before he gets home; he is truly a deserving, brave man, and saved Reid's life, when wounded, by dragging him from the covert way into the trenches. I am very happy you have made poor Sullivan; we are all obliged to you for it.

¹ Collier's braves are arrived, and mutinous dogs they are; we gave one of them 300 this morning, for drawing his sword on my deputy and abusing him grossly. . . .

No news, the troops quiet and fortifying with redoubts the line of the Bidazoa from Irun.

Believe me, yours faithfully,

F. STANWAY.

FROM THE SAME.

August 27th, 1813 (San Sebastian).

DEAR JONES,—

We took the island of Santa Clara last night, with little loss; our batteries have opened a place wide enough for a brigade to march in, in line, so you may expect miracles. . . .

Yours truly,

F. STANWAY.

[NOTE.—The second assault of San Sebastian, on August 31st, 1813—notwithstanding Wellington's memorable call for volunteers from distant divisions ("men who could show other troops how to mount a breach"), and the noble response it evoked—proved a much more formidable affair than was anticipated, and was only saved, by a miracle, from ending in an even more disastrous repulse than on the last occasion. Though successful, the loss of life was appalling, comprising, amongst other valuable officers whose services could ill be spared, Wellington's Chief Engineer and right-hand man, Sir Richard Fletcher, whose loss was universally deplored. Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne, the second engineer—whose letters form an interesting feature of this volume, was wounded; and the whole loss during the second siege, according to Napier, exceeded 2,500 men and officers—a fearful price to pay for the capture of, what the same authority describes as, "a third-rate fortress in bad condition."]

¹ This is doubtless in allusion to the party of seamen landed by Sir George Collier to man one of the breaching batteries. These men rendered valuable service, and suffered heavily. For an interesting account of their manner of life, see "Seven Years' Campaigning," by Sir R. Henegan, Vol. II., p. 31.

FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL J. F. BURGOYNE, R.E.

Lesaca, October 1st, 1813.

DEAR JONES,—

I enclose the 2nd set of the bill for £176-8, the third, I find, is to be kept by Mr. Pink in case of accidents, so I suppose upon these two you can get the money.

I will be much obliged to you with the amount, to pay my bills with Mr. Hoby, Bootmaker, St. James's Street, about £30; Mr. Cuff, Sadler, Curzon Street, Mayfair, about £16; Mr. Prater, Linen Draper, Charing Cross, about £30; Mr. Buckmaster, Tailor, Old Bond Street, on account (not one-third of his bill, I fear), £30; and send me their several receipts that they may not call upon me again.

Then, if it will not give you too much trouble, I wish you would order me a canteen according to the enclosed directions, which will probably be sufficient for the guidance of any friend of yours, a canteen maker, and pray see that he introduces good strong and neat articles without increasing the expense with much finery. I reckon, with the little or no plate, it will cost about £30; or if it should not amount to that you may cause to be added a few spoons to about that sum, or near it, so as to bring, with the payment of the above-mentioned bills, and £30 to Mr. Buckmaster, the remainder an even sum of money to be given to the agents and placed to my account of credits with them. Though I had rather in the first place the neatness of the cups and saucers, castors, teapot, etc., were considered, as then a good foundation for a canteen will be laid, and then additions, and not alterations, required.

The army remains quiet, but the general opinion is that a move will take place to the front, on the fall of Pamplona. The French have strong ground and numerous entrenchments, but I suppose not numerically very strong, if the good news we hear from the north is true. Besides our late siege, a great many redoubts have been thrown up round Pamplona, and various works and entrenchments on the positions here of the Pyrenees, some, I think, very good. We shall have now, of course, a great deal of fortifying as we go; besides the work of reducing the enemy's fortified posts. St. Jean de Pied de Port is a fortress something of the nature of Ciudad Rodrigo, as I hear. At St. Jean de Luz is a regular fort, but I imagine not very strong. Bayonne is a fortress, and of considerable size. At all those places we can perceive numerous new redoubts and works. Our own game would be, I should think, to finish everything in Spain, but perhaps we shall move into France, from the superior effect it may be thought to have in drawing off more French troops from the main battles of the north.

Elphinstone is still at Lisbon by the last accounts, but probably now on his way up. Goldfinch remains before Pamplona. Stanway has charge of reinstating the fortress of St. Sebastian, for which I have been lately much employed in making reports, projects, and estimates. Capt. Dickens is landed in this country, but not yet joined. Every division of the army has one officer, and most of them are on very good terms with the Generals commanding.

When you get the canteen equipped, will you be able to send it out to St. Sebastian or Passages to the care of Capt. Stanway or officer of Engineers in command there? If any opportunity occurs pray do so.

Yours truly,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

When done with, take the elegant description of the canteen out of the maker's hands that he may not shew it about.

[NOTE.—The above letter is dated from an obscure Pyrenean town on the Spanish side of the frontier, where Lord Wellington's Head Quarters were fixed for several weeks previous to the Battle of the Bidassoa (October 7th, 1813), after which Head Quarters were moved to Vera. The name conveys nothing to the present generation, and it is never visited by roving Britons, lying far out of the beaten track; yet it is associated with one of the most memorable events in our military annals—Lord Wellington's appeal to the Peninsular Army for volunteers for one of the most desperate exploits that can fall to the lot of soldiers—the assault of a fortress. One attempt on St. Sebastian had already failed disastrously. The honour of the Army, and Lord Wellington's reputation were at stake, and to ensure the success of the second attempt, his Lordship issued that memorable order already referred to. "He was incensed," Napier tells us, "and demanded fifty volunteers from each of the fifteen regiments composing the 1st, 4th, and Light Divisions—men who could show other troops how to mount a breach. Such was the phrase employed, and 700 gallant soldiers instantly marched in answer to the appeal." But such an appeal was never made to British soldiers in vain; the number might have been doubled—trebled—so magnificent was the response; the difficulty lay in making a selection from the immense number of men who came forward to save the honour of the Peninsular Army. Nor were these gallant soldiers natives of the British Islands alone—English, Scotch, and Irish: for Germans and Portuguese came forward with equal alacrity, and played a noble part in the desperate exploit which won St. Sebastian. But what is there in the name of Lesaca which should evoke a feeling of pride in all who hold dear the glorious traditions of the British Army, and admire true heroism? Because it was to Lesaca that all these gallant souls were bidden to rendezvous, in response to the General's call; and a strange sight the little town must have witnessed as the "rugged veterans of the Light Division" and their companions-in-arms came trooping in from the mountains and valleys of the Pyrenees in which their respective regiments were at that moment located—many, doubtless, but scantily clad in ragged uniforms, and only half fed; but stout of heart, and full of fight where the reputation of their corps was concerned. The incident is scarcely even alluded to in the narratives of the campaign compiled by military officers. For the only lengthy notice of it that has been preserved we are indebted to a civilian, Francis Seymour Larpent, Judge Advocate-General, who was attached to Wellington's staff. He wrote in his journal, under date, Lesaca, August 29th, "Nothing but confusion here last night from eagerness of officers in Light and 4th Divisions to volunteer for the storming party at St. Sebastian. Major Napier was here quite in misery, because, though he had volunteered first, Lieut.-Colonel Hunt, of 52nd, his superior officer, insisted on his right to go. The latter said that Napier had been in the breach at Badajoz, and he had a fair claim to go now. So it is with the subalterns—ten have volunteered where two are to be accepted. Hunt has nothing but

honour to look to, he is past promotion. The men say they don't know what they are to do, but are ready to go anywhere."

As the modesty of the historian of the war precluded any reference to this episode, when compiling his splendid epic, few people are acquainted with the details of it. It is fitting, therefore, that they should be rescued from the oblivion that has overtaken them, as an illustration of the splendid spirit that pervaded Wellington's Peninsular Army. Sir W. Napier's biographer tells us that, "always eager for distinction, Major Napier volunteered to lead the Light Division stormers. He was accepted, and even put in orders for that service. Many officers and men who had before been engaged in affairs of the same kind offered themselves expressly to give him support, and, following the order of the day, these officers and men found their way to the market place of Lesaca, where they were to parade. But when he arrived there to take the command, he was suddenly informed that Lieut.-Colonel Hunt, of the 52nd, was to lead them, and that his services would not be required. Much mortified, he remonstrated with General Alten, but without avail, on the injustice done him. He then went to Colonel Hunt and urged him to forego his claim. Hunt then told him that, having gained his rank and having been on several storming parties, he had had no intention of offering himself and did not know Napier had volunteered. He had heard that a Major — was the man, and not thinking him of sufficient capacity to do the Division justice he had come forward; feeling now how hard it was upon Napier, he consented to forego his claim if the other could procure an order from Lord Wellington to that effect to save Hunt's honour, but not otherwise. He did apply to Lord Wellington, who would not listen to him, saying, he did not approve of volunteering, although obliged to resort to it sometimes, as he had lost his best officers in that way. Napier was so chagrined that he was resolved to take a musket and march with the men who had come forward at his call, since he could not command them; but General Alten, getting some inkling of his design, ordered him forthwith to join his regiment."

And so, as told in the "History," "Lieut.-Colonel Hunt, a daring officer, who had already won his promotion at former assaults, was at the head of the fierce rugged veterans of the light division."

The names of most of the officers who took part in that desperate exploit are on record. With two exceptions, however, history has scarcely troubled itself even to name the private soldiers who gave their lives on this memorable occasion. Of these two, the first was an Irishman, of indifferent character, but of exceptional courage, who so pestered the Captain of his company to be included amongst the volunteers on the score that they would not succeed without him, that at last his wish was gratified. The next case is related by Colonel Cadell, of the 28th Regiment: "Some of the officers requested Colonel Belson to send a party to Passages, near St. Sebastian, to purchase tobacco for the men, and tea and sugar for the officers; 2,000 dollars were collected, and given in charge of Sergeant Ball, and six grenadiers. The conduct of these brave fellows on this occasion was chivalrous in the extreme—proving beyond doubt, that British soldiers possess a high sense of honour and heroism, and that they are not, as supposed by many, mere machines. The party arrived at Passages on the 30th, and, learning that St. Sebastian was to be stormed the next day, the sergeant addressed his men, telling them there was hardly an action in the Peninsula in which the 28th had not a share, and proposed to them to volunteer on the storming party, for the credit of their regiment. To this the men joyfully assented, and the next question was, how to dispose of the money safely, with which they had been entrusted. It was determined to place it in the hands of a commissary, taking his receipt for the amount; which document the sergeant again lodged in the hands of a

third person. Having thus carefully provided for the property of their officers, these brave fellows volunteered for the desperate enterprise, and joined the ranks of their gallant comrades of Barossa heights—the grenadiers of the 9th. It would be superfluous to say they did their duty, and most fortunately—indeed singularly—none of them were hurt. After the town was taken, the gallant sergeant collected his men, reclaimed the money, purchased the supplies, and returned to his regiment with a handsome testimonial of their conduct, addressed to Colonel Belson, from the general commanding the brigade." We are further told that Sergeant Ball, on a former occasion, received a musquet ball through the fleshy part of his leg, when he very quietly took the quid out of his mouth, applied it to the wound, tied it up, and thought no more of the matter.

Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne, in his letter mentions "Elphinstone as being still at Lisbon." This was Lieut.-Colonel Elphinstone—Sir R. Fletcher's successor in command of the Royal Engineers, whose long stay at Lisbon, and official letter to Lord Wellington asking for instructions, drew from his Lordship a somewhat cutting reply. The following extracts from "Larpent's Journal," with reference to this officer, are not without interest:—

"St. Jean de Luz, February 4th, 1814. Poor E. got a very loud discourse (from Lord W.) all the way home from church last Sunday.

". Poor E. does not seem to draw well with Lord W., who never consulted him and has never exactly told him where the grand bridge (over the Adour) which he is preparing is to be. E. seems to be too much of the English official school—has too much regard for forms and regular orders.

"Lord W., if his plans are thwarted, will be in a rage with E. He banishes the terms 'difficulty,' 'impossibility,' and 'responsibility' from his vocabulary. To show you how little Lord W. listens to objections, and how he rather likes to cut up routine work, I may mention that Elphinstone told him the quantity of plank necessary (for the bridge) would take time and make a delay. 'No,' says he, 'there are all your platforms of your batteries, which have been sent in case of siege, cut them all up.' 'Then when we proceed with the siege what is to be done?' quoth E. 'Oh, work your guns in the sand until you can make them new ones out of the pine-wood near Bayonne.' So, all the platforms have been cut up accordingly."

With reference to Colonel Burgoyne's mention of Captain Stanway as being in charge of reinstating the fortress of St. Sebastian, we are informed by Sir J. T. Jones, that immediately after the capture of the place steps were taken to repair the damage and render it defensible. On September 25th charge of the fortress was handed over to the Spaniards, and all the allied forces were withdrawn, with the exception of Captain Stanway, of the Engineers, who remained to supervise the complete re-establishment of the fortifications. These services were continued for three months after the general peace, till everything had been rendered most perfect. But the most remarkable fact was that the total expense, amounting to £12,000, was defrayed by the British Government; an act of generosity, which, having regard to the conduct of the Spanish Government towards the allies—especially during the latter phases of the war—seemed somewhat uncalled for.

The siege of St. Sebastian marked a stage in the development of the Corps of Royal Engineers which had long been called for, and is thus described by Sir J. T. Jones: "On the failure of the attack of Badajos, in 1811, the most pressing applications were made, that half a dozen companies might be selected from the Royal Military Artificers to be formed into a body under the name of Royal Sappers and Miners, and that, after some instruction in their art, the companies

should be sent out to the seat of war to aid the troops in their future siege operations. Whereupon, General Mann, recently appointed Inspector-General of Fortifications, arranged for the name of the whole Corps of Royal Military Artificers to be changed to that of Royal Sappers and Miners. This change of name operated like magic. Everyone in an instant saw the absolute necessity of the whole body being instructed in sapping and mining, and an institution was created by Lord Mulgrave for that purpose at Chatham. At the same time arrangements were made to enable each officer, during three periods of his career, performing regimental duty and acquiring experience in the drill, discipline, and internal economy of troops; which measure, by linking together the men and officers, and closely connecting their mutual interests, gave discipline and pride to the soldiers, and conferred the utmost benefit on the corps.

We are further informed that the Company of Engineers at St. Sebastian was the first which took the field after these great changes, and that the men were found useful and intelligent.]

FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL J. F. BURGOYNE, R.E.

Head Quarters, Vera, October 15th, 1813.

DEAR JONES,—

I have lately written you some letters and sent bills and commissions, etc., that would, I fear, give you a great deal of trouble; if you find it so, do not hesitate to neglect them; if not, I am inclined to increase it by begging you to send the enclosed to the nearest Post Office to you; and to send me out a fold-up map of the seat of war in Germany, as good a one as you can recommend.

Since I wrote to you last we have had a pretty little affair in turning the enemy off their last mountain position on our left.¹ The ground was very strong, but not occupied in great force; we attacked its whole extent, but it was only on the second day that we gained most of the position, and that night that the enemy abandoned the main hold himself, probably from the fear of drawing on a more general engagement. The Spaniards behaved very well, but have since, by some maladroitness of outpost, lost some hundreds of men in an affair of outposts.

¹ This refers to the passage of the Bidassoa and the expulsion of the French from the whole of the mountainous and very strongly fortified position they held on the right bank of the Bidassoa, from its mouth to the summit of the lofty La Rhune, which latter point was only gained by the Spaniards after two days and nights of hard fighting. The assault of the very formidable and elaborately defended position above Vera was entrusted to the Light Division, and, to the surprise of everyone, accomplished with comparatively small loss. Major W. Napier—the historian of the war—in a letter to his wife, thus describes the business:—"Camp of Vera, October 1st. There is some talk of our invading France, but I do not think it can take place so late in the season and with such a force and position as Soult has in our front." Nevertheless, seven days later the position had been stormed and the left of the Allied army was encamped on French soil. The day after, Napier wrote to his wife:—"About an hour before your letter came we had received an order to attack on the next day at 7 o'clock the position in front of us. I will tell you candidly, I expected we should be cut to pieces, and I believe very few of us thought differently; it was, however, managed perfectly;

We fortify and entrench as the Army takes up new positions, and have at this moment several bridges on our hands besides. Our travelling field depôt of stores is of 100 mules carrying 1,000 extraordinary tools, and some other stores.

¹ Elphinstone is just come up to assume the command. Goldfinch remains before Pamplona, which Lord Wellington expects to surrender about the 25th inst.

If you order the canteen for me, tell the fellow you will not have the twopenny-halfpenny articles they usually introduce, but good ones.

Yours very truly,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL J. T. JONES, R.E.

— (England), November 7th, 1813.

MY DEAR JONES,—

I think it is hardly fair to quarter oneself for a month on a gentleman, and then to cut him till the next time it is convenient to go and live upon him again, and therefore, for decency sake, I trouble you with this epistle to thank you for the past, to enquire about the present, and to express my good wishes for the future.

I congratulate you upon the good news which flows in so abundantly from all quarters, as I think it will produce a speedy and a long peace, in which case those who have good houses, with forage for horses, will have the laugh all on their side. You have almost made me a convert to the superiority of a curricule; everyone here tells me my ideas have risen a hundredfold by my journey to London. In an argument the other day to prove that two horses are better than one, I was very properly silenced by a friend reminding me of my former opinions on the subject. However, with all my magnificent ideas I cannot muster spirit even to purchase a gig, and have relinquished the idea as being too extravagant. I blush to record this poorness of my spirit.

My leg gets on pretty well; I had a return of pain soon after I left London which rather frightened me, but it has gone off without any bad effects. I shall, I think, be able to hobble about soon after Christmas.

I have a letter from Burgoyne by which I am glad to hear that Lord W. received Elphinstone very well; it is much better for us all that it should be so.

Believe me very sincerely and faithfully yours,

JOHN T. JONES.

You have, of course, heard of the fate of our namesake; the Corps

great precision, great courage, great luck, and great numbers, enabled us to carry with little loss an immense mountain—entrenched with abattis, walls, rocks, and obstacles of every kind—in a space of two hours or less. . . . The position was stronger and higher than Bussaco three times over; in short, if the enemy had put enough men into it we must have been beaten. The plains of France lie before us, cultivated, enclosed, rich, and beautiful beyond description."

¹ Lord Wellington's stinging reply to Lieut.-Colonel Elphinstone's letter asking for instructions brought that officer up from Lisbon post-haste.

has had a good chance lately of losing the name out of it altogether.¹ However, I hope now you and I will hold it a try.

FROM CAPTAIN F. STANWAY, R.E.

San Sebastian, November 10th, 1813.

MY DEAR JONES,—

We were all much pleased with the late brevet you have given the Sappers, you have promoted several most deserving men, the colour-sergeant has given great *esprit* to that rank.

The army advanced by the right before yesterday; they are to push the enemy beyond the Nivelle if possible. The 3rd and 4th Divisions attack by the Puerto de Maya, and the Light from La Rhune Mountain; they are if possible to cut off some of the enemy's columns; the left, Sir J. Hope, is to make a noise and grand demonstrations to prevent the enemy's columns being detached to the aid of their left. Burgoyne writes me, he expects some work against a work near St. Jean de Luz, and at all events lots of *têtes de ponts*, retrenchments, etc. The French work like devils on the heights.

Altho' you wont write to say how you do, I nevertheless act better now and then to you. I am preparing stones and crosses to the memory of our *Braves* who fell here.

Yours truly,

F. STANWAY.

[NOTE.—The writer, as may be remembered, had been left in charge of the restoration of the defences of the fortress. The Battle of the Nivelle was actually fought while this letter was being penned; but the wind being westerly, the sound of the cannonading, so far to the front, probably did not reach the fortress.]

FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL J. F. BURGOYNE, R.E.

Guetary, 3 miles in front of St. Jean de Luz,

DEAR JONES,—

November 21st, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 9th, and have to return you thanks for the trouble you have taken on my account.

With respect to the canteen I think you have hit upon my idea, that I would rather add to the expense, than recede from my plan. It was a rough guess, £30, but if it amounts to £40, or £50, it is of little consequence, as I get what I wanted and only pay its price.

The map of Faden's you mention will answer my purpose, and I should like to have one also of the seat of war in North America, also folded on canvas; you will perhaps be able to get them franked out among your office friends.

¹ This refers to Lieutenant H. D. Jones, who was wounded and taken prisoner during the first assault on St. Sebastian. There were three officers of the name of Jones in the Royal Engineers who served in the Peninsular War.

I almost forget how I desired the money to be distributed, but if you have not paid it all away, I wish you would send me for winter quarter amusement, any new plays, pamphlets, etc., as they come out, and a January "Army List" as soon as it comes out. Any very small edition of Shakespeare and some of the principal poets, "Tristram Shandy" and any of Smollett's or Fielding's novels or other *classical* or interesting reading, histories of late campaigns, etc., etc. You office people, perhaps, have means of sending small packages by the mail. My sister has a small package to send me since a long time back. I will desire her to put it under cover to you to forward. You see I am about to make you *very useful*.

We are now in cantonments, or, as we have lately called it, winter quarters; but there is a report going that Lord Wellington has given a hint that our stay may not be very long, which I attribute only to his desire to have everybody always ready to move; for, though he sees no immediate prospect, a variety of circumstances under the present happy prospect of affairs may call us into the field at short notice.¹ It is that which has caused so much disappointment to people desirous of leave to go to England now the army has entered cantonments; Generals have got such assents as has prevented them taking the leave, and all under, receive flat refusals.

The weather, from horrible, has within these two days turned to very fine; our movements, I imagine, however, do not depend on that.

I was quite astonished at the Board's refusal of J. T. Jones' claim. They are an extraordinary set. I have been also, I think, ill used by them, and as I have told them so pretty plainly, I have of course given up all chance of any good from them for the future.

Yours very truly,

J. F. BURGOYNE.²

FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL J. F. BURGOYNE, R.E.

Guethary, December 19th, 1813.

DEAR JONES,—

A Packet has been taken going to England, and I fear it conveyed my annual order for new equipments for the coming campaign. You

¹ Early the following month Soult attacked the Allies, and there ensued three days of the severest fighting of the war.

² This officer rose to a position of high distinction, and took part in the famous siege of Sebastopol, forty years later. The following conversation, which took place on March 1st, 1911, at the Royal United Service Institution, in connection with a lecture on the Crimea by Major-General H. T. Arbuthnot, C.B., is not without interest:—

THE CHAIRMAN, General Lord W. F. Seymour, K.C.V.O.: Had we not on our side two of the finest officers of the Royal Engineers who had previously gained their experience in the Peninsula, that is, Sir John Burgoyne and Sir Harry Jones?

MAJOR-GENERAL OWEN: Yes, that is so. We also had many good Engineer officers of lower rank.

would oblige me on any visit to London to enquire of either Mr. Buckmaster, Hoby, or Cuff whether they have received any late order from me. If the gentlemen have not received them they all have been in the unfortunate Packet, and in that case I will thank you to put the enclosed into the post.

What with fire and water, we have had some days' sharp work lately. This charming climate of the South of France is the most detestable I ever witnessed, constantly heavy rains and high winds ever since our entrance.

Soult seems to have thought that our throwing part of our army across the Nive and making an arch, while he was so compact in its centre at Bayonne with his bridges and fortifications, was an opportunity of trying his fortune once more against us, not to be lost; he accordingly threatened our centre and attacked in force our left under Sir J. Hope, where he was completely repulsed, but not entirely in the brilliant style we usually do those things, with the bayonet, on account of the affair taking place entirely in the midst of woods. Three days he remained, attacking, threatening, and displaying himself to the greatest advantage; on the fourth he was off and round upon Sir Rowland Hill on the right. Here the ground was open, and he received his beating in a few hours in great style. His loss, including the 1,300 (three battalions of German deserters) cannot be less than 10,000 men, ours about 4,000. Thus he has had the satisfaction of seeing that wherever we can reduce our front proportionately, we can beat *all* his efforts with either wing of the army; other troops were ready to support the parts attacked, but never required. Soult thought we had passed the great body of our troops across the Nive, and came upon the extremity of this side; he was mistaken, and found us in force to receive him. After humbugging for three days, during which Sir Rowland had time to make his dispositions, take up his position and complete the bridges of communication, he attacked him. There, again, he did not find us napping. We have now extended to the Adour above Bayonne, on the navigation of which the French Army depends for subsistence; he must therefore draw his main body from the immediate neighbourhood of Bayonne, and will probably go higher up the Adour. Our guns fire at the boats passing, and *it is said*, that the boatmen leave the boats above us to float down the river and then catch them again, below.

I long to have a brush at Bayonne. It will be a tough job, but it is much in our favour that we can use about a mile and a half of the entrance of the Adour to land our stores and artillery out of sight of the place. I do not see any immediate prospect, however, of the siege.

Yours very truly,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

[NOTE.—The reader who cares to fill in the details of the above sketch will find much to interest him in the graphic narrative of "The Subaltern."]

FROM MAJOR H. G. GOLDFINCH, R.E.

Vieu Moguere, December 25th, 1813.

DEAR JONES,—

Merry Xmas to you. Could you contrive to pop across the bay, and eat roast beef and capons with Emmet, Wright, Pringle, and myself to-day, we could show such a climate and weather as you have not often seen at Xmas; notwithstanding, campaigning at this season is in truth bad work. Tho' the sun shines to-day and we can look with indifference at an expiring fire (like mine at this moment), it now and then takes a fancy to rain, and roads and country are as nearly impracticable as may be; days are short, too; in fine, winter, as Bonaparte said last year, is the time for cantonments for armies, and not for works—making bridges, *tête-de-ponts*, etc., with which we have our hands so full at this moment, and have had for some time past, that I have been obliged to be unusually remiss to all my correspondents, among others, yourself. I should otherwise, knowing the pleasure it gives you to hear of our success, have given you an account of our late—you will at home, I hope, consider—brilliant affair in this neighbourhood. The 13th was another grand day's satisfaction for us out of Soult. He was really licked most handsomely. He did not attack with less than 30,000 men. We had to oppose him but three British and three Portuguese brigades, Ross' guns and Tulloch's; say in all 9,000, which is the outside. The ground upon which the contest took place is strong; every advantage was taken of it by the Generals commanding. Sir W. Stewart and General Barnes particularly distinguished themselves, and General Byng finished the day by driving the enemy from a part of their own position in very pretty style. Sir Rowland Hill was particularly happy on this occasion, and has added largely to his former celebrity. The artillery did great execution; the field was as thickly strewn with dead and spoils as any I have ever seen. I am sure the enemy lost three for one at least; we were minus 2,000. We are now busy strengthening the same position with *flèches*, etc. I hardly expect, however, that Soult will again try to upset us at *St. Pierre*, the village the fight was at. I know not, nor do I even pretend to guess at, what further we are to do. Bayonne is a very formidable post; Soult has it as a centre from which he can fall upon either part of our army, divided already by the Nive, and obliged also to have an *eye behind* towards *St. Jean Pied de Port* which Paris still holds with a division and strong cavalry. But was I to guess, I should say we shall not as yet cross the Adour or attempt anything further.

I am like the *Times*, decidedly for setting up Louis 18th and declaring to France what we are here for—the people, the army, in short, 9 in 10, 19 in 20, nay, I believe 99 out of 100 would be for Louis. We are rather grovelling in the dark without such a declaration. The inhabitants, where we are, are as friendly to us as any I have seen in these wars.

I have received your letter of the 22nd; do not apologise for want of news, I am always glad to hear from you; for an office character

(you are at least a demi one) you stand paramount; none of them will write us unfortunate outcasts. I tried Handfield—not a line! The secretary—mum; in short, continue to favour me with your news, and believe me,

Yours very truly,

H. G. GOLDFINCH.

Remember me kindly to Whinyates, if with you still, and tell him why I do not write him at this moment—you have it below in black and white.

FROM CAPTAIN F. STANWAY, R.E.

San Sebastian, January 12th, 1814.

DEAR JONES,—

Amongst the last batch of promotions you sent my company is included one D. H—; this man, since being recommended, has several times disgraced himself and been broke from a Lance N.-C.; I have therefore stopped the notification of your promotion to him.

I beg to recommend one, R. O'Neil, a fine young man and a promising soldier. My company here gets on famously: the Governor, a Spanish General, says they are the best behaved English he ever saw. Had the town not been burnt we might have hoped for the freedom of it. If I could but get rid of some vile Irish ruffians in it, it would be as complete as it is possible to make them. I got some fine young men of the last draft. But you may depend upon it, the Sappers will never be that respectable corps we all wish to see them, as long as so many Irish vagabond *sans culottes* are taken; they are not the proper kind for this service.

I beg to recommend one, Sergeant McKenzie, now on his way home; he is a very deserving man, but nearly worn out.

Lord Wellington and Soult have been hunting each other last week, but little ensued; they did not seem to wish to have another threshing.

Is it likely any of us will be half-paid at the peace taking place, or the Sappers reduced?

Write sometimes oftener.

Very truly yours,

F. STANWAY.

FROM MAJOR H. GOLDFINCH, R.E.

Vieu Mouguerre, February 1st, 1814.

DEAR JONES,—

At this season you know, when all is at a standstill, we have little to communicate to our friends at home. The weather is no longer what I described to you at Xmas; but decided winter has completely paralised all military operations for weeks past. We think that when it becomes more favourable our great chief will not remain idle; indeed, what we hear of the movements of the Allies on the other frontier of France makes our idleness irksome, and renders the army more

impatient (at least the speculating part of it) than usual. By the way, I have long been looking out for your promised map of France; I am still without one of any kind.

Your Blüchers, Schwartzbergs, &c., have quite surpassed all my hopes; I only fear they will not go so far as they now surely might do—that is, to upset the little Corsican *in toto* and restore the Bourbons. Europe cannot disarm with security or reckon on five years' peace otherwise. Peace, however, of some sort is now assuredly at hand; we shall be among you before many months.

Yours very truly,

H. GOLDFINCH.

FROM MAJOR H. GOLDFINCH, R.E.

Garlin, March 13th, 1814.

DEAR JONES,—

I know you will be glad to hear how we get on in this Christian-like country—details of our late operations you would, I am sure, see in Chapman's office, to whom I have sent a regular account. We have all been at a standfast, or nearly so, since my last, saving the left under Marshal Beresford, which we hear will enter Bordeaux to-day. Sir Rowland Hill shifted his Head Quarters to this place on the 10th to make room for the Lord at Aire, where he is hunting, &c., in the old style. Our patrols only go into Pau; the troops are cantoned on the road towards it, in this neighbourhood; those on the other side the Adour extend as far as Nogaro. Soult is, I fancy, at or near Plaisance, and has his army concentrated near there. His force is said to be greatly diminished by desertion, and we hear of his soldiers still deserting him by hundreds. *Why* we are halting, or what we are going to do I pretend not to tell—we thought the other day the siege of Bayonne was to be instantly commenced, and that the army was to be stationary until its conclusion; after waiting, however, at single anchor ready to step off for this service, we are told (the Genies with me—with the army) we shall not be wanted. The most probable guess at our inactivity is to allow time for the troops from Spain, our own cavalry, and the Spanish armies that have been cantoned on the Ebro all this winter, to come up to us. The weather is the only thing we can complain of in this country; the season is extraordinary; since the fine Xmas I told you of, we really have not had a mild, congenial day. It snowed heavily the day we came here, the 10th; tho' fair to-day, all is cold and winter-like. For the rest, in quarters, hay, corn, fowls, hams, wine, and such campaigning consolations, we are in the land of plenty.

Our news from home and from the Allies is long in arrears, and in a perplexing crisis. We just know for a certainty poor old Blücher's and Schwartzberg's disasters on the Seine up to the 20th. If they don't soon smash Bonaparte, I fear their ever doing it.

Remember me to all friends, and believe me,

Yours most truly,

H. GOLDFINCH.

FROM CAPTAIN STANWAY, R.E.

San Sebastian, March 12th, 1814.

DEAR JONES,—

. I am sadly in want of N.C. officers, there being several vacant in company.

I can give you little news, except that the siege of Bayonne is decided on, and the stores, &c., are moving up from Passages. Lord Wellington made a fine effort to expend the engineers and sappers lately in throwing the bridge over the Adour; a fleet of Chasse-Marées were commanded by a captain and eight subs., and two companies of sappers,¹ there being a scarcity of seamen: a few Spanish boatmen being the remainder of the crews; in consequence lots were sunk, others put back and enough arrived to do the business. We have lost a very fine fellow in Parker, I don't know whether you knew him. They expect to break ground about the end of the month.

I wish you would send me some corps news.

Believe me,

Very truly yours,

F. STANWAY.

FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL J. T. JONES, R.E.

April 15th, 1814. (London.)

MY DEAR JONES,—

. You will think me a strange fellow when you know that I am still here, and even yet uncertain when I shall go out of town. The peace has set everyone so much agag that no one can talk of anything else, and it has entirely upset all my plans—my dreams of returning to the army are all past, and luckily so, for I find my foot does not improve under the great exercise I have given it lately. You are now a fixture for some years, as there will be no more promotion in the corps till a considerable number have died off. I think you are the best situated of all those I know, and without flattery, all must feel glad that the sappers are likely to remain so long under your control; that corps cannot fail to benefit much from having its discipline and economy regulated by the same officer for a considerable period, and I think I know you sufficiently to feel assured that you will not relax in your attention to them. I trust you will do your endeavour to reduce their numbers roundly: let us have no assimilation of battalions and companies of officers and men; it is our interest to render the two establishments as dis-

¹ Admiral Penrose, who was in charge of the naval operations, spoke in the highest terms of the services rendered by these young officers. In his despatch he wrote: "The zeal and science of these officers triumphed over the difficulties of the navigation, and I trust that none of their valuable lives have fallen a sacrifice to their spirited exertions."

similar as possible. I would reduce the sappers to two battalions of eight companies each, one a skeleton battalion having only the N.C. officers, and a few of the best men; now will be the time to officer these men from the second captains. If Pasley's establishment¹ cannot be put on a better footing, it should be abolished, as the corps of sappers will never be worth anything till it has a head quarters of its own—separate from all garrisons; and whilst that semblance of a military school exists, it stands in the way of the great change we require. We should now have barracks and a head quarters appointed under a very senior officer in the corps. Pasley should have his school at the same place, and your honour his office; then the services of all would run in unison, and an establishment worthy of the corps and creditable to the country would arise. But I fear, in this interested age, and amongst a body of men more self-interested than any other in His Majesty's Service, no such happy concordance can ever take place.

Ever sincerely yours,

JOHN T. JONES.

FROM THE SAME.

Colchester, May 17th, 1814.

MY DEAR JONES,—

I am writing to enquire how your arrangements stand for the peace and plenty which is to overwhelm us. I have been here nearly a month, and as I correspond with no one since I left town, my knowledge of affairs is becoming rather antiquated, and I apply to you as a kind friend to bring my ideas a little into date again. I wish to know if anything has been arranged for the peace establishment of this Corps; whether any of our officers are to go to America from France; if not, where the devil they are to stow us all; or any speculations which may be afloat.

I get on gradually in walking; I can now manage two miles without inconvenience, and begin to be very tired of an idle life. I speculate on a trip to the Continent, but as it must be at my own expense, I shall wait till I am obtaining the full benefit for my money; walking two miles per day would not make the tour of Paris in six months. I have letters of the 30th from Bayonne all our officers intend to go there (Paris) as soon as permission should be granted.

¹The establishment, now known as the School of Military Engineering, at Chatham, was organized by Royal Warrant (April 23rd, 1812), Lieut.-Colonel Pasley was the first Director of it, and presided over its destinies for the long period of 29 years. ("The Training of a Recruit, &c.," by Colonel B. R. Ward, R.E.)

Did you happen to hear if my book¹ has given offence in Pall Mall, or in any other quarter? I have never heard a word about the publication from anyone whatever; I shall therefore be obliged to you to let me know in what light it is considered. I cannot see that anyone has a right to be annoyed with it, and yet I am apprehensive many will be so.

Ever my dear Jones,

Yours faithfully,

JOHN T. JONES.

FROM THE SAME.

Colchester, July 31st, 1814.

MY DEAR JONES,—

I am on the point of embarking for Ostend, in which neighbourhood I shall remain till thoroughly fit for duty. . . . I am glad you are going to Portsmouth to put to right the companies of sappers for America, as I hear very indifferent accounts of their organization. I hope the peace will not take from exertion to render that Corps more complete; Pasley's establishment should now be perfected; by the bye, wonders will never cease—Pasley married!—the last thing I should have supposed; I hope it is an advantageous connection for him—I hear she is pretty. Our friend B, I see, is Major; I am glad of it; but I cannot for the life of me give a probable guess how he obtained his promotion. . . .

Believe me, my dear Jones,

Very faithfully yours,

JOHN T. JONES.

FROM MAJOR THOS. BLANSHARD, R.E.

H.M.S. "Tonnant," off Baltimore,

September 18th, 1814.

DEAR JONES,—

My time will not allow me to enter fully into the detail of the company. They go on, generally speaking, well, but I must again urge the necessity of a sub-lieut. being sent out, as they are almost left to themselves in our shore operations. I have also had the misfortune to lose Actg.-Sergt. Hutchinson; he was left with a man at Washington wounded by an explosion of gunpowder. Wm. Walters

¹ This refers to "Journals of the Sieges in Spain," which, the author states, in the preface, to have been penned at the commencement of 1813. The second edition was issued in 1827; the third edition, edited by his old brother-officer, Lieut.-Colonel Harry Jones, who also served throughout the war, was issued in 1846.

was drunk when last seen, but he joined Sergt. H. afterwards; they are at ———(?) I expect them soon to be exchanged. You must have heard of the fall of poor General Ross; this damps the pleasure of our success. If 1,000 more men had joined us we might have marched almost to Philadelphia; the Baltimore people were greatly alarmed; their entrenchments were strong in the front, but in rear they were not finished; they could not have kept us out, and would not have done them much service. But as there were nearly 20,000 men inside, and we had not more than 2,000 regulars, it was not thought advisable to attack them—the Admiral having sent word that he should be unable to co-operate.

I am perfectly equipped in entrenching tools, &c., if anything therefore goes wrong it must rest with me. God bless you, my good fellow.

Believe me,

Yours truly,

THOS. BLANSHARD.

FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL J. F. BURGOYNE, R.E.

Dauphine Island, March 1st, 1815.

DEAR JONES,—

The war being over, we expect to be in England by about June, after our short but sharp campaign. At present we are bivouacked on the island,¹ where we have abundance of *wood* and *water*, if we could only convert some of it into *bread* and *beef* it would save us from the chance of being starved at the end of about a fortnight. The army and fleet are on very short allowance, and ships sent off in a violent hurry to Havannah and all directions to endeavour to procure supplies. When Sir A. Cochrane left us a few days ago we thought we had provisions for months. We do not enjoy many of the *agrèments* of a campaign, not having as yet been in so much as a village since leaving England. The troops are reasonable healthy, but I should be inclined to fear scurvy breaking out amongst us as it has in many of the men of war.

Yours very truly,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL JOHN T. JONES, R.E.

Tournay, March 30th, 1815.

MY DEAR JONES,—

I am sorry to find that the scheme we had planned for you has been frustrated by the appointment of Oldfield to be Brigade Major; *entre nous*, I should imagine—if war takes place—General Bryce will have the command here, and under that idea, I had made two or

¹ Off the coast of Alabama, U.S.A.

three attacks upon him to appoint you his Brigade Major; and he, I rather thought, seemed to be inclined to do it. I cannot think O. well calculated for the situation.

Everything seems to indicate an immediate attack from the French, who, it is said, are collecting in great numbers at Lisle; our army is also concentrating. The Brigadier and myself have been round by Antwerp, &c. . . . They say the Duke of Wellington is coming, and he will of course very soon decide on all our arrangements. . . . Send me a few lines and let me know all you hear about stations in England, and whether anything further is decided about the general officers.

Ever my dear Jones,

Faithfully yours,

JOHN T. JONES.

FROM THE SAME.

Brussels, April 6th, 1815.

MY DEAR JONES,—

I believe I have fully arranged with the Brigadier that, should he be appointed to take the command, he will ask for you to be his Brigade Major, if agreeable to you, and he will endeavour to provide for the present holder in another way; therefore write one word if you would like it, and whether you could get the assent of the office, and how long you would require to wind up your accounts.

The Duke arrived yesterday and has been so busy, that we have not yet seen him, so that we know nothing of his intentions.¹

Ever yours faithfully,

JOHN T. JONES.

P.S.—I wish you would send me out an Army List under a frank, as I have not one and cannot procure one.

FROM THE SAME.

Brussels, May 2nd, 1815.

MY DEAR JONES,—

I am very sorry to acquaint you that there is no chance whatever of the arrangement I mentioned to you being carried into effect, as it

¹ During 1814, Colonel Jones examined the principal fortresses of the Netherlands; met Wellington in Paris, and was appointed, with two other officers to report to his lordship on the defence of the Netherlands; and subsequently accompanied his lordship on a tour of the principal defensive positions. At the conclusion of the campaign, Colonels Jones and Williamson, in their capacity as Commissioners for the allied Sovereigns, prevented the fortress of Charlemont from falling into the hands of the Prussians. (See "Dictionary of Nat. Biog.")

is certain the Brigadier will not assume the command of the department.

Ever faithfully yours,
JOHN T. JONES.

FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL JOHN T. JONES, R.E.

Ghent, June 8th, 1815.

MY DEAR JONES,—

I hear I may congratulate you on the appointment of Brigade Major to the Corps of Sappers and Miners—is it so? I would rather you could have obtained the same situation on the staff of this army, but that is completely hopeless, and therefore as a friend I must wish you the next best thing. The arrangements of the army seem now nearly completed, and there is no expectation whatever remaining, that Bryce will be ordered to take command of the department. I think it is to be regretted that he does not, as his rank would give us weight, and a variety of Lt.-colonels might then be sent out, who are senior to the present. Commandant and officers of some standing much required, as I believe there is not even a first captain in the country. We have nearly finished in this part of the kingdom, and we are about to go to Liege, and the fortresses on the Meuse, which I expect will occupy us till the end of July, when, of course, we shall return to England. I understand Landmann has got the Gravesend district; I hope they will give it to me again or some other home when I get back, as it will be exceedingly inconvenient for me to dance attendance on the office for a twelvemonth to get a station. I have been very unlucky that the only twice I have ever had a district in England, I have lost them both at the end of a fortnight.

Ever my dear Jones,
Faithfully yours,
JOHN T. JONES.

FROM CAPTAIN STANWAY, R.E.

Brussels, June 12th, 1815.

DEAR JONES,—

I enclose you a return I received some time since from Sergt. Wison concerning his claim for prize money in the Peninsula.

.
We expect to move in a very few days, as everything is ready, and the Empereur has left Paris and is at Lille, going along his line.

Very truly yours,
F. STANWAY.

FROM THE SAME.

Hd. Qrs., 3 Div., Aundy (?), July 3rd, 1815.

DEAR JONES,—

We are at last got to our journey's end, six miles to Paris, and they wont let us in. The army occupies a position this side of the city, our left on the Canal de —— (?), the line extends by le Bourget to the front of St. Denis to the Seine. The enemy hold St. D. Blücher has crossed the Seine and holds St. Germain and Versailles. Our left is thrown back, but we expect the Bavarians on that flank, near the forest of Bondy, when we shall have pretty well shut them in. Reports are various as to Boney and his force, you know best, I dare say, in England. We get on in this army better with our sappers and tools: five engrs., a compy. of sappers, and six waggons are attached to each division; besides 2 comdts. to the two Corps d'Armees; lots of pontoons, basket-makers, &c. . . .

Very truly yours,

F. STANWAY.

FROM CAPTAIN STANWAY, R.E.

Paris, July 26th, 1815.

DEAR JONES,—

. . . . They talk of the army going into cantonnments 14 lgs. from Paris, leaving a certain force from each of the allied armies to keep the capital in awe, as forage and other articles are becoming very scarce.

We had a grand review of the army on Monday; the Emperors and Kings attended; the Sapeurs headed the columns of infantry and were particularly remarked. . . .

Yours faithfully,

F. STANWAY.

FROM LIEUTENANT ALEX. ROSS.

Banks of the Seine, near Paris,

August 12th, 1815.

HONOURED SIR,—

. . . . On my leaving Woolwich you were pleased to say that you should be glad to here from me at any time. I now state, for your information, that I left Ostend June 29th, and marched by Forsed Marches to join the army; and to induce the men to march I myself marched the whole of the way, and, thanks be to God, I have seen what I wished to see 22 years ago—*viz.*, Paris. I saw several places where I had been in 93 and 4, and in particular Le Cato, where the Commdr.-in-Chief took 70 pieces of cannon and General Shapuy, the French General Commanding. The French nation will long remember the —— Prussians coming amongst them—if you was to see the houses, villages, &c., destroyed by them on the road to Paris. My company was at the destruction of the barriers of Paris; the proud city has come to nought—as they have served others, they

are served themselves. . . . I am happy to inform you that the men have conducted themselves well since our arrival in this country; only one court-martial, on Sergeant Henry Williams, who was admonished in front of the company. All the companies are within four miles of Paris. I hope and wish you to come over and inspect them; be assured I shall be glad to see you in this country; and I have taken the liberty to enclose you a plan of the city of Paris; also a sketch of the British in Paris. How galing this sight is to the French. But to return to the sappers, what will the Duke of Wellington say about the sappers, when he was eye witness to them and them alone mounting the gates and walls of the only town that made any opposition to his army on the road to Paris, and taking its outworks—Perunne. Lieut. Stratton conducted his men in grand style. I had it from officers of the Guards who was present. I have been to all the public places in Paris. I am highly gratified with the sights. I have been three times in the Painted Hall, in the Louvre, and in the different Museums; the more I looks at the public buildings the more I thinks of Bonaparte; his plans is grand beyond description; it is no wonder that the French nation should love him. The new stone bridges across the river Seine are handsome, good materials and workmanship, &c.

The Jardins des Plantes is grand, I could spend six months in this place alone; it contains everything. I have not been at the Hospital of Invalides as yet, I intend as soon as possible, and taking some of the men with me to see the Moddles, &c., &c. The other day I took Moses Jones with me to see the Painted Halls and some sculpture, on his return home to camp he took two days in writing a letter in Welsh too his father, giving him an account of Paris, &c.; this man is an honest and sober well-conducted man. Paris contains everything to soother youth; how I feel for the young officers who I meet flying into it, in the evening, when I am coming home. "Ha, old fellow, now is the time!" is their reply. Some of them will long remember Paris. Several officers of engineers have made some good purchases of books, &c. I am very sorry that Capt. Gipps is not here, as he wanted to purchas; he is a good officer, and I find that in Lieut. Batten, commanding the company in his absence. I do not know how long we may remain incamped in this place; we are very closs pitched. I am in a shady walk, and the horse under the trees. All the country is eat up and the gardens, &c., distroyed. Wine is 2/6 a bottle; good brandy the same. In Paris they will dine an officer at £0 16s. 8d., or a Napoleon. I most now conclude. I know that a long letter is very improper, in this I hope you will excuse me. I hope Colonel Rowley and Handfield are well. I could wish to be remembered too them, only this is taking too much liberty.

I am, honoured Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

ALEX. ROSS, LT.,

Royl. Sappers and Miners.

Brigade Major Jones, &c., &c.

FROM CAPTAIN STANWAY, R.E.

Paris, September 4th, 1815.

DEAR JONES,—

. The big wigs and Emperors are about to set off to a grand review, near Chalons sur Marne, on the 8th, 9th, and 10th; it is not expected they will return here. Adieu.

Yours truly,

H. STANWAY.

For your amusement I enclose you a specimen of the French caricatures on the Prussians; the two young ladies of the Palais are not in the least overdone, but what may be seen any day.

FROM THE SAME.

Paris, September 27th, 1815.

DEAR JONES,—

I send you a caricature of a fashionable game in these parts—it may divert you in your weaker moments to practise it. We have no news except that Blücher's army is returned out of Normandy and is assembling round the capital, his head qrs. at Versailles—the reason no one knows. They are going to take down all the triumphal arches and the beautiful column a la Trajan in the Place Vendome, that was erected in honour of the German war; some say the troops are assembled to protect it. We are to remain in camp another month, as things are far from quiet. For my own part, I think things will never be so till Louis abdicates; the rage against him is too general; you may depend on his falling directly we leave the country; his best friends say there is not doubt of it. He is not made to govern such a set as the French of the present day. These people should be ruled with a rod of iron—a person whom they fear is the only one that can lead them.

Yours very truly,

H. STANWAY.

FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL J. T. JONES.

Paris, October 15th, 1815.

MY DEAR JONES,—

. We know nothing certain, except that the Duke says he cannot spare us out of the country. Smyth expects to keep upwards of fifty officers in the country; the artillery nearly double (80 pieces of field ordnance), it will be a great help to the two services, and will, I trust, prevent any reductions.

Ever my dear Jones,

Faithfully yours,

J. T. JONES.

FROM CAPTAIN STANWAY.

Paris, November 29th, 1815.

DEAR JONES,—

. We are every moment expecting the Comdg. Engineer's orders from the Duke. There are to be three divisions of infantry, under Cole, Colville, and Clinton, of 8,000 men each, and three brigades of cavalry, 2,000 each—total 30,000 men. The remainder of this army, about 25,000 men, are under orders to proceed to the point of embarkation; the country must be evacuated by them by December 11th, according to the treaty. Burgoyne, Jones, Smith and Hoste, and five field officers of artillery, are gone to the frontiers to see the fortresses given over, their state, &c. You could not have done better for Douglas than you have done; it is much better than making him an officer. His late capt. said he was good for nothing when his wife was with him in America; with me he has always been a good N.C.O., and kept his dignity up, which few of our N.C.O.'s think proper to do. I send you a likeness of Ney, taken at his trial. They say the capital will be occupied by our troops till February.

Yours very truly,
H. STANWAY.

FROM THE SAME.

St. Cloud, November 8th, 1815.

DEAR JONES,—

. The army went into cantonments on the 30th ult., and occupy the villages and towns round the capital as far as six leagues round. They say we remain at least till January 1st, when the King's Guard are expected to be forthcoming. The Committee are still in Paris idle; but Lord Wellington said a few days ago, he should find employment for them very shortly—which, of course, is law; and we hear several towns are to be fortified that they have not yet been sent to report on. Ney's trial has not yet commenced; he was very near escaping a week ago; some of his friends and A.D.C.'s dressed as Gens d'armes went to the prison and produced an order from the Minister of Police authorising his removal to another prison. The keeper, an old man, believed it, and ordered his daughter to get the keys ready; but as age is slow and cautious, his precautions and tardiness annoyed one of the pretended Gens d'armes so much as to provoke him to strike the keeper; this created suspicion and blew the whole business.

Yours truly,
H. STANWAY.

FROM THE SAME.

St. Cloud, December 11th, 1815.

Ney's sentence was pronounced at midnight; next morning at nine he was shot; he died as he had lived, a brave man. He put

one hand to his heart, held his chapeau in the other, and said: "My comrades fire on me!" He fell—three balls thro' his head—in the Garden of the Luxemburg.

FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL J. T. JONES.

Paris, February, 1816.

MY DEAR JONES,—

I have been very much disappointed in not seeing you here this winter, as we should have been able to make Paris pleasant to you. I should have sent you an invitation, but our stay was very uncertain, and in the beginning of December I was sent as one of the Commissioners for taking possession of the places in dépôt. My luck, first of all, threw me into the most barren, bleak part of France to spend my Christmas—Charlemont, amongst the Ardennes, where we had incessant snow storms, and such. I just recollect I must not abuse a mountainous country to a man of your name; therefore I will throw the horrors of the Ardennes into the shade, by mentioning greater difficulties we had to encounter, in reconciling, pacifying, and arbitrating between French, Prussian, Russian, Saxon, Dutch, and English Commissioners; it was like mixing oil and vinegar together. However, by patience and perseverance, we effected it; but heaven preserve me from ever again being a Commissioner. On our arrival at Charlemont we found the place strictly blockaded by the Prussians, who, at the end of five months, found themselves within a few days of gaining possession of the fortress by famine, as all the meal was expended, and Prussian man was very obstinate in his endeavours to get in. We were obliged to be very strong in our remonstrances to get the blockade raised, and, having succeeded in inducing the Prussians to withdraw, we had a garrison of three thousand French vagabonds to keep in order; we marched them out at the end of a few days, and fell from bad to worse, as they were succeeded by 4,000 beings called Russians—an animal, barely human. The difficulty there was in preventing losses and accidents in these changes is inconceivable, and I cannot feel too happy that I have done with it.

All our army now is in its cantonments, and there only remain at Paris, the Duke and his personal staff, and the Adjutant and Or.-Mr.-General. The French Royal Guard do the duty of the Duke's Palace. Everything is exceedingly tranquil, and I think all will go on smoothly; all the bad news I hear is thro' the English newspapers—I wish with all my heart their circulation was prohibited in France; French men are not able justly to appreciate the rhapsodies of our newspaper editors, and many an article which would be treated with contempt in England, is here received as being written from conviction of the truth, and the character of the English Government is very much hurt by it, as well as that of France.

If I get Gravesend again, you must endeavour to be a good neighbour by frequently coming over to see us.

Believe me,

Very faithfully yours,

JOHN T. JONES.

FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL J. F. BURGOYNE, R.E.

Sedan, March 15th, 1816.

MY DEAR JONES,—

I begin to be rather uneasy about the fate of a letter with important enclosures. The contents were bills for the amount of my Peninsula prize money. The total amount being upwards of £400, is enough to make a poor man as myself anxious for its fate.

My stay at this place still remains doubtful; new points of discussion arise between the French and Prussians on account of these two singularly unfortunate fortresses, as fast as the old ones are arranged. I know little or nothing of what is going on in the world, having been in this kind of banishment now upwards of three months.

A friend of mine has a son going to the Academy very soon; by some blundering, and thro' an apparent irritability of temper of Mr. Evans, the Professor there, the father of the boy thinks he has affronted the mathematician, and is very fearful of the consequences towards his son at examination and future progress. What sort of a man is said Dr. Evans? and what mode would you recommend of getting over him? Can they make it up by making the boy take private lessons of him whilst a cadet; that is, paying the money for such lessons—the mode which I always adopted when at the Academy with any masters I conceived looked upon me with an evil eye. The boy's original instructor affronted Evans; the father, to prevent mischief asked his advice for a better one, and he recommended his son, young Evans, who is established in London; the boy was sent, but a week after, the father, finding him walking Bond Street, and otherwise on enquiry, as he conceived, shamefully neglected and going to the Devil, took him hastily away under pretence that his mother was fidgety about his health in London, and, being ill, he was forced to humour her.

Believe me, my dear Jones,

Yours most faithfully,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

FROM THE SAME.

Sedan, March 23rd, 1816.

DEAR JONES,

. Our tedious affairs in this quarter are at length put an end to, as far as negotiations are concerned, by a determined

decision of the French Government; German slowness, however, and French formalities, still drag out a dilatory office copying business, that will delay us another week or ten days, for what might be done in two; but *Patienza!* If the Duke is still at Paris we shall rejoice at the excuse of taking that (to me) delightful place in our way to Cambrai.

Elphinstone sends me, with apparent exultation, the Duke of York's approbation of our bearing the Peninsula badge on our appointments, I must confess, however, that it does not appear to me to be done in the most gratifying mode, being so long after other people, and only in consequence of *les démarches* Elphinstone made to obtain it.

Yours very faithfully,
J. F. BURGOYNE.

You put me in mind of my misfortunes! for in those late seizures among the Ordnance stores was unfortunately an innocent box of trifling presents I was sending home, and which I did not mean to smuggle.¹ If there is such a thing as a printed tariff of duties on foreign articles brought into England it will probably be found at your book shop at Woolwich, and you will oblige me by putting it (I suppose it is on a sheet of paper) under an envelope to me; as, if I go to England soon on leave I shall wish to take a gun, and perhaps some other little things, if the duty is not excessive.

FROM CAPTAIN STANWAY.

Cantain, April 14th, 1816.

DEAR JONES,

We are vegetating here in as stupid a manner as possible; all our news and novelties come from the English papers. The Duke arrived in Cambrai yesterday—how long to remain is not generally known; but not for long, of course, as he has taken a country seat near Paris, and is embellishing its gardens.

We had a shocking long winter here, nothing but wet, wet, wet; I fear it will never be fine again. We 1st Div. people are very lucky in our quarters, we have got into a fine château, with every accommodation, whilst those in the villages are most miserably off. I hope we shall see you out this summer; I can give you a bed and other accommodations if you come this way. We expect to be sent shortly to the French fortresses to meet some French Genie about repairing said fortresses, but it cannot take much time. Is it true

¹ It is on record that in 1816 advantage was taken of the return of Government stores to Woolwich for the purpose of introducing contraband goods of immense value. In one packet alone, marked "Returned Congreve Rockets," were goods value £7,000 for one person; inside mortars were laces, gloves, cambrics, &c.; in the tumbrils were claret, champagne, &c. "Many people," added the report, "had long supplied themselves and friends with wines in this way, and their wives with finery."

our uniform is about to be changed? as here reported, and that the sappers are to have arms.

Don't you think I have been very cruelly treated about the Peninsula prize money? I got only £13 for my services. . . .

Yours very truly,

FRANK STANWAY.

FROM THE SAME.

Cantain, November 10th, 1816.

DEAR JONES,

Now the reviews are over, I send you an account of it. There were nearly 50,000 men assembled; of them about 8,000 cavalry, on the plain of Denain to the left of the Schelt. After they were inspected they commenced manœuvring; Col. Scovell's Staff Corps of Cavalry were the enemy and covered the passage of the above river; the Saxons and Danes forming the right, attacked him and made a feint of forcing the passage near Bouchain, at Neuville; whilst the left, Hanoverians and British, threw bridges over the river at and below Denain, thus turning the enemy's right, who then changed the front of his right wing and opposed their passage of the Selle; this was, however, forced also; the village of Douchy on the Chaussee was carried by the bayonet, and the enemy turned again by the cavalry at Haspres and driven beyond Bouchain. The fight ended in a heavy rain. Lots of powder was expended; the ground was knee-deep from the wet previously fallen.

Yours ever,

F. ST.

(Plan of field-day operations enclosed.)

FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL JOHN T. JONES.

Paris, April 5th, 1817.

MY DEAR JONES,—

. . . . I trust your fortress will not be attacked; it appears to me that everything has been most exceedingly ill-managed with respect to the Engineers' service, and if only half is true that I am told, I shall not be surprised to see us cut down to the imbecility of 1793.

I have every reason to believe myself firmly fixed for two or three years in this employment, which turns out very pleasant. I have my family with me, and if you take a trip to this country we will endeavour to make Paris agreeable.

Ever faithfully yours,

JOHN T. JONES.

FROM LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR J. BURGOYNE.

Ordnance Office, Pall Mall, April 24th, 1852.

MY DEAR COLONEL,—

. You will have heard of my promotion to the G.C.B. I was greatly supported by Lord Hardinge in making great remonstrances about the monstrous fees, and even intimated that great as the sacrifice would be to my pride and ambition, I felt it to be a moral obligation towards the close of one's professional, and perhaps natural, life, to decline the honour rather than submit to them; it was, however, too late, and Sir Peregrine Maitland and myself were led like lambs to the slaughter and compelled to take a distinction that cost us so dearly. I have reason to believe that my remonstrances were submitted to the Queen and Prince Albert, who both entirely sympathized with me, but there were difficulties in the matter beyond their control.

Yours very faithfully,
J. F. BURGOYNE.

FROM THE SAME.

London, April 16th, 1853.

MY DEAR JONES,—

We have no particular news yet. Lord Hardinge is very busy in preparing a great camp near Bagshot Heath in June. There will be a company of sappers, and H. D. Jones will attend at some period for a little pontooning, field works, blowing up batteries, &c.; it will, I expect, be almost as great a show as the Great Exhibition.

Yours faithfully,
J. F. BURGOYNE.

FROM THE SAME.

London, February 19th, 1853.

MY DEAR COLONEL,—

I have just received a letter from Sir Robt. Gardiner, mentioning that he has recommended strongly to the authorities at home to continue with the *breakwater*. I do not see any objection, as it is one of the improvements contemplated, but it must of course be done out of the gross annual sum allowed for the general reforms as proposed by Sir John Jones. I should not have thought that if the object was to be prepared for any sudden war breaking out, that the continuation of that breakwater would have been the most urgent matter to attend to. I must confess that where I have always looked with an uneasy eye at Gibraltar, are the approaches to the land and water port entrances, which are singularly wanting in obstacles to an enemy, and the want of height to the lower rock lines above the inundation, all which might be greatly improved by moderate means.

We are looking with some anxiety to the speeches in Parliament regarding our national defences. The Government appear to be very sensible, when we talk to them in their office, but in the Houses of

Parliament they seem to coquette with the economists in a way that may greatly embarrass our future proceedings.

Yours faithfully,

Colonel R. Jones.¹

J. F. BURGOYNE.

FROM THE SAME.

London, June 16th, 1853.

MY DEAR JONES,—

The engrossing topics of conversation now are the camp of 8,000 men in Surrey, which everybody is going to see, where there are to be reviews, sham fights, pontoon bridges over Virginia Water, redoubts, blowings up, &c., &c. Col. Vicars is Comdg. Engr., and has a great deal to do in all the preliminary arrangements with a company of sappers who have been for some time already encamped on the ground—sinking wells, damming up streams, making temporary light stables, roads, &c., &c., they have been very useful, and are applied to on all occasions, as they were at the Great Exhibition.

The other subject is the Russian demonstrations in the East; the prevailing opinion is that nothing serious will come of it—since the union of France and England against the aggression of the Czar.

Yours faithfully,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

FROM THE SAME.

Pall Mall, September 19th, 1853.

MY DEAR COLONEL,—

We have nothing new, in the corps way, to communicate to you. The business of the camp at Chobham was performed by *our* people in a way that gave general satisfaction; under any difficulty, the sappers were called for to explain to the Line *how to take care of themselves*; the cavalry seem to have been particularly helpless, and one day of very heavy rain, the sappers were turned out to cut a drain to prevent their tents being inundated; so that at last it was reported that the sappers were sent for to tuck the cavalry into their beds at night. Col. Vicars was an excellent man for them; he had always to command the enemy, and the sappers took a great interest in their manœuvres under him. On one day a sergeant said, "Ah! they would not have turned me out of my post so easily, if it had been in earnest! I had got a *capital position!*"

Vicars, with a subaltern (Elphinstone, who speaks German), is gone, officially, to attend and report on the Grand Reviews in Prussia and Austria.

The breaking up of Parliament has led Sir Jas. Graham (1st Lord of Admiralty) to visit all the ports; at some he has been accom-

¹ Commanding R.E. at Gibraltar.

panied by Lord Raglan and by me; we are just returned from the Channel Islands. These combined tours will have a very useful effect, as we work after them in full harmony.

The leading subjects of interest to the country in general have been the fear of a want of corn, which seems to be subsiding, and the Russo-Turkish affairs, the end of which no one seems able to divine; but I believe the Russians are standing out at a bold game of brag!

Yours faithfully,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

FROM THE SAME.

London, January 26th, 1854.

MY DEAR COLONEL,—

... All attention is turned to the prospect of a war with Russia, which is not very cheering, as we find other Powers, who alone can act with *armies*, hold back; and a *maritime* war, or appearance of war—for it would be little more—cannot check the progress of that power in the quarter to which its attention is turned. The consequence would be, unless Austria, Prussia and France, one or all, will send their *armies* forth, we shall, after all our blustering, see the Czar in possession of Constantinople, and a general scramble for portions of Turkish territory, of which Russia would obtain the lion's share and the most direct aggrandisement.

Yours very faithfully,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

This correspondence was brought to a close by the death of Colonel Rice Jones, Commanding Royal Engineers, at Gibraltar, in 1854.

OBITUARIES OF CERTAIN OFFICERS MENTIONED IN THE PRECEDING PAGES.

1. Lieutenant Boothby	... Died in Holy Orders	... 1846
2. Captain By	... Died at Frant, February	... 1836
3. Captain Chapman	... Died at Taunton	... 1851
4. Captain Dickinson	... Killed at Badajoz	... 1811
5. Lieutenant Elliott	... Died in London	... 1842
6. Colonel Elphinstone	... Died at Hastings	... 1846
7. Captain Hamilton	... Died at Lisbon, May 20th	... 1810
8. Major Handfield	... Died in London	... 1821
9. Major Holloway	... Died, Plymouth	... 1826
10. Major J. Jones	... Died, Cheltenham, February	1843
11. Colonel Fletcher	... Killed S. Sebastian	... 1813
12. Captain Mulcaster	... Killed at Badajoz	... 1812
13. Captain Squire	... Died at Truxillo	... 1812
14. Lieutenant Stanway	... Died, Limerick	... 1852
15. Lieutenant Melville	... Killed, Badajoz, May	... 1811
16. Captain Ross	... Killed, Ciudad R., January	... 1812

[NOTE.—Captain Dickinson and Lieutenant Melville were buried together in the Capella de Carval Ho. Captain Ross and Lieutenant Skelton were buried in the same grave near where they fell.]

BERLIN IN QUEST OF ASIATIC DOMINION.

By LIEUT.-COLONEL A. C. YATE.

MANY of us recall the period, a period of only seven years' duration (1864-1871), during which Prussia raised herself from the status of a kingdom of moderate size and power to that of Hêgemôn of a great Empire. Did we foresee in 1871 that within half a century the Pan-Teutonic Alliance would throw down the gauntlet to practically the entire world, and challenge it to dispute the pretension of the arrogant motto "Deutschland über alles"? During the eighteen months which have elapsed since the Triple Entente took up the Teutonic challenge, we have had time to look back, and trace in outline the course by which Germany, working hand-in-hand with Austria, arrived at the point and hour when it was judged opportune to stake all on the Great Endeavour.

There were men among us—and I exclude Foreign and War Office officials, who, presumably, knew the truth, if they did not act on it—from Lord Roberts to Professor Cramb, who insisted on the immînence of war with Germany, set the proofs of it before us, and urged us to put our Army House in order.

Some three centuries ago a well-known British Ambassador and Provost of Eton wrote in a German album:—" *Legatus est vir bonus peregre missus ad mentiendum reipublicæ causa.*" This he afterwards explained as: "An ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country," a *double entendre* to which neither the Latin nor the German language lends itself. Is it possible that our lamentably defective diplomacy at Sofia was due to any addiction to Sir Henry Wotton's "supposititious" principles? I say "supposititious" because it is recorded that Sir H. Wotton advised a young diplomat to "always speak the truth; for you will never be believed." Twenty-five years ago I heard one of the great British diplomats of the close of the 19th century say: "I do not think I ever said what was untrue, though I may have reserved the truth." Let Herr von Bethmann Hollweg say what he pleases to his Reichstag, truth was on the lips of our Foreign Secretary when he took up on behalf of Belgium the gage thrown down by Germany, and on behalf of Serbia that thrown down by Austria. For the rest, Britain was bound, in duty and self-interest, to stand by France and Russia. Furthermore, on the issue of the war hung the supremacy of the world's commerce, industry and maritime power, and the security of communication between the British Isles and His Britannic Majesty's Near and Middle Eastern, Australasian, and African possessions.

Lord Redesdale, in his "Memoirs," has told us in graphic language the story of Earl Russell's failure in 1864 to cope with the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty. Prince Gortchakoff's consequent gibe, which, after a pause of half a century, still rankled in the Redesdale

bosom, may pass for what it is worth, and that is less than Lord Redesdale makes of it. If our Prince of Wales married Princess Alexandra in March, 1863, the Czarevitch became the betrothed of Princess Dagmar in September, 1864. To no one was the Prussianization of Schleswig-Holstein of more vital moment than to Britain, the naval mistress of the North Sea, and to Russia, the mistress of the Baltic. Neither, it seems, would be the first to move. Their inaction in 1864 has made the war of fifty years later possible. Lord Redesdale implies in his "Memoirs" that in 1864 Prince Gortchakoff was friendly to England. Was the memory of the Crimea dead? Were not the embers of the Polish revolution still smouldering? Was it not precisely in 1864 that Vambery visited Bokhara and Herat as a dervish, and warned England to beware of Russian designs in Central Asia? Sir Edwin Pears, in his "Constantinople," was the first, to my knowledge, to describe the intimacy of Professor Vambery's relations with Abd-ul-Hamid. In October, 1890, I heard something of this from the Professor's own lips. I had just returned from a visit to Tashkent, travelling via Baku, Merv, and Samarkand, with General Sir James Hills-Johnes and Mr. C. E. Biddulph (killed some years later, I grieve to say, by a panther in the Berars), and found M. Vambery in Constantinople. We foregathered there and travelled together to Buda Pest. During my stay at the Hotel Ungaria, I had the pleasure of visiting him occasionally, hearing some of his remarkable experiences, and seeing some of the beautiful and valuable gifts which H.I.M. the Sultan had presented to him in recognition of his services. M. Vambery told me that he had correspondents in various parts of Asia, and was at times the recipient of private information, which the Sultan found useful. As is well known, M. Vambery viewed with apprehension Russia's advance into Central Asia, and was a distinct partisan of England. The first visit of the German Emperor, who was accompanied by the Empress, to the Sultan, took place in November, 1889, just 11 months before I met M. Vambery. That visit strengthened the bond initiated by Bismarck between Byzantium and Berlin in the seventies and eighties of the 19th century.

We Britons have reason for the most devout thankfulness that, when the Great War did come, it found us arrayed in line with Allies whose military strength ensured to the British nation and Empire time for preparation and concentration. Those "six months" which Viscount Haldane of Cloan coolly demanded for the training of his Territorials, *after war broke out*, were, by one of those strange dispensations which defy reason, actually vouchsafed to us. For that we thank our fleet, and we thank our allies, Belgium, France, and Russia. Our Expeditionary Force, small as it was in comparison with Continental millions, by dint of generalship and heroic effort, foiled von Kluck in his effort to surprise both it and Paris. I heard Mr. John Fortescue say at Sunderland House in December, 1915, when he lectured on "Heroes and Heroism of the last War and this," that the retreat from Mons to Le Cateau in August, 1914, was one of the finest feats in military history. I have an idea that that from Ctesiphon to Kut-el-Amara, 24th to 28th November, 1915, will also make its mark.

Meantime, in the Empire on which the sun never sets, east and west, north and south, hand and head prepared for war. "As far as the east is from the west" are words which, under the modifying influences of modern science, have become comparatively meaningless. In vain Mr. Kipling sings: "For east is east, and west is west, and never the twain shall meet." Politics and science unite east and west, north and south. Britain reaches out its hand to India, Canada, the Cape, the Antipodes. Japan holds the China as Britain the North Sea. We repel one German squadron off Helgoland and sink another off the Falkland Islands. Then what avails it to moralize on the four points of the compass? It is not nation, continent, or hemisphere that is at war, but the world. This very fact proves the expansion of the German Empire since 1870; for at the outset German forces, naval or military, met ours in every sea and almost every continent.

Who will be the historian of this world-wide war, which now, curiously enough, is converging upon the scene of several of the world's most famous conflicts? Homer's little armies fought across the Ægean for the passage of the Dardanelles. Herodotus brings Persian and Greek face to face, and again the Hellespont plays a conspicuous part. The names of Troy and Abydos have to-day almost passed into the realm of myth, while those of the Dardanelles, Constantinople, and the Bosphorus loom larger before the whole civilized world. The years A.D. 1204 and 1453 record—if we except the events of 1877—the last two great sieges of Constantinople. In the one the Western Church and Empire assailed the Eastern; in the other Moslem overcame Christian. To-day votaries of both the Western and the Eastern Church have united to cut Islam apart from the dual alliance of Catholic Austria and Protestant Germany. And yet it is not a religious but a political war. In the background looms Shintoism, Buddhism, and Hinduism; but it is not the fate of any one of these faiths or of Christendom that hangs in the balance, but that of the Briton, the Frank, the Slav, and the Teuton, and incidentally of Islam. For that religion, and indeed, if we heed Teutonic precept and practice, for the Christian also, this war is of the highest import. Will a second Gibbon arise, able and willing to devote a life-time to the greatest political, religious, economical, and industrial crisis that the world, as far as we know, has ever seen?

The hub of the universe, when Hiram reigned over Tyre and Solomon at Jerusalem, must have rested somewhere in the vicinity of the fabled first home of man, the Garden of Eden. From the seas on either side of that land of the four rivers mariners sailed east and west, from Phœnician ports to the Pillars of Hercules, the Fortunate Islands and Ultima Thule, and from the Red Sea and Persian Gulf to the land of the Queen of Sheba and to Ind and far Cathay. Cadiz was the site of a Phœnician colony in 1100 B.C. Communication between the Near East and Far East in pre-Mahommedan days is outside the sphere of this article. Dr. Robertson's treatise on the Ancients' knowledge of India deals with it. The Arabs, the moment the prophet gave the word, spread like wildfire east and west, across Iran to India and Turan, and across North Africa into Spain and France. Their fleets

at once entered and contested the *maîtrise* of the Mediterranean. The Abbé Renaudot published 200 years ago the diary of two Mahomedans, who made the journey from the Persian Gulf to China in the 9th century A.D., as their forerunners had doubtless made it from Basra to Canton for some centuries before them. For 800 years Islam stood alike as a barrier and a link betwixt east and west, acting as middleman between Cathay and Ind on the one side and Genoa, Venice, and Bruges on the other. Then Portugal rounded the Cape and broke the spell. If Islam had its proselytizing message for the shores of the Mediterranean, Christendom had hers for the coasts of India and China, and so it repeats itself to this day. Bishop Heber a century ago hailed Afric's sunny fountains and India's coral strands; but to-day 100 millions of Moslems send their message as an integral and powerful unit in the heritage of the British Crown; and the reply which His Majesty's Ministers have made to that message is: that Islam itself will pronounce judgment on the Khalifate when this war is concluded. The Right Hon. Ameer Ali, a recognised authority, thus wrote to the *Times* on April 24th: "The question of the Khalifate concerns not merely the Mussulmans of India and Egypt, but affects equally the religious interests of the Moslems of Russia, of the French and British possessions in Africa, of the Malayan Peninsula, and China. To them the existence of an independent Khalif, as the spiritual and religious chief or Imam, is essential for the valid performance of prayers and other religious duties. The *imams* who lead the prayers in mosques act as his representatives. The subject is one of extreme delicacy and difficulty." The practical submission of the Sultan and the Government of Turkey to the Kaiser's control has split Islam into two camps, the one siding with the Sultan and Germany and the other with the Allies. This is very far from being the first time in the annals of Christendom and Islam that the two have been found in alliance against their own co-religionists. Almost concurrently with Charles Martel's famous victory at Tours we find Eudes, Duke of Aquitaine, giving his daughter Lampegie in marriage to the Moslem Governor of Cerdagne, and entering into an offensive and defensive alliance with him. East dovetails into West without much coaxing.

It is a curious coincidence that the last great inroad of Asiatics into Europe was almost contemporaneous with the first essay of European navigators to reach the Indies and Cathay via the Cape. In 1480 the Khan of the Great or Golden Horde, and Ivan III. of Moscow, mustered their rival armies on the banks of the Oka, a small river to the south-east of Perm and adjacent to the Ural mountains. The Russian Prince had refused to pay tribute, and the Khan came intending to enforce its payment. But a Russian Army, computed at 150,000, defending the passage of the Oka, made him pause; and, finally, he decided to withdraw and forego his tribute. The liberation of Russia from the Tartar-Mongol yoke dates from this incident. Just seven years later, *i.e.*, in 1487, Bartholomew Diaz rounded the Cape of Storms ("Good Hope" of to-day), and in July, 1497, Vasco de Gama sailed from Lisbon on his quest of the south-east passage to the Indies. Guided by Arab pilots, whom he engaged on the east coast of Africa,

he reached Calicut in July, 1498. The four European Powers who first entered the field of maritime and mercantile enterprise in the East (the famous Bull of Pope Alexander VI. sent Spain westward) were consecutively Portugal, Holland, England, and France. The merchant adventurers of these nations operated mainly by sea; but of Englishmen, Jenkinson, the Sherleys, and Jonas Hanway; of Frenchmen, Thevenot, Tavernier, and Chardin, and the Venetian Vincentio d'Alessandri, not to mention others, travelled by land. All four nations established themselves between 1550 and 1660 in India, the Persian Gulf, the Malay Archipelago, and the islands of the Indian Ocean, and on the coast of China.

Russia meanwhile had pushed steadily eastward. By the middle of the 17th century Cossack explorers had reached the Amur and the Sea of Okhotsk by land, and the Behring Straits and Kamschatka by sea along the north coast of Siberia. Of these five Powers, at the present day two, Britain and Russia, retain vast, two, Holland and France, extensive, and one, Portugal, limited possessions in the East. Within the last 30 years the Teuton, after long sojourn in Europe, has come forward as a sixth aspirant after Asiatic dominion. His aspirations do not appear to stir sympathy or enthusiasm in the Oriental breast. The Moslem subjects of Britain, France, and Russia are arrayed against him; Afghanistan is rigidly neutral; Persia and the Balkans are divided in their allegiance. The Turk alone pins his faith on the Teuton, and not without cause, content to seek safety in playing the rôle of an instrument. The words, uttered by M. Sazonoff last May, just after Italy joined the Entente, viz.: "Russia cannot allow Turkey to hold the keys of the Black Sea," admit of but one interpretation. Britain makes no secret of her intentions in Egypt and Mesopotamia. War must decide whether the fabled, but none the less hallowed in the eyes of Christendom and Islam, Garden of Eden is to be the granary of the Pan-Britannic or Pan-Teutonic Empire.

We should be blinding our eyes to historic fact, if we denied that the Teuton had not an equal claim to an Asiatic heritage with Slav, Frank, Anglo-Saxon, and Dutchman. Hungary and the Holy Roman Empire became, by their very geographical position, the pre-ordained barriers to the ambitions of the Ottoman monarchs. The two great sieges heroically borne and successfully resisted by the garrison and population of Vienna are landmarks in history, just as are the two famous sieges of Rhodes in 1480 and 1522. The names of the Hungarians Hunyadi and Matthias Corvinus, of Don John of Austria, the victor of Lepanto, and of the Pole John Sobieski, remind us that Europe and Christendom owe to them the same debt of gratitude that they owe to Charles Martel. Scanderbeg was no Teuton, but in his day he was a power, and has left a name in Albania which the German Prince William of Wied might, a year ago, have honestly envied. The Teutonic Knights of Marienburg, when the Holy Land no longer found a home for them, wielded against Letts and Poles the sword of proselytization with a zeal only equalled by that of the Moslems, who, in the 7th and 8th centuries, spread the faith of the prophet to Persia, India and China in the East, and to the Straits of Gibraltar in the

West. The Johanniter Orden of Brandenburg and Prussia maintained the fame and traditions of those Hospitallers who held Rhodes and Malta for six centuries against the armies of Mahomed II. and Suleiman the Magnificent, the fleets led by Barbarossa, Pialé, and Dragut, and the corsairs of North Africa. The Holy Roman Empire stood as a bulwark against the Turk until the Siege of Vienna in 1683. The high-water mark of Ottoman aggression was reached there. Since then Turkey has stood, for the most part, on the defensive. With the advent of Peter the Great to the throne of Russia Muscovite pressure began to tell upon the Turkish territories north of the Black Sea; and English squadrons, notably that under Lord Exmouth, taught Algiers and other Corsair strongholds severe lessons. At Navarino, a combined British, French, and Russian fleet crushed the naval strength of Turkey, and Greece asserted herself. A few years after that, the first German officer, one destined within forty years to attain a world-wide reputation—Captain von Moltke, joined the staff of the Sultan Mahmud about 1832, and organized the Turkish forces against Egyptian aggression and French ambition in Syria. While visiting those countries and moving in the highest Turkish social, political, and military circles, von Moltke could not fail to pick up a wealth of ideas and plans.

If we look back into the annals of English enterprise in regard to railway and maritime communication between Europe and the East, the schemes that originated in British brains alone astonish us. The names of Chesney, Waghorn, and Andrew are still familiar, but who knows that a scheme for a Calais-Constantinople-Calcutta Railway was put forward by Mr. William Pare of Dublin in 1842? It is barely four years since the Central Asian Society invited me to lecture before it on the Anglo-Russian project for a Trans-Persian Railway. I then said that such a line would ultimately reach Calcutta, and, in due course, the Pacific coast of China, and I imagined my idea was original. Mr. William Pare in 1845 had proposed the very same line, designating it as "The Atlas Railway." Messrs. Campbell, Wright, Thomson, and R. M. Stephenson, severally, evolved cognate schemes between 1845 and 1851. Ostend, Vienna, Belgrade, Constantinople, Aleppo, Baghdad, Karachi, was the suggested alignment. We see clearly that Europe and the Ottoman dominions were at that time fully alive to the fact that Turkey in Asia was the possible route of the greatest railway then projected. The subject can hardly have escaped von Moltke's notice and thought. Russia was even then making her influence felt in Central Asia, across which her railways now extend to Andijan on the western border of China, while the P. and O. Company was developing that overland route which has made it, now that it has been amalgamated with the "British India," probably the most powerful shipping company in the world, and the one whose very welfare is bound up with the British Protectorate of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

If the German Empire then sought a path to Asiatic dominion, it had to drive a wedge right in between the Russian sphere of influence on the north and that of Britain on the south. We can well surmise

that this thought germinated in the Moltkian mind, and that later it was transplanted to the brains of the leading statesmen of Berlin and Vienna. Beaconsfield, who had, in 1876, at the suggestion of Mr. Frederick Greenwood, and with the help of Lord Rothschild, bought up Ismael Pasha's Suez Canal shares, went to the Berlin Conference in 1878 with a cut-and-dried plan in his mind for a railway from Alexandretta to Baghdad, a railway for the protection of which he had secured Cyprus. England at the time stood well with Turkey; but the Teuton was even then beginning to cut the ground away from under her feet. When the Crimean War broke out in 1854, Austria and Prussia showed promptly that they were not indifferent to Russian action on the Danube and in the Balkans. They warned Russia off. In 1869 the Crown Prince Frederick of Prussia secured a *piéd à terre* at Jerusalem in the "Muristan," the site of the earliest *chef-lieu* of the Hospitallers. The presentation of that site to the sovereign head of the Johanniter Orden was a graceful act on the part of the Sultan Abd-ul-Aziz, who cannot then have foreseen the close relations which would unite his successor Abd-ul-Hamid to the son of the Prussian Crown Prince. At that time Italy, Rome, and the Vatican were in the throes of transition, and the English Hospitaller Grand Priory had not yet arisen from the ashes of the 16th century. The Johanniter Orden stepped in at the psychological moment.

1870-71 brought the consolidation of the German Empire under the hegemony of Berlin, and then it was that Bismarck felt that the hour for the expansion of Germany had come. We might almost suspect that, when the Emperors William and Francis Joseph, attended by Bismarck and Beust, met at Salzburg in September, 1871, the conception of the scheme whereby the Teuton, not the Slav, should dominate Constantinople, and construct a great line of communication from the North Sea via Vienna to Constantinople and the Persian Gulf, had taken place. Later, in 1912, when this scheme had progressed far, and Germany's aims were clearly seen, von Bernhardt boldly outlined what it portended for England. He wrote: "Turkey is of vast importance to us. She is our natural ally; it is emphatically our interest to keep in close touch with her. Turkey is the only power which can threaten England's position in Egypt and thus menace the short sea route and the land communications to India. We ought to spare no sacrifices to secure that country as an ally for the eventuality of a war with England and Russia. Turkey's interests are ours."

Determined though we are that Germany shall not have Constantinople, we cannot approve the action of the *Times* and the *Spectator* in their premature advocacy of the claim of Russia not only to possess Constantinople, but with it the entire southern littoral of the Black Sea and all that is left of Turkey in Europe, including Adrianople. We hardly need the special pleading of Mr. Stephen Graham, an overrated votary of the pen, of Mr. J. W. Mackail, or Dr. Charles Sarolea, to stimulate our heartfelt esteem of Russia and the Russians.¹ A Russian

¹In "Europe's Debt to Russia," Dr. Sarolea writes: "We realize that the future belongs not to England or to France or to Germany, but to Russia." I would gladly study von Bernhardt's face, when he reads this.

himself, a certain Count Mouravieff, writing twelve or more years ago, has bequeathed to us this appreciation of his country's mission: "I believe that Russia has a civilising mission such as no other people in the world, not only in Asia, but also in Europe, has. We Russians bear upon our shoulders the New Age; we come to relieve the 'tired men.'" If the mission of the New Age be indeed one of civilization, Russia may have some special call. But does Teutonic devilment show any sign of fatigue or exhaustion? Let Russia begin by crushing that monstrosity. We will take that as evidence of her mission. But do we see in this great war any evidence that the Russian is less "tired" than any one, either of his allies or his foes? However determined we may be to crush Germany, we cannot deny merit to the indomitable courage, energy, and resourcefulness of the Kaiser and his people. The super-laudation of Russia is just as absurd as the belittling of Germany. When it came to attacking Constantinople, it fell to the lot, not of the "Heir of Byzantium," as the *Times* entitled Russia, to take it, but to that of Britain and France to try and take it for her. This Madame Novikoff gracefully acknowledged in the letter which she addressed to the *Times* on her return to England early in October, 1915. It is our British ironclads that have faced Turkish mines and German submarines. It is British and French troops that have laid down their lives by thousands on the shores of Gallipoli. We laugh to scorn German kultur and German pretension to regenerate the world; but the day-dreams of a Mouravieff come before their time. It is not in the interest of the civilised world that either Germany or Russia should monopolise the Ægean-Euxine channel. Such was the opinion of Admiral Mahan; such is the opinion of Sir Edwin Pears. The latter, I understand, thinks that Constantinople and both the Rumelian and Anatolian shores of the Straits, for some distance inland, should be neutralised and administered by an International Commission. I should prefer an Anglo-Franco-American Commission, guaranteed by the Great Powers of the world, Slav, Teuton, Turk, Italian, and Japanese.

Once more during this war we learn that one "head" is better than four. One great personality, that of Bismarck, dominated Prussia while it fought and built itself up from a kingdom into an empire; and one great personality dominates the Central Alliance, which is the machine by which Germany proposes to extend her empire from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. Meantime China and the Pacific know Germany no more, and Africa is on the verge of emancipation from her rule.

Bismarck made the first move in 1878, when he summoned Britain and Russia to meet the Powers in conference at Berlin, and, after the two would-be belligerents had gone through the farce, so it is said, of agreeing to terms agreed upon beforehand, persuaded the Conference to authorize Austria to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria therein acting as Germany's catspaw. Thus the Teutonic interest, without striking a blow or spending a farthing, raked out as many chestnuts as Russia, who had lost men and millions. A notable step forward towards the grand objective, this occupation of Bosnia and Herze-

govina! Mr. Justin McCarthy ("History of Our Own Times," vol. iv., p. 483) thus comments on it: "The arrangement which gave Bosnia and Herzegovina to the occupation of Austria became afterwards the subject of sharp controversy. The Prime Minister of Great Britain himself at a later day actually declared that this step was taken in order to put another Power, not Russia, on the high road to Constantinople, if the succession to the Porte should ever become vacant." On October 17th, 1879, Lord Salisbury, speaking in Manchester, pointed out that Austria was then in a position (at Novi Bazar) to oppose Russian designs against Turkey, and refers to a rumour that a defensive alliance had then been concluded between Germany and Austria. He spoke of this rumour as "good tidings of great joy." Madame Novikoff, writing in 1880, waxed indignantly¹ sarcastic over this, and to-day we must allow that the laugh, if there is a laugh, is on her side.

We can well understand that British statesmen, apprehensive of Russian designs, and scarcely foreseeing the mighty wedge which the Dual Alliance would drive or seek to drive in between the Russian and British highways to the East, might smile upon this Austro-German move. Beaconsfield did not live to hear Lord Salisbury warn the Sultan, after a series of ghastly Armenian Massacres, for which—probably thanks to German influence—no redress could be obtained, that he need not again look to England for help in trouble. In the half century that has elapsed between 1864, when Prussia secured Schleswig-Holstein and a powerful naval position on the North Sea and Baltic, and 1914, when Austro-German ambition forced war upon the Triple Entente, the Porte has drawn ever closer to Berlin and Vienna, while keeping at arm's length Russia, its traditional enemy, and England, France, and Italy, its occasional friends. Thus encouraged and protected, Turkey has for 40 years befooled the "Concert of Europe." We can perfectly well understand on what grounds German policy, as opposed to Russian, ingratiated itself with Turkey and Bulgaria. We have yet to learn how Germany, should she emerge still powerful from this war, proposes to reconcile the conflicting sentiments and ambitions of Turkey and of the Slav States.

We have practical proof that neither Beaconsfield nor Salisbury foresaw that the Berlin Conference opened a passage for the thin end of a Teutonic wedge, which would in the end threaten the British Dominions in the East and bring about that *rapprochement* of Great Britain with France and Russia, which for the past decade has been known as "The Triple Entente." Beaconsfield believed that he had won the gratitude and confidence of Turkey, and he expected that the construction of a railway from Alexandretta to Baghdad would be entrusted to British engineers and be carried out by British capital. The British electorate in 1880 frustrated that scheme. The years 1882-83 saw the British occupation of the Turkish Province of Egypt, and the appointment of General von der Goltz to the post of organizer of the Turkish Army. Those facts are significant. From that time forth

¹ Vide "Russia and England," by O.K., Part II., "The Future of the Eastern Question," p. 123 *et seq.*

Turkey drew closer to Berlin and Vienna. I was in Constantinople, on my return from the Afghan Boundary Commission, in July, 1885, when Sir Henry Drummond Wolff's Mission arrived on its way to Cairo. Sir William White, who has left behind him the reputation of our ablest ambassador to the Porte since Lord Stratford de Redclyffe, was then at Constantinople, and Hobart Pasha was in charge of the Turkish Navy. We have every reason to believe that even then British influence in Turkey was on the wane. Returning to India, I ere long found myself employed in the annexation of Burma, and it was not till the spring of 1890 that I again came into touch with evidence of Germany's aspirations after Asiatic power. Embarking at Karachi on a Messageries Maritimes steamer, I made the acquaintance on board of a M. Richarz, a German, who told me he had just spent two years at Baghdad, engaged on archæological research. When he added that he had his own steam launch on the Tigris, I frankly envied the man who could devote himself to archæological study under such kindly auspices. Nurtured as I had been for ten years in the school which regarded Russia as THE menace to India, I certainly, at the moment, did not associate M. Richarz with German designs threatening our British supremacy in the Persian Gulf. A year or so later I noted that M. Richarz had been appointed German Consul-General at Baghdad. Meantime, in August-October, 1890, I had made a trip from Odessa via the Caucasus and the Trans-Caspian Railway to Tashkent, and back to Constantinople. Thence I found my way via Belgrade, Sophia, Vienna, and Dresden to Berlin. I well remember a German, with typical German manners, turning to me in the train and saying abruptly and curtly: "Sie haben Helgoland verloren." To which I replied equally curtly: "Ich glaube dass Helgoland ist nichts." To which he replied: "Ich glaube es auch." I can only say now that the German's ignorance equalled my own. When I got to Berlin I met my friend Eugen Wolf,¹ von Wissmann's "commercial adviser" in East Africa. He waxed indignant over the thought that Britain had received "500,000² square miles of East African territory for Helgoland." The Kaiser and Bismarck had then in their mind's eye the creation of German naval power, and Helgoland was essential to its development in the North Sea and Baltic.

Cyprus has been fitly christened the "Helgoland of the Levant." We British may yet have to be thankful that Greece declined that

¹ Herr Eugen Wolf was also, in 1898, a traveller in China (*vide* his book "Im Innern Chinas"), and on my arrival at Tientsin in March of that year, I was surprised to meet him in the Astor House. Next morning he started across Shantung for Kiao-chau. Some months later the *Times* reproduced the report of a venomous attack made upon him in the Berlin papers, evidently inspired by German missionaries in Shantung. I wrote to him for an explanation. The reply was succinct: "Er ist ein Esel der hat keine Feinde." Quite characteristic! However, we do not deal here with Germany in the Far East. I last heard of Eugen Wolf up in a Zeppelin on Lake Constance. That was 10 or 12 years ago.

² These were his words—an obvious exaggeration. I am told by an East African official that 50,000 is nearer the mark.

"Helgoland." Our British sphere in the Middle East is Egypt, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Persia, and the Persian Gulf. With Palestine and Asia Minor we have no thought to meddle; but Cyprus is a strengthening link in the chain Gibraltar-Malta-Port Said. It overlooks the Asia Minor coast from Mersina to Beyrout, and flanks the Baghdad Railway between the Taurus and Aleppo. England must keep, fortify, and garrison it. Berlin may, on the conclusion of this war, continue to control the "B.B.B.," as the Berlin-Byzantium-Baghdad Railway is familiarly termed in German circles. The British sea-to-sea line will then probably run from Alexandria via Cairo, Suez, Akaba, El Jauf, and Basra to Koweit. This is the line advocated by Mr. C. E. D. Black in lectures addressed in 1909 to the Central Asian Society, and in 1911 to the Royal United Service Institution, Sir Mortimer Durand presiding, and there seem to be good reasons for thinking that it will be made ere long. It is understood that Captain W. H. Shakespear, whose death early in the war we deplore, thought well of this route, which he explored some three years ago. Mr. Percival Landon, when lecturing before the Royal Society of Arts on April 23rd, 1915, paid a well-deserved tribute to his memory. His journey from Koweit to Suez attracted little notice, but suggests much. He was a man whom we could ill afford to lose, especially at this critical juncture.

While the British Empire is bound to rival or outrival any commercial or political link that Germany may establish between Europe and the Middle East, we cannot withhold our tribute of admiration—purely academic—to the "Expansion of Germany" during the last half-century. That, however, does not mean resigning Turkey unconditionally to Prussian "kultur." The Armenian knows that curriculum to his sorrow. The far-reaching Teutonic arm has made itself felt alike in the Far East and in the Far West, in the mountains and plains of Persia and Baluchistan, as amid the busy scenes of American commerce and industry. A creeping paralysis is, it is hoped, gradually unnerving the power of that arm, but for eighteen months it has shown a marvellous vigour and cunning. Danton, in the intoxication of his ascendancy over the "*souverain peuple*," could swear by the motto "*De l'audace et encore de l'audace et toujours de l'audace*." Kaiser Wilhelm II. has flung that motto in the teeth of a far larger world than Danton ever faced. It remains to be seen whether that world will requite Wilhelm as the "*souverain peuple*" requited Danton.

The close of the 19th and opening of the 20th centuries saw the eyes of the political world focussed on the "Expansion of Russia," affecting, as it did, Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan, India, China, Japan and Mongolia. The Russo-Japanese War, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, the Trans-Persian Railway, and the colonisation of Outer Mongolia marked successive stages in the history of Russian plans of self-aggrandisement. The Turco-Italian and Turco-Balkan Wars, events of the highest import to the Great Powers of Europe, supervened, the Baghdad Railway negotiations meanwhile dragging on their tedious course. The issue of those negotiations has shown that

His Majesty's Government has by the narrowest margin maintained the position which Lord Lansdowne took up and defined on May 5th, 1903, in these words:—"I say it without hesitation, we should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified post in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it by all the means at our disposal." That declaration has been appropriately named "The British Monroe Doctrine in the Middle East." Lord Curzon of Kedleston, in his "Persia," published in 1892, indicated "impeachment" as the due meed of the British Minister who let any foreign Power establish itself in that Gulf. Lord Curzon spoke unofficially and meant his words for Russia. Lord Lansdowne spoke officially and meant his words for Germany as well as Russia, and also for Germany's catspaw, Turkey. Strange as it may seem, British interest and power in the Gulf antedated that of the Ottoman Turk by half a century. Prescriptive right, then, is on the side of the Briton. As Viceroy of India Lord Curzon had to check in the Gulf Turkish designs prompted by Germany, as well as Persian intrigues of which Russia was not altogether innocent. The late Admiral Mahan, of the United States Navy, foremost in his day among the world's authorities on naval affairs and policy, writing early in 1900 on "The Problem of Asia," is obviously obsessed with the then prevalent idea that Great Britain and Germany had a community of interest against Russia. All that he says in that book regarding the danger that Russia, mistress of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, would be to Britain's eastern trade route, and, if strongly established in the Persian Gulf, to India, is as true to-day as in 1900. He clearly did not then foresee that German ambition would effect such a *rapprochement* between the British and Russian Empires that the twain would take up arms together, and sign a treaty not to lay them down again until the Teuton danger should be overpast. What Mahan says most forcibly of the great danger of letting Russia turn the Black Sea into an impregnable naval base may in a measure be made applicable to Germany, which intends to be mistress of Constantinople. Had he been alive and writing to-day, he would have cautioned Great Britain to apply the Monroe Doctrine of the East as drastically to Germany as to Russia. That, we may fairly claim, Britain is bent on doing.

Having devoted half a century to checking Russian ambition in Central Asia, our Government realized some years ago that German schemes were promising to clash with British alike in Asia and in Africa. The Cape to Cairo railway project found a rival in the German conception of an East to West Trans-African line. German East and South-West African territories were a menace, as this war has shown, to British colonies at the Cape and in East Africa and Uganda. The Baghdad railway was steadily progressing along a line reported to be almost identical with Justinian's old road, which had subsequently become one of the great caravan routes from the Persian Gulf to Byzantium, the route that brought wealth in the middle ages to Genoa, Venice, Bruges and the Hanseatic towns. This last Teutonic project really threatened Russia equally with England.

Lord Ronaldshay, it is true, lecturing on December 14th, 1904, before the Central Asian Society, on his return from a journey from Constantinople across Asia to Peking, pointed out the danger not only of the intrusion of Germany on our Persian Gulf preserve, but also of "finding her at some future time walking hand in hand with Russia through Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf." Lord Ronaldshay emphasized this pregnant suggestion by a graphic picture, based on his own and Colonel Picot's information, of the agricultural wealth of Mesopotamia and the Karun and Khurramabad districts. Our army on the Tigris, though it has not yet reached Baghdad, has pushed the Turk back and well away from the Persian granary and oil-field. Russian forces are now pressing southward from the Caucasus, from Azerbaijan and from Hamadan, and may possibly be able to co-operate with ours in the occupation of Baghdad, although it would be more consonant with our *amour-propre* that Baghdad should fall before British troops unaided. It is noteworthy that within a space of fifteen years expert opinion on the Middle Eastern problem has passed from one kaleidoscopic view to another, from that of Great Britain and Germany united against Russia (Mahan) to that of Russia and Germany united against Britain (Lord Ronaldshay), until finally the real drama, in which Britain and Russia unite to oppose Germany, now holds the stage.

The Czars of Russia and their subjects have for some centuries had their eyes fixed upon Constantinople, as the cradle and *chef-lieu* of the Eastern Church, and also as the southern gateway of Russia to the open seas. The thought that a Lutheran and not a Greek Church ceremonial may replace that of Islam cannot but be gall and wormwood to the Muscovite soul. Russia is fighting for a great stake. She fights for freedom for her Black Sea commerce, for the prosperity of Batoum, for her political ambitions in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, for the Trans-Persian railway, which will give her access to the Persian Gulf, and last, not least, for the City which the Turks have held for 462 years under her very nose. The prescriptive or historic right of Greece to Constantine's metropolis would seem to be stronger than that of Russia; but behind the latter stand the big battalions. Bulgaria cannot forget that three years ago it was her army that took Adrianople and drove the Turks behind the lines of Chatalja. The Balkan States are pawns on a political chessboard which the Great Powers of Europe seek to move, each to its own advantage. At this very juncture two authoritative essays on the Balkans appear for the enlightenment of the student. The one is Sir Arthur Evans' lecture before the Royal Geographical Society¹ on "The Adriatic Slavs and their relation to the future Overland Route to Constantinople," and the other is the quadripartite narrative of the Balkan States by Mr. D. G. Hogarth's "Quartette," very recently published by the Clarendon Press. However much, when we look back to July 7th, 1915 (on which date, Sir Edward Grey stated in Parliament,

¹ January 10th, 1916. See also his incisive letter in *Times* of January 13th, 1916, and *Times* leaders of January 10th and 13th, on Montenegro and the Fall of Mount Lovtchen.

the Serbian Minister invited him to hold troops in readiness against Bulgaria), we may regret that the four European Allies made no move till it was too late to succour Serbia, we have now to consider the situation in the light of accomplished facts. The Allied diplomatists and generals have to do the same. Individual aspirations for the time being lie low, and the ardent advocates of a Muscovite Stamboul have suspended their cult. Britain and France, hampered though they were with the onerous task of extricating their forces from Gallipoli, were as usual, the most prompt to take action and occupy Salonika. The mobility which enabled Koutousoff in November, 1914, to annihilate the "Grande Armée" was wanting, when the winter of 1915-16 closed in upon the Russian line from Riga to Czernowitz. Italy was slow in moving troops into Albania, and the Austrian fleet issuing from Cattaro took unexpected liberties.¹ We cannot but surmise that "The Adriatic Slavs" have counted for something in this lamentable fiasco. In May, 1915, directly after Italy declared war against Austria, M. Sazonoff made a pointed reference to "Italy's traditional respect for the principle of nationality," and to circumstances which might "make Dalmatia not a bridge but a wall between Italy and the Balkans." Between the lines of those words much may be read. Yet we cannot with complacency watch Austria pressing on the mountain home of the Queen of Italy, while the Italian Army is stationary on the Isonzo front and the Albanian shores. To see Montenegro overrun by Austria, just as Serbia has been, must surely stir the Italian blood.

Dire was the vengeance vowed against the Turk when he decided to throw in his lot with the Central Powers. It was for fifty reasons a foregone conclusion that he would do so, and had Allied diplomacy been at all on the *qui vive*, the declaration of war against Turkey would have taken the form of a prompt bombardment of the Dardanelles by the most powerful Anglo-French fleet that could be assembled for that purpose. Russia, victorious at first on her Western frontier, could have spared men and munitions for attack in the Bosphorus, and the "Goeben" and "Breslau" would have been promptly brought to book. The refusal to intern those ships was a declaration of war and should have been treated as such. It must be borne in mind that Russia is the traditional enemy of Turkey and Persia; although, strange to say, these two Mahomedan Powers have never, to my knowledge, united for war against the common enemy.² There is no reason why Sunni and Shi'a should not so

¹ An American journalist, named Granville Fortescue, concludes his volume, entitled "Russia, the Balkans, and the Dardanelles," with, among others, this sentence: "France is doing her part; let England and Italy follow her lead." We have yet to learn that Britain and the British Empire are not doing their part. Italy can speak for herself.

² Vide "Life of Stratford Canning," vol. I., p. 105. In 1724 Russia and Turkey came near forestalling the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, by agreeing to partition Persia between them. Vide Malcolm's "History of Persia," vol. II., p. 25, and Jonas Hanway's "Revolutions of Persia," vol. III., chap. xxix.

unite. Turkey knows well that the issue of this war for her means, if the Allies are victorious, the loss of Constantinople and the Straits. Suspecting, if not knowing that, Turkey was perfectly right in staking all on the victory of the Central Powers. If they are victorious, the Kaliphate stays where it is; for I decline to believe that Germany could reward the Turk for his staunchness by turning him out in favour of anyone. Submissive now and hereafter to German behest he is no doubt expected and required to be. The German is playing a mighty game, on which hangs the destiny of the Near and Middle East and Persia, of Egypt, the Soudan, and Arabia, and we may add, of the German Empire itself. If the war ends in "honours divided," the Asiatic policy of Berlin will still have achieved a signal success, and it is as well to understand a little what that success portends.

We are face to face now, in this year of our Lord 1916, with the vital struggle for dominion in Asia between the British, Russian, and German Empires. It is a contest so stupendous in its issues that no single brain may pretend to do more than comprehend its general outline. The territories directly affected by it extend from the Adriatic on the west to the Gulf of Bengal on the east; but the crucial points are Constantinople and the Suez Canal. The first is the bone of contention between Russia and Germany, the second between Britain and Germany. Rob Germany of her "B.B.B." line, and German dominion in Asia is dead. Rob Russia of free access from the Black Sea to the Ægean, and her commercial and naval powers are half paralysed. Drive England from Egypt and wrest from her the control of the Suez Canal, and her Indian Empire may be handed over to Mr. T. Hart-Davies' *bête-noir*, the "National Congress," and her Antipodean dominions entrusted to the citizens, and those the deserving citizens, of an independent Commonwealth. At this stage of the war no one can say whether the final issue will be compromise or cataclysm. Speculation, above all in detail, may be dismissed as futile. One thing, we may predict, will preserve its course, whichever competitor prevails, viz., the development of railway communication between East and West. We look with wonder, in the January, 1916, No. of the *Royal Geographical Journal*, upon Sir Charles Metcalfe's map illustrating "Railway Development in Africa, Present and Future." We see an astounding network of red lines. Is benighted Africa to take precedence of the cradle of mankind? We see or foresee four or five Trans-Continental railways from Atlantic to Pacific, the Trans-Siberian already made; the Trans-Caspian (via Orenburg) prolonged north or south or both of the Gobi Desert; the "Trans-Persian," the "B.B.B.," and the Cairo-El Jauf-Basra systems, which last three may unite near the head of the Persian Gulf, and crossing the three thousand-mile breadth of our Indian Empire, diverge again across China to the Pacific coast. Taking Assam and Burma as starting points, and recalling to mind the explorations of Colonel Davies, Dr. Manifold, Mr. Little, Captain Bailey, and others, following upon the annexation of the

¹ See his clever skit "India in 1883," published at Calcutta in 1883. He was, after retiring from the Indian Civil Service, M.P. for Hackney.

Burmese Shan States up to the Salween in 1887-88, those who know can trace in their mind's eye the future of railway progress in China. Add, further, that Afghanistan cannot for ever exclude railways. Askabad, Merv, and Samarkand are waiting to establish connection with the railways of India through Herat and Kandahar on the west and Balkh and Kabul on the east. This outline of the railway enterprise that waits upon Asia, when war has decided the Asiatic destinies of Britain, Russia, and Germany, points to India as the coming Euro-Asian Railway Emporium. Stupendous Himalayan and Trans-Himalayan mountain ranges, backed by the Pamirs, the Tibetan plateau, and the Gobi Desert, preclude railways on the north, but the Indus valley on the west, and that of the Bramaputra on the east are the gates by which great international railway systems will enter and leave India. Of recent Viceroy's, Lord Curzon is the one whose comprehensive intellect has most fully grasped these issues, and when he selected "Frontiers" as the theme of the Rômanes lecture of 1907, it was that to which his wide travel and study and his Asiatic experience had qualified him to do justice.

Twenty-seven years have gone by since Lord Curzon wrote his "Russia and Central Asia." The second chapter of that work delineates Russian feeling towards her European neighbours. Let me quote one or two sentences: "The main and dominating feature of the Russian mind in relation to foreigners is an abiding and overpowering dislike of Germany. . . . Not only is this sentiment a political sentiment, arising from the belief that Russia has suffered by the Berlin Treaty, alike in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Roumania, owing to the dark machinations of Bismarck alone, but the individual German is brought into constant and disagreeable collision with the Russian in the relations of ordinary life. . . . In the present reign (Alexander III.) this anti-German feeling has reached a climax. . . . Austria she regards with undisguised hostility, not free from contempt. 'Austria stings like a gnat and bites like an adder,' says the Russian, 'and ought to be crushed like the one and stamped under heel like the other.'" Naturally, in a work published in 1889, we find no hint of German intervention in the East, except the one allusion to Bismarckian machinations in the Balkans; although by October 4th, 1888, the concession for the Ismid-Angora Railway had been made and ratified, and, as I mentioned in the November, 1915, number of this Journal (p. 313) the "B.B.B." was familiarly spoken of in Berlin financial circles as early as 1889. "Persia and the Persian Question," the *magnum opus* of Lord Curzon, published in 1892, is equally silent.

When we recollect that, as Madame Novikoff tells us in her "Russia and England," Bismarck offered Constantinople to Russia in 1875 as the price of the betrayal of France, we may divine for ourselves the effect of Russia's refusal on the Bismarckian temperament. The Russo-Turkish War followed swiftly, and at its close came the Berlin Congress, from which the Teutonic Entente bore away Bosnia and Herzegovina. British statesmen, as we have seen, so far from divining the truth, rejoiced in the thought of Teuton thwarting Slav.

Small wonder, then, that mere onlookers were misled. Admiral Mahan,¹ in December, 1899, imagined Britain "preserving" in accord with Germany "predominance over the Levant and the Suez route." Invited in 1901 by the Editor of the *Empire Review* to say a few words on the railway schemes in the Middle East of Britain, Russia, and Germany, I forecast² the possible junction of all three in Southern Persia, at the same time insisting on sole British control in the Persian Gulf. In December, 1904, Lord Ronaldshay, addressing the Central Asian Society, represented³ the possibility of such a "Russian acquiescence or even co-operation in the Baghdad Railway Scheme" as would form a Russo-German combination dominating, through its ministers and diplomatists, Turkey and Persia. What we have seen and do see is Germany dominating Turkey completely, and Persia in part, through her diplomatists and consular agents, and that with a contempt for neutrality to which the existing state of anarchy in Persia has, unfortunately, lent itself.

M. André Chéradame, addressing the Central Asian Society on May 22nd, 1911, used the following words:—" *Aujourd'hui, l'affaire de Bagdad (i.e., the Baghdad Railway) est considérée comme ayant une importance mondiale, mais on peut dire que vers 1898 à peu près personne en France et sans doute assez peu en Angleterre en soupçonnait le danger, l'imminence et la gravité future.*" Sir Valentine Chirol, when he brought out his "Middle Eastern Question," in 1903, opens his 17th chapter with the words:—"Germany cannot yet be said to have acquired any positive status in the Middle East"; but in that and the following chapter he shows that the Kaiser means to spare no effort to gain that status. It was certainly this determination on the Kaiser's part which, three years after the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, brought about the visit of the Czar to Potsdam in November, 1910, and his assent to the "Potsdam Agreement." As M. Chéradame (*loc. cit.*) pointed out, "*En France, en Angleterre et en Russie les spécialistes de la politique étrangère n'adoptèrent pas en temps utile à l'égard de l'affaire de Bagdad une ligne de conduite identique et bien concertée.*" No! Germany took them one by one and made good terms with each, the last, Britain, completing the bargain for the Basra-Koweit section within a brief period of the outbreak of war in August, 1914.

To sum up. The début of the German Empire in the rôle of an Asiatic potentate is one of the phenomena of the last half-century. Von Moltke conceived the part, Bismarck, under the influences of 1875-78, grasped its potentialities, and William the Second has devoted his life to the staging of it. A Viennese writer, by name Josef Popowski, published in 1890, "The Rival Powers in Central Asia,"⁴

¹ "The Problem of Asia," pp. 117-18.

² *Empire Review*. January, 1902, pp. 662-6.

³ Central Asian Society's Proceedings, December 14th, 1904, p. 6.

⁴ Translated and edited by Mr. C. E. D. Black, London, 1893. I can well believe that the book was inspired by the Asiatic policy of the Dual Alliance, and was intended to make capital, in favour of that Alliance, out of the known British

and in it urged the union of England with the "Central European Coalition" against Russia. He maintains, as does Admiral Mahan, that England cannot allow Russia to form the Black Sea into an "impregnable base" behind Constantinople and the Straits. He indicates the very thing for which Mr. Hilaire Belloc obtained such kudos in August, 1914, viz., the utility of Belgium to Germany as a means of invading France and threatening England. We find the same thought that germinated in Admiral Mahan's mind, viz., a *rapprochement* between Britain and the Central European Coalition antagonistic to Russia. Despite all obstacle and intrigue, the Anglo-Russian Convention has cemented an Anglo-Russian brotherhood in arms, which will stand firm against the "Central European Coalition." This war must "dree its weird," and on its issue depends the status of the three great rivals for Asiatic dominion, Britain, Russia, and Germany, and the future of the Mahommedan faith and its three hundred millions of votaries. Despite the vagaries of journalism—vagaries which, as this war has shown, do not respect the sane judgment of the most sober and guarded of editors—the pen of the "special" imparts inspiration, and shares that honour with the music-hall ditty. Well-nigh forty years ago we sang, "We've got the Men, we've got the Ships, we've got the Money, too." We might sing it with greater truth to-day. Sixteen years ago Mr. Rudyard Kipling's doggerel verse appealed to "cook's son" and "duke's son." Lord Derby has them both on his list to-day. Finally, an eloquent voice fresh from Russia proclaims this war as "*Our War*." The more we look at it, the clearer we see that it is "*Our War*." The heart that hardens itself against the spell of that *multum in parvo* will, let us hope, be duly softened or chastened, whether he be a "conscientious objector," so sympathetically portrayed in *Punch* of 2nd February last, or whether he be a votary of the new Dual Alliance, the Conscription of Wealth and Work. When two people will not understand each other, a time-honoured old maxim says: "Knock their heads together." Will someone, please—a conscientious objector will undoubtedly volunteer for this ceremonial—knock the heads of Wealth and Work together! Then—we will win "*Our War*."

apprehension of Russia's advance in Central Asia towards Afghanistan and India. M. Popowski's preface commences thus: "For several centuries past there has been manifest in the Russian Empire a restless expansive force which has led to the extension of its frontiers in all directions. More recently she has concentrated her energies in the direction of Constantinople and Central Asia. The European Powers, however, and Austria in particular, *cannot at any cost permit Russia to take possession of Constantinople*. On the other hand, Russia's advance in Central Asia constitutes a menace to British rule in India. Russia can only attain her ultimate object by a combat à *outrance*."

The "combat à *outrance*" has been in progress since August, 1914, but the Teutonic knights find the knights of the Lion and the Bear firm allies. In the light of recent history, M. Popowski's book is interesting reading. It was written for a purpose—and that a purpose which has not been realised.

OFFENSIVE ORGANIZATION.

By LIEUT.-COLONEL ALSAGER POLLOCK.

I.—INTRODUCTORY.

ACTIVE operations being in progress, it is invariably imperative that each important unit shall have a definite mission, representing a task, or share of a task, which that unit is deemed capable of accomplishing. But strategical missions differ essentially from tactical, and in no respect more widely than in this, that whereas in the former case isolated action is often appropriate and sometimes unavoidable, close co-operation is a corner-stone of tactics that can seldom be neglected with impunity.

The commander of a unit, large or small, to whom a special mission has been assigned, whether that mission be of an independent character or otherwise, must frame his plan of action strictly in accordance with the strength and composition of the force actually at his own disposal, or definitely detailed to assist him in categorically stated conditions. In other words, it is unjustifiable to assume that aid will be forthcoming from any reserves held at the disposal of a superior officer, and the commanders of units must therefore rely principally upon their own resources. The supreme commander must naturally have his own views as to the particular locality in which the most vital issues are at stake, and he may consequently be prepared to allow one portion of his force to be sacrificed, if decisive success may thus be gained elsewhere. It was a notable failing of Kuropatkin that he was prone to reinforce, though seldom adequately, units that reported themselves to be hard pressed, when he might far more profitably have assisted others to pursue promising advantages already won.

Even if a subordinate has been informed by his chief that the mission which the latter has entrusted to him is one of supreme importance, there is in this no excuse for an assumption that assistance will without fail be forthcoming when and where required. The battle may develop in a manner entirely unexpected, so that the success of a particular enterprise previously regarded as an essential element of victory, may be rendered a matter of comparatively small account.

Alvensleben was absolutely right when on August 16th, 1870, he threw the whole of his force into the fighting line, and thus won by "bluff" a signal strategical success that he could not possibly have achieved by any other means; but unless in circumstances similarly exceptional, the longer a commander can keep in hand a reserve, however small, of the force actually under his own orders, the better his chances of winning victory or of averting disaster.

Just as a commander is personally responsible for safeguarding his force against surprise; although the services of security might reasonably be supposed to have been otherwise amply provided for; so also is he responsible for the performance, with his own troops, of whatever special mission may be assigned to him. It must ever be borne in mind that even if strong reinforcements are known to be actually on the march, some extraordinary complication may cause the expected aid to miscarry. The fatal wanderings of D'Erlon, on June 16th, 1815, furnish a very illuminating case in point.

A commander in the field should appear always to those around him a confirmed optimist, but within his own soul there should nevertheless be, as invariably, an element of pessimism. The "Pleasures of Hope" can prudently be indulged only when all possible precautions have been taken against the consequences of disappointment. Humanly speaking, nothing is certain that has not actually taken place.

Operations being projected against a formidable adversary, the dangers and difficulties of the enterprise will first be considered, the strength and composition of the force required to overcome them being afterwards determined accordingly. The calculation of force will naturally be based on an assumption that the commander of the army, or the commander of each army, if there be more than one, will not fail to keep his force united, avoiding wide dispersion and regulating the marches of army corps and divisions in accordance with general, rather than local, conditions. That is to say, an army corps favoured by good and level roads will not as a rule be permitted to isolate itself, by outstripping others marching in more difficult circumstances, lest a tactical situation presently developed, should be prejudiced by strategical irregularities. Similarly, in the battle itself, although it may be perfectly justifiable to contemplate and prepare for a prolonged prosecution of victorious operations by the whole army, it would be foolish to assign to the various units of that army, objectives very far in advance; because while some might rapidly accomplish their missions, others would almost certainly find themselves unable to gain ground with equal facility. Therefore an attacking force must be content to proceed *par bondes*, and as each "bound" is completed there must be a careful reorganization preparatory for the next effort. Infantry that recklessly follows up initial successes, disregarding the need for continuous artillery support, is very liable to find itself not only checked but hurled back with heavy loss; and such eventualities are the more likely to ensue if portions of the attacking force have greatly outpaced the rest. On the other hand, however, it is an important part of "higher leading" to ensure that delays pending more advanced artillery and other support, shall not be avoidably prolonged; since it is manifestly essential that an enemy who has been ejected from his positions shall be kept "on the run."

Attacking units may sometimes be obliged to assist others alongside them, by means of direct reinforcement, but as a rule the common object will best be served when each unit concentrates its efforts on

the task particularly assigned to itself; because by gaining further ground to its own front, it will usually be enabled to furnish to others less favourably situated, the most effectual aid towards overcoming the opposition that has hitherto prevented their advance. But, it has already been pointed out that victorious units will gravely imperil success, if they imprudently thrust themselves onwards, ignoring the inability of others to conform; because isolation must sooner or later involve liability to destruction by counter-attack. Therefore, the commander of a unit that has been more successful than others, may sometimes be obliged to suspend temporarily his own victorious advance, holding fast what ground has already been gained, and meanwhile most securely safeguarding his own flanks by assailing with his reserves the flanks of those hostile bodies that have hitherto obstructed the progress of his friends. The stronger, however, the unit concerned, the longer proportionately it may continue with impunity to pursue a more or less isolated career of victory. A strong army, for example, may safely, as well as profitably, prosecute a local advantage to far greater lengths than would be prudent in the case of a weaker force. A small or comparatively small, unit pushing forward unsupported by sister units on its flanks, risks itself dangerously in a salient of its own creation; but an *army* victoriously prosecuting its success against the enemy forces opposed to itself, may singly produce strategical conditions compelling the retreat of other hostile armies that have hitherto held their ground against those with which they have been engaged.

Sound principles are entitled to proper respect, and that which holds isolated adventures to be more often productive of damage than of advantage, is unimpeachable. Yet reasonable scope must be allowed to individual initiative. Boldness and rashness are no nearer akin than are prudence and pusillanimity. Imprudent daring may, indeed, induce disaster; but undue caution can neither win nor deserve substantial victory. Therefore skilled valour must not be too tightly restrained. Suwarrov, whose heroic tactics even Lake himself must respectfully have admired, never knew defeat until the preposterous Aulic Council had created for him conditions in which any other general must have been entirely undone; and the Napoleonic Hydra might have been slain in its cradle had not the same malign authority forbidden the Arch-Duke Charles to carry into Italy his victorious army of Wurtzburg. In both strategy and tactics well calculated daring is a corner-stone of victory. They were words to be held always in remembrance, those of the Arch-Duke Charles when he said: "Let Moreau march even to Vienna if he chooses, it is of no moment provided that I beat Jourdan." The event proved the truth of the saying: "One thing at a time, and that well done, is a very good rule as many can tell." Had it been attempted to oppose seriously both of the French marshals at the same time, nothing but disaster could have resulted. Actually Moreau was kept "amused" by a weak detachment, while the Arch-Duke, with the main army first destroyed Jourdan at Wurtzburg, and then, turning against Moreau, chased him ignominiously beyond the Rhine.

Guided then by the Arch-Duke Charles, whose history has furnished us with so instructive an example of soundly courageous appreciation, let us always endeavour in the least, as well as in the greatest, affairs of war, to do "one thing at a time," and to do it thoroughly. Every situation must be considered from more than one point of view, and the best solution of the problem involved will always be that which most successfully reconciles the ideal course with what is clearly possible or permissible in the circumstances.

Each unit in battle must use one by one its own tactical "stepping stones," and if obliged to pause in its advance, in order to assist others, a moment should be chosen when the feet are so firmly planted that they can scarcely slip, and an opportunity is thus found to gather strength for the next leap, while at the same time holding out a helping hand to fellow-travellers on the way to victory, who have hitherto been less fortunate. One's own foothold must be reasonably secure, if a friend is to be aided without danger of both falling into the stream. "Mutual support" is, indeed, always imperatively requisite, but the manner of giving it varies with the circumstances of particular cases. Certainly *fire* and *movement* must ever be interdependent. Sir John Colborne (Lord Seaton) wrote after Ciudad Rodrigo: "I have learned that assaults are not to be won by the bayonets of 'Forlorn Hopes,' without an adequate fire on the defences." Leaders of all ranks, from the highest to the lowest, ought implicitly to observe the teaching conveyed by this pithy maxim. Certainly, without "covering fire" there can seldom be a successful assault, and without the assault, or fear of it, there can never be decisive victory.

II.—FRONTAGES OF ATTACK.

Probing the enemy's position by means of a widely extended "screen" of infantry skirmishers, through whose line other troops will subsequently pass to the real attack, is an operation that has seldom been executed during the present war: simply because the opposing forces, having usually been entrenched at very short distances apart, the only preliminary question awaiting a definite answer at the time of launching an attack, has been that of whether the artillery preparation may indeed have produced conditions in which the assailants shall be enabled to cross without too great losses the narrow space intervening between their own and the hostile trenches. Even, however, if this were otherwise, we are now concerned only with frontages of actual assault, or of serious demonstration, on which units are disposed in depth rather than in breadth, and may therefore be expected to exercise a prolonged, and consequently important, influence on the operations in progress.

The proposition, then, which it will presently be sought to establish, is this:—

Every unit to which a specified frontage of assault is assigned, should be entitled, ipso facto, to proprietary rights of supremacy within the parallelogrammic area subtending that frontage.

The "vested interests" here claimed must obviously be held subject to certain limitations, and only in theory can the sides of the suggested parallelogram have rectilinear constancy, or even the given frontage on which it is based, be otherwise than a variable quantity. The line of advance of each minor unit is nominally supposed to be parallel with the major line of direction; but in actual practice it cannot fail to be rather irregular, and frontages are apt to spread or contract from time to time. Nevertheless, the figure described would seem to represent a legitimate imagination, and will at all events serve its immediate purpose.

In order to illustrate in its practical application the thesis propounded, let it in the first instance be assumed that a battalion has been ordered to attack on a frontage of two companies—say, 200 paces. "A" and "B" companies furnish the firing line and supports, while "C" and "D" companies are the battalion reserve. "A" company puts number 1 and 2 platoons in firing line, with 3 and 4 in support. The attack proceeds accordingly, until the leading platoons, having suffered losses, have need of reinforcements from those in support. These reinforcements are absorbed by the section or sections which they join, and those sections retain their original "numbers," no change in this respect being made, even though scarcely a man remains of the original organization. There is still a platoon frontage, divided into four sectional frontages (or two, as the case may be), and men who join (for example) No. 1 section, become members of it for the time, though they may actually belong to some other platoon. The formation of scratch sections, named after the sergeants or corporals or privates who form them, serves in cases of emergency, but ought not to be resorted to without necessity. Reinforcements can be told which section they have joined, or, if not told, the men can ask the question as they arrive in the line. Thus the command, "No. 1, Prepare to rush—Rush," will always set in motion all men who are within the frontage of No. 1 section. Moreover, the commander (if an officer) of a platoon that has originally been put in the firing line, should retain command of the platoon frontage, though he may be junior to the subaltern commanding a supporting platoon that has become amalgamated with his own—unless the company commander, or his second-in-command, elects to take over executive command himself, or orders a senior subaltern to do so. Eventually there may arrive further reinforcements supplied by "C" company, yet there will remain but one platoon on the platoon frontage, organized in sections as at the beginning, and the subaltern whose platoon was first placed on that frontage will, if surviving, still be in command, unless he has been superseded by (or by order of) an officer of superior rank.

Continuity of command and organization are of no slight importance in action, and if this be so in respect of platoons, how much more clearly is it the case when companies, battalions, brigades, and larger units are concerned. A company, for instance, to which a certain frontage has been assigned, should retain responsibility for that frontage, subject to interference only by the battalion commander or the second-in-command.

Thus we are now in a position to state two ruling principles:—

- (1) *The officer by whom operations are commenced on whatever extent of frontage, should continue to direct them, subject only to the orders of the officer commanding the greater unit of which his own is a part.*
- (2) *Commanders of adjacent units should not fail to confer, so as to ensure intimate co-operation, generally and particularly, but, on the other hand, such commanders should not, except in cases of emergency, give any orders, by virtue of seniority, one to another. Differences of opinion should, except in grave emergencies, be referred for decision by the officer commanding the major unit to which both belong.*

It may at first sight appear that the conditions laid down above might cause serious trouble when higher units, such as divisions and army corps, are in question. This, however, should not be so, provided that the commanders concerned "play the game," and possess reasonable common-sense. Let us imagine an example:—

The 3rd Division, 1st Army Corps needs assistance, in order to pursue an advantage or to extricate itself from a difficulty, the IInd Army Corps, in Army reserve, is ordered to send a division to the scene of action. The 5th Division is detailed for the purpose, and its commander proceeds at once in his motor, in advance of his troops, to confer with G.O.C. 3rd Division, the officer on the spot, who explains the situation and the plan of co-operative action which he considers suitable to the occasion. If G.O.C. 5th Division concurs, it remains only to carry the plan into effect, subject to approval by the G.O.C. 1st Army Corps, to whom it will doubtless have been already reported, but if G.O.C. 5th Division objects, the question can be submitted through G.O.C. IInd Army Corps, to the Army Commander for decision. Meanwhile, in emergent circumstances, the G.O.C. 1st Army Corps, the superior "frontage commander," is entitled to decide the matter at his own discretion, and G.O.C. 5th Division, having come under his orders, has no option but to obey with a good grace—however unwillingly. Thus, G.O.C. 3rd Division can only *suggest*, whether he be the senior divisional commander or not; but G.O.C. 1st Army Corps, the officer directing operations on an army corps frontage, has power to employ the 5th Division at his discretion, without consulting G.O.C. IInd Army Corps on the subject; albeit if time admits, G.O.C. 5th Division may be allowed, as a matter of courtesy, not of right, to make an objection to G.O.C. IInd Army Corps who, if he concurs, can refer the case in dispute to the Commander of the Army. Meanwhile, the full discretion with which G.O.C. 1st Army Corps has been invested furnishes sufficient security against advantage to the enemy owing to delays in arriving at conclusions. So long as the "officer on the spot" has power to act on his own responsibility, and is a competent leader of men, the King can suffer no damage that generalship is capable of preventing.

It may be regarded as a matter of small importance whether the commanders of minor units, such as platoons, companies and

battalions shall or shall not be allowed to exercise prolonged control over the areas on which they operate; but if the general principle be accepted, it would seem well to emphasize its importance by giving it the widest possible application. Certainly, in the cases of major units, continuity of tactical control is of immense value. The officer on the spot has had his finger constantly on the pulse of the fight, he thoroughly understands the situation, and is therefore better qualified to frame plans for further action than another officer but newly arrived on the field, even though the latter be the more generally competent of the twain.

III.—ARTILLERY.

The artillery of an attacking force is required to perform two parts: the first, *Preparative*; and the second, *Co-operative*.

The objects to be achieved during the preparative phase are:—

1. To inflict upon the defending infantry such moral and physical losses that they shall be rendered incapable of offering effective resistance to the assailants of their positions.

The greater the physical results, the greater proportionately must also be the moral, and Napoleon has told us that battles are won not so much by the numbers of men killed, as by the numbers frightened. Trenches, while undergoing a bombardment of heavy, high-explosive shells, are very unpleasant habitations, and there is therefore a natural tendency to withdraw all but a few of the defenders from the fire trenches; the bulk returning after the bombardment has ceased, in time to meet the assault. To damage the communication trenches as much as possible, is therefore an object of the attacking artillery, almost, if not quite, as important as that of rendering the fire trenches untenable; because at every point where communication trenches have been blown in, the enemy must either expose himself while passing the obstruction, or else refrain from persevering beyond it.

2. To win superiority over the hostile guns, so that after the enemy's position has been stormed, the victorious infantry, when further prosecuting their advantage, may continuously be supported by echelons of artillery sent forward for that purpose.

It is obviously difficult for field batteries to follow up the infantry advance, unless the heavy guns of the enemy have had a good deal the worst of the preliminary fire-fight. Every ascertained or suspected position of the enemy's machine-guns must also be destroyed, or damaged to the utmost; but the Germans are past-masters in the art of placing and concealing these very arresting weapons, and positions hitherto undetected are pretty sure to be disclosed during and after the assault. With such eventualities the artillery must be prepared to grapple as soon as they occur, and even at some risk to infantry thus assisted. If, however, the system of communication between infantry and artillery is efficient, there should seldom be any great difficulty in dealing with emergencies of the nature suggested.

In order to deceive the enemy, the preparative bombardment is always divided into irregular periods, so that although the fact of abnormally heavy bombardment unmistakably suggests a coming assault, the actual moment of that assault may be left until the last moment in doubt, and the garrisons of the fire trenches be tempted, perhaps more than once, to reoccupy them with resulting losses when firing is presently resumed. At length, however, comes the appointed time, and then, springing from their trenches, the assailants rush forward, while the guns that have previously been shelling the enemy's forward trenches, lift their fire to more distant areas, and a fresh phase of the operations is thus entered upon.

The Co-Operative Phase.

Here, again, the attacking artillery is called upon to fulfil a dual rôle, of which the first part is to ensure that the victorious infantry shall not be repulsed, by counter-attack, from the trenches they have initially succeeded in capturing, and the second to support unceasingly the efforts subsequently made to achieve complete penetration of the hostile position. Of these two parts the second is obviously the more difficult. To maintain an effective fire, from entrenched fire positions, on targets, the ranges of which have been registered to a yard, is one thing; but quite another it is, while exposed to hostile heavy artillery still remaining in its original positions, to be constantly well placed and ready to prepare for and to support the various assaults that must be delivered by the infantry in the course of their further movement in advance. Without the aid of artillery, the infantry cannot indefinitely continue to "keep the enemy on the run"; sooner or later there must come a check, caused, for example, by a murderous cross-fire of machine-guns on the edge of an area which gallant and costly efforts have proved to be unapproachable, until after the obstructing machine-guns have been knocked out. Those who have seen infantry mown down in swathes, like so much corn, by the fire of machine-guns, can testify to the absolutely imperative need that artillery assistance shall never be far to seek; but those, on the other hand, who have seen a horrid shambles of mutilated men and horses, surrounding shattered material, know well the consequences of batteries coming into action in the open, where the enemy's heavy guns can shell them. To prevent entirely the incidence of either misfortune is no doubt impracticable; yet much may be done to reduce the chances against the artillery, if sufficient care is taken beforehand to select the best routes and positions with reference to the probable course of the operations, in accordance with all conceivable hypotheses.

Rough ideas having been gained from the map, aerial reconnaissances by artillery observers sent to examine the various lines of advance that have been considered suitable, and the localities where fire positions appear likely to be required, can do much to confirm the soundness of the plans projected, or to find cause for their amendment. Moreover, assuming that complete schemes have been prepared to meet the requirements of all the various situations that

may alternatively have been anticipated, it will often be possible to utilize the cover of darkness, after the close of each day's operations, in order to prepare with pick and shovel fire-positions expected to be useful on the morrow. In at least one instance within the knowledge of the present writer, the last suggested precaution was not taken, and the omission was attended by very lamentable consequences. It must be remembered that in order to support fully the infantry attack, batteries must sometimes be placed where the gunners can see their target over the sights. The infantry can always tell by what enemy positions their advance has been arrested, and this information having been communicated, the most suitable artillery positions can be selected by daylight, and entrenched during the night by infantry soldiers who, however tired, will work hard and willingly in such circumstances.

In any case, as soon as the sun has fallen below the horizon, advanced emplacements for heavy guns ought instantly to be commenced, so that the guns may surely be disposed therein before daylight. If an army is to gain ground day by day, it is obviously essential that support from its heavy artillery shall not be wanting. Field artillery being capable of rapid movement over short stretches of exposed ground, may be able to advance during the day; but not so the heavy batteries, unless very exceptionally favoured by the existence of completely concealed routes, or, when the enemy's retreat is in the nature of a rout, and his heavy guns being therefore obliged to fall back to distant positions are thus during long periods out of action.

The sum of the whole matter is that the plans of the General Officer Commanding the force having been clearly explained to the artillery, it is the business of the latter to consider all the probabilities in reference to routes and positions, and as far as possible to test the correctness of their selections by means of aerial reconnaissances. Afterwards, during the battle, constant communication with the attacking infantry, and with the observing "sausages," will ensure much valuable guidance, while trained eyes for ground at all times, and the concealment afforded by the hours of darkness, will probably do the rest. The problem is a gunner's problem, and gunners must therefore solve it as best they can. Certainly it is not possible for infantry to win victories, fight they never so stoutly and skilfully, unless the artillery affords them constant support. Therefore the artillery must find a way to "get there," and without serious losses of personnel or material—lest they should arrive inefficient. Constant and reliable information, together with a good tactical eye for country, would seem to be the principal aids to solving the problem involved. Gallant willingness to advance *anywhere* we have always with us, but ability to do so and *live* is far less common. In war, that which has not been well-planned can seldom be well executed. Every great general has always been an opportunist, but opportunism without method is of as little value as ammunition without a rifle.

Finally, there remains the knotty question of efficient means of communication, and it would appear that there is strong reason for us to take again fully into favour the system of visual signalling, not of course to the prejudice of the telephone, but as supplementary thereto, so that if wires are cut, or have not yet been connected, the infantry and artillery shall nevertheless be always enabled to communicate as the occasion may require. It is not well that infantry should lack support which the artillery are ready to give, and it is very deplorable that the former should sometimes be mistaken for enemies, owing to failure of connection.

IV.—RESERVES.

The objects which reserves are intended to achieve are:—

1. To make good the successes won by other troops;
2. To turn the balance, by timely intervention, when victory is in doubt;
3. To avert disaster by covering the retirement of troops that have been repulsed.

The winning of victory is obviously the most satisfactory preventive of disaster. Therefore a commander who will not tempt his fate, in conditions of reasonable possibility, can seldom be acquitted of incompetency.

Reserves are usually ill-posted if the critical moment finds them unable to act as readily and effectively on the offensive as on the defensive.

Owing to the adverse influence of aerial observation it has become increasingly difficult to avoid discovery when concentrating masses of troops in the vicinity of an enemy.

The undetected as well as timely arrival of reserves on the scene of action is an ideal consummation, very greatly to be desired, though seldom attainable in modern conditions. No effort should be spared in order to approach the ideal as nearly as possible, but the element of punctuality being that which is absolutely essential, no other considerations must upon any account be permitted to imperil it. To be discovered while on the march is very disadvantageous; but to be too late is utterly calamitous. Therefore the prudent commander will not strain over-much at the gnaw of discovery, lest he be thereafter compelled to swallow the camel of defeat.

It is much easier, however, to state precepts than to apply them in practice, and it is plainly manifest that a result of recent aeronautical developments has been enormously to augment the difficulty of executing strategical manœuvres undetected by the enemy. Many of Napoleon's most notable successes were chiefly due to his extraordinary skill in concentrating superior numbers on the decisive point, in conditions that caused his adversaries to be doubly surprised; they being not only unprepared to meet the onslaught where actually delivered, but further disadvantaged by having been led to expect it in some other locality, or in a different form.

Supposing, for example, that aircraft had existed in 1806; it is evident that both the strategy of Ulm and the tactics of Austerlitz must have been very adversely affected. How would Napoleon have guarded himself against aerial discovery? The obvious answer is that he would have taken measures to ensure gaining command of the air; he would have made his "Flying Corps" so strong, that while he himself should be kept accurately informed of the enemy's movements, those of the Grand Army would be effectually concealed—no hostile airman being able to penetrate behind the veil. Undoubtedly this is what the Emperor would have wished to do; but was it feasible? Perhaps. Albeit there can be no question that Napoleon, in the same epoch, ardently longed for the command of the sea and utterly failed to win it. Moreover, supposing the French Flying Corps to have achieved an extraordinary ascendancy as complete as can reasonably be imagined, there could even thus have been no certainty that some enterprising air-scout, briefly favoured by fortune, might not have accidentally observed and reported particular movements, with a generally illuminating effect. Command of the air may very probably suffice to prevent distant reconnaissance on a considerable scale by the weaker side, but it is nevertheless an unreliable safeguard against the adventures of single aviators who are intelligently discreet as well as bold, and who are provided with fast machines.

How Napoleon would have solved the problem of the air, only a Napoleon could explain in convincing fashion; but this much is certain, that the General who first succeeds in evolving and applying a system suitable to the existing conditions, will do much to bring about the conclusion of the present war.

One of the greatest among existing strategical difficulties is that, if reserves are brought up betimes, they can scarcely escape detection, and their value must consequently be discounted; but if in the effort to arrive undiscovered they are delayed until too late, their arrival is rendered valueless. Obviously, therefore, the primary consideration is to avoid being too late, and the second to prevent, to the last possible moment, the almost inevitable discovery. But this is easier said than done, because modern armies are of unwieldy size, and therefore incapable of sudden changes of direction in the course of games of "hide and seek." Night-marching is an expedient that naturally suggests itself, and that has already been largely employed. This expedient is attended by various disadvantages, yet must be accepted as indispensable; although it only partially meets the case. The enemy has other means of obtaining information irrespective of his air-scouts. It is difficult to exterminate the spies that infest the country.

Troops going into action on the day succeeding a long night march may, if they are in very hard condition, fight just as well as if they had been subjected to no such hardship; but assuming victory, and the consequent need of vigorous pursuit, the fact of having commenced the operations after a sleepless night or nights, must necessarily prove sooner or later a serious detriment, more especially

as questions of food and water are almost inevitably included among the difficulties to be overcome.

Just now the opposing forces, in both the principal theatres of war, are entrenched on the longest possible lines, and are separated from each other by distances that are for the most part exiguous. The only possible offensive opening in the circumstances is to break through selected sections of the opposing frontage, a more or less general demonstration being simultaneously made in order to disguise to the last moment the points actually to be assaulted. Assuming one or more of the assaults to be successful, it is manifestly imperative that strong reserves shall be at hand to support the further movement in advance. But to have reserves in immediate readiness, and in sufficient strength, is by no means an easy matter.

It has already been pointed out that arrival after a long night march is attended by disadvantages in reference to the fighting capacity of the men, who in case of a victorious pursuit may be without rest during a period of several days. On the other hand, to arrive within a short march of the intended scene of action, say, twenty-four hours beforehand, must almost inevitably involve detection by hostile airmen. There is thus, apparently, only a choice of alternative evils, or, at best, some sort of compromise between the two. The adoption of the latter, although compromises are rarely satisfactory, would seem to furnish the most acceptable solution in the present case.

It may reasonably be predicated that if reserves are without fail to arrive in time to play their part, the heads of their columns should not be more than one hour's march distant from the trenches, at the hour chosen for the assaulting troops to quit those trenches in order to attack. This contention is reasonable enough, but it will be obvious that at so short a distance the reserves would probably be under fire of the enemy's heavy guns, and, apart from the question of, perhaps, appreciable losses, would at all events be deprived of that very rest and sleep which have been declared to be necessary. It is to overcome this difficulty, and also to provide a possibility of eluding discovery, that the following plan is now proposed.

Let it be assumed that on a given date an assault will be delivered half-an-hour after daylight; a final series of bombardments commencing at dawn. On the previous morning, after a fairly long night-march, the troops in reserve reach duly appointed towns and villages, woods and farms, where they find concealment within an area, the forward boundary of which is about five or six miles distant from the trenches. During the day, the men rest and sleep, and in the evening, say, 6 p.m., have a thoroughly good dinner. All water-bottles are filled, the water-carts are replenished, and to each man there is served out, additionally to his two days' "iron rations," a substantial breakfast, including half-a-pound of cooked meat or "bully," to be eaten before marching in the morning. Thus, well fed and rested, the troops are set in motion at such an hour as will enable them to arrive, by the time the assault is being delivered, within about one hour's march from the scene of action. It does not seem altogether improbable that the march of approach may in this manner escape detection, and

more especially so if other troops are permitted (not *too* patently) to be discovered moving towards some point in the line where no veritable assault is intended. At all events, there is secured a practical certainty of arriving in time—the primarily essential achievement.

In order still further to augment the available forces on the spot, it may in some cases be practicable to utilize the railway, and when this is so, advantage should usually be taken of the fact. It is always well to have as large as possible a margin over and above the strength estimated to be sufficient. Napoleon has told us that "a single battalion sometimes decides the day." It was the arrival of Confederate reinforcements at Manassas Junction that decided the day at Bull Run. An army may prove too weak for its task, but can never be too strong. Reinforcements are, moreover, as necessary to the prosecution of a victory, however apparently decisive, as they are in the most desperate of conditions. A weak force, beyond reach of succour, is fully justified in tempting fortune by the very boldest offensive. Thus it was that Wellesley averted disaster by winning a brilliant victory at Assaye, and similarly Graham at Barosa. But a General who, having ample strength at his disposal, uses only a part, without ensuring that the whole shall be enabled to participate betimes, if required, is inexcusably foolhardy. "When you have resolved to fight a battle," says Napoleon, "collect your whole force. Dispense with nothing."

Be an assault never so successful, the troops that deliver it must necessarily suffer losses, not only in that assault itself, but afterwards. Moreover, a certain amount of disorder inevitably attends pursuit. Thus, in proportion as the victorious advance is prolonged, must the vulnerability of the pursuers be increased, if presently subjected to counter-attack or strong resistance by fresh troops of the enemy. Therefore it is indispensable that strong reserves shall follow on the very heels of the stormers, ready at any moment to give further impetus in case of a check, and eventually to take over from their exhausted comrades the arduous duty of constantly pressing the defeated enemy. Besides this, other echelons of reserves will be required to operate against the hostile troops to right and left of the gap through which the assailants have forced their way. In a word, it is essential to complete success, that reserves shall be piled upon reserves, up to whatever may be the limit of available forces. Any omission to provide against unexpected contingencies, by means of more than ample reserves, implies trust in good fortune rather than in good organization.

CASUAL RAMBLES IN THE MUSEUM OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

By COMMANDER W. F. CABORNE, C.B., R.N.R.

II.

AMONG the relics dating back to the Tudor period to be seen in the Museum is an iron breech-loading cannon, recovered, after immersion for about three centuries in the sea, from the wreck of the "Mary Rose," 500 tons, which vessel, when leaving Portsmouth Harbour on the 19th of July, 1545, to assist in repelling an attack upon that even then very important naval base by a French fleet, under the command of Admiral d'Annabault, suddenly heeled over until her open lower ports, normally only some sixteen inches above the water, were submerged, with the result that she quickly foundered, carrying to the bottom her captain, Sir George Carew, and all her officers and men, with the exception of about 35 persons, the disaster being witnessed from the shore by King Henry VIII., who had dined on board a few hours previously, and by Lady Carew.

The "Mary Rose" was armed with both muzzle-loading brass guns and breech-loading iron guns, the former, which were provided with trunnions, being mounted on wooden carriages, furnished with four wooden trucks, a system which remained in vogue until the middle of the last century, while the latter were trunnionless, and were mounted in a sort of wooden cradle, having two trucks, one on each side about amidships, and a longitudinal groove or slot in its under side to enable it to slide on a directing bar.

In the breech-loading guns, the separate breech portion, in which was the powder chamber, was kept in position by a wedge inserted between it and the solid block of the cradle, and however much we, in these days of long range rifled guns, powerful explosives, wonderful breech mechanisms, and scientific recoil apparatus, may be inclined to laugh at such primitive arrangements, it must be borne in mind that gunpowder, at any rate in its adaptation to war purposes, was in its infancy and exercised comparatively little force.

It would appear to be a somewhat common fallacy that breech-loading weapons are of modern invention, but, as we have seen, that is not the case, and a few extracts from a paper contributed by Lieutenant (afterwards General Sir) Henry Brackenbury to the "Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution" in 1856, may be of interest and not out of place.

In discussing the records of the origin or invention of cannon, he said: "These will carry us back no further than the year 1326, in which year dates the earliest authentic document hitherto found proving

the existence of cannon. This record, which is still in existence, gives authority to the priors, the gonfalonier, and 12 good men, to appoint persons to superintend the manufacture of cannons of brass, and iron balls, for the defence of the commune, camps, and territory of Florence.

"In the year 1338, however, we come upon unquestionable testimony that cannon, both of iron and brass, were employed at that date on board English ships of war. We find an indenture between John Starling, formerly clerk of the Ships, Galleys, Barges, Bolingers, and other the King's vessels, and Helmyng Leget, keeper of the same, 22nd June, 12 Edward III., 1338. The said John delivered to the said Helmyng in a ship called the 'Bernard de la Tour' 'ij canons de ferr sanz estuff.'" There are also entries in the same indenture of other deliveries. "It must be observed here that these cannon, whether of brass or iron, appear to have been, as we shall presently find was the case at about the same period in France, breech-loaders, with movable chambers to contain the charge; each gun being provided with more than one of these chambers."

Having traced the history of cannon from their first authentic and contemporary mention to the end of the first half of the 14th century, Brackenbury continued: "We have found them throughout but feeble weapons in comparison with the great warlike engines of the period, which still were employed for the more serious operations; the largest cannon of which we have read being not more than 120 lbs. weight.

"We have found them constructed of brass, and of iron, breech-loading, the charge being placed in a chamber, which was kept in its place by a wedge.

"The projectiles were in some cases leaden, iron, and stone shot; in some cases arrows with an iron or leaden point, with leather bound to the shaft to keep them firmly in the tube, and winged with brass—but no one of these projectiles appears to have exceeded 2 lbs. in weight, and the greater number were far smaller. The powder was made when required for use, the saltpetre and sulphur being kept in store, and the charcoal made when wanted; the three ingredients being then mixed together by hand. This powder was, of course, very weak in its action, giving but low velocity to the projectile; and this fact, joined to the small size of the cannon, caused the latter to be considered of less value, for anything but close quarters, than the 'arbalètes à tour.'"

Stone projectiles, of which there are some specimens in the Museum, including a Turkish one of large size, were principally employed down to the beginning of the sixteenth century, but they were also used at a much later date, as witness the defence of the Dardanelles in 1807.

Before leaving the subject of these old cannon, it should be mentioned that among the exhibits is the model of a great gun made in 1464 under the auspices of Mahomet II., who had, 11 years previously, used very heavy artillery at the siege of Constantinople, which resulted in the capture of that city and the death of Constantine Palæologus, the last of the emperors of the Eastern Empire.

The original of the model (which was presented to the Institution by the late Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Edmund Commerell, V.C., G.C.B.) is to be found at Woolwich, it having been given to the British Government by the Sultan in 1868, in exchange for two modern weapons.

Dr. Richard Pococke, F.R.S., afterwards bishop respectively of Ossary and Meath, who visited the Dardanelles in 1737, in "A Description of the East and some other Countries," published in London in 1745, says: "The castles are sometimes called by the Turks Bogas Hissar (the castles of the entrance); but that to the east is called Natoli Eskihissar (the old Asia castle); it is a high, square building, encompassed with an outer wall and turrets; there are 14 large brass cannon without carriages on the sea shoar; they are always loaded with stone ball, ready to sink any ship that would offer to pass without coming to anchor, in order to be searched: They fire likewise with ball, in answer to any ship that salutes the castles: As this does much damage where they fall, so the lands directly opposite commonly pay no rent: There are eight other cannon towards the south: I saw among them two very fine ones, one is twenty-five feet long, and adorned with *flower-de-luces*, which they say was a decoration antiently used by the emperors of the east before the French took those arms, and I have seen them in many parts; the other cannon is of brass, twenty feet long, but in two parts, after the old way of making cannon of iron of several pieces; the bore of this is about 2 feet, so that a man may very well sit in it; two quintals and a half of powder are required to load it; and it carries a ball of stone of 14 quintals.¹

"The other castle called Rumeli Eskihissar (the old castle of Romelia) has in it twenty large brass cannon, one of which is of great size, but not so large as that on the other side."

Brigadier-General (afterwards General Sir) John H. Lefroy, R.A., F.R.S., in describing the great Turkish gun at Woolwich—which is in two parts, each weighing eight or nine tons—in the "Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution," 1870, having quoted Bishop Pococke, remarked: "A more recent Prussian traveller, Major von Moltke (1829) says that there are '63 Kamerlicks or guns which throw stone balls, some of which weigh 1570 lbs. weight.' 'These gigantic guns,' he adds, 'are some of them 28 inches in diameter, and a man may creep into them up to the breech. They lie on the ground on sleepers of oak, instead of gun carriages, and their butts against strong walls, so as to prevent recoil, as it would be impossible to run them forward in action. Some of them are loaded with as much as 1 cwt. of powder.'"

Although they could be neither readily trained nor run out if so required, these old Turkish guns, with their stone projectiles, proved formidable weapons when Vice-Admiral Sir John Duckworth, as already alluded to, forced the passage of the Dardanelles in 1807, several men-of-war being more or less damaged, and a number of men being either killed or wounded.

Close alongside the gun of the "Mary Rose" is an English long bow of yew, also recovered from the wreck of that vessel—a weapon

¹ A quintal is 110 rotoli of 144 drams or 1 lb.; other authorities 1.27 lbs.

reminiscent of Crecy, Poitiers, Agincourt, and other mediæval fights, in which our redoubtable archers did such notable and good work.

There are likewise various specimens to be seen of ordinary and mechanical cross-bows, some of them being extremely fine, and for the period, powerful instruments of war.

An exhibit which should not be overlooked is a shield of the Tudor era, fitted in its centre with a breech-loading pistol.

Another interesting Tudor relic, although neither a naval nor a military one, is an embroidered petticoat, once the property of Queen Elizabeth, who has been credited with having left an enormous number of articles of dress behind her.

Born at Greenwich on September 7th, 1533, the daughter of Henry VIII. and the unfortunate Anne Boleyn, christened with all the rites of the Roman Church (as on her accession to the throne in after days she was crowned according to the same rites by the Bishop of Carlisle); at various times debarred from, or placed in different positions with regard to, the succession to the throne; a prisoner in the Tower in her half-sister Mary's reign, and in imminent peril of the axe and block; what vicissitudes of fortune formed the prelude to the long and glorious reign of the great "Protestant Queen"—that reign which really laid the foundations of the British Empire as we know it, and demonstrated for all time the overwhelming and abiding value of sea power.

In imagination we can see Gloriana herself, arrayed in ruff and farthingale, and it may be wearing the identical petticoat we have before us, surrounded by her brilliant Court. Or it may be that she wore it when she made her historic speech to her soldiers at Tilbury. And what a glorious crowd of sailors, soldiers, and adventurers appear before us in her memorable reign!

First is Sir Francis Drake, whose walking-stick and snuff-box have found a home in the case containing his Sovereign's petticoat. We see him in early life a merchant seaman; at San Juan de Ulloa with Hawkins (of whom more hereafter); at Nombre de Dios, coveting the treasure that he could not carry away; on a tree top on the Isthmus of Darien, gazing for the first time on the Pacific Ocean, and registering a vow that he would one day sail upon those waters; successfully looting the Spanish treasure convoy on the Isthmus; making his celebrated voyage round the world, having many adventures and collecting much treasure on the way; returning to England and being knighted on board his ship, the "Pelican" or "Golden Hinde," by Queen Elizabeth, who, incidentally, shared in the spoils of the expedition; "singeing the King of Spain's beard" at Cadiz; and manfully playing his part on board his flagship, the "Revenge" (later to be still more famous), in the great Channel fight against the "Invincible Armada" in 1588.

A humbler seaman should not be forgotten in the person of John Oxenham, who was with Drake at Darien, was the first Englishman to embark on the Pacific Ocean, and being afterwards captured, mainly through his own folly, was hanged as a pirate at Lima by the Spaniards.

Then there is Lord Howard of Effingham, to be known in later years as Earl of Nottingham, Lord High Admiral of England, and commander-in-chief of the naval forces that defeated the Armada,

whose portrait in oils, representing him with a pointed beard and wearing an embroidered cap, is to be found hanging in the Council Room of the Institution. A relic of that memorable fight is a cross made from wood of one of the Spanish ships. It is noteworthy that in 1569 Lord Howard commanded the mounted forces under the Earl of Warwick, when suppressing the Roman Catholic rebellion in the north; while in the following year he commanded a squadron of vessels despatched to watch the Spanish Fleet detailed to conduct the Queen of Spain from Flanders, upon which occasion we are told: "His lordship accompanied with 10 ships only of Her Majesty's Navy Royal, environed their fleet in a most strange and warlike sort, enforced them to *stoop gallants* and to vail their bonnets for the Queen of England."

After him, Sir John Hawkins, merchant seaman, adventurer, puritan, pirate, and pioneer of the English trade in negro slaves, yet withal a loyal servant of the Queen, and one who as a flag officer did yeoman service in improving and fitting out ships, and also in fighting afloat, at the time of the Armada. We see him (and with him Drake) shutting out a Spanish admiral and fleet from the Spanish port of San Juan de Ulloa, and afterwards making his escape from that place after a desperate fight brought on by the treachery of the Spaniards; and at a later date firing into a Spanish ship at Plymouth because the captain of the latter had declined to strike his colours upon entering an English port. We see him during one of his voyages, with 400 slaves on board, becalmed near the Equator, short of water and fearful that many if not all on board would perish of thirst, "but the Almighty God, who never suffereth his elect to perish (in which category it is to be inferred that the unfortunate negroes were not included), sent us . . . the ordinary Brise . . . which never left us, till we came to an Island of the Canyballs, called Dominica." His instructions to his crew were: "Keep good company; beware of fire; serve God daily; and love one another"—excellent sentiments, but some of them difficult to reconcile with the active enslavement of his fellow men.

We read that in 1590 he was sent to the coast of Portugal to intercept the Spanish treasure fleet, but did not meet it. In giving an account of his failure to the Queen he quoted the text: 'Paul doth plant, Apollo doth water, but God giveth the increase,' which exhibition of piety is said to have provoked the Queen into exclaiming: 'God's death! This fool went out a soldier and has come home a divine.'

What a strange mixture the man was; but his memory deserves to be kept green as that of one who faithfully served his country, and did much to break the then predominant power of Spain.

And what of another great seaman, Sir Martin Frobisher, who, among other services, essayed the discovery of a North-west Passage, a task in completing which the gallant Sir John Franklin, and his no less gallant comrades, perished about two and three-quarter centuries later, many relics of the latter expedition being in the Museum?

The following are extracts from the quaint regulations drawn up by Frobisher for this third voyage in 1578:—"Art. I. Imprimis. To banishe swearing, dice, cards-playing, and all filthie talk, and to serve

God twice a daie with the ordinarie service, usuall in the Church of England; and to clear the glass everie nighte, according to the ould order of England." "Art. VIII. If any man in the fleete come upon another in the nighte, and hail his fellowe, knowinge him not, he shall give him this wache worde, 'Before the world was God'; the other shall answer, if he be one of our fleete, 'After God came Christ, His Sonne.' Soe that if any be found amongst us, not of our owne companie, he that first descrieth any such sayle or sayles shall give warning to the Admyrall. . . ."

Sir Walter Raleigh, too, appears upon the scene, soldier, sailor courtier, royal favourite, adventurer, historian, poet, philosopher, and founder of Virginia, who, after many years of imprisonment in the Tower, under sentence of death, in the reign of James I., and a brief spell of liberty to conduct an unfortunate expedition, was executed under his original condemnation on October 29th, 1618.

The next to come along is Sir Richard Grenville, a man "of intolerable pride and insatiable ambition," whose glorious and unequal fight against a large and powerful Spanish fleet of 53 vessels, in the little "Revenge," 500 tons, off the Azores, in 1591, will never be forgotten while courage and chivalry are honoured in the land.

From the afternoon of August 31st until the following morning the battle raged; fifteen Spanish ships were repulsed in turn, two of them were sunk alongside the "Revenge," two more were disabled, so that they eventually foundered, while as many as 2,000 of the enemy were killed or drowned. To quote Sir Walter Raleigh: "The masts were lying over the side, the rigging cut or broken, the upper works all shot in pieces, and the ship herself, unable to move, was settling slowly in the sea; the vast fleet of Spaniards lying round her in a ring, like dogs round a dying lion, and wary of approaching him in his last agony." Further defence being hopeless, Grenville, who had received more than one hurt, and was indeed mortally wounded, ordered the master-gunner "to split and sink the ship, that thereby nothing might remain of glory or victory to the Spaniards," but he was overruled by the survivors of his crew, who had done all that mortal men could do, and was eventually taken on board the "San Pablo," where he died, his last words being: "Here die I, Richard Greynvile, with a joyful and quiet mind: for that I have ended my life as a true soldier ought to do, that hath fought for his country, queen, religion, and honour. Whereby my soul most joyfully departeth out of this body, and shall always leave behind it an everlasting fame of a valiant and true soldier, that hath done his duty as he was bound to do."

When the "Revenge" surrendered, practically all the gunpowder had been exhausted, and "The Royal Navy: A History" tells us "she had six feet of water in her hold, not a mast standing, and but about 60 men, and nearly all of whom were wounded, alive, out of a crew which, at the outset, may have numbered 250, if all were on board. But sickness had been rife in the fleet, and no matter what may have been the number of men victualled in the "Revenge" on the day of the action, only about 100 of them went into the fight fit for duty."

And thus the procession passes along, including many other units too numerous to mention, of Elizabethan worthies, gallant, patriotic, and loyal gentlemen, ready it might be to accept defeat in the face of overwhelming force, but surrender, never. Rather than that: "Sink me the ship, master-gunner, sink me the ship!" Such was the spirit of those days, and such is the spirit that should exist among us now.

If those same gentlemen, who did so much for their nation and their posterity in their lifetime, can look down upon us from the blue vault of heaven and take note of the greatest war that the world has ever seen, while full of admiration for our sailors and soldiers so gallantly fighting for their Sovereign and the Empire, what must be their opinion of the opponents of universal service; of the conscientious objectors to risking their own skins; of strikers for shorter hours of work and higher wages, during their country's vital need; of the fanatical teetotalers, and other cranks, anxious to utilise the situation for the furtherance of their own narrow views; of the peace at any price party; of the unpatriotic Union of Democratic Control; of those who would have forced "The Declaration of London" (now, happily, defunct, as it is to be hoped is also the case with Hague Conferences) upon us, restricting as it did in time of war the activity and usefulness of the Navy, "whereon, under the good Providence of God, the wealth, safety, and strength of the Kingdom chiefly depend"; and of those silly and misguided persons who are arguing for the so-called "freedom of the seas," which would mean eventual German ascendancy and the downfall of the British Empire, which was founded upon and is maintained by sea power? Verily, in the days of Elizabeth, these people would have met with a sharp, speedy and fitting reward!

However, while the ultimate victory of Great Britain and her Allies in the present struggle is certain, yet for many a long year to come we shall have to observe Cromwell's admirable advice to "Trust in God, and keep our powder dry."

In many respects, Elizabeth's reign was indeed a golden age, and we may charitably hope, with an old writer: "Even that she is now in heaven with all those blessed virgins that had oil in their lamps."

Many exhibits connected with the Stuarts and their epoch are on view, a rather ghastly one being a painting of the head of Mary Queen of Scots—whose career has been the subject of so much romance in the past, and will probably continue to be so for centuries to come—after decapitation at Fotheringaye Castle on February 8th, 1587.

Others include a pocket universal dial made for Prince Charles (Charles I.) in 1616, and engraved with the heraldic device of James I.; a round shot and two bullets used at the Battle of Marston Moor, near York, on July 2nd, 1644, when the Royalists, under Prince Rupert and the Marquis of Newcastle, were defeated by Oliver Cromwell; bullets used at Naseby, Northamptonshire, where the Parliamentary Forces under Sir Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell gained a decisive victory over Charles I. on June 14th, 1645, upon which occasion the latter lost his guns, baggage, and some 5,000 men taken prisoners; and a small piece of the oak tree at Boscobel, in Shropshire, in which Charles II. concealed himself after the disastrous fight at Worcester

on September 3rd, 1651, which extinguished, for the time, all hope of his recovering his throne—a battle termed by Cromwell a “crowning mercy.”

Then there is part of a bandolier of a musketeer of the early part of the 17th century. The charge-holders, which usually numbered 12, were attached to a shoulder-belt, which suspended a powder-flask. These bandoliers were discontinued about 1640, and, it is of interest to observe that, in the manner that history has of repeating itself, our mounted troops in the 20th century also wear bandoliers, although of a different pattern.

In the same way, hand grenades disappeared about the middle of the last century, but they have been resuscitated once more, and, whether arsenal manufactured or improvised out of an empty jam tin, are proving themselves formidable weapons in trench fighting. There is one of Turkish manufacture, recently brought from Gallipoli, in the Crypt.

Another exhibit to attract attention is the Bible of John Balfour, of Kinloch, the Covenanter. The Covenanters were Presbyterians who bound themselves by bonds or covenants, the first “godly band” having been formed in 1557. In 1643 the Solemn League and Covenant, which was a treaty between Scotland and England, was made, its object being the preservation of the Reformed Religion in Scotland, the reformation of religion in England and Ireland “according to the word of God and the example of the best reformed churches,” and the extirpation of popery and prelacy. John Balfour, who played a leading part in the assassination of Archbishop Sharp, of St. Andrews, in 1679, when Charles II. (who had in former years been himself compelled to sign the Covenant) re-introduced prelacy into Scotland, had his estate forfeited for this crime, and a large reward was offered for his capture. He fought at Drumclog (where the Covenanters defeated John Graham, of Claverhouse, the famous Viscount Dundee) and at Bothwell Bridge (where he and his friends were beaten by Monmouth) in June, 1679, leaves from his Bible being taken for musket wads, and is said to have fled into Holland. Dundee fell at Killiecrankie, in 1689, fighting on behalf of James II., and in the moment of his victory. The circumstances of his death “allowed full play to the imagination of the Covenanters. No one had seen him shot, and he was supposed to have obtained a charm from the devil against leaden bullets; various accounts became current as to how he met his death; but that which ultimately found general acceptance was that he was shot by his own servant ‘with a silver button he had before taken off his own coat.’”

Although determined not to have prelacy imposed upon themselves, Covenanters were by no means backward in imposing their own particular views upon other people, and, as a matter of purely personal interest, I find from the State Papers that Christopher Caborne, of Saltfleetby, who had been in arms for the King against the Parliament, and had remained in arms until the reduction of Newark, was fined £300 and compelled to sign the Covenant, which he did (doubtless most unwillingly) before John Barton, minister of John Zacharias, on July 20th, 1646.


In the last "Rambles," much was written about the Banqueting House, but visitors should carefully study the beautiful model, constructed in accordance with various engravings and plans, of the Palace of Whitehall, as a whole, as it existed in the days of Charles I., the generous and valuable gift of Lieut.-Colonel Sir Arthur Leetham, Secretary of the Institution and Curator of the Museum.

Of great interest is a "Standard of the Commonwealth," deposited by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, which, until 1909, had been preserved in Chatham Dockyard, and has been asserted by some to be the flag actually flown by Robert Blake, Admiral and General at Sea. While there is no corroboration of this legend, it is quite possible that it may be true. Upon the death of Charles I., the Council of State devised a standard for the Commonwealth, which comprised the "arms of England and Ireland in two several escutcheons in a red flag within a compartment," and it is a specimen of that standard that is in the Museum. It is a red flag having two shields, one bearing a red St. George's cross, on a white ground, the other a gold harp on a blue ground, the shields being surrounded by a wreath of palm and shamrock leaves. Every man-of-war was also to have similar shields on her stern.

The late Mr. H. L. Swinburne, an authority upon these matters, wrote in the "Encyclopædia Britannica": "When Cromwell became Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland, he devised for himself a personal standard. This had the cross of St. George in the first and fourth quarters, the cross of St. Andrew, a white saltire on a blue ground, in the second, and the Irish harp in the third. His own arms—a lion on a black shield—were imposed on the centre of the flag. No one but royalty has the right to fly the Royal Standard. . . . There has, however, always been one exception, namely, that the Lord High Admiral, when in executive command of a fleet, has always been entitled to fly the Royal Standard. For example, Lord Howard flew it from the mainmast of the "Ark Royal" when he defeated the Spanish Armada; the Duke of Buckingham flew it as Lord High Admiral in the reign of Charles I.; and the Duke of York fought under it when he commanded during the Dutch Wars."

The old flag of England was St. George's Cross. "St. George had long been a patron saint of England, and his banner argent, a cross gules, its national ensign. St. Andrew in the same way was the patron saint of Scotland, and his banner, azure, a saltire argent, the national ensign of Scotland. On the union of the two crowns James I. issued a proclamation ordaining that 'henceforth all our subjects of this Isle and Kingdom of Greater Britain and the members thereof shall bear in their main-top the red cross commonly called St. George's cross, and the white cross commonly called St. Andrew's cross, joined together according to a form made by our heralds, and sent by us to our admiral to be published to our said subjects; and in their fore-top our subjects of South Britain shall wear the red cross only, as they were wont, and our subjects of North Britain in their fore-top the white cross only as they were accustomed.'" This was the first Union Flag. "At the

death of Charles I., the union with Scotland being dissolved, the ships of the Parliament reverted to the simple cross of St. George, but the Union Flag was restored when Cromwell became protector, with the Irish harp imposed upon its centre. On the Restoration, Charles II. removed the harp, and so the original Union Flag was restored, and continued as described until the year 1801, when on the legislative union with Ireland, the cross of St. Patrick, a saltire gules, on a field argent, was incorporated with the Union Flag."



STANDARD OF THE COMMONWEALTH, 1649.

Bearing the St. George's Cross and the Irish Harp.

[From the original in the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution.]

Samuel Pepys, who accompanied as secretary his cousin, Sir Edward Montagu (afterwards Earl of Sandwich), when the latter went in the "Naseby" (re-named "Charles") in command of the fleet that brought back Charles II. from the Hague, thus describes the methods of the changes made: "May 7th (1660). My Lord went this morning about the flag-ships in a boat, to see what alterations there must be, as to the armes and flags. He did give me orders also to write for silk flags and scarlett waistcloathes. For a rich barge; for a noise of trumpets, and a set of fidders." "11th. This morning we began to pull down all the State's arms in the fleet, having first sent to Dover for painters and others to come to set up the King's." "13th. To

the quarter-deck, at which the taylor and painters were at work, cutting out some pieces of yellow cloth in the fashion of a crown and C.R. and put it upon a fine sheet, and that into the flag instead of the State's arms, which after dinner was finished and set up."

Whatever may be our individual opinion of Cromwell, the fact remains that he caused the flag of the Commonwealth to be respected abroad. Macaulay says: "After half a century during which England had been of scarcely more weight in European politics than Venice or Saxony, she at once became the most formidable power in the world, dictated terms of peace to the United Provinces, avenged the common injuries of Christendom on the pirates of Barbary, vanquished the Spaniards by land and sea, seized one of the finest West Indian Islands, and acquired on the Flemish coast a fortress which consoled the national pride for the loss of Calais. She was supreme on the ocean. She was the head of the Protestant interest. All the Reformed Churches scattered over Roman Catholic kingdoms acknowledged Cromwell as their guardian. The Huguenots of Languedoc, the shepherds who, in the hamlets of the Alps, professed a Protestantism older than that of Augsburg, were secured from oppression by the mere terror of his great name. The Pope himself was forced to preach humanity and moderation to Popish princes. For a voice which seldom threatened in vain had declared that, unless favour were shown to the people of God, the English guns should be heard in the Castle of Saint Angelo."

Note.—In November, 1915, Journal, "Rambles," page 347, line 10, 1665 should be 1655.—W.F.C.



THE BRITISH SOLDIER IN THE PAGES OF DICKENS AND THACKERAY.

By HENRY BELCHER, Fellow of King's College, London.¹

BOTH Dickens and Thackeray were born towards the close of the Napoleon Wars: Thackeray in 1811, Dickens in 1812. Neither attained the age of sixty. Thackeray died worn out in his 52nd year; Dickens was fading fast in 1870, the year of his death. Contrasted with the years of Gladstone, of Newman, of Tennyson, of Manning, all of them men of strenuous minds and habits, Dickens and Thackeray appear to have expended great forces in a few years. Thackeray did not reach his public until his thirty-sixth year, and his career terminated sixteen years later. Dickens found his public in his twenty-sixth year, and left "Edwin Drood" unfinished some thirty years afterwards. As most readers know, his final work was such a blend of mystery and tragedy, that many hands were stretched out to complete it. Of "Denis Duval," left incomplete by Thackeray, I am not aware that any attempt has been made to complete this unfinished work of the author.

These few lines make no attempt to deal with the question of the relative methods, values, and success of these two great artists. It has been commonly said of Dickens that he could not in his fiction portray a gentleman; equally it has been said that Thackeray was easily successful in his pictures of gentlemen. We shall in due time, when reaching his military sketches and papers, see what he appears to have understood by this much-used word. Of Dickens it is obvious that, as Andrew Lang pointed out, he "never thought for a moment about the title of gentleman." R. L. Stevenson's "Miscellaneous Papers" contain an essay on "The Gentleman in Fiction," which leaves the matter somewhat bifurcated. Carlyle considered Dickens no gentleman; and speaks of him as he would of some curiously constructed marionette: *a good creature, a bright little man*; and the only occasion of his hearing Dickens read in public, Carlyle appeared to consider a waste of time. Macaulay's opinion of Dickens, whether as a gentleman or not, is summed up in his expressed opinion that "Northanger Abbey" was better worth attention than any or all of Dickens' work. "Northanger Abbey" was in the book market before Pickwick was published, let alone the fact that with a view to their respective purposes comparison on their merits of Jane Austen

¹ Rector of S. Michael-in-Lewes, Sussex. Author of "The First American Civil War" (MacMillan).

and Charles Dickens is an elusive undertaking. Macaulay's distaste for Dickens is merely one expression of the dislike natural to a highly-placed and not too scrupulous Whig apologist for a man of the middle-class to which Dickens belonged. Both James Oliphant and P. G. Hamerton express a profound dislike for Dickens; Oliphant because his plots are no plots; and Hamerton, as a man convinced of his own intellectual values should feel towards a *bourgeois*, whose emotions were ever aflame, and whose judgment was never more than a pale ineffectual fire!

In fact, many of the great ones have fallen afoul of Dickens, and Sara Coleridge went so far as to say that Little Nell in the "Curiosity Shop" owes all that she has worth attention to a German play and a German character. In a former day, to know a little German and make a quotation or two of that uncouth language was the high crest and seal of culture.

On a brief review of his earlier contemporaries (always excepting Mr. Gaskell and Thackeray himself) it seems that acquiescence in the general admiration inspired by Dickens' work was grudgingly accorded.

Adhering, then, to the gentlemanly interest and reviewing briefly Dickens in relation to the British Army with the rank and file thereof, we observe that of the commissioned men in the days of purchase and seniority controlled by purchase, it is admitted, that Dickens knew nothing at all. Officers of the Army were then a caste; a close corporation accessible only to men in command of a golden key. With their scarlet uniforms and gorgeous mess jackets, a poor boy, child of needy parents, born in a garrison town, would have little acquaintance. But in Landport and Portsea, where Dickens spent the earliest years of his life, soldiers of the brick-dust variety of red clothing, swarmed through streets in which the public sale of drink was under few restrictions, prostitution was unashamed, and police were unknown. Probably as a boy he had frequently seen, if he had not carefully observed, scenes of the roughest temper, with much drunkenness and tipsy violence close by his father's door. Perhaps some reminiscence of these early impressions is felt in Pickwick's notes on soldiers in Rochester. "Nothing," wrote Pickwick, "can exceed their good humour. It was but the day before my arrival that one of them had been grossly insulted in the house of a publican. The barmaid had positively refused to draw him more liquor, in return for which he had, in playfulness, perhaps, drawn his bayonet and wounded the girl in the shoulder, and yet this kind fellow was the very first to go down to the house next morning and express his readiness to overlook the matter and forget what had occurred."

But when in "Nicholas Nickleby" he conducts his readers to Portsmouth, Dickens abstains from any description of these sinister military scenes. No soldier, nor any service man, is mentioned in the Portsmouth episode; Bulph, the landlord of Crummles' lodgings is a pilot; the somewhat shadowy person who runs away with Mrs. Lillyvick is a half-pay marine officer, who does not count.

Neither does his early acquaintance with bluejackets, the rank and file of the Great Silent Service, move Dickens to make sustained reference to men whose business lies in the great waters. To one of his side pieces he brings in a Navy captain in the character of a vestryman, who nourishes an unappeasable hostility to churchwardens, overseers of the poor, beadles, and poor law guardians. This is Captain Purdey, R.N., who, being a ready speaker and in the course of debating that the recipe used by the workhouse cook for making the paupers' soup, should be produced, brought forward an indictment that the Guardians, led by the parish churchwardens, had mismanaged the workhouse, ground the paupers, watered their beer, slackbaked their bread, stolen their meat, heightened their work, and lowered their soup. This is all very funny, but unconvincing as a sketch of the activities of a captain of the Navy. Of the other bluewater characters, there are Old Bill Barley, Captain Swosser, Lieutenant Tartar, and Jack Bunsby, skipper of the "Cautious Clara," of whom we should have been pleased or amused to know more, if the author had seen his way to make enlargements. More prominent is Captain Cuttle, who "had been a pilot or skipper, or a privateersman, or all three, perhaps," but Dickens leaves us in doubt whether this captain had ever navigated beyond the Nore. In fact, perhaps because early associations had made that subject distasteful to his memory, Dickens touches but slightly on the vast sealore and custom of his native land.

Still keeping steadily in view the gentlemanly question, we remark that toad eaters were perhaps more within view in the social life of the first half of the nineteenth century, coarser in their ways and methods than are the toad eaters of our day, for Victorian literature is well stocked of this class of human reptiles: Tadpole and Taper, Pyke and Pluck, Wenham and Wagg, Todhunter and Henchman, Tusher and Runt, Pecksniff, Old Pendennis, Old Bagstock and Old Hugby, *cum multis aliis*, all belong to the Dickens or the Thackeray gallery of illustration.

Major Bagstock is the toad eater in chief of the Dickensian characters. He is a military person, in the sense that Montague Tigg, whose name and fame were not unknown in the annals of Spanish warfare, was a military person. His military tone is conceived as a gross set-off against the pomposity of the mercantile Dombey, who finds in Bagstock a gentlemanly person. Bagstock is aflame with the fire of his own boisterously humble merits. Dombey is aflame with two jets of fire: that of his own flagrant self-complacency, below which burns a fire of self-criticism. He is a common fellow, never at ease about his position, who consequently asserts himself with a frosty arrogance, sustained on one side by Carker, who munches toads with a grimace of loathing; by Miss Tox, who treats them as tit-bits; and by Bagstock, who swallows them, oyster fashion, with a dash of pepper and a smack of the lips. Tigg's services to Chevy Slyme, the object of his admiration, belong to the same kitchen and to the same school of cookery.

Of Bagstock there is a picture in "King Lear":

"This is some fellow

"Who having been praised for bluntness doth affect

"A saucy roughness He cannot flatter, he

"In honest mind and plaint; he must speak truth

"An they will take it so. If not, he's plain."

And, as is well understood, such men—

"Harbour more craft, and more corrupter ends

"Than twenty silly ducking observants."

Dickens, then, knowing nothing of the British officer class, appears to dub Bagstock with the rank of major, because of the fatal charm some writers of fiction find in that title. There are Bagstock, Pendennis, G. O'G. Gahagan, O'Dowd, Dobbin, Double-dick, Taunton, Loder, MacWhirter, Henchman, and Major Wood or Brock. When, as in Thackeray, we ascend into the society of the spotless officer, we meet Colonel Esmond and Colonel Newcome and General Baynes.

Dickens, however, never failed in kindly appreciation of the British soldier, of which estimate, the passage following is witness:—

"Any animated description of a modern battle, any private soldier's letter published in the newspapers, any page of the records of the Victoria Cross will shew that in the ranks of the Army there exists as fine a sense of duty as is to be found in any station on earth!"

"Who doubts that if we did our duty as faithfully as the soldier does his: this world would be a better place? There may be greater difficulties in our way, than in that of the soldier. Not disputed! But let us, at least, do our duty towards him."

So wrote the Uncommercial Traveller in view of the vast scandal of the case of "The Great Tasmania" troopship, which, after the mutiny, brought back to their own shores some time-expired men; men who had served under Havelock. Her voyage ended; one hundred and forty of those veterans were transferred in a perishing condition to the Liverpool Workhouse. Before being carried out of the ship, the sufferers, racked with dysentery and black with scurvy, were dosed with brandy. A heavy rain accompanied this disembarkation of dying men, who lay helpless in open carts, and on arriving at the Workhouse, drenched, shivering and twisting with pain, were borne on the backs of paupers to their quarters on the higher floors of the building. This was the welcome home offered to the men who had done their share in the reconquest of India. Of their former comrades sixty had perished at sea. The food, the attendance, the sanitary conditions were of the worst. If the deep-sea authors of our time are justified in their writing, if Cutcliffe Hyne, Morley Roberts and Clark Russell are correct in their account of the food served out to our merchant seamen, as given in "The Wreck of the Grosvenor,"

"Salt of the Sea," and in "Captain Kettle," fifty years have brought about little change in these details of management. Anyhow, the Uncommercial Traveller says of the official enquiry, "The Medical Officer laid before me a handful of rotten biscuit and a handful of split peas. The biscuit was a honey-combed heap of crawling maggots. The peas were worse than this filth. A handful of peas had been experimentally boiled for six hours. These were the stores on which the men had been fed." All this garbage had been under an inspector's eye at the port of departure, and had been passed as good and wholesome food. Who may have been flogged or hanged for the death or ruin of so many of Britain's heroes does not now concern us. That Dickens in the fire of his indignation expressed himself strongly was to be anticipated. His voice was ever raised against meddle and muddle, against the inevitable consequences of dual control. Lord Sydenham, in the *Times* of July 6th, 1915, pointed out that in former days the commissariat of the Army was under the Treasury, while the Commissary-General was under the direction of the War Office. The latter formulated its wants, and through the Commissary-General presented its demands to the Treasury. The Treasury "taxed" all these demands as men of some consequence will, who are usually under the impression that what they do not know, is not knowledge. This ignorance, known to theologians in the sphere of casuistry as invincible, is called by complacent friends, conscientiousness.

Whether the muddle which slew so many of Havelock's men was due to this particular combination of responsibility and incapacity needs not detain us here. The nation has painful and costly experience of the flexibility of evasion, wherever responsibility is divided. The nation at large is consequently very ready to believe rumours and stories connected with quarters where dual control prevails. When, for instance, they hear that one potentate gave telegraphic instructions for the course of a certain vessel, and that these instructions being left to subordinates for completion, were torn up by another potentate; the people at large have no hesitation in accepting the story as very likely to be true. Their fathers or grandfathers have told them of regrettable incidents of similar import in the Crimea, in India, in South Africa. They were no windmills at which Dickens tilted: the Circumlocution Office was no fiction of the great man's brain. "How-not-to-do-it" is no idle sarcasm of a disappointed man victimised by a proud government. It is still a fixed belief in many minds, that Buffy, Cuffy, and Huffy, Coodle, Doodle, and Hoodle, and the Tite Barnacles hold the keys of all knowledge and statecraft. Against Army administration as part of a system he abhorred, Dickens was aflame, but of the men of the Army, of the few he brings before his footlights, he is a kindly critic. Of George Rouncewell, of Matthew Bagnet, of Gil Davis, the movements and speech are pleasing and wholesome. On the other hand, his commissioned men, omitting Major Bagstock, are mere Chinese shadows: they come, they vanish; as do Hawdon and Taunton, and the warrior whose wife's sister had married a marquess. If one year of time

separated Dickens from Thackeray—for the latter was born in the year of Badajos, the former in that of Vittoria—they were a hundred years or more apart in their estimate of soldiers, their work and nature. Dickens, with his gift of insight, speaks in the language and spirit of the day. Thackeray speaks in the spirit of Charles James Fox.

If Fox discovered in the Martello Towers, projected to embarrass an invasion of Sussex, a serious and standing menace to the liberty of the Subject; Thackeray discovered in the British Army a mass of pompous folly and vain parade. Posing as Michael Angelo Titmarsh in his early literary work, he did his best, and a very good best it was, to discredit and belittle the British soldier of every rank. He became a regular contributor to *Punch*, and his views, whether expressed in irony or sarcasm, of military men, appear to affect the illustrations in *Punch* to this day. Territorials, Volunteers, Regulars, as Mr. Punch portrays men in the ranks, do not include a good-looking man and seldom an intelligent face. His sergeants are coarse and overfed. His officers are simpering, choleric, red in the face, knock-kneed. If he draws a group of children playing at soldiers the boys are ragged, hydrocephalic, dirty and stunted. Caricature is intended to raise a laugh, and to make all classes, groups, callings, ridiculous in the eyes of men. But soldiers have been special objects of dislike and contempt to popular artists for generations. At the time when, as now, the question was raised, *quis caret ora cruore nostro*, caricature raged venomously and implacably in reply to the claim for the consideration implied by this question. Take, for instance, Cruikshank, of whose work M.A.T. writes:—

“He loved a joke at a soldier, in whose livery there appears to him to be something almost as ridiculous as in the uniform of the shoulder knot. Tall Lifeguardsmen and fierce Grenadiers figure in many of his designs, and almost always in a ridiculous way. Here again we have the honest popular feeling that jeers at pomp and pretension, and is especially jealous of all display of military authority. We hold the democratic fist in much more honour than the sabre and the bayonet, and laugh at a man tricked out in scarlet and pipe clay.”

This outburst of pernicious nonsense was incited by a picture of Cruikshank's of a regiment marching to church with fixed bayonets. Of the picture M.A.T. says:—

“There they marched in state, and a pretty contempt our artist shows for all their gimcracks and trumpery. He has drawn a perfectly English scene. The little blackguard boys are playing pranks about the men and are shouting ‘Heads up! Eyes right! lobster!’ In the crowd the only person who admires the soldiers is a poor idiot whose pocket a rogue is picking.”

The picture itself is a poor thing at best—the blackguard boys are chimney sweeps; the misery of whose calling M.A.T. did nothing to alleviate. The spectators are, for the most, well-dressed women; and of the troops we see nothing but the band.

This criticism, or rather eulogium, of Cruikshank appeared in the *Westminster* of 1840: the organ of the high-browed Liberals of that day, and the writer was then twenty-nine. This should be a time of life when a man knows his own mind, as M.A.T. certainly did. His turn for caricature developed in his later boyhood.

Being entered at Trinity, Cambridge, he remained in college for one year, where, living doubtless in the fast and expensive style, described afterwards in *Pendennis*; he started *The Snob*—a periodical priced at 2½d., and published, I think, about once in ten days. If Thackeray did not write the whole contents of one number as, according to tradition, Brougham did of the *Edinburgh Review*, he at least contributed the chief pieces of every number during the few weeks of *The Snob's* existence. Here appeared his account of Timbuctoo, in which the leadership of the world is foretold to belong to that city, and not to Berlin.

M.A.T. quitted the university after a year's residence, and then, after a spell of the life which used to be called "sowing wild oats," began his literary work.

As the bulk of these wild oat transactions occurred in France and Germany, where, to be sure, he saw what he wished to see in the way of soldiers and soldiering; it is interesting to conjecture how or in what quarters he picked up acquaintance with the British officers who in his picture gallery are called Rawdon Crawley, Major Loder, Major Pendennis, Captain Rag, Cornet Famish, Major Ponto, Lieut. Wellesley Ponto, Captain George Osborne, Captain McMurdo and Sir George Tufto—to say nothing of Henchman, Todhunter, Costigan, Stubbs, Shandon and General Gorgon. Regard this secondhand lot, and consider whether there is a decent man in the parcel. They are duellists, liars, swindlers, cardsharps, drunkards, deceivers of women, snobs, cowards, tuft hunters, toad eaters. Touching on the intellectual conditions and qualifications of a soldier's work, M.A.T. expresses himself thus:—

"The whole system of the Army is something egregious and artificial. The civilian who lives out of it cannot understand it. It is not like other professions which require intelligence. A man one degree removed from idiocy, with brains just sufficient to direct his powers of mischief and endurance, may make a distinguished soldier. As to the men, they get the word of command to advance or fall back, and they do it; they are told to strip and be flogged, and they do it; or to flog, and they do it; to murder or be murdered, and they obey; for their food and clothing and two-pence a day for their tobacco."

Here notice, after the observation that a civilian cannot understand the Army: that here is a civilian at any rate who knew all

about it. This scornful dulness of vision remained with him even after his country's experience of the Crimean War. Similar mischievous nonsense occurs in some remarks belittling the memories of the Guards' Brigade in 1855, and as to the annual trooping of the King's Colour, M.A.T. regards all this ceremonial as "a magnificent piece of tomfoolery." These being his general opinions on this great subject, let us get down to particulars. Painted in higher tones and with some sunshine in the picture, are the Virginians, George Warrington and his brother Harry, Henry Esmond and Thomas Newcome. As to the Virginians, the Warrington boys are not of English birth, nor were they professional soldiers: they drift into the pursuit of arms in the quarrels with France, and ultimately they mature as soldiers in the War of American Independence. Harry becomes an American patriot and slave owner, George a British baronet and a loyalist; but in spite of differences between the Virginians, brotherly love continues. Of Henry Esmond it is difficult to make any estimate in terms suitable to a soldier of Thackeray's own times. There were no regimental messes and no great barracks and no military clubs in Queen Anne's days; nor was the Army large enough to admit of the career of arms being regarded as a professional pursuit. Of Colonel Newcome, so much has been said and written out of sympathy for that kindly and simple warrior, his disappointments and melancholy end, that it would be ungracious to do more than point out that his social and military failure appeared to be due to his defects in the special gifts which, according to Thackeray, are essential to promotion. Thackeray's soldiers, then, like Cruikshank's trees, are "like nothing in nature," but of a real gentleman's doings he is the accepted chronicler. Dickens is not considered capable of any notion of what constitutes a gentleman. R. L. Stevenson says there was nothing of the gentleman about Dickens; and Carlyle dubbed him a common-looking little fellow. Consequently, it is generally agreed he could not write sensibly about gentlemen. But who can? Who knows exactly what a gentleman is? Is it knowable? Did Dickens ever make any claim to describe a gentleman? Granted Eugene Wrayburn and Mortimer Lightwood, who are commonly denounced as among Dickens' absolute failures, is it pretended that the author had already stuck labels on his figures, "This is a gentleman"? If he did so the fact has escaped me. Thackeray, however, knows all about gentlemen. Practically he says so. He introduced among his puppets Sir George Tufto, K.C.B., of whom it is said, "that he was a thorough snob and also a perfect gentleman." "A man cannot help being a fool be he ever so old, and Sir George is as great an ass at sixty-eight as he was when he entered the Army at fifteen." He distinguished himself. "His name is mentioned with praise in a score of Gazettes, yet it is difficult to say what virtues this prosperous person possesses." This remarkable officer could not write, he had difficulty in reading, he told filthy garrison stories, he behaved horribly to women, was an ass and a snob and an ignoramus, and a perfect gentleman withal. He had manners, no doubt, but as to Army manners, a contemporary of

Thackeray's, Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, wrote an entertaining and instructive book called, "The Adventures of a Gentleman," in which Pelham is made to say of a man that his manners were worse than those of a major in the Army. Sir George Tufto reappears in *Vanity Fair* as of the family of the Duke of Wellington, *aux soins* with Mrs. Rawdon Crawley, to whom he makes lavish presents. Everyone knows that Wellington, like Marlborough before him, was stingy of praise. As Sir George Tufto was included by name in a dozen Gazettes, clearly he was a man of some judgment, nerve, coolness, courage, knowledge of war and full of sympathy with fighting men. All these gifts and their results are incompatible with a man being an ass all his life. Thackeray has made of Sir George Tufto a poor figure of straw, a tattered simulacrum of a successful military man, a Lieut.-General, forsooth, with as much vitality in it as animated the figurehead Quilp assailed with axe and hammer. But perhaps the most finished snob and gentleman is old Pendennis, whom Thackeray has decorated, polished and furbished as a man does the image he venerates. An old campaigner, too, as he approved himself in his skirmishes with Captain Costigan and Morgan, and a man of resource and courage. But when old Pendennis mentions a great lady he drops his voice as if he were in a cathedral. If Lady Stilton, at whose house Pendennis dined of a Tuesday, does not "see" him in Bond Street on Friday, he pays no more attention than if he were a wayfaring arrival from an adjacent planet. Months pass when, as the Lady Lettice Rennet is to be married, Pendennis, accepting an invitation to the wedding, turns up after a toilet of three hours' duration, and is welcomed as if he were just returning from the wars. His selfishness, his horror of poverty, and his cautious demeanour in the affairs of the great people to whose society he has access: a kind of tribal loyalty to his family and his caste, added to much native shrewdness, make of this London Ulysses both the most interesting and amusing character in a somewhat dull book.

But as a type of character and conduct, very general in all callings and professions, the connection of old Pendennis with the Army is merely incidental to the author's purpose, casting no reflection upon the profession of arms, any more than Pecksniff's special gifts and graces are a reflection on the profession of architects.

EXTRACT FROM THE DIARY OF AN ENGLISH
BOY AT SMYRNA, 1807.

From Mr. Arbuthnot, Ambassador to the Porte, to Mr. Consul Verrier.
(Most secret and confidential.)

Pera, January 29th, 1807.

SIR,—

THE very instant you receive this letter, you and every other British subject must instantaneously put yourselves on board the "Glatton," and make the best of your way to Tenedos, where I hope you will find ———.

Show this to the captain of the "Glatton." I have not time to write to him. If you regard your own interest, you will be expeditious and secret.

I am, yours

CHARLES ARBUTHNOT.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 5TH, 1807.—Embarked on board H.M.S. "Glatton," at Smyrna.

SUNDAY, 8TH.—Made sail at daylight with a very strong breeze, and about half-past twelve came to anchor off the east point of the Island of Tenedos, where the "Canopus," "Thunderer," "Standard," and "Endymion" were lying. At two o'clock we were joined by the "Lucifer" and "Meteor," fire-ships, who informed us that they had left Admiral Sir John Duckworth in the "Royal George," and Sir Sydney Smith in the "Pompey," off Cape Lecturn, in the breeze in which we were caught last night, with the "Windsor Castle," "Ajax," and "Repulse." My father went on board the "Canopus" to see Mr. Arbuthnot and Admiral Louis, and returned after dinner, bringing with him several letters, amongst them one for me from Eliza.

MONDAY, 9TH.—Anxiously looking out all day for the squadron, which by noon became visible from the mast-head.

TUESDAY, 10TH.—About nine o'clock the royals of a line-of-battle ship appeared, clearing the southern point of Tenedos, followed by another and another, till before noon the "Royal George," "Ajax," "Endymion," and "Repulse" had all come to anchor.

Soon after, the "Windsor Castle" and Sir Sydney's ship, the "Pompey," attended by the "Active," frigate, and the "Spider," brig, came round the north point of the island, and also anchored.

The "Royal George" had no sooner anchored, than Admiral Louis inquired by signal if he was to dine on board of her, which was answered in the affirmative.

A council of war was held after dinner, at which it was decided that Mr. Arbuthnot was to go off early in the morning in the "Endymion" with a flag of truce, to see whether the Turks were disposed to come to our terms.

The plan of attack upon the Dardanelles was also agreed upon.

Mr. Lloyd, chaplain to Sir Sydney, came on board of us to see my father, with Lieutenant Bencroft, first of the "Pompey." Captains Halsey of the "Standard," Talbot of the "Thunderer," and Mowbray of the "Active," spent the evening with us.

WEDNESDAY, 11TH.—At daybreak, the Admiral made the signal to clear for action, and at ten to weigh anchors. The "Standard" was the first ready, and afterwards, when the general signal was made, the "Windsor Castle" led the way, followed by the "Repulse," "Active," "Ajax," "Spider," "Thunderer," "Royal George," "Canopus," "Lucifer," "Meteor," and "Pompey." They passed between the small islands off the town, and advanced in face of the first castles of the Dardanelles, when the wind veered round from the north-east, and blowing right down channel, obliged them to come to an anchor, awaiting the result of Mr. Arbuthnot's mission.

As the "Pompey" passed under our stern, Sir Sydney got on the taffrail, and waved his hat to us on the poop, and to all his old Smyrna friends.

For the next few days nothing remarkable appears to have happened; the north-east gale continues to blow, and the convoy have a tendency to run on shore.

SATURDAY, 14TH.—Rather calm in the morning, but very cold; nothing remarkable till half-past eight at night, when we heard the firing of several minute guns, and an officer ran down into the ward-room with the dire report of a fire among the squadron. We rushed on deck, and to our great horror, beheld a large ship all in flames.

The boats were immediately manned and ordered out, and we remained on deck witnessing the awful scene with silent horror. One or two ships under sail glided between us occasionally and intercepted it from our view for a few minutes; but it was a tremendous sight, the fire raging without check, the flames running up every rope and spar, gushing out of every port-hole—by which we perceived she was a two-decker—and illuminating the whole sea and sky.

As the fire advanced her guns went off one after the other, and sometimes in a great explosion of several together.

In about half an hour one of our boats returned, and the officer reported that he had rowed up to the island, where he had fallen in with the "Royal George," and gone on board.

The admiral had informed him that the vessel on fire was the "Ajax," and as she lay athwart his hawser he had been obliged to cut his cable and run. Up to this time a midshipman and the captain's clerk had been the only persons saved; but between eighty and ninety boats were rowing about to pick up all they could.

From the midshipman it was ascertained that the fire originated in the bread-room, in consequence of the negligence of the purser's steward, who was given to intoxication, the men being at the time mostly asleep in their hammocks; it burnt for some time below unperceived, and when it burst out, blazed up at once as high as the main-top, which rendered it impossible to get it under. We remained watching the awful spectacle nearly the whole of the night, but as it is reported they have drowned the powder magazines, it is probable she may continue to burn some hours longer.

At three our cutters returned, not having been able to do any good. The admiral sent back the barge. The "Royal George" has come to anchor ahead of us. At four, the fire having burnt through the cables, the "Ajax" drifted towards the north shore of Tenedos, and about five she blew up with a tremendous explosion.

SUNDAY, 15TH, 1807.—This morning Captain Secombe and my father went on board the "Royal George," which ship got under weigh about half-past nine, with a fresh north-east wind: they returned to us about ten. We then learnt the terrible intelligence that it was probable that not less than 350 poor men perished last night, though one vessel had not yet given her report of saved. Amongst them were Messrs. Pickering and Farquhar, of Constantinople. Captain Blackwood was saved.

The admiral sent on board of us for the dimensions of our anchors, having lost two last night; he then made the signal: "Though less in numbers, weigh."

The "Phoenix" saw an officer's body and those of two seamen float by this morning; they tied shot to them and sunk them.

TUESDAY, 17TH.—I went ashore with our boats to visit the wreck. On our landing, several Turks who were there ran away, but returned on the captain waving his handkerchief, and took their seats on a carpet near a fire they had lighted. The party consisted of the Aga and Buluk-Bashi of the island: when they heard that we were come to work on the wreck they made some objections, and wanted an order from the Capitan Pasha; but Captain Secombe's firmness gained the day, and they were obliged to yield. The Aga promised to let us have provisions from the shore, hinting at the same time at a Bachsheesh.

The stump of the mainmast of the "Ajax" is left, and part of the hull; the lower deck port-holes are above the water, and about twenty 32-pounder long guns are still inside.

The whole side of the mountain to leeward of the wreck is quite black with the explosion, and pieces of timber, cordage, etc., are thrown up to its highest points. The coast is indeed entirely covered with the wreck, and the inhabitants are running off with the wood in every direction, no wood growing on the island.

The hull lies in three fathoms water, and was still burning when we visited it. The Aga told us that the explosion shook the town considerably, and had the burning mass gone but a few hundred yards to the south, it would have drifted right into the town.

THURSDAY, 19TH.—With the wind fresh from the south-west, the squadron got under weigh about eight o'clock, and half an hour afterwards the leading ship, the "Canopus," stood on with the European Castle, which immediately opened a smart fire on her, though she did not return a single gun. The rest then passed in line of battle, under their top-sails, and returned a few shot on the Castle, the "Royal George," however, giving them a whole broadside.

We could sometimes see the flash of the guns, and always the columns of white smoke, until Cape Janissary concealed them from our sight. About half-past twelve there arose immense columns of smoke across the plain of Troy, on a line with the Dardanelles, which we judged to arise from some explosion. We were engaged all day in detaining boats, amongst them the "Hirondelle," Lieutenant Skinner, from Malta, with despatches for the admiral.

The Castle fired several shot at us, which fell wide.

FRIDAY, 20TH.—The Castle has improved in its practice; the shot fall very near us.

SATURDAY, 21ST.—The launch returned from a cruise after a Turkish boat, loaded with troops, which she stranded. She left us on the nineteenth, and fell so far to windward as to oblige her to go on board the "Spider." As that brig was working up, the Castle fired some very well directed shot at her; two passed completely over her at a good distance. Mr. Poole, ambassador's secretary, and Mr. Proctor, first lieutenant of the "Ajax," came on board to-day; they are going home with despatches.

MONDAY, 23RD.—During the morning we perceived several sail coming down from the Dardanelles, and the English landed some men on the nineteenth, and destroyed a masked battery on the other side of the inner castle.

Having heard from the master of the Egyptian boat that a large Turkish caravella, loaded with coffee, was lying in Port Segrie, Captain Secombe fitted up the boat that had brought the Greek sailors, with two long brass four-pounders, put fifty men in her, and a few Greeks, under command of Lieutenant Watson, and sent them in search of the prey. As it was lying under the guns of the Castle, he also sent the "Hirondelle" to cover them.

MARCH 1ST.—Started at daylight in the white cutter, with a fresh breeze from the east, for Shag Island, and shortly after fell in with one of our prizes, a sacoleva, with Lieutenant Hawk and a crew in her, going to the same place.

They had taken several empty butts to fill with water, and intended to bring off some oxen. In half an hour it began to blow very fresh indeed, obliging us to tack in order to make the island.

We landed with our fowling-pieces, but it blew so extremely hard, as to render it quite impossible to shoot.

The sacoleva's crew were employed in loading wood, and they secured the oxen in their stable for the night, intending to take them on board in the morning.

Finding there was no shooting, we thought it as well to depart in the cutter, in spite of the weather.

We had only our mainsail set, and that with two reefs in it, and were repeatedly drenched from head to foot, every now and then shipping heavy seas. However, thank God! in about an hour and a quarter we arrived safely alongside of the "Glatton," where we found a comfortable home, and change of clothes.

We found that during our absence, the "Hirondelle," with the barge, black cutter, and launch, had sailed for Port Segrie, to cut out the Turkish ship there. Lieutenant Watson, Lieutenants Treveson and Sandwith, of the Marines, and Mr. Parker, a midshipman, were of the party.

TUESDAY, 3RD.—A sail was seen coming down from the Dardanelles, and the Castle volleying out smoke, as in a short space of time eleven sail were anchoring off the mouth, a little to windward of their former berth.

WEDNESDAY, 4TH.—Captain Secombe went off to the admiral at four o'clock. When he returned in the evening we learnt that the fleet had burnt a 64-gun ship at the Dardanelles, four frigates, and fifty other sail, spiked the guns at the castles, and blown up their magazines. They then advanced to Constantinople, and anchored off Prince's Island the next morning, at nine o'clock, where they landed, taking in fresh stores and water. On the arrival of the flag of truce, despatched in the "Endymion," the Turks appeared to wish to come to terms, but demanded twelve hours for consideration, which were granted. At the expiration of the twelve hours, a calm of five or six days ensued, during which the Turks made the best use of their time to arm their coast at every point.

It is said that the French ambassador offered large rewards to induce troops to return to the Dardanelles and other ports; but it is certain that the forts were manned, and the coast armed at every point before the wind changed again to the north-east. Our admiral, then perceiving this very unfavourable state of things, and being furthermore advised that the Turkish fleet, of eighteen sail of the line, and twenty frigates, was to come down on him under the batteries, thought it best to get under weigh and return. In passing the Dardanelles they met with a most terrible resistance, and our ships sustained great damage from their immense *stone shot*.

Though the number of killed and wounded is not yet exactly known, it is believed to be about four hundred. The "Standard" alone had forty men killed and wounded, and was very near being blown up; and she was hit several times by red-hot shot from the batteries. The "Endymion" received a shot of 160 pounds weight.

THURSDAY, 5TH.—The "Endymion's" gig arrived in the afternoon with a letter from the admiral for my father, saying that he wished to advise with him, as the ambassador was ill, and unable to attend to business. My father accordingly went off to the fleet at half-past four. At seven the black cutter arrived from the "Hirondelle," and

informed us that they boarded the Turkish vessel in Segrie last night, and after a brisk engagement cut her cables, and brought her out from under the fort, with the loss of Lieutenant Watson, two sergeants of Marines, a corporal, and a private, and eight wounded. Having possession of the ship, they turned her guns on the fort, but found their carriages so rotten as to render them utterly useless. A shot from the fort carried away her maintop sail halyards, and two went through her foresail. The Turks lost about twenty killed, while the wounded and the rest jumped overboard, to make for shore.

FRIDAY, 6TH.—Went on board the prize; she is a large caravelle, with a deep waist, and stern gallery, loaded with coffee and rice from Alexandria. We buried the dead, the Marines firing volleys from the forecastle.

At night, the captain, for whom a signal had been made in the course of the day, returned from the admiral with my father.

We heard the "Windsor Castle" had lost her mainmast, and that we were to go up to the fleet to supply them with all the stores and provisions we could spare. An imperial brig informed us that she had left several Russian men-of-war in Tdra.

SATURDAY, 7TH.—A Russian line-of-battle ship hove in sight early in the morning; captain went on board of her. Shortly after, eight or nine others came down, and were abreast of us just as we were getting under weigh to join the fleet.

We passed between the island of Tenedos and the town; the Castle did not think proper to fire on us, but our men were at quarters. The Russians passed us, and anchored to the east of our fleet.

We took up our station astern of the "Royal George" and "Canopus." At ten o'clock we received a visit from Sir Sydney Smith, Sir Thomas Louis, Captains Capel and Mowbray. They said that in the "Windsor Castle" there was a stone shot weighing 800 pounds. It had made a hole that a man could stand upright in. The "Standard" had been struck by one weighing 756 pounds, and the "Active" by one of 560 pounds weight.

Sir Sydney told us that when these shot come into collision with iron, they strike out an electrical fire, that burns with wonderful vivacity. The "Standard" had, he said, taken fire in this manner, and sixty-one men were killed and wounded on board of her. My father dined with Sir Sydney, and my brother went on board the Russian admiral's ship. The Russian officers made very light of the damage our fleet had sustained, and were in great spirits. They suppose they are going to Constantinople.

They said Sir Thomas Duckworth was to have called at Corfu for them, and that they were to have made the attack together. Mr. Arbuthnot received from them the news of a victory obtained by the Russian Army over the French in Poland, with a column of 47,000 against 60,000. The Russian ships seem fine vessels, and in high order.

TUESDAY, 10TH.—I went on board the "Standard," and saw the large stone shot. They say it weighs 774 pounds. It came in at the

lower deck, making a hole as big as a port-hole, and carrying away two timbers and a knee. It struck fire, by striking against the copper of the capstan, and, setting fire to a salt-box that contained powder and cartridges, blew up the deck, and wounded about forty men. I saw these poor fellows on the main deck, lying on beds made up for them between the guns; they were scorched quite black, and so disfigured as to be hardly recognizable as human beings. A horrible stench pervaded the whole ship. Sixty-one is the total of her killed, drowned, and wounded. Went from thence on board the "Active," and saw four of these enormous shot-holes.

Enormous ruins (Greek) at Eski-Stamboul made away with by the Turks, who hewed them into balls for their immense cannon at the Dardanelles.



LETTER FROM HOSPITAL AT MINDEN.

(From a MS. in the Royal United Service Institution.)

[This letter is evidently by an officer of the 20th Foot, in which regiment there were at the time two men of the same name as he who signs this letter—spelled, however, with a “p” in contemporary lists—the one John, the other Thomas. In the History of the 20th, by Smyth, the writer is called John, but the letter, though referred to, is not given.]

Hospital at Minden, August 18th, 1759.

DEAR SIR,—

Agreeable to promise and inclination, I take the earliest opportunity of paying my respects to yourself and the good family at Pethem; this being the first day my health would admit of so long a letter. My wounds, I thank God, are, by report of my surgeons, now in a good way, but by no means free from great pains at times, both night and day: insomuch that my surgeons cannot prevent frequent attacks of fever, which consequently raises the inflammation and keeps the wound back by causing a great torture and not a proper discharge of matter—hope when I get rid of splintered bones, which they say are endeavouring to find their way out, I shall then be more at ease, but this must be a work of time.

When I reflect on the miraculous escape which is, and will be every hour of my life (that my friends and self had by coming out of the field alive), it fills me with a just sense of the power and goodness of the great God above. I shall attempt, by giving you a sketch of the proceedings of that day, notwithstanding I am certain a much abler pen than mine must fall greatly short, as no words can sufficiently paint the horrors and shocking sights which were every moment presented to the eyes of the living.

At one in the morn of the glorious 1st of August we received orders to turn out, accoutred, with all speed. The regiment was under arms in less than eight minutes. Our tents left standing and baggage unpacked; notwithstanding all this a very few thought of an action, as we have often been alarmed in the same way—exactness is always highly necessary. We marched towards Minden, about two miles, found many regiments preparing and all the English on their march. At length the scene appeared, a battery of six guns began to play on the camp we had left very smartly. We proceeded about a mile further, joined the Brunswick troops of infantry and our own, and got into a regular line of battle march. Everything was still quiet before us until we got about half a mile further, when we

discovered the enemy with the greatest advantage over us, being already formed in battle array ready to receive us. On the immediate sight of us they opened a battery of eighteen heavy cannon which, from the nature of the ground (which was a plain), flanked this regiment in particular every foot we marched—their cannon was ill-served at first, but they soon felt us, and their shot took place so fast, that every officer imagined the battalion would be taken off before we could get up to give a fire, notwithstanding we were then within a quarter of a mile of their right wing and absolutely running up to the mouth of their cannon in front. I saw heads, legs and arms taken off, flying into the front every moment. My right-hand file of men, not more than a foot from me, were all by one ball dashed to pieces and their blood flying all over me. This, I must confess, staggered me not a little, but on my receiving a contusion in the bend of my right arm by a spent musket shot, it steadied me immediately. All apprehensions of hurt vanished, revenge and the care of the company I commanded took place, and I was then much more at ease than at this time.

By this time we were within two hundred yards or less of them and plainly perceived the Fuzilliers, Stewart's and Napier's Regiments,¹ engaging an amazing number of their best troops—all the time their right wing was pelting us, both with small arms, cannon and grape shot, and we were not suffered to fire, but stood tamely looking on whilst they at their leisure picked us off as you would small birds at a barn door. I cannot compare it to anything else, as their shot came full and thick. Had one quarter of them taken place there could not have been a man left. Everyone, I believe you will allow with reason, cursed our leader, "Beckwith," who was more confused than was consistent with his character, and I not only hope, but imagine, an enquiry will take place notwithstanding his being made Aidecamp to the Prince. The French charged them, the three regiments above mentioned, with at least 20 squadrons, but by their steadiness and bravery, keeping their fire until the enemy was close up to them, gave them such a terrible fire that not even lions could have come on—such a number of them fell, both horses and men, that it made it difficult for those not touched to retire. This charge over, a second and a third came on, and were repulsed in the same manner. Now was the time the English cavalry should have come up—every eye was looking with impatience. Just at this time I got my wound, after having been hit three times before by spent balls—but this seared me like a red-hot iron—found myself fainting and quitted the regiment after having called for a fresh officer—but found no one to supply my place, several being (gone off) wounded, already dead. I had not got four rods in the rear, but I heard the battalion fire which pleased me so much in my agony, that I stood stupefied looking on them. Many poor soldiers praying, begging me to come off—after a few moments recovered my senses, and found I had no further business there and made the best of my way, which

¹ 23rd, 37th, and 12th Regiments of Foot.

was slow enough, over about a mile of common where the balls came as thick as in front. By this time a soldier of the regiment, slightly wounded in the leg, came up offering me his assistance. While supporting me his left leg was carried away by a cannon ball, the wind of which fairly turned me round, but did not hurt me otherwise. The poor man is since dead. The common was strewed with dead and wounded men and horses—on the leeward side of those horses, quite dead, lay wounded soldiers that could not get any further to shelter them from the small shot. The action came on in such a hurry that we did not know where to look for the surgeons. Captain — and self walked 3 miles in this condition before we could get the blood stopped. At last, fortunately, met with my Lord George Sackville's coach and a surgeon he had in reserve for himself, which he need not have had, as there was no danger of his being hurt, as you will soon find by the *vox populi*. I don't imagine, by what the surgeons say, I shall be able to take the field again sooner than the end of September, if then. I don't care who knows my sentiments when I say my curiosity is satisfied, and that I never wish to see a second slaughter of my fellow creatures. We have little or no intelligence here, but find the enemy are entrenching by Hesse Cassell and the Duke alone at their heels—at least 10,000 of them have deserted. George is with me, to whom I owe my life from his great care before I came here, being two nights in a barn. I hope to have the satisfaction to hear from you soon. The more letters from a family the greater comfort, to whom, as well to other friends, I beg my best respects.

From Sir, Yr Obt Servant,
(signed) THOS. THOMSON.

I hope the nation is now satisfied, as there was plenty of blood for their money.



THE WAR.

ITS NAVAL SIDE.

WORK OF THE FLEETS.

In the issues of the JOURNAL for November, 1914, August, 1915, and November, 1915, the naval events of the war were recorded from the beginning of hostilities to the end of October last. The compilation is here continued to the end of 1915, with some of the occurrences in January of this year. In its general arrangement, this instalment is on the same lines as those which preceded it, the chronological sequence being followed in each of the eleven divisions, *viz.*, North Sea, Baltic, Atlantic, Mesopotamia, Mediterranean, Adriatic, Balkans, Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora, Black Sea, and East Africa. Every care has been taken to ensure completeness and accuracy, the idea being to supply dates and facts in concise outline, with sufficient detail to be useful later on to the historian when he weaves it into a continuous and ordered narrative of the stirring events in progress in the different theatres of the naval war.

In general, there has been no important change in the naval situation during the past three months. The administration of the Navy has remained in the hands of Mr. Balfour as First Lord, and its employment has been largely concerned with the Foreign Office, the War Office, and the Board of Trade. This has followed from the fact that the protection of the transport and supplies of the various divisions of the Army, and their support, in many quarters of the globe; the patrol work; the maintenance of a restricted "blockade" of Germany; and the necessity for meeting the menace of the submarine, has supplied employment for the Navy, under the protecting shield of the Grand Fleet. There have been no offensive operations by the British Navy alone since Christmas Day, 1914, when an air raid, with cruiser and submarine support, was delivered on the German Fleet in Schillig Roads, Cuxhaven; and no important meeting with German forces at sea has taken place since the battle off the Dogger Bank on January 24th, 1915. The Allied squadrons and flotillas in the Adriatic and Baltic have been engaged on several occasions; and British submarines in the Sea of Marmora continued their useful work up to the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula, to the success of which undertaking the ships of the Navy present largely contributed, as well as in assisting the depleted forces on land in holding their own until they were withdrawn.

Following closely on the change in the chief command of the French Fleet, recorded in the last JOURNAL, it was officially announced early in October that Admiral Leone Viale, the Italian Minister of Marine, had resigned his office owing to ill-health, and Vice-Admiral Camillo Corsi, who served as Chief of the Staff to Admiral Viale during the Tripolitaine War, was chosen to succeed him. At the end of October, on the reconstruction of the French Ministry under M. Briand, Admiral Marie Jean Lucien Lacaze became Minister of Marine in the place of M. Augagneur.

Two changes in the British home port commands were announced on New Year's Day, Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley C. J. Colville being appointed to succeed Admiral of the Fleet the Hon. Sir Hedworth Meux as Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth; and Admiral Sir George J. S. Warrender being appointed to succeed Admiral Sir George Le Clerc Egerton as Commander-in-Chief at Plymouth. On the same day it was announced that the King had been pleased to confer

the dignity of a baron of the United Kingdom upon Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, and a fortnight later Admiral of the Fleet the Hon. Sir Hedworth Meux was returned unopposed as Member of Parliament for Portsmouth in his place.

The official "Navy List" for October revealed certain changes in naval commands. Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly succeeded Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Coke in command on the coast of Ireland on July 20th, 1915; and four of the dockyards were shown to have new chiefs, Rear-Admiral A. W. Waymouth being appointed to Portsmouth on August 5th; Rear-Admiral A. D. Ricardo to Chatham on August 9th; Rear-Admiral E. H. Smith to Sheerness on September 21st; and Rear-Admiral Bernard Currey to Gibraltar, as Senior Naval Officer, on October 21st.

NAVAL OPERATIONS.

NORTH SEA.

LOSS OF "ARGYLL."—On October 28th, the cruiser "Argyll," Captain J. C. Tancred, grounded off the East Coast of Scotland, and, owing to the bad weather prevailing, became a total wreck. All her officers and crew were saved. A week later, Dr. Macnamara stated in the House of Commons that it was feared salvage was impossible. In the severe weather prevailing about this time, it was reported that a number of men were washed overboard from the battleship "Albemarle," including the commander of the ship, Commander George R. Nixon, whose death from drowning was officially reported on November 7th.

SHIPS SUNK IN ELBE.—On October 22nd, a Lloyd's telegram announced that three British steamers, which were detained at Hamburg on the outbreak of war, had been sunk by the Germans. No reason was given, but it was conjectured that this was either by way of reprisal for the loss of German steamers sunk by Russo-British submarines in the Baltic, or for the capture of a group of German fishing craft made in the North Sea about the same time; or it might have been to block the channel as an obstruction to hostile submarines.

GERMAN TRAWLERS CAPTURED.—On October 22nd, a very considerable haul of German fishing boats was stated to have been made in the North Sea by British warships. Previously, the fishing industry of the enemy had been free from molestation, in accordance with the provision made at the Hague Conference of 1907; but the Germans never respected this rule, attacks on the fishing fleet being common from the first month of war. The raid in October was made in the neighbourhood of Helgoland, according to Press reports, and resulted in nearly fifty trawlers being brought into Grimsby, Yarmouth, Scarborough, and Aberdeen.

PATROL YACHTS SUNK.—Early in November, it became known that the yachts "Aries," formerly belonging to the Duke of Leeds, and "Irene," the Trinity House yacht, had been sunk. No details were given. From the "Irene," 22 men were reported missing, the survivors numbering 13. On November 12th, it was officially stated that the King had expressed his deep regret to the Deputy-Master of the Trinity House at the loss of the vessel, his Majesty recalling the many occasions on which the "Irene" had escorted the Royal yacht, both in his own and previous reigns. The King also expressed sympathy with the families of the men who were lost.

"THE OLDEST NAVAL OFFICER AFLOAT."—It was on October 31st that the "Aries" was sunk. A month earlier, on September 25th, an officer, whom the January "Navy List" showed to have been serving in her, Lieut.-Commander

Gartside-Tipping, R.N., was officially reported killed in action. On the publication of Vice-Admiral Bacon's despatch on January 13th, 1916, however, it was shown that Commander Gartside-Tipping was lost in the sinking by gun-fire of the armed yacht "Sanda" during operations off the Belgian coast. Admiral Bacon referred to him as the oldest naval officer afloat, and said that in spite of his advanced age, he rejoined, and with undemonstrative patriotism served at sea as a Lieut.-Commander.

GERMAN SUBMARINE INTERNED.—On November 4th, a German submarine, stated to be "U. 8" (although the original boat of this number had been destroyed off Dover in March, 1915) stranded on the island of Terschelling, and in response to rocket signals a Dutch lifeboat towed the vessel off and into the port of Terschelling. Dutch torpedo boats were delegated to watch the boat, and two days later it was announced from the Hague that she would be detained and her crew interned. The vessel had steered a wrong course and entered Dutch territorial waters, stranding within 1,700 yards of the low-water line. The damage sustained was not enough to oblige her to enter a Dutch port, nor could the conditions of the sea be pleaded as an excuse for this step. Therefore, the submarine's commander violated the regulation forbidding him to cross the limit of Dutch territorial waters.

HOSPITAL SHIP MINED.—On November 17th, the hospital ship "Anglia" struck a mine in the Channel and sunk. Of the 385 officers and men on board, some 300 were saved by a patrol vessel. Another ship which proceeded to the rescue was also sunk by a mine. The "Anglia," of 1,862 tons, was formerly a London and North-Western Railway steamer. It was in her that King George crossed to England after his accident while visiting the troops in France.

SUBMARINE SUNK BY AIRMAN.—On November 28th, off Middelkerke, a German submarine was sunk by Flight Sub-Lieutenant T. E. Viney, R.N.A.S., who was on patrol off the Belgian coast, accompanied by a French officer, Lieutenant le Comte de Saincy. A bomb was dropped on the boat, which was observed to have her back broken, and sank within a few minutes. This was the second time such an incident was reported officially to have taken place, a similar feat being performed by Squadron-Commander Bigsworth on August 26th.

SEAPLANE FIGHT.—On November 28th also an encounter took place between a British and German seaplane, in which the latter was destroyed. The British machine was in charge of Flight-Lieutenant Ferrand, R.N.A.S., with Air-Mechanic Oldfield as passenger, and the German seaplane, of the Albatross type, was encountered off Ostend. It dived, nose first, into the sea and sank. This was one of the first—if not the first—recorded duels between seaplanes as distinct from land machines.

AEROPLANE AND SEAPLANE.—On December 14th, Flight Sub-Lieutenant Graham, R.N.A.S., in an aeroplane with Flight Sub-Lieutenant Ince, R.N.A.S., as observer, whilst on patrol off the Belgian coast at about 3.15 p.m., sighted a large German seaplane, and gave chase. After a severe engagement, the German machine was hit and fell. Before reaching the water it burst into flames, and at the moment of striking exploded. No trace of pilot, passenger, or machine could be found. Flight Sub-Lieutenant Graham's machine was severely damaged by machine-gun fire, and fell into the sea, but both officers were picked up and safely landed.

BELGIAN COAST OPERATIONS.—The attacks on the German works and positions along the Belgian coast were continued during the past quarter with satisfactory results. On January 12th, the Admiralty issued the despatch of Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald H. S. Bacon, commanding the Dover Patrol, in reference to the offensive operations from the sea against these points between August 22nd and November

19th, 1915. This despatch showed that concerted operations of considerable magnitude had been carried out on six occasions, and on eight other days attacks on a smaller scale on fortified positions had taken place.

MONITORS' FIRE.—Certain new monitors and auxiliary craft were mentioned for the first time in Admiral Bacon's despatch, and he records that "extreme accuracy was obtained with the gun-fire at the long ranges necessary for the best attack of such defences. This accuracy fully justifies the novel methods used and the careful training in attention to details to which the vessels are subjected." The ships named were the "Lord Clive," "Sir John Moore," "Prince Rupert," "General Craufurd," "M. 25," "Redoutable," "Marshal Ney," "Prince Eugene," and older vessels like the "Bustard" and "Excellent." Three auxiliaries were lost during the operations, the armed yacht "Sanda," drifter "Great Heart," and mine-sweeper "Brighton Queen."

LATER ATTACKS.—On November 30th, Dutch newspapers reported another attack on the Belgian coast, lasting two hours. On December 20th, the German official report stated that "the fire from our coastal batteries drove off enemy monitors which shelled Westende yesterday." On December 30th, further firing off the coast was reported to have taken place. Vice-Admiral Bacon had stated in his despatch, in reference to the attack on Zeebrugge on October 3rd, that "the whole coast during our passage was showing signs of considerable alarm and unrest, as a result of the previous operations," and, as further illustrating the moral effect of these continual bombardments, it was mentioned in a Dutch journal on December 31st that the German troops at Westende were kept in perpetual fear of an Allied landing on the shelving, sandy beach.

THE GERMAN SEARCH.—On December 19th, the Admiralty Staff in Berlin said: "A portion of our fleet last week searched the North Sea for the enemy, and then cruised on Wednesday and Thursday last in the Skagerack, watching shipping. Fifty-two vessels were examined, and one steamer with contraband was seized. During the whole time British naval forces were nowhere sighted." A Copenhagen message a few days later said that merchantmen who observed the German Fleet's "search" declared that it steamed with great caution close to the coast. Zeppelins and aeroplanes flew at a great height and ahead, watching for hostile ships.

GERMAN SUBMARINE SUNK.—On December 27th, Rear-Admiral G. A. Ballard, Admiral of Patrols, presented a seaman named Harry Playle, of Grimsby, with the Distinguished Conduct Medal for gallantry, in connection with the sinking of a German submarine in the North Sea on July 11th. Playle was the second hand in an armed trawler which engaged the "U." boat and sunk her, after a sharp fight. Admiral Ballard stated that Playle was one of four who especially distinguished themselves on this occasion, and whose conduct had been recognized by the King, but the other three, who, like Playle, were wounded, were unable to be present at the public ceremony.

DESTRUCTION OF "NATAL."—On December 30th, the cruiser "Natal," Captain Eric P. C. Back, was blown up by an internal explosion while in harbour, with the loss of more than half of her ship's company. Captain Back, Commander John Hutchings, Lieutenant-Commanders J. B. Murray and G. B. Harrison, and Lieutenants R. E. L. Treweeks, Guy Titley, L. H. White, and C. G. Chaplin, were among the officers killed or drowned, the total being 25. Of the petty officers and men a list containing the names of 380 dead and missing was published in the Press on January 5th. The lists of saved issued by the Admiralty contained the names of 14 officers and 373 men.

THIRD EXPLOSION LOSS.—The "Natal" had been serving for some years in the Second Cruiser Squadron, and was a vessel of the "Achilles" type, launched by Messrs. Vickers in September, 1905, and completed in 1907. Two other ships had previously been destroyed in the war by internal explosions, the battleship "Bulwark" on November 26th, 1914, and auxiliary ship "Princess Irene" on May 27th, 1915; both these were off Sheerness, and involved the loss of all on board. On January 12th, Dr. Macnamara announced in the House of Commons that the court-martial to ascertain the cause of the explosion in the "Natal," required under Section 92 of the Naval Discipline Act, would be held shortly.

"E. 17" LOST.—On January 6th, the Dutch cruiser "Noord Brabant" encountered, off the Texel, outside territorial waters, the British submarine "E. 17," making distress signals. Some ten hours earlier, according to Press accounts, the boat had drifted out of her course, grounded on the Haaksgrond Bank, and sprung a leak. Her crew of 33 were taken on board the Dutch cruiser before the submarine sank, and conveyed to the Helder. Two days later it was announced from the Hague that they were to be interned.

"KING EDWARD VII." SUNK.—On January 9th, the Admiralty stated that the battleship "King Edward VII." had struck a mine and sunk. She had to be abandoned owing to the heavy sea at the time, and went down shortly after the crew had been taken off. There was no loss of life, and only three men were injured, a chief petty officer, stoker, and signalman. The "King Edward VII." was a famous vessel, having served as a flagship since her completion in 1905. Moreover, she was formally laid down at Devonport by King Edward himself in 1902, and launched by Queen Mary, as Princess of Wales, in July, 1903. She was the eighth British battleship officially stated to have been lost since the beginning of war, the others being the "Bulwark" and "Formidable," sunk in home waters; and the "Irresistible," "Ocean," "Goliath," "Triumph," and "Majestic," sunk at the Dardanelles.

BALTIC.

GERMAN VESSELS SUNK.—British submarines, working in co-operation with those of the Russian Navy, under the command of the Russian admiral, continued their attacks with success on enemy vessels during the period under review. On October 8th, the Russian official *communiqué* stated that "In the Baltic Sea, a British submarine shelled and destroyed a German transport near the German coast." In a Copenhagen telegram, on October 10th, it was stated that, as far as could be ascertained, ten steamers had been destroyed in the past few days, "though the insurance companies say that the number is far greater." Within about ten days after October 10th, the ships reported torpedoed or sunk included the "Lulea," of 2,239 tons; the "Direktor Reppenhausen," 1,683 tons; the "Nicomedia," 4,088 tons; the "Germania," 1,933 tons; the "Gutrune," 3,000 tons; the "Svanen," 668 tons; the "Gertrude," 1,038 tons; the "Pyrgos," 3,588 tons; the "Walter Leonhardt," 1,261 tons; the "Pernambuco," 4,788 tons; the "Soderhamn," 1,499 tons; the "Johannes Russ," 1,751 tons; the "Dalälffven," 1,046 tons; the "Emgård," of unknown tonnage; the "Babylon," of 2,489 tons; the "Hernosand," 465 tons, and another steamer of the same name, 1,182 tons; the "Electra," 1,261 tons; the "Rendsburg," 4,639 tons; and the "Plauen," 4,210 tons. It was about the third week of October that the attack on the German trade routes across the Baltic attained its largest proportions. During November and December, the toll of ships fell away considerably, the traffic having by then been largely driven into port by the submarines, or forced to continue only under the protection of convoying warships. On October 15th,

37 of the 50 steamers loaded with metal for Germany were reported to be held up in Swedish ports.

CASE OF THE "GERMANIA."—In regard to the steamship "Germania," included in the above list, the British Foreign Office on December 1st issued a statement in reply to a German wireless communication of November 11th, alleging that the vessel was blown up by a dynamite bomb placed on board her by a British submarine. The latter's commanding officer reported that he signalled the "Germania" to stop at noon on October 11th, between Utlangen and the south of Gotland, but she ignored this, and shots were fired to bring her to and warn her that she was running on a sand-bank. Paying no heed, the steamer ran ashore between Landbrink and the Outer Stengrund, when the submarine entered Swedish territorial waters to save the crew and help to save the ship, but the latter was found to be abandoned. As, after an hour's fruitless effort to tow the "Germania" off, the water was gaining in the engine-room, the British seamen returned to the submarine. The explosion mentioned by the Germans would appear, said the British statement, to have been the result of sea water coming into contact with the boilers. "It certainly was not due to any attempt on the part of the British sailors to destroy the vessel." The "Germania" was bound for Stettin with a cargo of 2,750 tons of concentrated iron ore.

TORPEDO BOAT SUNK.—On October 15th, it was reported that the German steam ferry, which left Trelleborg at 6 p.m., collided halfway across with a German torpedo boat, which was cut in two, and only five of the 45 men on board were saved. One account stated that the torpedo boat was convoying the ferry to Sassnitz (Prussia). The reason for the night journeys thus revealed was indicated by Commander F. A. N. Cromie in a letter published in the Press on December 14th. This officer, commanding the submarine which sank the "Undine," said: "Nothing travels by daylight since our last raid on the 'hun run,' so my special haunt was very dull, and I gave it up after four days, and tried another spot where I knew train ferries must pass."

PATROL BOAT AND TRANSPORTS.—On October 16th, the Russian official *communiqué* stated that "British submarines in the Baltic have sunk five German transports, and forced another to run ashore." Two days later, it was reported unofficially that a German minelayer or patrol boat, guarding the approach to the Langeland belt, had been blown up, probably by a torpedo from a British submarine. The crew of ten were reported missing, and wreckage of the boat was found at Marstal.

ACTION OFF MÖEN.—On October 13th and 14th, attacks were reported to have been made by a British submarine or submarines on a German torpedo boat flotilla with success. On the first day, off the island of Möen, a German cruiser and three torpedo boats were stated to have been heard and seen firing at a submarine, which was endeavouring to attack them. One torpedo boat was believed to have sunk after an explosion. Next day the same flotilla, returning with reinforcements, was again attacked, when fishermen heard another explosion, and observed a torpedo boat sink. On October 16th, a message from Berlin, but only semi-official, stated that nothing was known "of the fight between German warships and a British submarine off the island of Möen, in which a German torpedo boat was reported to have been sunk," and the occurrence was attributed to the explosion of a mine.

RUSSIAN RAID.—On October 22nd, a raid was made by the Russians on the Courland coast at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga, at a place called Dome Ness. After warships had bombarded this point and also Petragge and Gipken, on either side of it, a landing was effected at Dome Ness, and a German detachment there

was beaten off. Several prisoners and some war material were captured, and, according to the Russian official *communiqué*, one German officer and 42 men were killed. The only losses on the Russian side were a few men wounded. On October 24th, it was announced in the German official *communiqué* that "On the advance of the German troops the Russian forces which had landed at Dome Ness returned



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to their ships." This surprise landing behind the German lines was made possible by the work of the Russo-British submarines, which prevented naval co-operation on the part of the enemy. Petrage, and the district south-west of it, was again shelled by Russian destroyers on November 16th.

"PRINZ ADALBERT" SUNK.—On October 23rd, the cruiser "Prinz Adalbert," one of the four remaining German armoured cruisers, was sunk by a British sub-

marine off Libau. It was probably the news of the Russian landing at Dome Ness on the previous day which accounted for the presence of the cruiser in this locality, as she was reported to have been engaged on a special reconnoitring mission. It was only after skilful manœuvring that the British submarine was able to attack her. Of the 550 or more men in her crew, the Germans announced that only a small portion could be rescued. Captain Wilhelm Bunnemann went down with his ship. On October 27th, the wireless news transmitted by the German Government to their American Ambassador stated that a despatch had been sent to the *New York World* by Mr. Carl von Wiegand, the Berlin correspondent of that journal, in which the "Prinz Adalbert" was stated to have been sunk in the daytime, in hazy weather. The correspondent mentioned that the pathways of two torpedoes were seen, cutting the water almost side by side, "from which it is assumed that the English submarine was equipped with the new double torpedo tube system, which the latest English models are said to have."

THE SUBMARINE PROBLEM.—Mr. Carl von Wiegand proceeded in the same message to discuss the question of Russo-British submarine activity. Enemy submarines in the Baltic, he said, offer a difficult problem. The German Admiralty is confronted with the practically impossible task of keeping them out. They can mine or set barrier nets in the Sound between Sweden and Denmark only up to the three-mile limit, where the neutral waters of the two countries begin. It is assumed that the English submarines slip through one or the other of the three-mile strips of neutral water on either side of the channel, either on the surface at night or submerged, as the Germans may not mine or go into these waters without violating neutrality. Mr. von Wiegand declared that the problem was causing the German Admiralty serious thought. He compared the matter with the British position in relation to German submarines, and showed that the English were able to mine and set barrier nets across the Channel from shore to shore because France was their ally, and there was no neutral stretch of water, moreover, through which German submarines could slip.

THE SUBMARINE BLOCKADE.—Losses of enemy shipping from submarine attack went on for some time after this. On October 27th, the Russian official *communiqué* stated that four more German steamers had been sunk by British submarines, and next day the *communiqué* revealed the fact that the Russian submarine "Alligator" had been at work, having captured, near the Aland Islands, a German steamer, and brought her into port. These successes of the Allied flotilla were held to warrant a reconsideration of the British position towards neutrals in connection with the holding up of supplies to Germany. It had been asserted that it was impossible to declare a lawful blockade of Germany, which would be completely effective and impartial, as, while the United States was prevented from shipping to Germany, Scandinavian ports were still in a position to do so. The efforts of the submarines in the Baltic altered this, and showed that the Allies were able to prevent the passage of goods on a contraband list into Germany from Scandinavian countries.

"UNDINE" SUNK.—On November 7th, the German light cruiser "Undine" was sunk by a British submarine in charge of Commander F. A. N. Cromie, R.N., off the south coast of Sweden. The German official telegram spoke of the vessel as being on patrol off this coast, but other reports stated that she was conveying the steam ferry "Preussen," which had a full cargo of loaded railway trucks. The "Undine," hit by two torpedoes, went down in a very few minutes, but nearly all her crew were saved by a torpedo boat which was in company. Commander Cromie's account, given in a private letter, stated that he had an exciting chase in a locality where he knew train ferries must pass, but it was spoilt by two destroyers and a cruiser turning up. "Guessing that they would come back again,"

said the Commander, "I lay low, and, sure enough, I caught the 'Undine' in the afternoon. The first shot stopped her and put her on fire, but she was not going down quickly enough, so, avoiding the destroyer that was after us, I dived under the 'Undine's' stern and gave her another from the other side. . . . We arrived in covered with ice." On November 10th, the Tsar travelled to Reval and conferred the Order of St. George upon two British submarine commanders, of whom Commander Cromie was one.

CATTEGAT ACTIVITY.—On November 15th, a German squadron, composed of several cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was reported to have passed the Aland Islands, steaming in a northerly direction. It was understood, according to Press reports, that the vessel's intention was to endeavour to find the base or depôt ship whence the Russo-British submarines drew their supplies, and to attack it. Nothing apparently came of the movement, however. On November 17th, this or another portion of the German Fleet was reported to have passed through the Sound into the Cattegat. The reported presence next day of a British destroyer flotilla and light cruisers in the Cattegat, between the Danish island of Anholt and the Swedish coast, gave rise to rumours of an engagement being imminent, but the British vessels returned round the Skaw into the North Sea without anything of the kind taking place. A Copenhagen version of these movements stated that a strong British force entered the Skaw convoying submarines. The cruisers and larger vessels stopped at the Skaw, while the torpedo and submarine flotillas proceeded as far down as Elsinore. Thence the submarines continued down the Sound, past Copenhagen, into the Baltic. The Germans, learning this, although too late to prevent it, sent a torpedo flotilla across the Sound at full speed towards Gothenburg, which pursued the British torpedo craft until near the Skaw. Here the sight of the British supporting vessels made them cautious, and they returned.

PATROL BOAT SUNK.—On November 20th, after a short engagement, a German patrol boat was sunk by Russian torpedo boats in the Baltic, the incident being revealed in the Russian official war news. One officer and 19 men were made prisoners. Newspaper reports mentioned that the vessel was of 3,000 tons, carrying 4.11n. guns, with a crew of 200, but this the Germans denied. Similarly, on November 28th, they denied a statement that the light cruiser "Frauenlob" had been sunk by an Allied submarine.

"THELMA'S" VOYAGE.—The steamer "Thelma," a British vessel, which had been in Trelleborg, Sweden, since the outbreak of war, left there on November 15th, arrived at Halmstadt on the 18th, and leaving next day for Gothenburg arrived at that port in safety, being reported in dock on the 22nd. The Germans attempted to capture the ship when she was moved, and she therefore not only kept in Swedish territorial waters during the journey, but was escorted by the Swedish torpedo boat "Pollux." Nevertheless, German destroyers attempted to intercept her, although they were deterred by the action of the Swedish warship. Only the "Thelma's" captain was British, the others on board her being Swedes. An explanation of the German attempt to stop her passage contained the view that the Germans suspected her of signalling to British submarines during the voyage. On November 20th, however, the Swedish Minister in Berlin received instructions to make representations in connection with the incident.

USING GERMAN SUBMARINES.—On December 1st, it was reported in the Press that the Allies were using captured German submarines in the Baltic. These former "U." boats, it was stated, had been refitted to use British instead of German torpedoes, and, in addition to the moral effect on the Germans of thus turning the tables upon them, the plan had the advantage of increasing the difficulties in meeting

the submarines' attack, and perhaps of compelling the Germans to withdraw their own under-water boats from the Baltic for safety.

CRUISER AND DESTROYER SUNK.—On December 17th, a further and more striking coup was made by the Allied submarines, when the light cruiser "Bremen" and a torpedo boat were sunk. The loss was officially admitted by the Germans next day, when it was announced that the vessels had been destroyed in a submarine attack in the Eastern Baltic, and that a considerable portion of the crews were rescued. On the same day that these vessels were torpedoed the Germans were reported to have lost the patrol boat "Bunz" or "Buenz" in the Baltic, near Rudkvebing, on the island of Langeland. Danish gunboats picked up some bodies of the crew. A mine was believed to have destroyed the vessel.

"JUPITER" HONOURS.—On November 19th, it was announced in the *London Gazette* that the King had granted to the officers of the battleship "Jupiter," Captain D. St. A. Wake, R.N., authority to wear certain decorations which the Tsar of Russia had conferred upon them in recognition of valuable services rendered. Although no official indication of these services was given, it was understood, and the publication in the Press on December 12th of the photograph of the deck of the ship covered in snow and ice supported the report, that the "Jupiter" had been employed at Archangel as port guardship and ice-breaker. The officers who received decorations were twenty-two in number, including Captain Wake and Commander H. Luxmore.

REPORTED SUBMARINE LOSS.—On December 21st, the German steamer "Ludvig" was sunk in the international sea road, six miles from Karlskrona, in the north of Ahus Bay, and divers who investigated the hull of the ship reported that she had apparently collided with a sunken submarine. A "U." boat was found on the sea bed, riddled with shot holes, and thus impossible to be raised. There was nothing to show how the submarine met her fate, although the report that it was a German boat was not denied.

ATLANTIC,

ALLIED CRUISER CORDON.—In the joint British and French Declaration of March, 1915, concerning restraints upon trade with Germany, it was announced that the British Fleet had instituted measures to stop supplies going to or from Germany, "effectively controlling by cruiser 'cordon' all passage to and from Germany by sea." An illustration of the working of the "cordon" was given by Mr. Gilbert Hirsch, special correspondent of the *Evening Post*, New York, in the first week of October, 1915. Writing from Copenhagen, he described how the sea passage north of Scotland was kept by the British Navy, and showed how the ship in which he was travelling from New York to Copenhagen was detained and taken to Kirkwall by a British cruiser. Referring to a score of neutral ships there, he said: "These were the flies caught in the great web spun by the British across the northern trade route. Beyond the harbour's mouth, in the waters about these Orkney Isles, about the bleak Shetland Islands to the north, and the Hebrides to the south-west, along the eastern coast of Scotland, and out across the North Sea towards the Norwegian shore, converted cruisers on patrol duty are for ever weaving their criss-cross courses, with Dreadnoughts waiting within easy call. . . . I pictured a similar web centring at Dover, in which all the Channel shipping becomes enmeshed; a third at Gibraltar, which controls, even more effectively, traffic between America and the Mediterranean ports. And I got a vivid idea of the completeness with which England dominates trans-Atlantic intercourse."

FLAGS AND OWNERSHIP.—By an Order in Council published in a supplement to the *London Gazette* on October 25th, it was declared to be no longer expedient to adopt article 57 of the Declaration of London, which provided that the neutral or enemy character of a vessel was determined by the flag which she was entitled to fly. Therefore, the article ceased to be in force from that date, and in its place British Prize Courts were ordered to apply the rules and principles which they formerly observed. According to the latter, the Prize Courts are enabled to go beyond the flag flown by a vessel and decide the interests in her ownership, condemning, if necessary, those of enemy origin.

NEUTRAL SEIZURES.—What were believed to be the first cases of arrest after the abrogation of article 57 of the Declaration of London were reported on November 1st. On that day, the steamer "Hocking," flying the American flag, was brought into Halifax on a suspicion of German ownership or part-ownership; and two days earlier the Dutch steamer "Hamborn" was also taken to Halifax for a similar reason.

COTTON SHIP'S EVASION.—On October 28th, Sir Edward Grey made a statement in the House of Commons concerning a Norwegian vessel with a cotton cargo, which was alleged to have successfully run the British blockade. The ship succeeded in evading the Allied patrol, and after proceeding to Gothenburg left there ostensibly for Copenhagen, her orders being to keep within the three-mile limit during the latter part of her voyage. She appears, however, to have been "captured" by a German man-of-war while in Swedish waters. Sir Edward Grey added that what precautions could be taken to avoid the repetition of such an occurrence was a matter for the naval authorities, who were not likely to make their plans public.

ANOTHER EVADER.—On November 27th, an American steamer, the "Robert M. Thompson," was reported to have arrived at Bergen from the United States, after having evaded the British patrol boats by going north of Iceland. The captain asked two of the largest coal firms at Bergen, it was reported, to supply him with 150 tons of coal, but the request was refused, as it was considered strange that the ship gave Archangel as her destination, and yet had not proceeded northward. Her cargo included several motor-cars.

AMERICAN NOTE.—On November 8th, there was published the text of an American Note replying to the letters of the British Foreign Secretary with reference to representations on the subject of restrictions on American commerce during the war. The main grounds of communication were:—(1) That the British reading of the law of contraband was wrong; (2) that our "blockade," instituted by the Order in Council of March 11th, was illegal; (3) that our suggestion that American shipping might protect itself through our Prize Courts was illusory. Under the second count, it was alleged that the "blockade" was not impartial, for "German ports are notoriously open to traffic with the ports of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden."

DANISH AND OTHER AGREEMENTS.—On November 19th, it was reported that an agreement had been entered into between the British Government and the Merchants' Guild of Copenhagen and Industrial Association of Denmark, respecting imports by Danish ships. The text of this agreement was not published by the Government or in Denmark. It was stated by the committee of the Grosserer Societets, however, that no goods could henceforth be imported, except under declaration signed by the respective importers and endorsed by the Danish Committee, who guarantee that the goods will not be re-exported to other than neutral countries and those allied to Great Britain. In the course of discussion on this measure, it was revealed that similar agreements had been entered into with the Netherlands Overseas Trust, and with Norwegian and Swedish agencies. A Swedish mission arrived in England

in the first week of December to arrange an agreement concerning the shipping and trade of that country in relation to the British "blockade," and the members were allowed to visit Aldershot, munition centres, and the Grand Fleet.

GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM.—On January 5th, 1916, the Government issued, as a White Paper (Cd. 8, 145), a Memorandum of the "Measures Adopted to Intercept the Sea-borne Commerce of Germany." The object of the statement was declared to be to give an account of the manner in which the sea power of the British Empire had been used during the present war for the purpose of intercepting Germany's imports and exports. The eleventh or concluding clause was as follows:—

- (i.) German exports to oversea countries have been almost entirely stopped. Such exceptions as have been made are in cases where a refusal to allow the export of the goods would hurt the neutral concerned without inflicting any injury upon Germany.
- (ii.) All shipments to neutral countries adjacent to Germany are carefully scrutinized with a view to the detection of a concealed enemy destination. Wherever there is reasonable ground for suspecting such destination the goods are placed in the Prize Court. Doubtful consignments are detained until satisfactory guarantees are produced.
- (iii.) Under agreements in force with bodies of representative merchants in several neutral countries adjacent to Germany stringent guarantees are exacted from importers, and so far as possible all trade between the neutral country and Germany, whether arising overseas or in the neutral country itself, is restricted.
- (iv.) By agreements with shipping lines and by a vigorous use of the power to refuse bunker coal, a large proportion of the neutral mercantile marine which carries on trade with Scandinavia and Holland has been induced to agree to conditions designed to prevent goods carried in these ships from reaching the enemy.
- (v.) Every effort is being made to introduce a system of rationing which will ensure that the neutral countries concerned only import such quantities of the articles specified as are normally imported for their own consumption.

TORPEDO BOAT SUNK.—On November 1st, torpedo boat No. 96, under the command of Chief Gunner John D. Sumner, R.N., was sunk in the Straits of Gibraltar, after being in collision with a mercantile fleet auxiliary. Two officers, including the commander, and nine men were drowned. The boat was built in 1893-4, and carried a crew of 25. She had been at Gibraltar for some years.

"BARALONG" CASE.—On December 9th, Herr Bethman-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, in the course of a speech, said: "To what a pitch the hate against us leads our enemies is shown in the 'Baralong' case, in which the crew of a British warship murdered the helpless crew of a German submarine. This was hushed up in the British Press. The British were always proud of the spirit in their Navy. Can they reply to this murder, which remains a black stain on the history of the British Navy?" Next day the British Government announced that the circumstances referred to were then the subject of communications between them and the United States Government, and they therefore did not publish any statement at the moment "beyond repudiating the unwarranted charge which the German Chancellor is reported to have preferred against the British Navy." On January 5th, the Foreign Office issued the official papers on the subject in the form of a White Paper (Cd. 8, 144). These showed that the German Government, through the American Embassy, had formulated charges of murder against the captain and crew of the British auxiliary cruiser "Baralong," arising out of the destruction by that ship of a German submarine on August 19th, 1915. The German Government asked that the British seamen concerned should be tried for murder, and threatened, if this expectation was disappointed, "to take serious decisions as to retribution for

the unpunished crime." In reply, Sir Edward Grey offered to place the whole facts before some impartial court for investigation—for example, a tribunal composed of officers belonging to the United States Navy—provided that three incidents of German seaman's methods occurring during the same 48 hours in which the "Baralong" sunk the submarine were likewise investigated by the same court. These incidents were the sinking of the "Arabic," the firing on the stranded British submarine "E.13" on the Danish coast, and the attack on the steamer "Ruel." On January 6th, the United States Government, adhering to the policy of non-intervention in the controversies of belligerents, announced that it would not permit American naval officers to investigate the "Baralong" case.

MESOPOTAMIA.

TIGRIS FIGHTING.—The operations of an Anglo-Indian force, accompanied by a naval brigade, on the rivers at the head of the Persian Gulf have continued. The headquarters of this force are at Basra, just below the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates. The river and land fights on the Tigris River were carried on after the capture of Kut-el-Amara on September 29th with complete success, until a sanguinary battle was fought at Ctesiphon on November 22nd-25th, only 18 miles from Baghdad. Considerable losses were inflicted on the Turks, but want of water and the reinforcement of the enemy obliged the retirement of the British forces first to the river and afterwards to Kut-el-Amara, 80 miles below Ctesiphon, which was reached on December 5th. Two river gunboats were abandoned during the retreat, after their engines and guns had been rendered useless. The Turks gave the names of these vessels as the "Kemed" and "Firikless." At several dates in December the Turks tried to rush the position at Kut-el-Amara, and on Christmas Eve effected a lodgment, but were subsequently driven out. In the defence, vessels on the river participated. A relief force under General Aylmer, which was despatched, assisted by a naval force on the Tigris, fought an action with three Turkish divisions near Sheikh Saad, about 25 miles from Kut-el-Amara, on January 7th, and on the 9th the General reported the Turks to be in retreat, but heavy rain hindered their pursuit. On January 13th General Aylmer was officially stated to be pressing back two divisions of Turks on the left bank, while General Kemball's column on the right bank was holding a Turkish division in front, and next day a further retirement of the enemy was reported, although the weather was still bad. It was stated that the advance of the British relief force was being made mainly by water, with the assistance of the naval flotilla.

MEDITERRANEAN.

SUBMARINE ACTIVITY.—From a date in September, hostile submarines began to attack merchant shipping of the Allies in the Mediterranean in a manner similar to that in which the German "U." boats began their attempted "blockade" of the British Isles in February, 1915. The attack was continued up to the end of the year, with fluctuations similar to those which marked the earlier raid. It became evident that this Mediterranean venture of the enemy submarines must have been planned about the time that the original submarine "blockade" was suppressed, perhaps in August, when the Germans, following upon the representations of the United States, made promises not to torpedo merchant liners without warning. In spite of this, however, several passenger and other merchant vessels were mercilessly destroyed as soon as the under-water boats got to work in the Mediterranean.

TRANSPORT LOSSES.—In the last issue of the JOURNAL the presence of enemy submarines in various parts of the Mediterranean was recorded, with the sinking of

the transport "Royal Edward." This, the first British transport admittedly destroyed in the war, was followed by others, but relatively the losses in this respect were small, and it may have been due to the protective measures taken on behalf of these ships that the submarines paid greater attention to merchant vessels.

"SOUTHLAND" TORPEDOED.—On September 2nd, the transport "Southland," with Australian and New Zealand troops from Alexandria for Anzac, was torpedoed in the Ægean Sea, but reached Mudros under her own steam at 10 p.m. the same day. As a precautionary measure the troops were transferred to other transports. The occurrence was not officially announced until November 12th. The casualties amounted to nine killed, two slightly injured, and 22 missing (believed drowned). An officer's letter, published in the *Times* on November 13th, stated that there was on board "an infantry regiment whose name should go down to history, only equalled by the marines on board the 'Birkenhead.' . . . I should like to write to every paper and say, 'Never can men have faced death with greater courage, more nobility, and with a braver front than did the Australian and New Zealand troops on board the s.s. 'Southland.' The song they sang was 'Australia will be there,' and by God they were.'" This officer records having been an hour in one of the half-floating boats, when he was picked up by the hospital ship "Neuralia."

"RAMAZAN" SUNK.—On September 19th, the transport "Ramazan" was sunk by an enemy submarine by shell fire at 6 a.m., off the island of Antikythera, in the Ægean Sea. There were about 380 Indian troops on board, of whom 75 were saved; 28 of the crew were also saved. A number of boats were smashed by shell fire. The survivors reached Antikythera in their own boats the same night, and were kindly and hospitably treated by the inhabitants. In the American papers, on September 30th, it was announced that the Greek Government had released the troops, described as Sikhs and Ghurkas, who got ashore at Antikythera. They were sent to Malta on board the Messageries Maritimes steamer "Siboni." It was not until November 6th that the War Office announced the loss of the "Ramazan."

"MARQUETTE" TORPEDOED.—On October 27th, it was officially announced that the British transport "Marquette" had been torpedoed in the Ægean Sea on a date not mentioned. Of those on board, only 99 were unaccounted for. From Athens, it was reported that after torpedoing the vessel, the German submarine's crew fired on the boats when these had got away from the ship. The casualties, officially published on November 22nd, included mainly details of the Royal Field Artillery, and of the 29th Divisional Ammunition Column, R.F.A. (T.F.). In addition, ten staff nurses in the New Zealand Nursing Service were also officially stated on November 11th to have lost their lives in the sinking of the "Marquette."

"WOODFIELD" SUNK.—On November 30th, the casualty lists included the names of 30 members of the Army Service Corps—seven killed, eight wounded and interned, and 15 interned—"as a result of the attack on H.M. transport "Woodfield." This was the first intimation of any such occurrence. On December 7th, in reply to a question, the Under-Secretary for War announced that the "Woodfield" was sunk off the coast of Morocco by an enemy submarine on November 3rd. The military casualties were six killed and 14 wounded, and the survivors numbered 49 British and nine Arabs. They were then, said Mr. Tennant, in the hands of the Spanish authorities, and were being treated with every consideration and kindness. On December 13th, Lord Robert Cecil, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, announced that a party of survivors from the "Woodfield" were captured by Moorish tribesmen, but had been released. The remainder of the survivors were under the care of the Spanish authorities at Alhucemas, Penon, and Melilla.

"MERCIAN" ATTACKED.—On November 3rd, the same day that the "Woodfield" was sunk, the outward bound transport "Mercian" was attacked by gun-fire from a submarine in the Mediterranean. She was not sunk, and reached harbour safely, but the following casualties occurred—23 killed, 30 missing, and 50 wounded. The wounded were landed at Gibraltar and taken to hospital. Letters from survivors, published at the end of December, showed that the vessel had on board the 1/1st Lincolnshire Yeomanry, and among those in this regiment who were killed was Lord Kesteven. One soldier's letter stated that the firing started at 2.17 p.m. and finished at 3.30, more than a hundred shells being fired at the troopship. Part of the bridge was knocked away by one shell, and with it the steersman, but a Yeomanry trooper immediately rushed forward and took charge of the wheel, although it happened that he had never been on board a ship before in his life, and, assisted by arm signals from the captain, he steered the ship during the attack. The parents of this soldier, who, before the war, was a groom at Revesby Abbey, Lincolnshire, were informed by his captain that "by taking the wheel under the orders of the captain of the ship, and steering during the greater part of the time that we were being shelled, your son did a great deal towards saving all our lives."

SUBMARINES PAST GIBRALTAR.—In connection with the attacks on British transports on November 3rd, a notice issued by the French Ministry of Marine three days later indicated that the "U." boats must have come from Germany and not from an Austrian port. "Enemy submarines," said this official *communiqué*, "coming from the Atlantic passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, probably on the night of November 2nd. On November 4th, they sank, off Arzeu (Algeria), the French steamer 'Dahra,' and near Cape Ivi (Algeria) the French steamer 'Calvados' and the Italian steamer 'Ionid.'" Thus a new wave of submarine reinforcements had succeeded in reaching the Mediterranean.

"ANCONA" TORPEDOED.—On November 7th—or exactly six months, by a significant coincidence, after the destruction of the "Lusitania" with the loss of 1,125 lives—the Italian liner "Ancona," of 8,210 tons, belonging to the Italian Steam Navigation Company, and bound from Messina to New York, with 572 people on board, mostly women and children emigrants, was shelled and afterwards torpedoed and sunk off the coast of Sardinia. No warning whatever was given, the presence of the submarine being first revealed by a shot at a distance of about five miles. The "Ancona" stopped, and the submarine continued to fire while approaching her to within 300 yards, about 100 shells being discharged altogether. The liner's captain stated on his arrival at Rome that the fire struck boats about to be launched, and others which were in the water. The ship was then torpedoed, and sank in seven minutes. The number of lives lost was about 300, including 25 Americans.

DIPLOMATIC NOTES.—In the first week of December it was announced that the United States had despatched a Note to the Austrian Government, asking that the latter should denounce the sinking of the "Ancona" as an illegal and indefensible act, that the submarine commander should be punished, and that reparation should be made by payment of an indemnity for American citizens killed and injured. On December 31st, the Austrian reply was published. This alleged that the submarine commander thought the ship was a transport; that she tried to escape, when 16 shells were fired, of which three hit; that it was during her flight at full speed that the steamer dropped several boats filled with people, which at once capsized; and that the commander of the submarine fired a torpedo into the foremost hold because a steamer, believed to be an enemy cruiser, became visible.

COMMANDER PUNISHED.—The Austrian Government did not comply with the demand to denounce the sinking of the "Ancona," but promised an indemnity, while disclaiming responsibility. In regard to the submarine commander, the

Government Note said that "the Austro-Hungarian naval authorities arrived at the conclusion that he apparently neglected to take sufficiently into consideration the panic among the passengers, which rendered disembarkation more difficult, and the spirit of the regulations that Austro-Hungarian naval officers should refuse assistance to no one in distress, even if they are enemies. The officer was therefore punished for violating the instructions embodied in the rules in force for such cases."

BOARDING VESSEL LOST.—On November 5th, the armed boarding steamer "Tara," Captain Rupert Gwatkin-Williams, R.N., was attacked by two enemy submarines in the Eastern Mediterranean, and sunk. Thirty-four of her crew were reported missing. On November 21st, the Admiralty announced that they were without information of the missing, who were compelled to land on the North African coast, beyond the Egyptian frontier. Five days later, they announced that news had been received that Captain Gwatkin-Williams and the rest of the survivors were seen at El Aziat, two days west of the Gulf of Sollum, all well. On December 22nd, the Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty stated in the House that the "Tara" was in the Bay of Sollum, on the frontier of Egypt and Cyrenaica, on the morning of November 5th, and although the Admiralty had no first-hand evidence of what occurred, she was no doubt torpedoed there by an enemy submarine. The greater part of the crew were forced to land, and fell into the hands of the local tribesmen, but there was every reason to believe they were being well treated, and a list of survivors was promised as soon as the endeavours to procure the information were successful. On November 19th, the Germans claimed that in addition to the "Tara," two Anglo-Egyptian gunboats, the "Prince Abbas," of 300 tons, and "Abdul Moneim," of 450 tons, each armed with two guns, were destroyed in Sollum harbour by a submarine, which also "silenced the fire of an armed British merchant steamer and captured her gun."

HOSPITAL SHIP CHARGE.—On November 12th, a German Wireless Press message asserted that British hospital ships had been sighted on their way to the Mediterranean oftener since the activity of German and Austro-Hungarian submarines had increased, and that they were very heavily laden, from which it was conjectured that they were conveying troops, munitions, and other war material. On the 14th, the Admiralty said: "This is absolutely false. British hospital ships have always been, and will always be, used in the conditions prescribed by the Geneva and Hague Conventions." On December 5th, the Admiralty announced that in view of the German allegations, the hospital ship "Mauretania" had been examined at Naples by the American, Danish, and Swiss Consuls, who had jointly signed a declaration that there were neither combatants nor warlike stores on board her. The full text of this declaration was subsequently published.


CHANGE OF STEAMSHIP ROUTES.—In the middle of December, it was announced that the Dutch East India liners and mail-boats would not continue to use the Suez Canal for the present, but would follow the Cape route instead. The public explanation given was "the increasing uncertainty of being able to obtain the necessary coals at the appointed stations." This course was afterwards adopted by Japanese steamers.

"PERSIA" TORPEDOED.—On December 30th, the P. and O. liner "Persia," which left London for the East on December 18th, was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine about 40 miles to the south of the eastern end of Crete, shortly after 1 p.m., with the loss of about 200 lives. No warning was given, and the torpedo struck the ship opposite the boiler room, so that she foundered in five minutes. It was impossible to launch the boats on the starboard side, as the vessel at once heeled over to port, and of the boats which did get away, those picked up had been drifting for several hours. The "Persia" had little cargo, and no war material, but a

large quantity of important mails. She was the first P. and O. steamer to be lost by enemy action in the war.

ADRIATIC.

RAIDING TACTICS.—There were no important naval incidents during October and November in the Adriatic. In December, however, concurrently with the despatch of an Italian army to Albania, the Austrians exhibited more liveliness, and raids on a small scale took place. On December 5th, the Austrian light cruiser "Novara" and some destroyers came down to San Giovanni di Medua (Albania) and shelled the ships found there. The Austrians claimed to have sunk three large and two



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small steamers, together with five large and several small sailing vessels which were discharging war material, while one steamer was blown up. They also said their flotilla was bombarded very heavily from the land by about 20 guns, without success. On December 8th, the British Admiralty published information from Rome showing that in this raid two small steamers only were sunk, one of which was of 390 tons, and also a few sailing craft. The information as to the guns placed on land must be regarded, said the *communiqué*, as doubtful. In regard to the Austrian claim to have destroyed "a large motor sailing vessel" en route from Brindisi to Durazzo, this ship, said the Admiralty, was actually the "Gallinara," of 30 tons.

FRENCH SUBMARINE DESTROYED.—On December 5th, apparently in conjunction with the raid on San Giovanni di Medua, an Austrian flotilla bombarded the mouth

of the Boyana, a small river flowing into the Adriatic south of Scutari. Here a French submarine, the "Fresnel," was destroyed, being attacked while aground. According to the Austrians, her assailant was the "Warsdiner," which took prisoners the commander, second officer, and 26 men of the submarine.

ITALIAN EXPEDITION.—On December 9th, an Italian *communiqué* showed that the Austrian efforts "in no way interfered with our important and frequent communications with Albania, and still less with any military objectives. The operations for the transport of troops destined for Albania, which necessitated the use of large vessels, were successfully carried out. In spite of enemy attempts against our transports of men and war material, these, escorted by our naval forces, reached the ports for which they were making in perfect order and effected their landing." One chartered vessel, the "Re Umberto," of 1,182 tons, and the destroyer "Intrepido," were sunk by mines with the loss of 40 and three men respectively, most of those killed losing their lives by the explosion.

AUSTRIAN DESTROYERS SUNK.—On December 28th, an Austrian flotilla left Cattaro with the intention of bombarding Durazzo. At this place the Austrians claimed to have sunk a steamer and sailing vessel by gun-fire, and to have silenced land batteries. Allied flotillas, however, steamed out to meet the raiders, and chased them back to their base. The Austrian destroyer "Lika" struck a mine and was blown up, and her sister ship, the "Triglav," was destroyed by the Allied ships. The Austrian account stated, however, that the "Triglav" was taken in tow after being mined, but was sunk, "as several large enemy cruisers and destroyers were threatening the retreat of the whole fleet." . . . "Amongst the enemy ships were clearly recognized a British cruiser of the 'Bristol' and 'Falmouth' type and a French cruiser." Unofficially, the Austrian force was said to comprise the scout-cruiser "Helgoland" and five destroyers, and a submarine was also reported among their losses.

"MONGE" SUNK.—On the night of December 28th, before the fight at Durazzo, the French submarine "Monge" was sunk by an enemy cruiser off Cattaro. According to prisoners from the "Lika," the greater part of the submarine's crew were saved. In the same *communiqué* in which the French Ministry of Marine announced this loss, it was stated that a French submarine had torpedoed and sunk in the Adriatic a transport conveying war material.

FALL OF LOVTCHEN.—On January 11th, the capture of Mount Lovtchen by the Austrians was announced, and naval ships were said to have participated in this event. All the forts and mobile batteries of the Bocché di Cattaro, and also cruisers, had shelled the height for some days, but it was also reported that two Austrian Dreadnoughts assisted.

AUSTRIAN CRUISER SUNK.—On January 13th, the French submarine "Foucault," attached to the Italian forces in the Lower Adriatic, torpedoed and sunk an Austrian light cruiser of the "Novara" type, in the neighbourhood of Cattaro. On the 16th, a Vienna statement asserted that the Austro-Hungarian Navy had not missed any vessel, so that it must be assumed that the "Foucault" sunk one of the Allied ships in error.

BALKAN EXPEDITION.

LANDING AT SALONIKA.—It was on October 5th, according to enemy reports, that a military force, British and French, began to disembark at Salonika. These first troops to arrive in Greece comprised, according to statements in the Allied newspapers, one British and one French division. These were followed by others, until a force of 150,000—90,000 British and 60,000 French—had been put ashore. On

October 26th, Lord Lansdowne, speaking in the House of Lords, said that the steps taken by the British were the only proper steps which could be taken to relieve the position in Serbia, "but the small British force which we sent to Salonika—I think 13,000 in round numbers—was regarded as the precursor of a larger force which



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was put under orders at the same time." No naval despatches or *communiqués* concerning the transport or protection of this Allied expedition to Salonika have been issued.

BRITISH NAVAL MISSION.—Another phase of the struggle in the Balkans yet to be revealed in full is that of the British Naval Mission to Serbia, under the command of Rear-Admiral E. C. T. Troubridge. In November, this force was reported unofficially to have made good its retreat with the Serbian Army after the capture of Belgrade. A telegram was said to have been received from Rear-Admiral Troubridge, dated Mitrovitza, November 20th, reporting all well, and subsequently refugees arriving at Salonika reported that the members of the British naval detachment were with them. The French sailors who were in Belgrade were similarly reported to have reached Monastir, losing only five out of a detachment of 105. They marched more than 315 miles, and met with many difficulties on the way. In the *London Gazette*, on November 19th, Major B. N. Elliot, R.M.L.I., was awarded the D.S.O. for his services in laying mines and in charge of minefields in the Serbian rivers for several months, and Gunner J. G. Law, R.N., received the D.S.C. for mining duty in Serbia. In the *London Gazette*, on January 21st, four officers, four warrant officers, and six petty officers and men were noted as having been mentioned for their services with the British Naval Mission in Serbia.

DEDEAGATCH BOMBARDED.—On October 21st, a bombardment of the Bulgarian coast was carried out by an Allied squadron, composed of British, French, and Russian ships. A number of military positions were shelled, and serious damage was inflicted on the harbour works, railway station, and shipping at Dedegatch. Great care was exercised by the Allied squadron to avoid firing upon any points other than those known to be of military importance. The places shelled covered a distance of 38 miles, extending from Dedegatch to Porto Lagos, at which latter place the Russian cruiser "Askold" led the attack. On November 11th, Dedegatch was again shelled by the Italian cruiser "Piemonte," which was attacked by a submarine, but without result. The port of Enos was stated in a Turkish official telegram on November 6th to have been shelled by an Allied monitor and torpedo boat. There were also several unofficial reports of bombardments in this neighbourhood during October and November.

SITUATION OF GREECE.—On November 20th, there was published in the Greek Press a *communiqué*, said to have been issued by the British Legation at Athens, to the effect that the Entente Powers had declared an economic and commercial blockade of Greece. On November 23rd, the British Press Bureau issued the following notice from the Foreign Office: "No Greek ships are being seized or held up in the ports of the United Kingdom, and no blockade of Greek ports has been instituted or is in force."

DARDANELLES.

NAVY'S WORK.—In the three months from October until the complete evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula in January, the naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean continued to support the Army on shore with their heavy guns, to protect its supplies, and to convoy reinforcements and wounded, while in the delicate task of withdrawal the ships contributed largely to the brilliant success of the operation. No despatches from the Vice-Admiral commanding at the Dardanelles have been published, except that issued on August 16th relating to the landing in April, but a few intermittent *communiqués* were published by the Admiralty during the period in question.

SWEEPER SUNK.—On the night of October 28th, the auxiliary fleet sweeper "Hythe," Lieutenant-Commander A. H. Bird, R.N.R., was sunk after being in collision with another ship off the Gallipoli Peninsula. At the time she had on board 250 men, in addition to her crew, and there were lost in her one warrant officer and nine men of the Navy, and two officers and 143 men of the Army.

"LOUIS" WRECKED.—On November 10th, the Admiralty announced that the British destroyer "Louis," Lieutenant-Commander Harold D. A. Hall, R.N., had stranded in the Eastern Mediterranean and become a total wreck. All her officers and crew were saved. The "Louis" belonged to the "L" class, and was built in 1913. Until this announcement, it was not known publicly that any vessel of this type had been sent to the Mediterranean.

"EDGAR" OFF HELLES.—On November 17th, a despatch from the General Officer Commanding in the Mediterranean, reporting the capture of 280 yards of Turkish trenches in the neighbourhood of the Krithia Nullah, on the 15th, stated that fire was maintained by the artillery, and by two 14in. monitors and the cruiser "Edgar," until the new position was reported consolidated in the evening. This was the first mention of the cruiser "Edgar" at the Dardanelles, although the presence of her sister ships "Endymion" and "Theseus" had been revealed by Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett.

SUVLA AND ANZAC WITHDRAWAL.—On December 20th, the withdrawal of the British troops at Suvla and Anzac was officially announced, and on the same day in the House of Commons Mr. Asquith said that this operation, so successfully carried out, reflected the utmost credit on the General on the spot, the Admiral and his staff, and on all ranks of the Navy and Army. It was accomplished without a single casualty.

HELLES WITHDRAWAL.—On January 9th, the complete evacuation of the peninsula was announced. All guns and howitzers were got away, except 17 worn-out guns, which were destroyed. The casualties were one British rank and file wounded, and there were no casualties among the French troops. Sir Charles Monro stated that the successful accomplishment of this task was due largely "to the invaluable assistance rendered in an operation of the highest difficulty by Admiral de Robeck and the Royal Navy." A further announcement issued by the War Office on January 11th said that "aeroplane reports show that the naval fire on the left flank was most accurate, and it is probable that the enemy suffered considerably. . . . A hostile submarine was reported off Cape Helles about 9 p.m. (8th). The French embarcations were carried out by their own Navy, who also greatly assisted us by embarking some of our animals."

SEA OF MARMORA.

SUBMARINES' RECORD.—The work of Allied submarines in the Sea of Marmora was continued with great success almost up to the time of the retirement from the Dardanelles. In the House of Commons, on November 2nd, Mr. Asquith stated that up to October 26th British submarines, operating against enemy vessels in the Sea of Marmora, had succeeded in sinking or damaging two battleships, five gunboats, one torpedo boat, eight transports, and no less than 197 supply ships of all kinds, whether steamers or sailing vessels. On October 24th a British submarine sunk the Turkish transport "Carmen" laden with munitions.

"TURQUOISE" RENAMED.—On November 3rd, the French Ministry of Marine announced that their submarine "Turquoise" had been reported sunk by gunfire in the Sea of Marmora. Two officers and 24 seamen had been made prisoners. The "Turquoise" was launched at Toulon in 1908, and was a vessel of 390 tons. A week later it was reported from Constantinople that the "Turquoise" had been refloated and brought there in good condition, where it was formally renamed "Ahmed" on November 8th, after the Turkish gunner, who, by a well-aimed shot, destroyed her periscope, forced the submarine to run ashore, and caused her capture.

RUSSIAN RETRIBUTION.—In January, a semi-official statement issued at Petrograd, described the destruction in the Black Sea of a boat which may have been the "Turquoise." From prisoners captured in the "Carmen," said this report, it was learnt that two Turkish gunboats were sent to the help of a stranded submarine. These were the boats sunk by Russian torpedo craft under Captain Prince Trubetzkoj. Acting on the information of the "Carmen's" crew, however, Russian torpedo boats, on January 10th, approached the spot where the submarine was said to have grounded. They discovered her near the mouth of the Melen, and destroyed the boat with gun-fire.

ISMID RAILWAY ATTACKED.—On December 6th, the Admiralty announced that a report had been received from one of the British submarines operating in the Sea of Marmora, describing her recent activities. On December 2nd, she fired into and damaged a train on the Ismid Railway. On December 3rd, she torpedoed and sank the Turkish destroyer "Yar Hissar" outside the Gulf of Ismid, picking up two officers and 40 men of the destroyer's crew and putting them on board a sailing vessel. On December 4th, she sank a supply steamer of 3,000 tons off Panderma by gun-fire, and also destroyed four sailing vessels that were carrying supplies.

SUBMARINE AT GOLDEN HORN.—During December, another British submarine was reported to have made her way from the Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus into the Golden Horn. There she attacked the arsenal on the Pera side, causing serious damage, and creating a panic among the workmen and inhabitants. On December 20th, the German steamer "Leros," of 2,679 tons, was reported to have been sunk, along with other craft, in the Sea of Marmora. About the same time, it was reported that the Turkish transport "Rechid Pasha," of 8,000 tons, was sunk near Sylviria, by a French submarine, where the Turkish Government had left only seven of the large number of vessels which they had chartered for transport purposes.

BLACK SEA.

RUSSIAN MASTERY.—The Russian naval forces have maintained their ascendancy over the Turco-German ships in the Black Sea during the past quarter, inflicting appreciable damage in isolated combats with gunboats and other small craft, and sweeping the Ottoman merchant marine from the trade routes. On October 21st, the "Goeben" was reported to be cruising in the Black Sea, and to have appeared off Constanza and Varna. No mention of her was made, however, when the Russian Fleet bombarded Varna on October 27th.

VARNA BOMBARDMENT.—In the attack on this chief Bulgarian port, one or two new Russian "Dreadnoughts" took part, and a Russian *communiqué* stated that Rear-Admiral R. F. Phillimore, Chief of the British Naval Mission, was present on board the flagship. The bombardment destroyed the railway station, custom house, wireless station, and other objects of military importance, and a torpedo boat and several merchantmen in the port were damaged. With the squadron was a number of seaplanes, which dropped bombs on the barracks and killed about 200 soldiers. No attempt was made to land. None of the Russian ships—which included the battleships "Panteleimon," "Evstafi," and "Ioann Zlatoust," and the cruiser "Kagul"—was hit by the fire from the land batteries.

NAVAL ENGAGEMENT.—A Petrograd *communiqué* of December 11th stated that on the previous day three Russian torpedo boats engaged two Turkish gunboats and sank them both without loss to themselves. The fight took place off the island of Kephken, east of the Bosphorus. One of the gunboats sunk was of the "Doruk Reis" type, and the other of the "Malatia" type, both built for Turkey by French yards in 1913 and 1907 respectively.

MOVEMENTS OFF VARNA.—A further bombardment of Varna was reported to have taken place on December 20th, when one account, afterwards shown to be incorrect, stated that a Russian expedition against Bulgaria had been landed after the occupation of the town by the naval forces. A Petrograd *communiqué* of December 27th said that the Russian torpedo craft had sunk two Turkish sailing vessels off the Bulgarian coast, and had also bombarded Bulgarian ports. Several enemy submarines attacked the destroyer "Gromky," which cleverly evaded two torpedoes fired at her, and attacked the boats with gun-fire. There was reason to believe, said the *communiqué*, that one submarine was sunk.

"GOEBEN" SKIRMISH.—On January 8th, it was officially announced that Russian torpedo boats had sunk a big steamer going out of the Bosphorus for coal, in which incident the "Goeben" had appeared. The battle-cruiser chased the torpedo boats until the latter had reached the protection of an armoured ship in the vicinity, when a short fight ensued between the latter and the "Goeben." Another account said that the fight lasted 25 minutes, and that more than one Russian ship of the line was engaged. However, the "Goeben," after being hit by a few shells, took advantage of her speed and fled to the Bosphorus. There were no losses on the Russian side.

THE WAR.

MILITARY NOTES by J. D. F.

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SECTION XXI.

The Operations in Galicia from January 1st to March 22nd, 1915 (Fall of Przemyśl).

JAN. 1ST.—The general battle line in Galicia was : Tarnow—Dukla Pass—Uojok Pass—south of Kimpolung.—The Austrians held Przemyśl, which was being besieged by the Russians.

The Austro-German plan was to regain the whole of the crests of the Carpathian Mountains, and then to advance to the relief of Przemyśl.

The Russian plan was to hold the whole line of the Carpathians, advance in force against Cracow, and also to raid the Hungarian plains as opportunity offered.

JAN. 2ND—4TH.—The Russian left in the Bukovina commenced to advance and reached the line Moldawitsa—Goura—Humora.

JAN. 6TH.—The Russian left occupied Kimpolung, and faced the Kirlibaba Pass.

JAN. 17TH.—The Austrians were driven out of the Southern Bukovina, and the Russians occupied the Kirlibaba Pass.

JAN. 20TH.—The Austro-German forces were now organized as follows :—

Boehm-Ermoli (left)—Dukla Pass—Uojok Pass—Lupkow; on Przemyśl (200,000 men).

Von Linsengen (centre).—Uojok Pass—Wyzkov on Stryj (200,000 men).

Von Pflanzler (right)—Southern Bukovina; reconquest of Bukovina (200,000 men).

JAN. 23RD.—The weather was very severe, heavy snow, the difficulties of an advance being very great.

Boehm-Ermoli—little progress, the Russians holding their ground well.

Von Linsengen—had captured the passes and was moving on Stryj.

Von Pflanzler—had captured the Kirlibaba Pass and was moving north.

JAN. 26TH.—Von Pflanzler captured Kimpolung and moved north.

FEB. 18TH.—Von Pflanzler took Czernowitz. Very heavy fighting by Von Linsengen north and north-east of the Dukla and Uojok Passes.

FEB. 20TH.—Von Pflanzler took Kolomea.

FEB. 27TH—MARCH 3RD.—Von Pflanzler took Stanislaw, but on the arrival of the Russian reinforcements had to retire. Von Linsengen made no progress, his movements being, practically speaking, brought to a standstill on the north slopes of the Carpathians.

MARCH 13TH.—The Russians carried the north-eastern positions at Przemyśl by assault.

MARCH 18TH.—The Przemyśl garrison made a vigorous sortie to the east, with the view of capturing Mosciska; the operation failed.

MARCH 22ND.—The garrison of Przemyśl surrendered.

[The fortress of Przemyśl is built on the River San, and is the chief defensive position against an army operating towards Cracow. It has always been a fortress, but in 1878 it was modernized, while in 1881 its defensive perimeter was greatly enlarged and improved. In 1904 the whole system was overhauled, and organized as a modern entrenched camp, with outlying works. Fourteen large forts with armoured cupolas were constructed, and the twenty-seven intermediate works were brought up to date; the total perimeter is about 84 miles. The works on the west are sited on the slopes of the Carpathians, while those on the south and south-east are in the more or less marshy plains. On the whole the defensive position was a bad one, especially on the west side. The garrison is said to have been 120,000 men, but this is probably an over-estimate, as is also the 1,000 guns reported to have been in the place.]

SECTION XXII.

The Operations in Galicia from the fall of Przemyśl on March 22nd to April 27th, 1915.

MARCH 22ND.—The general battle line was : Tarnow—Gorlice—Bartfeld—south of Lupkow Pass—south of Uojok Pass—north of Wyczow Pass—Kolomea—Czernowitz. By the fall of Przemyśl troops were now available for other work, and the Russians sent reinforcements to act against the Lupkow Pass and south of Stryj.

MARCH 30TH.—The Russians occupied the Lupkow Pass and gained a footing on the Uojok Pass.

APRIL 1ST—3RD.—Very severe fighting about the Lupkow and Uojok Passes. Weather very bad, much snow.

APRIL 4TH.—It was generally reported that large Austro-German forces were moving towards Galicia.

APRIL 5TH—7TH.—Further very severe fighting about the Lupkow and Uojok Passes.

APRIL 13TH.—Large bodies of German troops reported to be passing through Czestochowa.

APRIL 15TH.—The general Russian line was : Stropko in the Oudava Valley—Wrava in the Laborez Valley and a little south of the Lupkow and Uojok Passes.

APRIL 17TH—20TH.—There was a vigorous counter-attack by the Austro-German forces all along the line of the Carpathians, but it had no particular success. Very large Austro-German forces reported to be assembling about Cracow and Western Galicia.

APRIL 22ND.—The Austro-German attack towards Stryj failed.

APRIL 25TH—28TH.—Very heavy Austrian counter-attack from Koziowa to the Delatyn Pass ; very severe fighting.

SECTION XXIII.

The Operations in Galicia from April 15th to May 18th, 1915.

APRIL 15TH—28TH.—During this period the Germans made preparations for a vigorous attack on Southern Galicia, the object being to drive the Russians out of the Province. The greatest secrecy was observed and enormous supplies of men, food, and ammunition were brought up without the knowledge of the Russians.

The Austro-German armies were reorganized as follows :—

Army of the Left Flank—Archduke Josef Ferdinand (50,000 men) ; west of Kielce—Opatowiec ; on Opatow.

Army of the Left—Von Mackensen (500,000 men) ; Opatowiec—Grybow—west of Ropa ; on the Vistula and San Rivers.

Army of the Centre—Boehm-Ermoli (400,000 men) ; west of Ropa—south and east of the Dukla Pass ; on Przemyśl.

Army of the Right—Von Linsengen (300,000 men) ; south and east of Dukla Pass—Beskid Pass ; on Sambor and Stryj.

Army of the Right Flank—Von Pflanzer (150,000 men) ; east of the Uojok Pass—Kolomea—Czernowitz ; on the River Dniester to the north.

The general battle line on 28th April was : west of Kielce—Opatowiec—Grybow—west of Ropa—south of Dukla Pass—south of Uojok Pass—south of Delatyn—Kolomea—Czernowitz.

APRIL 28TH—30TH.—The general advance commenced all along the line on April 28th. The Austro-German left flank made little or no progress, but the Army of the Left pushed well forward and had gained considerable ground in

the direction of Gorlice by the evening of April 30th. The Army of the Centre made some progress, but the Armies of the Right and Right Flank did little more than maintain their positions.

MAY 1ST.—The Army of the Left captured Ciez Kowiece, and, acting in conjunction with the Army of the Centre, gradually pressed the Russians back; there was much severe fighting. The Russians about Kielce still held on to their positions.

MAY 2ND.—After very heavy fighting the Russians retired from the Tarnow—Ropa position towards the Debica—Jaslow line. This involved a general retirement; very heavy fighting about the Dukla Pass. The Kielce forces retired slowly towards Opatow and formed the pivot on which the troops further to the south wheeled.

MAY 7TH.—The Army of the Left captured the Jaslow—Debica line, pushing the Russians some ten miles further east. The Russians sent reinforcements towards the heavily pressed troops north of the Dukla Pass, but eventually these forces retired on Przemysl.

MAY 8TH.—The Army of the Left crossed the River Wislok on the front Cracow Jaroslav Railway—Fryszak—Rymanow; while the Army of the Centre pressed on towards Przemysl. The Russians now began to retreat all along the line. Reinforcements were sent to cover the retreat from the Dukla and Lupkow Passes, but the losses were very considerable.

MAY 9TH.—The Russian left crossed the River Dniester and defeated Von Pflanzler about Horodenka with considerable loss.

MAY 10TH.—The general battle line in the centre was: Szeshein—Debica—Krosno—Baligrod.

MAY 11TH.—The Russian retreat to the River San continued.

MAY 12TH.—The general battle line was: Opatow—Rudni—towards Jaroslav—Dynow—Sanok—Kosiowa—south of Stryj—south of Nadworna—Kolomea—Czernowitz.

MAY 13TH.—To the north, the Army of the Left had pressed the Russians back to the west of the line Ostrowiec—Opatow.

MAY 14TH.—The Army of the Left captured Dobromil and Jaroslav.

MAY 15TH.—The Russians commenced a counter-attack against the line Ostrowiec—Opatow—River Vistula. The attack against Von Pflanzler began on May 9th now resulted in his left being driven back south of Nadworna, but Kolomea and Czernowitz were still held by the Austrians.

MAY 18TH.—The Russian attack on the line Ostrowiec—Opatow was partly successful, Von Mackensen being driven back slightly.

SECTION XXIV.

The Austro-German Operations in Galicia from May 15th to June 22nd, 1915 (Fall of Lemberg).

MAY 15TH.—The general battle line was as follows: west of Ostrowiec—Opatow—Sandomir—Sieniawa—south-east of Medyka—south of Sambor—Drohobycz—Stryj—Nadworna—north of Kolomea—north of Czernowitz.

The general Austro-German plan of attack was:—

Archduke Josef Ferdinand—to hold the Russians to north of the River Vistula.

Von Mackensen—on the Jaroslav—Przemysl line.

Boehm-Ermoli—on the south of Przemysl and Medyka.

Von Linsengen—on Stryj—Halicz line.

Von Pflanzler—on River Dniester, north of Nachvorna—Czernowitz line.

The main attack was that made by Von Mackensen. The various fights which took place between May 16th and June 3rd, 1915, are generally known as the "Battle of the San."

MAY 16TH—17TH.—Boehm-Ermoli captured Dobromil and Sambor. The Archduke Josef Ferdinand made little progress, but Von Mackensen, by a vigorous attack, took Sieniawa on the evening of May 17th, forcing the Russians back on both sides of the River Lubaczowka.

MAY 18TH.—Von Mackensen reached Jaroslav and commenced the passage of the River San. Boehm-Ermoli took Lutkow. Von Linsengen commenced his attack on the Stryj—Halicz line.

MAY 19TH.—Von Mackensen attacked the line Jaroslav—North Przemysl, bombarding the forts to the north of the latter place heavily, and crossed the River San on the front Jaroslav—Radymno. Boehm-Ermoli attacked the south and south-east forts of Przemysl, and his right progressed somewhat north of Drohobycz. Von Linsengen's attack continued.

MAY 21ST.—The attacks of Von Mackensen and Boehm-Ermoli progressed. Von Linsengen turned the right of the Russian position about Sambor.

MAY 22ND—24TH.—There was heavy fighting all along the line.

MAY 25TH.—Archduke Ferdinand crossed the River San at Radymno and moved on Mosciska. Von Mackensen made a vigorous attack on the north and west of Przemysl.

MAY 27TH.—The Russians made a counter-attack against the Austro-German left, and succeeded in driving the Archduke Ferdinand back across the river about Sieniawa, but reinforcements came up and the Russians had to retire to their original positions.

MAY 31ST.—Von Mackensen carried the northern forts of Przemysl. Von Linsengen occupied Stryj.

JUNE 2ND.—The Russians vacated the southern forts of Przemysl and commenced the retirement on Lemberg.

JUNE 3RD.—The Austro-German forces occupied Przemysl. The general battle line south of River Vistula was: Sieniawa—east of Radymno—Medyka—Sambor—Stryj.

JUNE 5TH.—Von Linsengen took Zuwarno. Von Pflanzer reached Zaleszczyki.

JUNE 6TH.—The general Austro-German movements were now as follows:—Von Mackensen on the Rawa Russka—Lemberg line, his right being on the Przemysl—Lemberg Railway; Boehm-Ermoli, from Hussakow on Lemberg; Von Linsengen on the River Dniester, down to the River Bystrzyca; Von Pflanzer from Zaleszczyki towards the north.

JUNE 8TH.—The Russians commenced a vigorous counter-attack against Von Linsengen.

JUNE 10TH.—The Russians drove Von Linsengen across the River Dniester with heavy loss. Von Mackensen decided to make the main attack on Lemberg from the north, but at the same time a false attack was to be made on the River Dniester line in order to deceive the enemy.

Von Mackensen marched on the line Zapatow—Laski—Bonow.

JUNE 12TH.—Von Mackensen had some heavy fighting about Huszow and drove Russians from the line Sieniawa—Jaroslav.

JUNE 13TH.—Von Mackensen's line was: Lubaczow—Jaworow—Ozomla and towards Lemberg.

JUNE 14TH.—The Austro-German forces were: left towards Rawa Russka; centre opposite the Grodek position; right Kolodrably—Rozwadow. The general line of battle was now: Ciezanow—Grodek position—Mikelajow—Turawno—Halicz, along the River Dniester to the Roumanian frontier.

The forces under Von Linsengen commenced a heavy attack on the River Dniester position.

JUNE 15TH.—Von Linsengen defeated with considerable loss. Von Mackensen ordered an advance on Rawa Russka; very severe fighting. The Russians retired to the east, after making a stand at Futory, a little to the north of Lubaczow. Von Linsengen, after severe fighting, was slightly driven back.

JUNE 16TH.—The Archduke Ferdinand had now compelled the Russians to retire, and was on the line Janow—Tarnograd. Von Mackensen was marching on the Tamazow—Rawa Russka—Zolkiev position, and Boehm-Ermoli was close up against the Grodek lines.

The Russians now began to retire from Lemberg.

JUNE 17TH.—Von Mackensen captured Javorow.

JUNE 19TH.—Von Mackensen was close to Rawa Russka. Von Linsengen crossed the River Dniester at Nizniow.

JUNE 20TH.—Von Mackensen, after heavy fighting, captured Rawa Russka and Zolkiev. The Russians retired from the Grodek position.

JUNE 22ND.—The Austro-German forces occupied Lemberg, the Russians retiring to the east and north. The general battle line on the eastern front was: west of Windau—Shavli—west of Kovno—west of Grodno—Ossowietz—Lomza—Prasnitz—west of Novo Georgiesk—Radom—Zawichost—east of Rawa Russka Rohatyn—Nizniow—Zaleszczyki.

SECTION XXV.

The Operations in E. Galicia and S. Poland from June 22nd to July 10th, 1915.

JUNE 22ND.—The general arrangements for the advance were:—

Von Woysch—on Lublin.

Archduke Josef Ferdinand—on Krasnik and Lublin.

Von Mackensen—on Zamosc and Cholm.

Boehm-Ermoli—on Sokal.

Von Linsengen—on Halicz.

Von Pflanzer—on east of Halicz to the Roumanian frontier.

JUNE 24TH.—Von Linsengen crossed the River Dniester west of Halicz; Von Mackensen about Javorow.

JUNE 26TH.—Von Linsengen occupied heights to the north-west of Halicz, his left being at Rohatyn. Von Mackensen about Zolkiev and to the west.

JUNE 28TH.—Boehm-Ermoli reached a point a little to the south of Kamionka. Von Linsengen captured Halicz. The general battle line was: Zawichost—north of Nisko—north of Rawa Russka—Rohatyn—Nizniow—Czernowitz. Von Mackensen had some fighting about Tomaszow.

JUNE 30TH.—The general battle line was: Ilza—Janow—Tomaszow—Kamionka—Rohatyn—Nizniow—Zaleszczyki.

JULY 2ND.—Krasnik and Zamosc were occupied by the Austro-German forces. The Archduke Ferdinand took up a position north of Krasnik; considerable fighting took place.

JULY 3RD.—Boehm-Ermoli endeavoured to cross the River Bug about Kamionka. Von Linsengen, after heavy fighting, compelled the Russians to retire to the line Brzezany—Nizniow.

JULY 4TH.—The Archduke Ferdinand turned the left of the Russians to the north of Krasnik and compelled them to retire to a position some three miles north of the village. Von Mackensen reached a point about five miles north of Zamosc on the road to Krasnostav.

JULY 5TH—9TH.—Heavy fighting commenced north of Krasnik, and continued for four days. The Archduke Ferdinand was driven back to a position north of Krasnik with heavy loss. Von Linsengen attacked the Russians on the line Brzczyany—Nizniow, assisted by Von Pflanzler from the south, but the position was held.

JULY 10TH.—The general battle line was: Kamionka—Brzczyany—Nizniow—Zaleszczyki.

SECTION XXVI.

The Operations on the N.E. Prussian Frontier from May 1st to June 10th, 1915.

MAY 1ST.—The general battle line was: north of Memel—Rossieny—Velony—east of Suwalki—west of Ossowietz.

German Plan.—The general object of the operations was to distract attention from the work of far greater importance going on in Galicia.

Russian Plan.—The object held in view by the Russians was to generally maintain their position, and to save men for the Galician campaign.

MAY 9TH.—Libau occupied by the Germans.

MAY 20TH.—The Germans reached the Tetchi—Likniki district and were west of Chavli.

JUNE 1ST.—Russian counter-attacks developed north and south of Libau, the objects being to retake the town and cut it off from Memel.

JUNE 4TH.—A German naval demonstration was made in the Gulf of Riga, to co-operate with the troops moving against Mitau and Riga; the movement made little progress.

JUNE 8TH—10TH.—There was severe fighting on the River Windava about Lake Radievo and near Kongi. Chavli was heavily bombarded.

The general battle line was: north of Libau—Chalanovo—east of Chavli—east of Kura—Lipsk.

SECTION XXVII.

The Austro-German Campaign in Poland from July 12th to August 5th, 1915 (Occupation of Warsaw).

JULY 12TH.—The general battle line was: east of Rossieny—east of Velony—west of Augustow—Kalno—west of Prasnitz—Wyznogrod—Radom—south of Krasnik—south of Tomazov—south of Sokal to the Roumanian frontier.

The Austro-German Plan.—The general objects of the Austro-German forces were to:—

1st: Conquer Poland.

2nd: Take up a good defensive position on the east side of Poland so as to allow the bulk of the armies to be transferred to other theatres of war.

3rd: If possible, capture the Russian Army.

The Russian Plan.—The objects in view were to:—

1st: Hold the general battle line as described above.

2nd: Break the Austro-German lines held by Field-Marshal Von Mackensen, and thus compel the enemy to retire.

3rd: If unable to progress, to retire slowly into Old Russia and cause the enemy as much loss as possible during the retirement.

The Austro-German Forces were organized as follows:—

The Army Group of the North (Von Below)—from Libau to Velony; operating about Mitau and Chavli, and later to move on Vilna (five or six corps with a very large force of cavalry).

The Army Group of the Left Centre (Von Hindenburg):—

Third Army (Von Eichhorn)—Velony to Augustow: operating towards Kovno and Grodno (four or five corps).

Second Army (Von Scholtz)—Augustow towards Prasnitz: operating towards Bielostok (three or four corps).

First Army (Von Gallwitz)—Prasnitz to Wyznogrod: operating north of Warsaw (three or four corps).

The Army Group of the Centre (Prince Leopold of Bavaria)—west of Warsaw to north of Radom: operating against west and south of Warsaw and north of Ivangorod (three or four corps).

The Army Group of the Right Centre (Von Mackensen):—

First Army (Von Woysch)—Radom to Urjendow: operating towards Ivangorod (four or five corps).

Second Army (the Archduke Josef Ferdinand)—Krasnik—Sulow—towards Tomazov: operating towards Lublin (four or five corps).

Third Army (Von Mackensen)—Tomasow to Sokal: operating towards Cholm—Wlodawa (seven or eight corps).

The Army Group of the Right Flank (?)—Sokal—Halicz—Czernowitz: holding the extreme right of the line (three or four corps?).

The Army of the Left Centre commenced its advance; very heavy fighting all along the line. The Russians retired slowly. Von Scholtz bombarded Lomza.

JULY 13TH.—Local actions all along the whole battle front.

JULY 14TH.—Army Group of the North—general advance.

Army Group of Left Centre—general advance; Von Gallwitz carried the defences of the River Pissa.

Army Group of the Centre—general advance towards Warsaw, but stationary towards the south.

Army Group of the Right Centre—general advance; Von Woysch heavily engaged about Radom.

Army Group of the Right Flank—stationary.

JULY 15TH.—Army Group of the North—general advance.

Army Group of the Left Centre—Von Scholtz heavily engaged about Lomza; Von Gallwitz pressing towards north of Warsaw.

Army Group of the Centre—as before.

Army Group of the Right Centre—as before.

Army Group of the Right Flank—as before.

JULY 16TH.—Army Group of the North—general fighting all along the line, towards Tukikum and Chavli.

Army Group of the Left Centre—very heavy fighting all along the line. The Russians evacuated Prasnitz.

Army of the Centre—as before.

Army of the Right Centre—Von Woysch moved on Solec and Opole. The Archduke Josef Ferdinand attacked Wylkolar, but made little progress.

Von Mackensen failed to drive the Russians out of Sokal, but advanced to the south of Krasnostaw, and began a vigorous attack on the Grabowiec—Bereste line.

Army Group of the Right Flank—as before.

JULY 17TH.—Army Group of the North—general fighting and progress towards Tukikum and Chavli.

Army Group of the Left Centre—Von Eichhorn reached Mariampol; Von Scholtz, Szczuczyn; Von Gallwitz, west of Rozan and Pultusk, and close to Novo Georgiesk.

Army Group of the Centre—west of the Blonie lines.

Army Group of the Right Centre—Von Woysch, north-east of Radom—south of Opole. The Archduke Josef Ferdinand, south of Bychawa—south of Bereste. Von Mackensen, after severe fighting, about Piaski—Bereste—Sokal.

Army Group of the Right Flank—as before.

JULY 18TH.—Fighting along the whole line, but little change.

JULY 19TH.—Fighting along the whole line.

JULY 20TH.—Army Group of the North—Tukkum and Windau taken. General line was now : Windau—Tukkum—just west of Chavli—Rossieny—Velony.

Along the rest of the line, general fighting.

JULY 21ST.—Fighting along the whole line.

JULY 22ND.—Army Group of the North—advance continued.

Army Group of the Left Centre—Von Eichhorn, east of Mariampol—near Augustow; Von Scholtz, towards Ruda and Lomza; Von Gallwitz, heavy fighting between Prasnitz and Ostrolenka and about Rozan and Pultusk.

Army Group of the Centre—west of Warsaw.

Army Group of the Right Centre—general line was : Grojec—north of Opole—Wylkolar—Krasnostaw—north of Grubiezow—north of Sokal.

Army Group of the Right Flank—as before.

JULY 23RD.—Army Group of the North—as before.

Army Group of the Left Centre—Von Gallwitz took Rozan and Pultusk. Von Scholtz occupied Lomza.

Army Group of the Centre—west of Warsaw.

Army Group of the Right Centre—Von Woysch commenced the bombardment of Ivangorod. The Archduke Josef Ferdinand was heavily engaged south of Lublin. Von Mackensen, as before.

Army Group of the Right Flank—as before.

JULY 24TH.—Army Group of the North—advance continued.

Army Group of the Left Centre—Von Gallwitz was counter-attacked by the Russians and driven back. Heavy fighting north of Novo Georgiesk.

Army Group of the Centre—the Russians commenced to retire on Warsaw, and prepared to evacuate the place.

Army Group of the Right Centre—Von Woysch, vigorous attacks on Ivangorod, but little success. Heavy fighting all along the rest of the line.

Army Group of the Right Flank—as before.

JULY 25TH.—Army Group of the North—advance continued, but the general line was now towards Wilkomir and the north of Vilna.

Army Group of the Left Centre—Von Gallwitz, closing in on the north of Warsaw, east of the Rozan—Pultusk line.

Army Group of the Centre was just outside the west front of Warsaw.

Army Group of the Right Centre—Von Woysch continued the attack on Ivangorod. Von Mackensen's right was north of Grubiezow. Archduke Ferdinand heavily engaged south of Lublin.

Army Group of the Right Flank—as before.

JULY 26TH.—Heavy fighting along the whole line of battle.

JULY 27TH.—Army Group of the North—advance continued; severe fighting.

Army Group of the Left Centre—Von Gallwitz's attacks on Novo Georgiesk held up.

Army Group of the Centre—as before.

Army Group of the Right Centre—Von Woysch heavily attacking Ivangorod. Severe fighting by Von Mackensen north of Grubiezow.

Army Group of the Right Flank—as before.

The Russians decided to evacuate Warsaw, Vilna, Grodno, Kovno and Bielostok.

JULY 28TH.—Heavy fighting along the whole battle line. The Archduke Josef Ferdinand captured Lublin. The Russians evacuated Ivangorod.

JULY 29TH.—Heavy fighting along the whole battle line. Von Mackensen occupied Biskupice.

JULY 30TH.—The evacuation of Warsaw and other places mentioned on July 27th commenced.

JULY 31ST.—The forces under Von Below had to retire about Mitau.

The general battle line was : Tukcum—west of Mitau—east of Rossieny—west of Kovno—east of Suwalki—west of Ossowietz—west of Lomza—east of Rozan—east of Pultusk—west of Novo Georgiesk—west of Warsaw—Ivangorod—Lublin—Cholm—Sokal—Halicz—Czernowitz.

AUG. 1ST.—Von Below held up before Kovno. Heavy fighting all along the line of battle.

AUG. 2ND.—Severe fighting north and south of Warsaw.

AUG. 3RD.—Heavy fighting all along the line. The Austro-Germans made some progress north of Ivangorod, north of Lublin towards Lubartow, and north of Cholm towards Wlodawa.

AUG. 4TH.—Heavy fighting all along the line of battle.

AUG. 5TH.—Warsaw entered by the Germans. The general battle line was : Mitau—Ponevie—Kovno—west of Grodno—Ossowietz—Lomza—Ostrolenka—Rozan—Wyzschow—Radzimin—Warsaw—Ivangorod—Opalin—Sokal—Brody—Zaleszczyki—Czernowitz.

SECTION XXVIII.

The Combined Military and Naval Operations in the Dardanelles from March 17th to May 5th, 1915.

MARCH 17TH.—The original fleet operations in the earlier part of the year having been found inconclusive, it was decided to send a combined military and naval force to carry out a fresh attack.

General Sir I. Hamilton, G.C.B., was selected for the supreme command, the troops under his orders being certain British troops at this date assembled in transports at Mudros Bay, and a French force commanded by General D'Amade at the same place.

General Hamilton arrived at Tenedos, the headquarters of the British Fleet, on this date, and, after a careful examination of the position, decided at a conference held between the military and naval commanders that the general organization of the forces was unsatisfactory, and that the only thing to be done was to send all the transports back to Egypt and reorganize the whole expeditionary force there. This was accordingly done (with the exception of one Australian infantry brigade).

MARCH 18TH—APRIL 15TH.—The reorganization of the force took place during this period.

IN COMMAND: GENERAL SIR I. HAMILTON.

BRITISH TROOPS.

29th Division :—

86th Brigade : 2nd Royal Fusiliers ; 1st Lancashire Fusiliers ; 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers ; 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

87th Brigade: 2nd South Wales Borderers; 1st K.O.S. Borderers; 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers; 1st Border Regiment.
 88th Brigade: 2nd Hampshire Regiment; 4th Worcester Regiment; 1st Essex Regiment; 5th Royal Scots (Territorial).

East Lancs. Territorial Division:—

Lancs. Fusiliers, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th Battalions.

East Lancs. Brigade, 4th and 5th East Lancs. Battalions, and 9th and 10th Manchester Battalions.

Manchester Brigade, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th Manchesters.

Two Divisions Australian and New Zealand Troops.

An Indian Division.

A Naval Division:—

Brigade of Royal Marines.

A Naval Brigade.

A Naval Brigade.

FRENCH FORCES.

The French force consisted chiefly of Colonial infantry, and was organized in two divisions.

NAVAL FORCES—Vice-Admiral De Robeck in command.

British Fleets:—

1st Fleet: Rear-Admiral Wemyss: 7 battleships, 4 cruisers, 6 fleet sweepers, 14 trawlers.

2nd Fleet: Rear-Admiral Thursby: 5 battleships, 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers and 15 trawlers; 1 seaplane carrier, 1 balloon ship.

There were numerous other ships of different kinds, but no details are available regarding them.

FRENCH FLEETS—Contre-Amiral Guepratte in command.

No details available, but a Russian cruiser, the "Askold," joined later on.

TURKISH FORCES.

The enemy forces were under the command of General Liman Von Sanders, who, on March 29th, was appointed to command the 200,000 men said to form the Fifth Army. The whole Gallipoli Peninsula and the eastern shores of Asia Minor were strongly fortified.

APRIL 16TH—24TH.—During this period the reorganization of the British forces took place. On April 7th Sir Ian Hamilton returned to Lemnos and prepared his plan of operations for the attack.

APRIL 25TH.—After reconnoitring the enemy's position the British commander decided to attack at seven different points on the coast. The Navy was to assist in landing the troops, and cover such landings by the gun-fire of the ships.

The landing places selected were:—

(a) *The French Troops* were to land on the Asiatic side of the Straits near Kum Kale and prevent any attacks by the Turkish batteries in that neighbourhood on the landings at V and S beaches (Sedd-el-Bahr and Morto Bay).

(b) *British Forces.*

The covering troops were ordered to land as follows:—

S beach: 2nd South Wales Borderers.

Y beach (west of Saghir-Dere): K.O.S. Borderers and Plymouth Battalion Royal Marines.

(The above were intended chiefly as flanking parties.)

V beach : Dublin Fusiliers, Munster Fusiliers, half-battalion Hants. Regiment and W. Riding Royal Engineers.

W beach (Cape Helles) : 1st Lincs. Fusiliers.

X beach (north of Cape Tekke) : 1st Royal Fusiliers with two other battalions of the 87th Brigade to follow.

(The above were the main landings.)

Gaba Tepe beach (one mile to north) : 3rd Australian Brigade with two Indian mounted batteries followed by 1st and 2nd Australian Brigades.

The remainder of the British force was held in reserve.

(c) *Naval Forces.*

Y beach : 2 battleships, 2 transports covered by gun-fire of other ships.

X beach : 1 battleship, to cover embarkation and assist with gun-fire later.

W beach : 1 battleship and 1 cruiser to convey the troops.

V beach : The troops were partly in boats and partly in a collier called "The River Clyde"; this latter ship was specially prepared for landing operations, large ports being cut in her sides, fitted up with gangways, to assist reaching the lighters which it was arranged should be drawn up so as to form a bridge to the shore.

S beach : 2 battleships to convey troops.

Gabba Tepe beach : 2nd Fleet.

(d) *French Fleet.*

Dispositions not known, but the landing was covered by gun-fire.

APRIL 23RD.—The covering troops were ordered to leave Mudros Bay and land on April 25th as follows :—

S and Y beaches, at dawn.

V, W, X beaches, at 5.30 a.m., after half an hour's bombardment by the fleet.

Gabba Tepe landing at 5 a.m.

French landing at 6 a.m.

APRIL 24TH.—The covering troops arrived off Tenedos in the morning and were transferred to warships and other boats during the course of the afternoon. At midnight the forces were escorted to the various rendezvous by the 2nd and 3rd Fleets. The preliminary positions were duly taken up at the hours named.

APRIL 25TH.—At 5 a.m. a general fleet bombardment commenced and lasted till 5.30 a.m. During this period the troops were transferred to small boats and the landing operations commenced.

S Beach.—The landing here was successfully carried out by 7.30 a.m., and the troops established themselves on high ground near the ruined De Tott's battery with a loss of only fifty men.

Y Beach.—This landing was also successful and the troops reached the top of the cliff with reserves of food and water at 7 a.m. They at once endeavoured to get into touch with the landing at X beach. In this, however, they were unsuccessful, as the X beach party had to contend with a very large Turkish force and could give them no assistance, while the intervention of a further enemy force at a point of about one mile south of Y beach added further difficulties. The movement had to be abandoned.

About mid-day the Turks made a heavy attack from the direction of Krithia, and all through the afternoon and night violent assaults continued. The troops held their own, but with very heavy losses.

X Beach.—By 6 a.m. the troops detailed for this attack made good their landing and at once advanced against the enemy's position on Hill 114. They were, however, counter-attacked and forced to give ground. Two more battalions of the 87th Brigade were landed, and by 7 p.m., after severe fighting, the force was holding a line from about half a mile round the landing place to Hill 114. At this latter point the troops were in touch with the forces at W landing by 11.30 a.m.

W Beach.—The troops landed at 6 a.m.; three companies on the right moved directly on the beach, one company on the left advancing towards a small ledge of rock directly under Tekke Burnu. A very heavy fire was opened as soon as the troops reached the beach, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that they succeeded in breaking through the heavy wire obstacles and assembling under the cliffs. At this point they were re-formed and advanced partly towards Hill 114 and partly towards the Cape Helles side of the landing place. At 9.30 a.m. more infantry arrived, and by 10 a.m. three hostile lines of trenches had been taken. At 11.30 a.m. a junction was effected on Hill 114 with the force which had landed at X beach. On the right progress was small owing to the fire from a redoubt on Hill 138. At 2 p.m. this hill was heavily bombarded and the redoubt was, after severe fighting, carried by the Worcesters at 4 p.m. An effort was now made to join hands with V beach landing, the 86th Brigade pushing out towards the east, but the attempt was unsuccessful.

V Beach.—This landing commenced at 5.30 a.m. The "River Clyde" got fairly well into position and was beached at the same time that the boat parties arrived at the selected site. There was at first no opposition, but as soon as the landing began a heavy fire was opened by the Turks, and only a few men succeeded in reaching the beach. The troops on the "River Clyde" had also great difficulties to contend with, as the lighters could not be got into position, and when, after heavy losses, the pier was formed, it broke down and many of the men on it were drowned. A fresh effort, however, was made, and a few troops got ashore, though their losses were very heavy.

For a time the attempt to land was discontinued: when it was renewed the pier again failed, and the lighters drifted into deep water, the troops lying down or them suffering very severely. Between 10 and 11 a.m. it was decided to stop the landing, and such troops as were on board the collier and the lighters remained there, sheltering themselves as well as they could. A machine gun battery rigged up on the bows of the "River Clyde" did good work and stopped several Turkish counter-attacks on the beach party.

Just before dark some of the first landing party moved up towards the Old Fort; at nightfall the men on the collier succeeded in landing. An attempted attack by the whole force on the Old Fort, however, failed, and by midnight the troops were back in their original positions along the beach.

Gabba Teppe Beach.—The rendezvous was reached at 1.30 a.m., and, after transferring the men to boats and destroyers, the landing commenced at 3.30 a.m. at a point one mile north of Gabba Teppe point. The 3rd Brigade, followed by the 1st and 2nd Brigades, carried it out successfully. Just as the boats reached the shore some Turkish troops poured a heavy fire on them, but a vigorous attack made by the landing parties drove the enemy off. By 2 p.m. 12,000 men and two Indian mountain batteries had been landed, and, though heavily attacked between 11 a.m. and 3 p.m., the force eventually occupied a semicircular position: right, about one mile north of Gabba Teppe; left, on the high ground above Fisherman's Hut. About 5 p.m. to 6.30 p.m. a very heavy attack was made and severe fighting continued all through the night, the troops having, practically speaking, no rest. They, however, maintained their position.

French Landing.—This commenced at 10 a.m. after a heavy preliminary bombardment, and by noon all the force had been landed. It was not, however, found possible to advance against Yeni-Shehr, and the general line occupied was a little south of Kum Kale village.

APRIL 26TH, *S Beach Landing.*—The troops maintained the positions gained on the previous day.

Y Beach Landing.—There was heavy fighting throughout the night and early morning; the troops suffered very severely. At 7 a.m. it was decided to withdraw this force, as it was doubtful whether reinforcements could reach it. The retirement was successfully carried out with the help of H.M.S. "Goliath," "Dublin," "Amethyst" and "Sapphire." The rearguard was handled with exceptional ability.

X Beach Landing.—The position gained the previous day was maintained.

W Beach Landing.—The position gained the previous day was maintained.

V Beach Landing.—At daylight a vigorous attack was made by the troops which had landed on the previous day, and, after very severe fighting, a footing was gained in the south end of the Sedd-el-Bahr village at 10 a.m. The advance was continued, and by 12 noon the north side of the village was in our hands. The attack was still further vigorously pushed, and by 2 p.m. the Old Castle and Hill 141 were captured.

Gabba Teppe Landing.—The troops maintained the positions gained on the previous day.

French Landing.—In the evening the French troops were withdrawn from the Kum Kale position, and V beach was allotted to them for a new landing place.

APRIL 27TH.—A general advance by the whole force was now ordered, the position to be taken up stretching from Hill 236, near Eski Hissarlik, to the mouth of the stream two miles north of Teppe Burnu. This was carried out by 12 noon without opposition. By the evening the troops were distributed as follows: 29th Division (less two battalions) on the left and left-centre, four French battalions right-centre and one British battalion on the extreme right.

APRIL 28TH.—A general advance was ordered to commence at 8 a.m. The 29th Division moved on Krithia, 87th Brigade leading, followed by the 88th, with the 86th Brigade in reserve. The French brigade was on the right with right flank on Kereves Dere.

87th Brigade (one battalion R.N. Division in place of K.O.S. Borderers and S. Wales Borderers) had advanced about two miles by 10 a.m. While re-forming for attack a counter-attack was made by the Turks; this was beaten off, but no further progress could be made, so the position gained was entrenched. The Inniskilling Fusiliers on the right got up to within three quarters of a mile of Krithia, but could make no further progress, and eventually fell back in line with the rest of the division.

88th Brigade.—This moved steadily forward till about 11.30 a.m., when the advance ceased, partly for want of ammunition and partly owing to the strong resistance offered by the Turks.

86th Brigade.—Was at 1 p.m. pushed through the 88th Brigade towards Krithia. It reached the general line held by the division but could get no further.

French Brigade.—Advanced to within a mile of Krithia, meeting with considerable opposition. Eventually the brigade retired, its losses being very considerable.

At 2 p.m. it was decided, owing to the want of ammunition and the fatigue of the troops, to abandon any further advance for the time being; the troops were ordered to maintain their positions.

At 3 p.m. a vigorous counter-attack was made by the Turks, and a partial retirement took place.

At 6 p.m. the whole force entrenched itself in the positions won, and by nightfall the general line ran from a point three miles north-west of Tekke Burnu to a point one mile north of Eski Hissarlik and thence south-east to the coast.

APRIL 29TH.—A general straightening-out of the position was arranged, in preparation for a further advance.

APRIL 30TH.—No further advance was made. A large force of artillery was landed and a reserve formed by two new battalions of the Royal Naval Division, and three battalions of the 88th Brigade withdrawn from the fighting line.

MAY 1ST.—The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade arrived and was used to release the three battalions of the 88th Brigade above mentioned. By the evening the French had disembarked all their infantry and nearly all their artillery. At 10 p.m. the Turks opened a vigorous artillery bombardment and at 10.30 p.m. launched their infantry attack, chiefly against the 86th Brigade. At first they succeeded in making a gap in the line as the brigade was very weak, but two battalions, one from the reserve and one from the 88th Brigade, counter-attacked and drove them back.

A fresh attack was then made against the French who gave way slightly, but the reserves came up, and the ground was fairly well maintained.

MAY 2ND.—At 2 a.m. a battalion of a naval division was sent up to reinforce the extreme right of the British line.

At 5 a.m. a general advance was ordered and some five hundred yards was gained by 11.30 a.m. On the right, however, the French made little progress.

At 11 a.m., however, it was found impossible to maintain the position and the whole force withdrew to its former trenches.

MAY 3RD.—On the night of May 3rd a very heavy attack made on the French position was repulsed with heavy loss.

MAY 4TH.—The position was generally reorganized and strengthened. A part of the line occupied by the French was handed over to the 2nd Naval Brigade.

MAY 5TH.—The Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade and the East Lancashire Division were disembarked and placed in reserve behind the British left.

The casualties from April 25th to May 5th were (British only):—

177 officers and 1,990 other ranks killed;
412 officers and 7,807 other ranks wounded;
13 officers and 3,580 other ranks missing.

SECTION XXIX.

The Combined Naval and Military Operations in the Dardanelles from May 6th to June 30th, 1915.

MAY 6TH.—The general positions were:—

Allies	{	Left: above V beach; 29th Division.
		Right centre: Royal Naval Division.
		Extreme right: north of De Tott's battery; the French Expeditionary Force.
		Gaba Teppe: on a semi-circular front of about 550 yards radius; the Australians.

Turks: Facing the Allies about half a mile to the north; strength said to be about 200,000 men.

The Allied forces were now reorganized as follows:—

29th Division { 87th Brigade.
88th Brigade.
Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade (T.F.).
29th Indian Brigade.

French Expeditionary Force: as before, but with 2nd Royal Naval Brigade attached.

Composite Division: 2nd Australian Brigade; 2nd New Zealand Brigade; a naval brigade (two battalions).

Australians as before.

The Allies decided to attack on this day, the general plan being as follows:—

Main attack	{	29th Division: on south-east edge of Krithia.
		French Expeditionary Force: on the ridge running north and south, on the east side of the Kereves Dere.
		Composite Division: in the centre to act as a connecting force between the 29th Division and French Expeditionary Force; a Naval Brigade.
		Rest of Composite Division: in reserve.
Subsidiary attack	{	Australians at Gaba Tepe. These were instructed to keep open the route to the centre of the Turkish position, and, by constant attacks on the enemy in front of them, prevent his sending reinforcements to his forces opposing the main attack.

At 11 a.m. the ships in the Straits carried out a heavy bombardment of Ach Baba, and the ridge north of the Kereves Dere. At the same hour the 29th Division commenced to advance, the French Expeditionary Force doing the same about 11.30 a.m. By 1.30 p.m. the movements in advance had progressed some 200 or 300 yards, but the main enemy position was still a considerable distance ahead. At 4.30 p.m. the general position was:—French Expeditionary Force, on the south slopes of the Kereves Dere Valley; 29th Division, about 300 yards in advance of their morning positions. As no further progress seemed possible, operations were suspended. Orders were given to entrench and link up to the flanks on each side. About 10 p.m. a severe counter-attack was made by the Turks on the French position: at first ground was gained, but the French regained it during the night.

MAY 7TH.—A fresh attack commenced at 10 a.m., and, after a heavy bombardment, the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade began to move forward: the very heavy enemy fire, however, prevented much progress being made on this section. The 88th Brigade, however, managed to carry a clump of fir trees to their immediate front, in which were numerous snipers and machine guns, and things improved. A battalion of the 87th Brigade was brought up in support, but at 1.20 p.m., owing to a strong Turkish counter-attack, the fir-tree position was lost. Three Turkish trenches were, however, taken, and another battalion of the 87th Brigade came up to hold them.

At 3 p.m. the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade was definitely held up, and the enemy's guns were enfilading the left of the 88th Brigade. It was therefore decided at 4.45 p.m. to make a general attack all along the line. The whole force at once attacked; when darkness fell, a general advance to the extent of some 300 yards (except on the left, where no further progress was feasible) was made, and the first line of Turkish trenches was occupied. Owing to the exhausted condition of the troops it was now decided to entrench and cease further attacks for the day. The Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade was withdrawn and held in reserve, the New Zealand Brigade taking its place.

MAY 8TH.—It was decided to make a fresh attack; the New Zealand Brigade to advance through the line held by the 88th Brigade and press on towards Krithia. At the same time the 87th Brigade was to threaten the works on the west of the ravine and make advances as opportunity offered. At 10.15 a heavy bombardment began from the ships and batteries along the whole front, while at 10.30 a.m. the New Zealand attack commenced. This was vigorously opposed by the enemy, who had received reinforcements during the night, but the advance continued, and by 1.30 p.m. about 200 yards had been gained. The French Expeditionary Force at this time reported that they could not advance until further progress had been made by the British. At 4 p.m. orders were given for the whole line, reinforced by the 2nd Australian Brigade, to advance on Krithia at 5.30 p.m. after a preliminary bombardment at 5.15 p.m., and this was well carried out. The French 2nd Division stormed the first Turkish redoubt, lost it, rallied and regained it, while the 1st Division, after many difficulties, succeeded in gaining two lines of Turkish redoubts and trenches. The New Zealanders, after severe losses, succeeded in reaching a point within a few yards of the Turkish trenches which had held up the advance beyond the first, and entrenched themselves, while the 2nd Australian Brigade advanced through the composite division and gained about 400 yards of ground in spite of heavy losses. The general result of the operations was an advance of about 400 to 600 yards on the British section, and the capture of important works by the French. During this day the Australians at Gaba Tepe made frequent attacks on the enemy and had much heavy fighting, particularly around Quinn's Post.

MAY 9TH—10TH.—The Turks made vigorous counter-attacks on the main position, but failed to make any impression; and for the first time the General Officer Commanding felt that he had secured a fairly firm foothold on the southern end of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The 42nd Division landed on May 9th. At Gaba Tepe a night assault on the trenches in front of Quinn's Post was successfully carried out, but, owing to a strong Turkish attack on May 10th, this position had to be evacuated. The General Officer Commanding telegraphed for reinforcements: two divisions to be sent from home.

MAY 10TH—11TH.—The 29th Division was withdrawn from the trenches, after eighteen days and nights of extremely hard fighting, for a rest. It was replaced by the 29th Indian Brigade and the newly-joined 42nd Division. On the night of May 10th—11th, the 6th Gurkhas succeeded in reaching the top of the high cliff north-east of Y beach, making a very successful preliminary reconnaissance of the position.

MAY 12TH—13TH.—Arrangements were made for the 29th Indian Division to attack the position, now known as Gurka Bluff, reconnoitred on May 11th. The plan was for the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division to make a demonstration, assisted by the fire of the ships and all available field guns, while the 6th Gurkhas crept up the height. At 6.30 p.m., covered by the fire of the artillery, a company of Gurkhas rushed the cliff, and at 4.30 a.m. on May 13th another company drew up alongside. At 5.30 a.m. these companies entrenched and connected diagonally with the trenches held by the rest of the battalion. At 6 a.m. a third company was pushed up, while a fourth held the old line of trench. As a general result it may be said that the left flank of the position had now advanced nearly 500 yards, the losses being small.

MAY 14TH.—General Gouraud arrived and took over the command of the French Expeditionary Force. There was steady fighting all along the front. On the night of May 14th—15th a sortie was made from Quinn's Post, but no definite results were obtained.

MAY 15TH.—Severe fighting on the main front. At Gaba Tepe, Major-General W. T. Bridges, Commanding the Australian Division, was severely wounded. His death took place a few days later, much to the regret of all ranks.

MAY 16TH—18TH.—Steady fighting along both fronts. On May 17th General Officer Commanding asked for two new army corps to be sent from home. The 52nd Division arrived from home. A series of very strong attacks, preceded by bombardment from newly brought up heavy artillery, were made on Gaba Tepe.

MAY 19TH.—At 4 a.m. a strong Turkish column attacked No. 2 section of the defensive line; and, although this was repulsed with great loss, five more attacks were made in the same way. Similar attacks were made on No. 4 section, Quinn's Post, Courtney's Post, and on the right section. By 5 a.m. there was severe fighting all along the line, and, although about 9.30 a.m. the Turks pressed Quinn's and Courtney's Posts very hard, they had eventually to retire. At 11 a.m. the enemy began to withdraw his troops and the operations ceased. The Turkish losses were very heavy—considerably over 3,000; the British were about 600.

MAY 20TH.—At Gaba Tepe the Turks made proposals for an armistice to bury the dead at about 5 p.m., but, as the officers sent were not properly authenticated, arrangements were made to discuss correctly authorized suggestions at 8 p.m. It was, however, noticed that very large Turkish reinforcements were being brought up, and consequently the enemy was notified that no further steps could be taken that night. At 8 p.m. the Turks attacked all along the line, but with no very great vigour.

MAY 21ST.—By 4 a.m. the attack at Gaba Tepe died down. On this date an arrangement for a truce, to last from 7.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. on May 24th, was made.

MAY 24TH.—The armistice arranged for on May 21st was duly carried out.

MAY 25TH.—Assisted by two destroyers, Royal Navy, a raid was carried out on Nibrunesi Point, the telephone line and an observing station being destroyed. On the main front the 42nd and Royal Naval Divisions gained about 100 yards of ground.

MAY 28TH.—Raids were successfully made on a post 1,000 yards north of Gaba Tepe and against an enemy's trench on the left of the British line.

MAY 29TH.—On the main front the British made a small further advance, while the French captured a small redoubt on the extreme Turkish left, west of Kereves Dere. All Turkish attacks were repulsed.

On the Gaba Tepe front, the Turks succeeded in springing a mine near the centre of Quinn's Post about 3.30 a.m., and partially captured the position. By 6 a.m., however, the place was retaken. The Turks made a fresh attack at 6.30 a.m., but gained no ground; the operation stopped about 8.45 a.m.

MAY 30TH.—Gaba Tepe front: Sorties were made from Quinn's Post, with some success, at 1 p.m., but the ground gained had to be given up, owing to heavy pressure from the enemy.

Main front: Heavy night attacks by the enemy were repulsed.

MAY 31ST.—Gaba Tepe front: Heavy fighting about Quinn's Post.

Main front: Heavy night attacks by the Turks repulsed.

JUNE 1ST—3RD.—A great deal of fighting along both fronts.

JUNE 4TH.—On the main front the line of battle was formed from right to left as follows:—French Expeditionary Force, Royal Naval Division, 42nd (East Lancs.) Division, and 29th Division. The length of the front was about 4,000 yards, held by about 24,000 infantry, with a reserve of 7,000 men.

At 8 a.m. the Allies commenced a heavy bombardment of the Turkish lines, which lasted, with short intermissions, till 12 noon. At that hour the whole line

advanced to the attack. This assault was at first extremely successful, as the 1st French Division carried the trenches in front of them, while the 2nd French Division captured the "Haricot" redoubt, a very strong work. The Royal Naval Division was also very successful, and by 12.25 p.m. was in possession of the first line of Turkish trenches opposite their former position. The 42nd Division assaulted with great vigour, and by 12.30 p.m. had occupied fully the second line of trenches opposing them. The 29th Division also did remarkably well, and succeeded, after heavy losses, in capturing the first line of the enemy's trenches. The principal difficulties were on the extreme left of the line, where, although every effort was made to advance, the severe fire of the enemy prevented anything effective being done.

About 1 p.m., owing to a very heavy counter-attack, the French had to retire from the "Haricot" redoubt. This uncovered the right of the Royal Naval Division, which had therefore to give up the trenches they had won, and by 1.30 p.m. the whole of the troops in this sector of the position were back in their original lines. As the position of the 42nd (East Lincs.) Division was now very insecure, owing to the retirement on the right, it was arranged to make a fresh assault all along the line at 3 p.m., but the French reported that they could not advance again that day with any prospect of success, and the attack had to be abandoned. It therefore became necessary at 6.30 p.m. to withdraw the 42nd Division back to its original position; this was duly done, but the losses were considerable. The general net result of operations was an advance of from 200 to 400 yards. Our losses were heavy, but those of the enemy, from all accounts, were heavier still.

Gaba Teppe front: In order to prevent the enemy sending assistance to their forces on the main front, vigorous assaults were made on this flank. A bombardment of the Turkish trenches, about Gaba Teppe, the Navy assisting, was very successful, and a sortie from Quinn's Post at 11 p.m., although at first driven back, eventually succeeded, with considerable loss to the enemy. Another sortie from the same work inflicted a good deal of damage on the enemy, and our troops returned to their original positions without serious loss.

JUNE 5TH.—Gaba Teppe front: A sortie was made from Quinn's Post against a work known as "German Officers' Trench." This was very successful, a good deal of damage being done, while the Allies' casualties were only 36.

JUNE 6TH—20TH.—Heavy fighting along the whole line on both fronts.

JUNE 21ST.—The French made a series of heavy assaults. The 2nd Division, at 12 noon, stormed the trenches in front of them and captured the "Haricot" redoubt. Meanwhile the 1st Division assaulted the lines in front of them, but were unable to hold them, owing to the heavy attacks made by the enemy. A fresh effort was made unsuccessfully, but, as the loss of these trenches would have compelled the 2nd Division to retire, another and successful attack was made at 6 p.m., with result that a distance of some 600 yards was gained all along the French position.

JUNE 22ND—27TH.—There was considerable fighting all along both fronts.

JUNE 28TH.—As there had always been great difficulty in advancing on the extreme left of the position, it was decided to make a vigorous effort on this side. At 10.20 a.m. a heavy bombardment commenced, and the Border Regiment carried the "Boomerang" redoubt at 10.45 a.m. At 11 a.m. the 87th Brigade had captured two lines of trenches, and fair progress had been made on their right; but at the pivotal point the 156th Brigade was unable to make much advance. A second attack was therefore made at 11.30 a.m.; this was very successful, as two more lines were taken, and the whole general position was much improved, especially as the Indian Brigade managed to secure a spur running from the west of the further captured trench to the sea.

JUNE 29TH—30TH.—Two very heavy attacks were made by the Turks on the Gaba Tepe position: one about 1.30 a.m., another about 2.30 a.m. Both failed completely, with very heavy loss to the enemy.

APPENDIX X.

*Despatch from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the British Forces,
dated October 15th, 1915.*

General Headquarters, British Army in France,
October 15th, 1915.

My Lord,—I have the honour to report the operations of the forces under my command since the date of those described in my last despatch dated June 15th, 1915.

1. Those of the greatest importance took place during the last days of the period under report. Nevertheless the Army under my command was constantly engaged throughout the whole time in enterprises which, although not securing the same important results, have yet had considerable influence on the course of events.

2. On June 2nd the enemy made a final offensive in the Ypres salient with the object of gaining our trenches and position at Hooge. The attack was most determined, and was preceded by a severe bombardment. A gallant defence was made by troops of the 3rd Cavalry Division and 1st Indian Cavalry Division, and our position was maintained throughout. During the first weeks of June the front of the Second Army was extended to the north as far as the village of Boesinghe.

3. After the conclusion of the battle of Festubert the troops of the First Army were engaged in several minor operations. By an attack delivered on the evening of June 15th, after a prolonged bombardment, the 1st Canadian Brigade obtained possession of the German front line trenches north-east of Givenchy, but were unable to retain them owing to their flanks being too much exposed.

4. On June 16th an attack was carried out by the Vth Corps on the Bellewaarde Ridge, east of Ypres. The enemy's front line was captured, many of his dead and wounded being found in the trenches. The troops, pressing forward, gained ground as far east as the Bellewaarde Lake, but found themselves unable to maintain this advanced position. They were, however, successful in securing and consolidating the ground won during the first part of the attack, on a front of a thousand yards, including the advanced portion of the enemy's salient north of the Ypres—Menin road.

During this action the fire of the artillery was most effective, the prisoners testifying to its destructiveness and accuracy. It also prevented the delivery of counter-attacks, which were paralysed at the outset. Over two hundred prisoners were taken, besides some machine-guns, trench material, and gas apparatus. Holding attacks by the neighbouring IInd and VIth Corps were successful in helping the main attack, whilst the XXXVIth French Corps co-operated very usefully with artillery fire on Pilkem.

Near Hill 60 the 15th Infantry Brigade made four bombing attacks, gaining and occupying about fifty yards of trench.

On July 6th a small attack was made by the 11th Infantry Brigade on a German salient between Boesinghe and Ypres, which resulted in the capture of a frontage of about 500 yards of trench and a number of prisoners.

In the course of this operation it was necessary to move a gun of the 135th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, into the front line to destroy an enemy sap-head.

To reach its position the gun had to be taken over a high canal embankment, rafted over the canal under fire, pulled up a bank with a slope of nearly 45 degrees, and then dragged over three trenches and a sky line to its position seventy yards from the German lines. This was carried out without loss. This incident is of minor importance in itself, but I quote it as an example of the daily difficulties which officers and men in the trenches are constantly called upon to overcome, and of the spirit of initiative and resource which is so marked a feature amongst them.

From July 10th to the 12th the enemy made attempts, after heavy shelling, to recapture the lost portion of their line; but our artillery, assisted by that of the French on our left, prevented any serious assault from being delivered. Minor attacks were constant, but were easily repulsed by the garrison of our trenches. On July 19th an enemy's redoubt at the western end of the Hooze defences was successfully mined and destroyed, and a small portion of the enemy's trenches was captured.

5. Since my last despatch a new device has been adopted by the enemy for driving burning liquid into our trenches with a strong jet. Thus supported, an attack was made on the trenches of the Second Army at Hooze, on the Menin road, early on July 30th. Most of the infantry occupying these trenches were driven back, but their retirement was due far more to the surprise and temporary confusion caused by the burning liquid than to the actual damage inflicted. Gallant endeavours were made by repeated counter-attacks to recapture the lost section of trenches. These, however, proving unsuccessful and costly, a new line of trenches was consolidated a short distance further back. Attacks made by the enemy at the same time west of Bellewaarde Lake were repulsed.

On August 9th these losses were brilliantly regained, owing to a successful attack carried out by the 6th Division. This attack was very well executed and resulted in the recapture, with small casualties, not only of the whole of the lost trenches, but, in addition, of 400 yards of German trench north of the Menin road. At the end of this engagement it was estimated that between four and five hundred German dead were lying on the battlefield. Valuable help was rendered by two batteries of French artillery lent by General Hely d'Oysel, commanding XXXVIth French Corps.

6. From the conclusion of the above-mentioned operations until the last week in September there was relative quiet along the whole of the British line, except at those points where the normal conditions of existence comprised occasional shelling or constant mine and bomb warfare. In these trying forms of encounter all ranks have constantly shown the greatest enterprise and courage, and have consistently maintained the upper hand.

The close accord and co-operation which have always existed between the Commander-in-Chief of our Allies and myself have been maintained, and I have had constant meetings with General Joffre, who has kept me informed of his views and intentions, and explained the successive methods by which he hopes to attain his ultimate object. After full discussion of the military situation a decision was arrived at for joint action, in which I acquiesced. It was arranged that we should make a combined attack from certain points of the Allied line during the last week in September.

The reinforcements I have received enabled me to comply with several requests which General Joffre has made that I should take over additional portions of the French line.

7. In fulfilment of the rôle assigned to it in these operations the Army under my command attacked the enemy on the morning of September 25th. The main attack was delivered by the 1st and IVth Corps between La Bassée Canal on

the north and a point of the enemy's line opposite the village of Grenay on the south. At the same time a secondary attack, designed with the object of distracting the enemy's attention and holding his troops to their ground, was made by the Vth Corps on Bellewaarde Farm, situated to the east of Ypres. Subsidiary attacks with similar objects were delivered by the IIIrd and Indian Corps north of the La Bassée Canal and along the whole front of the Second Army. The object of the secondary attack by the Vth Corps was most effectively achieved, for not only was the enemy contained on that front, but we have reason to believe that reserves were hurried toward that point of the line.

The attack was made at daybreak by the 3rd and 14th Divisions, and at first the greater part of the enemy's front line was taken; but, owing to the powerful artillery fire concentrated against them, the troops were unable to retain the ground, and had to return to their original trenches toward nightfall. The Vth Corps succeeded, however, in capturing two officers and 138 other prisoners. Similar demonstrations with equally good results were made along the whole front of the Second Army.

With the same object in view, those units of the First Army occupying the line north of the Bethune—La Bassée Canal were detailed to carry out some minor operations. Portions of the Ist Corps assaulted the enemy's trenches at Givenchy. The Indian Corps attacked the Moulin du Piètre, while the IIIrd Corps was directed against the trenches at Le Bridoux. These attacks started at daybreak and were at first successful all along the line. Later in the day the enemy brought up strong reserves, and after hard fighting and variable fortunes the troops engaged in this part of the line reoccupied their original trenches at nightfall. They succeeded admirably, however, in fulfilling the rôle allotted to them, and in holding large numbers of the enemy away from the main attack. The 8th Division of the IIIrd Corps and the Meerut Division of the Indian Corps were principally engaged in this part of the line.

On the front of the Third Army subsidiary operations of a similar nature were successfully carried out.

The wing of the Royal Flying Corps attached to this army performed valuable work by undertaking distant flights behind the enemy's lines and by successfully blowing up railways, wrecking trains, and damaging stations on his line of communication by means of bomb attacks. Valuable assistance was rendered by Vice-Admiral Bacon and a squadron of His Majesty's ships operating off Zeebrugge and Ostend.

8. The general plan of the main attack on September 25th was as follows:—

In co-operation with an offensive movement by the Tenth French Army on our right, the Ist and IVth Corps were to attack the enemy from a point opposite the little mining village of Grenay on the south to the La Bassée Canal on the north. The Vermelles—Hulluch road was to be the dividing line between the two Corps, the IVth Corps delivering the right attack, the Ist Corps the left.

In view of the great length of line along which the British troops were operating, it was necessary to keep a strong reserve in my own hand. The XIth Corps, consisting of the Guards, the 21st and the 24th Divisions, were detailed for this purpose. This reserve was the more necessary owing to the fact that the Tenth French Army had to postpone its attack until 1 o'clock in the day; and, further, that the Corps operating on the French left had to be directed in a more or less south-easterly direction, involving, in case of our success, a considerable gap in our line.

To ensure, however, the speedy and effective support to the Ist and IVth Corps in the case of their success, the 21st and 24th Divisions passed the night of the 24th-25th on the line Beuvry (to the east of Bethune)—Noeux les Mines. The

Guards' Division was in the neighbourhood of Lillers on the same night. I also directed the General Officer Commanding Second Army to draw the 28th Division back to Bailleul and to hold it in readiness to meet unexpected eventualities.

The British Cavalry Corps, less 3rd Cavalry Division, under General Fanshawe, was posted in the neighbourhood of St. Pol and Bailleul les Pernes; and the Indian Cavalry Corps, under General Rimington, at Doullens; both in readiness to co-operate with the French Cavalry in exploiting any success which might be attained by the combined French and British Forces. Plans for effective co-operation were fully arranged between the cavalry commanders of both armies. The 3rd Cavalry Division, less one brigade, was assigned to the General Officer Commanding First Army as a reserve, and moved into the area of the IVth Corps on September 21st and 22nd.

9. Opposite the front of the main line of attack the distance between the enemy's trenches and our own varied from about 100 to 500 yards. The country over which the advance took place is open and overgrown with long grass and self-sown crops. From the canal southward our trenches and those of the enemy ran, roughly, parallel up an almost imperceptible rise to the south-west. From the Vermelles—Hulluch road southward the advantage of height is on the enemy's side as far as the Bethune—Lens road. There two lines of trenches cross a spur in which the rise culminates, and thence the command lies on the side of the British trenches. Due east of the intersection of spur and trenches, and a short mile away, stands Loos. Less than a mile further south-east is Hill 70, which is the summit of the gentle rise in the ground.

Other notable tactical points in our front were:—

"*Fosse 8*" (a thousand yards south of Auchy), which is a coal mine with a high and strongly defended slag heap.

"*The Hohenzollern Redoubt*."—A strong work thrust out nearly five hundred yards in front of the German lines and close to our own. It is connected with their front line by three communication trenches abutting into the defences of *Fosse 8*.

Cité St. Elie.—A strongly defended mining village lying fifteen hundred yards south of Haisnes.

"*The Quarries*."—Lying half way to the German trenches west of *Cité St. Elie*.

Hulluch.—A village strung out along a small stream, lying less than half a mile south-east of *Cité St. Elie* and 3,000 yards north-east of Loos.

Half a mile north of Hill 70 is "*Puits 14 bis*," another coal mine, possessing great possibilities for defence when taken in conjunction with a strong redoubt situated on the north-east side of Hill 70.

10. The attacks of the Ist and IVth Corps were delivered at 6.30 a.m. and were successful all along the line, except just south of the La Bassée Canal. The enemy met the advance by wild infantry fire of slight intensity, but his artillery fire was accurate and caused considerable casualties.

The 47th Division on the right of the IVth Corps rapidly swung its left forward and occupied the southern outskirts of Loos and a big double slag heap opposite Grenay, known as the Double Crassier. Thence it pushed on, and, by taking possession of the cemetery, the enclosures and chalk pits south of Loos, succeeded in forming a strong defensive flank. This London Territorial Division acquitted itself most creditably. It was skilfully led and the troops carried out their task with great energy and determination. They contributed largely to our success in this part of the field.

On the left of the 47th Division a Scottish Division of the New Armies (15th Division) assaulted Loos, Hill 70, and *Fosse 14 bis*. The attack was admirably delivered, and in a little more than an hour parts of the division occupied Loos

and its northern outskirts, Puits 14 bis, and Hill 70, whilst some units had pushed on as far as Cité St. Auguste, a mile east of Hill 70.

The 15th Division carried out its advance with the greatest vigour, in spite of its left flank being exposed, owing to the 1st Division on its left having been checked.

About 1 p.m. the enemy brought up strong reserves, and the advanced portions of the division at Fosse 14 bis and on the far side of Hill 70 were driven in. We had, however, secured the very substantial gain of Loos and the western portion of Hill 70.

11. At 9.30 a.m. I placed the 21st and 24th Divisions at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding First Army, who at once ordered the General Officer Commanding the XIth Corps to move them up in support of the attacking troops. Between 11 a.m. and 12 noon the central brigades of these divisions filed past me at Bethune and Noeux les Mines respectively. At 11.30 a.m. the heads of both divisions were within three miles of our original trench line. As the success of the 47th Division on the right of the IVth Corps caused me less apprehension of a gap in our line near that point, I ordered the Guards Division up to Noeux les Mines, and the 28th Division to move in a southerly direction from Bailleul.

12. The 1st Division, attacking on the left of the 15th, was unable at first to make any headway with its right brigade. The brigade on its left (the 1st) was, however, able to get forward and penetrated into the outskirts of the village of Hulluch, capturing some gun positions on the way.

The determined advance of this brigade, with its right flank dangerously exposed, was most praiseworthy, and, combined with the action of divisional reserves, was instrumental in causing the surrender of a German detachment some 500 strong, which was holding up the advance of the right brigade in the front system of trenches. The inability of the right of this division to get forward had, however, caused sufficient delay to enable the enemy to collect local reserves behind the strong second line.

The arrangements, the planning and execution of the attack, and the conduct of the troops of the IVth Corps were most efficient and praiseworthy.

13. In the attack of the 1st Corps the 7th Division was directed on the Quarries. The 9th Division was to capture the Hohenzollern Redoubt and then to push on to Fosse 8. The assault of the 7th Division succeeded at once, and in a very short time they had reached the western edge of the Quarries, Cité St. Elie, and even the village of Haisnes, the tendency of the action having been to draw the troops northward.

On the right of the 9th Division the 26th Brigade secured Fosse 8 after heavy fighting, and the 28th Brigade captured the front line of the German trenches east of Vermelles railway. At the latter point the fighting was extremely severe; and this brigade, suffering considerable losses, was driven back to its own trenches.

At nightfall, after a heavy day's fighting and numerous German counter-attacks, the line was, roughly, as follows:—From the Double Crassier, south of Loos, by the western part of Hill 70, to the western exit of Hulluch; thence by the Quarries and western end of Cité St. Elie, east of Fosse 8, back to our original line.

Throughout the length of the line heavy fighting was in progress, and our hold on Fosse 8, backed as it is by the strong defences and guns of Auchy, was distinctly precarious. Heavy rain fell throughout the day, which was very detrimental to efficient observation of fire and reconnaissance by aircraft.

In the course of the night September 25th-26th the enemy delivered a series of heavy counter-attacks along most of our new front. The majority of these were repulsed with heavy loss; but in parts of the line, notably near the Quarries, our troops were driven back a certain distance.

At 6 p.m. the Guards Division arrived at Noeux les Mines, and on the morning of the 26th I placed them at the disposal of the General Officer commanding First Army..

14. The situation at the Quarries, described above, was readjusted by an attack of the 7th Division on the afternoon of September 26th; and on that evening very heavy attacks delivered by the enemy were repulsed with severe loss.

On the IVth Corps front attacks on Hulluch and on the redoubt on the east side of Hill 70 were put in operation, but were anticipated by the enemy organizing a very strong offensive from that direction. These attacks drove in the advanced troops of the 21st and 24th Divisions, which were then moving forward to attack. Reports regarding this portion of the action are very conflicting, and it is not possible to form an entirely just appreciation of what occurred in this part of the field.

At nightfall there was no change up to Hill 70, except for a small gain of ground south of Loos. From Hill 70 the line bent sharply back to the north-west as far as Loos—La Bassée road, which it followed for a thousand yards, bearing thence north-eastward to near the west end of Hulluch. Thence northward it was the same as it had been on the previous night.

The night of September 26th-27th was as disturbed as the previous night, for many further counter-attacks were made and constant pressure was maintained by the enemy. A dismounted cavalry brigade was thrown into Loos to form a garrison. On this day I placed the 28th Division at the disposal of the General Officer commanding First Army.

I regret to say that Major-General Sir Thompson Capper, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., commanding 7th Division, was severely wounded on the 26th and died on the morning of the 27th. He was a most distinguished and capable leader, and his loss will be severely felt.

15. Soon after dawn on the 27th it became apparent that the brigade holding Fosse 8 was unable to maintain its position, and eventually it was slowly forced back, until at length our front at this point coincided with the eastern portion of the Hohenzollern Redoubt.

I regret to say that during this operation Major-General G. H. Thesiger, C.B., C.M.G., A.D.C., commanding the 9th Division, was killed whilst most gallantly endeavouring to secure the ground which had been won.

In the afternoon of this day the Guards Division, which had taken over part of the line to the north of the IVth Corps, almost restored our former line, bringing it up parallel to and slightly west of the Lens—La Bassée road. This division made a very brilliant and successful attack on Hill 70 in the afternoon. They drove the Germans off the top of the hill, but could not take the redoubt, which is on the north-east slopes below the crest. They also took the Chalk Pit which lies north of Puits 14, and all the adjacent woods, but were unable to maintain themselves in the Puits itself, which was most effectively commanded by well-posted machine-guns.

The 47th Division on the right of the Guards captured a wood further to the south and repulsed a severe hostile counter-attack.

The 28th was passed in consolidating the ground gained and in making a certain number of internal moves of divisions, in order to give the troops rest and to enable those units whose casualties had been heavy to refill their ranks with reinforcements. The 47th Division made a little more ground to the south, capturing one field gun and a few machine-guns. On the evening of this day the situation remained practically unchanged.

16. The line occupied by the troops of the First Army south of the canal became now very much extended by the salient with which it indented the enemy's line.

The French Tenth Army had been very heavily opposed, and I considered that the advance they were able to make did not afford sufficient protection to my right flank. On representing this to General Joffre, he was kind enough to ask the Commander of the northern group of French armies to render me assistance. General Foch met these demands in the same friendly spirit which he has always displayed throughout the course of the whole campaign, and expressed his readiness to give me all the support he could. On the morning of the 28th we discussed the situation, and the General agreed to send the IXth French Corps to take over the ground occupied by us extending from the French left up to and including that portion of Hill 70 which we were holding, and also the village of Loos. This relief was commenced on September 30th, and completed on the two following nights.

17. During September 29th and 30th and the first days of October fighting was almost continuous along the northern part of the new line, particularly about the Hohenzollern Redoubt and neighbouring trenches, to which the enemy evidently attached great value. His attacks, however, invariably broke down with very heavy loss under the accurate fire of our infantry and artillery.

The Germans succeeded in gaining some ground in and about the Hohenzollern Redoubt, but they paid heavily for it in the losses they suffered.

Our troops all along the front were busily engaged in consolidating and strengthening the ground won, and the efficient and thorough manner in which this work was carried out reflects the greatest credit upon all ranks. Every precaution was made to deal with the counter-attack, which was inevitable.

During these operations the weather has been most unfavourable, and the troops have had to fight in rain and mud and often in darkness. Even these adverse circumstances have in no way affected the magnificent spirit continually displayed alike by officers and men. In the casualty clearing and dressing stations, of which I visited a great number during the course of the action, I found nothing but the most cheery optimism among the wounded.

I have to deplore the loss of a third most valuable and distinguished General of Division during these operations. On the afternoon of October 2nd Major-General F. D. V. Wing, C.B., commanding the 12th Division, was killed.

18. On the afternoon of October 8th our expectations in regard to a counter-attack were fulfilled. The enemy directed a violent and intense attack all along the line from Fosse 8 on the north to the right of the French IXth Corps on the south. The attack was delivered by some twenty-eight battalions in first line, with larger forces in support, and was prepared by a very heavy bombardment from all parts of the enemy's front.

At all parts of the line, except two, the Germans were repulsed with tremendous loss, and it is computed on reliable authority that they left some eight to nine thousand dead lying on the battlefield in front of the British and French trenches.

On the right the attack succeeded in making a small and unimportant lodgment on the Double Crassier held by the French; whilst on the left the trench held by troops of the Guards Division to the north-east of the Hohenzollern Redoubt was temporarily captured. The latter was, however, speedily retaken, and at midnight on October 9th the line held by the First Army was identically the same as that held before the enemy's attack started.

The main enemy attacks on the front held by our troops had been against the 1st Division in the neighbourhood of the Chalk Pit and the Guards Division in the neighbourhood of the Hohenzollern Redoubt. Both attacks were repulsed, and the enemy lost heavily from machine-gun and artillery fire.

From subsequent information it transpired that the German attack was made by about twelve battalions against the line Loos—Chalk Pit, and that a

subsidiary attack by six to eight battalions was made from the direction of the Hohenzollern Redoubt against the Guards Division. Some eight or ten German battalions were directed against the French IXth Corps.

19. The position assaulted and carried with so much brilliancy and dash by the 1st and IVth Corps on September 25th was an exceptionally strong one. It extended along a distance of some 6,500 yards, consisted of a double line, which included works of considerable strength, and was a network of trenches and bomb-proof shelters. Some of the dug-outs and shelters formed veritable caves thirty feet below the ground, with almost impenetrable head cover. The enemy had expended months of labour upon perfecting these defences.

The total number of prisoners captured during these operations amounted to 57 officers and 3,000 other ranks. Material which fell into our hands included 26 field-guns, 40 machine-guns, and 3 minenwerfer.

I deeply regret the heavy casualties which were incurred in this battle, but in view of the great strength of the position, the stubborn defence of the enemy, and the powerful artillery by which he was supported, I do not think they were excessive. I am happy to be able to add that the proportion of slightly wounded is relatively very large indeed.

20. Since the date of my last despatch the Army has received strong reinforcements, and every reinforcement has had its quota of field artillery. In addition, numerous batteries of heavy guns and howitzers have been added to the strength of the heavy artillery. The arrival of these reinforcements in the field has tested the capacity of the artillery as a whole to expand to meet the requirements of the Army and to maintain the high level of efficiency that has characterized this arm throughout the campaign. Our enemy may have hoped, not perhaps without reason, that it would be impossible for us, starting from such small beginnings, to build up an efficient artillery to provide for the very large expansion of the Army. If he entertained such hopes, he has now good reason to know that they have not been justified by the result.

The efficiency of the artillery of the New Armies has exceeded all expectations, and during the period under review excellent services have been rendered by the Territorial artillery.

The necessity to denude the old batteries of Regular Horse and Field Artillery of officers and non-commissioned officers, in order to provide for the expansion referred to, has not in any way impaired their efficiency, and they continue to set an example to all by their high standard and devotion to duty.

I must give a special word of praise to the officers and rank and file of the Royal Garrison Artillery for the admirable way in which they have accustomed themselves to the conditions of active service in the field, to which for the most part they were unaccustomed, and for the manner in which they have applied their general knowledge of gunnery to the special problems arising in trench warfare. The excellence of their training and the accuracy of their shooting have, I feel sure, made a marked impression on the enemy.

21. The work of the artillery during the daily life in the trenches calls for increasing vigilance and the maintenance of an intricate system of communications in a thorough state of efficiency, in order that the guns may be ever ready to render assistance to the infantry when necessity arises. A high standard of initiative is also required in order to maintain the moral ascendancy over the enemy, by impeding his working parties, destroying his works, and keeping his artillery fire under control. To the many calls upon them the artillery has responded in a manner that is altogether admirable.

In the severe offensive actions that have taken place it is not too much to say that the first element of success has been the artillery preparation of the attack. Only when this preparation has been thorough have our attacks succeeded. It is impossible to convey in a despatch an adequate impression of the amount of care and labour involved in the minute and exact preparations that are the necessary preliminaries of a bombardment preparatory to an attack in a modern battle. The immense number of guns that it is necessary to concentrate, the amount of ammunition to be supplied to them, and the diversity of the tasks to be carried out, demand a very high order of skill in organization and technical professional knowledge.

22. The successful attacks at Hooge on August 9th and of the First Army on September 25th show that our artillery officers possess the necessary talents and the rank and file the necessary skill and endurance to ensure success in operations of this character. Moreover, the repulse of the enemy's attack on October 8th in the neighbourhood of Loos and Hulluch with such heavy losses shows the capacity of the artillery to concentrate its fire promptly and effectively at a moment's notice for the defence of the front.

I cannot close these remarks on the artillery without expressing my admiration for the work of the observing officers and the men who work with them. Carrying out their duties, as they do, in close proximity to the front line in observing stations that are the special mark of the enemy's guns, they are constantly exposed to fire, and are compelled to carry on their work, involving the use of delicate instruments and the making of nice calculations, in circumstances of the greatest difficulty and danger. That they have never failed in their duties, and that they have suffered very heavy casualties in performing them, are to their lasting credit and honour.

The work of the artillery in co-operation with the Royal Flying Corps continues to make most satisfactory progress, and has been most highly creditable to all concerned.

The new weapons that have been placed in the field during the period under review have more than fulfilled expectations, and the enemy must be well aware of their accuracy and general efficiency.

23. I have on previous occasions called your Lordship's attention to the admirable work of the corps of the Royal Engineers. This work covers a very wide field, demanding a high standard of technical knowledge and skill, as well as unflagging energy; and throughout the supreme test of war these qualities have never been found wanting, thus reflecting the greatest credit on the organization of the corps as a whole, and on the training of the officers and men individually. The spirit which is imbued in all ranks, from the base ports to the front trenches and beyond, is the same. No matter where or how the personnel of the corps has been employed, devotion to duty and energy have been ever present.

In this despatch I wish particularly to draw attention to the work of the Field Units and Army Troops Companies, which must almost invariably be performed under the most trying circumstances by night as well as by day. Demanding qualities of whole-hearted courage and self-sacrifice, combined with sound judgment and instant action, the work of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men has been beyond all praise. The necessity for skilled labour at the front has been so continuous that Royal Engineer units have frequently been forced to forego those periods of rest which at times it has been possible to grant to other troops; but, in spite of this, they have responded loyally to every call on their services.

Notwithstanding the heavy casualties sustained by all ranks, the *esprit de corps* of the Royal Engineers is such that the new material is at once animated by the same ideals, and the same devotion to duty is maintained.

24. I desire to call your Lordship's attention to the splendid work carried out by the tunnelling companies. These companies, officered largely by mining engineers, and manned by professional miners, have devoted themselves wholeheartedly to the dangerous work of offensive and defensive mining, a task ever accompanied by great and unseen dangers. It is impossible within the limits of a despatch to give any just idea of the work of these units, but it will be found, when their history comes to be written, that it will present a story of danger, of heroism, and of difficulties surmounted worthy of the best traditions of the Royal Engineers, under whose general direction their work is carried out.

25. Owing to the repeated use by the enemy of asphyxiating gases in their attacks on our positions, I have been compelled to resort to similar methods; and a detachment was organized for this purpose, which took part in the operations commencing on September 25th for the first time. Although the enemy was known to have been prepared for such reprisals, our gas attack met with marked success, and produced a demoralizing effect in some of the opposing units, of which ample evidence was forthcoming in the captured trenches. The men who undertook this work carried out their unfamiliar duties during a heavy bombardment with conspicuous gallantry and coolness; and I feel confident in their ability to more than hold their own should the enemy again resort to this method of warfare.

26. I would again call your Lordship's attention to the work of the Royal Flying Corps. Throughout the summer, notwithstanding much unfavourable weather, the work of co-operating with the artillery, photographing the positions of the enemy, bombing their communications, and reconnoitring far over hostile territory has gone on unceasingly.

The volume of work performed steadily increases; the amount of flying has been more than doubled during this period. There have been more than 240 combats in the air, and in nearly every case our pilots have had to seek the enemy behind his own lines, where he is assisted by the fire of his movable anti-aircraft guns; and in spite of this they have succeeded in bringing down four of the German machines behind our trenches, and at least twelve in the enemy's lines, and many more have been seen to dive to earth in a damaged condition or to have retired from the fight. On one occasion an officer of the Royal Flying Corps engaged four enemy machines and drove them off, proceeding on his reconnaissance. On another occasion two officers engaged six hostile machines and disabled at least one of them.

Artillery observation and photography are two of the most trying tasks the Royal Flying Corps is called upon to perform, as our airmen must remain for long periods within easy range of the enemy's anti-aircraft guns. The work of observation for the guns from aeroplanes has now become an important factor in artillery fire, and the personnel of the two arms work in the closest co-operation.

As evidence of the dangers our flying officers are called upon to face, I may state that on one occasion a machine was hit in no fewer than 300 places soon after crossing the enemy's lines, and yet the officer successfully carried out his mission.

The Royal Flying Corps has on several occasions carried out a continuous bombing of the enemy's communications, descending to 500 feet and under in order to hit moving trains on the railway. This has, in some cases, been kept up day after day; and, during the operations at the end of September, in the space of five days, nearly six tons of explosives were dropped on moving trains, and are known to have practically wrecked five, some containing troops, and to have damaged the main railway line in many different places.

For the valuable work carried out by the Royal Flying Corps I am greatly indebted to their commander, Brigadier-General H. M. Trenchard, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.

27. Throughout the campaign the financial requirements of the Army have been successfully met by the Army Pay Department. The troops have been paid, and all claims against the Army discharged, with unbroken regularity, and the difficulties inseparable from a foreign banking system and a strange currency have been overcome. The work of the department has been greatly assisted by the Bank of France, the administration of which has spared no effort to help.

28. While the circumstances of this campaign have brought no exceptional strain on horses, great credit is due to all concerned for the excellent arrangements in the remount depôts and veterinary hospitals.

29. I am pleased to be able once more to report very favourably on the divisions of the New Armies which have arrived in this country since the date of my last report. It is evident that great trouble and much hard work have been expended on these units during their training at home, and it is found that they have received such sound teaching that a short period of instruction in trench life under fire soon enables them to take their places with credit beside their acclimatized comrades of the older formations.

30. The Territorial Force units have continued to merit the favourable remarks I have made on them in previous despatches, and have taken a prominent part in many of the active operations in which the Army has been engaged.

31. A new division has been sent from Canada and has joined the Army in the field. The material of which it is composed is excellent; and this division will, I am convinced, acquit itself as well in face of the enemy as the 1st Canadian Division has always done.

32. During the period under report I have been very glad once more to receive the Prime Minister at my Headquarters, as well as the Secretary of State for War. The Prime Minister of Canada and the Minister of Militia and Defence of Canada also came to France for a few days and visited the troops of the Canadian Contingent. The Chief Rabbi paid a short visit to the front and interested himself in the members of the large Jewish community now serving with the Army in the field.

33. I cannot conclude the account of these operations without expressing the deep admiration felt by all ranks of the Army under my command for the splendid part taken by our French Allies in the battle which opened on September 25th. Fortified positions of immense strength, upon which months of skill and labour had been expended, and which extended for many miles, were stormed and captured by our French comrades with a bravery and determination which went far to instil hope and spirit into the Allied Forces. The large captures of men and material which fell into their hands testified to the completeness of their victory. The close co-operation between the two armies of the Allied Powers, which has been so marked a feature throughout the whole campaign, has been as prominent as ever in the work of the last three weeks.

I have already referred to the cordial and willing help rendered by General Foch in the support of the IXth French Corps, and I have also once again to express my deep indebtedness to General d'Urbal, commanding the Tenth French Army, operating on my right; and to General Hely d'Oissel, commanding the French forces in the north.

34. The part taken by the troops of his Majesty the King of the Belgians was very effective in holding the enemy in front of them to his positions.

35. I have many names to bring to your Lordship's notice for valuable, gallant, and distinguished service during the period under review, and these will form the subject of a separate report at an early date.

I have the honour to be, your Lordship's most obedient servant,

J. D. P. FRENCH,

Field-Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, the British Army in France.

APPENDIX XI.

Despatch from the General Officer Commanding the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, dated 11th December, 1915.

1, Hyde Park Gardens, London, W.,

11th December, 1915.

MY LORD,—

For the understanding of the operations about to be described I must first set forth the situation as it appeared to me early in July.

The three days' battle of May 6th-8th had shown that neither of my forces, northern or southern, were strong enough to fight their way to the Narrows. On May 10th I had cabled asking that two fresh divisions might be sent to me to enable me to press on and so prevent my attack degenerating into trench warfare. On May 17th I again cabled, saying that if we were going to be left to face Turkey on our own resources we should require two army corps additional to my existing forces at the Dardanelles. The 52nd (Lowland) Division had been sent me, but between their dates of despatch and arrival Russia had given up the idea of co-operating from the coast of the Black Sea. Thereby several Turkish divisions were set free for the Dardanelles, and the battle of June 4th, locally successful as it was, found us just as weak, relatively, as we had been a month earlier.

During June Your Lordship became persuaded of the bearing of these facts, and I was promised three regular divisions plus the infantry of two Territorial divisions. The advance guard of these troops was due to reach Mudros by July 10th; by August 10th their concentration was to be complete.

Eliminating the impracticable, I had already narrowed down the methods of employing these fresh forces to one of the following four:—

- (a) Every man to be thrown on to the southern sector of the Peninsula to force a way forward to the Narrows.
- (b) Disembarkation on the Asiatic side of the Straits, followed by a march on Chanak.
- (c) A landing at Enos or Ebrije for the purpose of seizing the neck of the isthmus at Bulair.
- (d) Reinforcement of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, combined with a landing in Suvla Bay. Then with one strong push to capture Hill 305, and, working from that dominating point, to grip the waist of the Peninsula.

As to (a) I rejected that course—

(1) Because there were limits to the numbers which could be landed and deployed in one confined area.

(2) Because the capture of Krithia could no longer be counted upon to give us Achi Baba, an entirely new system of works having lately appeared upon the slopes of that mountain—works so planned that even if the enemy's western flank was

turned and driven back from the coast the central and eastern portions of the mountain could still be maintained as a bastion to Kilid Bahr.

(3) Because, if I tried to disengage myself both from Krithia and Achi Baba by landing due west of Kilid Bahr, my troops would be exposed to artillery fire from Achi Baba, the Olive Grove, and Kilid Bahr itself; the enemy's large reserves were too handy; there were not fair chances of success.

As to (b), although much of the Asiatic coast had now been wired and entrenched, the project was still attractive. Thereby the Turkish forces on the peninsula would be weakened; our beaches at Cape Helles would be freed from Asiatic shells; the threat to the enemy's sea communications was obvious. But when I descended into detail I found that the expected reinforcements would not run to a double operation. I mean that, unless I could make a thorough, whole-hearted attack on the enemy in the peninsula I should reap no advantage in that theatre, from the transference of the Turkish peninsula troops to reinforce Asia, whereas, if the British forces landed in Asia were not strong enough in themselves seriously to threaten Chanak, the Turks for their part would not seriously relax their grip upon the peninsula.

To cut the land communications of the whole of the Turkish peninsular army, as in (c), was a better scheme on paper than on the spot. The naval objections appeared to my coadjutor, Vice-Admiral de Robeck, well-nigh insurmountable. Already, owing to submarine dangers, all reinforcements, ammunition, and supplies had to be brought up from Mudros to Helles or Anzac by night in fleet-sweepers and trawlers. A new landing near Bulair would have added another 50 miles to the course such small craft must cover, thus placing too severe a strain upon the capacities of the flotilla. The landing promised special hazards, owing to the difficulty of securing the transports and covering ships from submarine attack. Ebrije has a bad beach, and the distance to Enos, the only point suitable to a disembarkation on a large scale, was so great that the enemy would have had time to organize a formidable opposition from his garrisons in Thrace. Four divisions at least would be required to overcome such opposition. These might now be found; but, even so, and presupposing every other obstacle overcome, it was by no manner of means certain that the Turkish army on the peninsula would thereby be brought to sue for terms, or that the Narrows would thereby be opened to the Fleet. The enemy would still be able to work supplies across the Straits from Chanak. The swiftness of the current, the shallow draft of the Turkish lighters, the guns of the forts, made it too difficult even for our dauntless submarine commanders to paralyse movement across these land-locked waters. To achieve that purpose I must bring my artillery fire to bear both on the land and water communications of the enemy.

This brings me to (d), the storming of that dominating height, Hill 305, with the capture of Maidos and Gaba Tepe as its sequel.

From the very first I had hoped that by landing a force under the heights of Sari Bair we should be able to strangle the Turkish communications to the southwards, whether by land or sea, and so clear the Narrows for the Fleet. Owing to the enemy's superiority, both in numbers and in position; owing to under-estimates of the strength of the original entrenchments prepared and sited under German direction; owing to the constant dwindling of the units of my force through wastage; owing also to the intricacy and difficulty of the terrain, these hopes had not hitherto borne fruit. But they were well founded. So much at least had clearly enough been demonstrated by the desperate and costly nature of the Turkish attacks. The Australians and New Zealanders had rooted themselves in very near to the vitals of the enemy. By their tenacity and courage they still held open the doorway from which one strong thrust forward might give us command of the Narrows.

From the naval point of view the auspices were also favourable. Suvla Bay was but one mile further from Mudros than Anzac, and its possession would ensure us a submarine-proof base and a harbour good against gales, excepting those from the south-west. There were, as might be expected, some special difficulties to be overcome. The broken, intricate country—the lack of water—the consequent anxious supply questions. Of these it can only be said that a bad country is better than an entrenched country, and that supply and water problems may be countered by careful preparation.

Before a man of the reinforcements had arrived, my mind was made up as to their employment, and by means of a vigorous offensive from Anzac, combined with a surprise landing to the north of it, I meant to try and win through to Maidos, leaving behind me a well-protected line of communications starting from the bay of Suvla.

Another point which had to be fixed in advance was the date. The new troops would gain in fighting value if they could first be given a turn in the trenches. So much was clear. But the relief of the troops already holding those trenches would have been a long and difficult task for the Navy, and time was everything, seeing that everywhere the enemy was digging in as fast as he possibly could dig. Also, where large numbers of troops were to be smuggled into Anzac and another large force was to land by surprise at Suvla, it was essential to eliminate the moon. Unless the plunge could be taken by the second week in August the whole venture must be postponed for a month. The dangers of such delay were clear. To realise them I had only to consider how notably my prospects would have been bettered had these same reinforcements arrived in time to enable me to anticipate the moon of July.

Place and date having shaped themselves, the intervening period had to be filled in with as much fighting as possible. First, to gain ground; secondly, to maintain the moral ascendancy which my troops had by this time established; thirdly, to keep the enemy's eyes fixed rather upon Helles than Anzac.

Working out my ammunition allowance, I found I could accumulate just enough high explosive shell to enable me to deliver one serious attack per each period of three weeks. I was thus limited to a single effort on the large scale, plus a prescribed unceasing offensive routine, with bombing, sniping, and mining as its methods.

The action of July 12th and 13th was meant to be a sequel to the action of June 28th. That advance had driven back the Turkish right on to their second main system of defence just south of Krithia. But, on my centre and right, the enemy still held their forward system of trenches, and it was my intention on July 12th to seize the remaining trenches of this foremost system from the sea at the mouth of the Kereves Dere to the main Sedd-el-Bahr—Krithia road, along a front of some 2,000 yards.

On our right the attack was to be entrusted to the French Corps; on the right centre to the 52nd (Lowland) Division. On the 52nd Division's front the operation was planned to take place in two phases: our right was to attack in the morning, our left in the afternoon. Diversions by the 29th Division on the left of the southern section and at Anzac were to take place on the same day, so as to prevent the enemy's reserves from reinforcing the real point of attack.

At 7.35 a.m., after a heavy bombardment, the troops, French and Scottish, dashed out of their trenches and at once captured two lines of enemy trenches. Pushing forward with fine *élan* the 1st Division of the French Corps completed the task assigned to it by carrying the whole of the Turkish forward system of works, namely, the line of trenches skirting the lower part of the Kereves Dere. Further to the left the 2nd French Division and our 155th Brigade maintained the two lines

of trenches they had gained. But on the left of the 155th Brigade the 4th Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers, pressed on too eagerly. They not only carried the third line of trenches, but charged on up the hill and beyond the third line, then advanced indeed until they came under the "feu de barrage" of the French artillery. Nothing could live under so cruel a cross fire from friend and foe, so the King's Own Scottish Borderers were forced to fall back with heavy losses to the second line of enemy trenches, which they had captured in their first rush.

During this fighting telephone wires from forward positions were cut by enemy's shell fire, and here and there in the elaborate network of trenches numbers of Turks were desperately resisting to the last. Thus, though the second line of captured trenches continued to be held as a whole, much confused fighting ensued; there were retirements in parts of the line, reserves were rapidly being used up, and generally the situation was anxious and uncertain. But the best way of clearing it up seemed to be to deliver the second phase of the attack by the 157th Brigade just as it had originally been arranged. Accordingly, after a preliminary bombardment, the 157th Brigade rushed forward under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, and splendidly carried the whole of the enemy trenches allotted as their objective. Here, then, our line had advanced some 400 yards, while the 155th Brigade and the 2nd French Division had advanced between 200 and 300 yards. At 6 p.m. the 52nd Division was ordered to make the line good; it seemed to be fairly in our grasp.

All night long determined counter-attacks, one after another, were repulsed by the French and the 155th Brigade, but about 7.30 a.m. the right of the 157th Brigade gave way before a party of bombers, and our grip upon the enemy began to weaken.

I therefore decided that three battalions of the Royal Naval Division should reinforce a fresh attack to be made that afternoon, July 13th, on such portions of our original objectives as remained in the enemy's hands. This second attack was a success. The 1st French Division pushed their right down to the mouth of the Kereves Dere; the 2nd French Division attacked the trenches they had failed to take on the preceding day; the Nelson Battalion, on the left of the Royal Naval Division attack, valiantly advanced and made good, well supported by the artillery of the French. The Portsmouth Battalion, pressing on too far, fell into precisely the same error at precisely the same spot as did the 4th King's Own Scottish Borderers on the 12th, an over-impetuosity which cost them heavy losses.

The 1/5th Royal Scots Fusiliers, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel J. B. Pollok-McCall; the 1/7th Royal Scots, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel W. C. Peebles; the 1/5th King's Own Scottish Borderers, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel W. J. Millar; and the 1/6th Highland Light Infantry, commanded by Major J. Anderson, are mentioned as having specially distinguished themselves in this engagement.

Generally, the upshot of the attack was this. On our right and on the French left two lines had been captured, but in neither case was the third, or last, line of the system in their hands. Elsewhere a fine feat of arms had been accomplished, and a solid and enduring advance had been achieved, giving us far the best sited line for defence with much the best field for machine-gun and rifle fire we had hitherto obtained upon the peninsula.

A machine-gun and 200 prisoners were captured by the French; the British took a machine-gun and 329 prisoners. The casualties in the French Corps were not heavy, though it is with sorrow that I have to report the mortal wound of General Masnou, commanding the 1st Division. Our own casualties were a little over 3,000; those of the enemy about 5,000.

On July 17th Lieut.-General Hunter Weston, commanding the VIIIth Corps, left the peninsula for a few days' rest, and, to my very deep regret, was subsequently invalided home. I have already drawn attention to his invincible self-confidence, untiring energy, and trained ability.

As I was anxious to give the commander of the new troops all the local experience possible, I appointed Lieut.-General Hon. Sir Frederick Stopford, whose own Corps was now assembling at Mudros, temporarily to succeed Lieut.-General Hunter Weston, but on July 24th, when General Stopford had to set to work with his own Corps, Major-General W. Douglas, General Officer commanding 42nd Division, took over temporary command of the VIIIth Corps; while Major-General W. R. Marshall, General Officer commanding 87th Brigade, assumed temporary command of the 42nd Division.

Only one other action need be mentioned before coming to the big operations of August. On the extreme right of Anzac the flank of a work called Tasmania Post was threatened by the extension of a Turkish trench. The task of capturing this trench was entrusted to the 3rd Australian Brigade. After an artillery bombardment, mines were to be fired, whereupon four columns of 50 men each were to assault and occupy specified lengths of the trench. The regiment supplying the assaulting columns was the 11th Australian Infantry Battalion.

At 10.15 p.m. on July 31st the bombardment was opened. Ten minutes later and the mines were duly fired. The four assaulting parties dashed forward at once, crossed our own barbed wire on planks, and were into the craters before the whole of the débris had fallen. Total casualties: 11 killed and 74 wounded; Turkish killed, 100.

By the time this action was fought a large proportion of my reinforcements had arrived, and, on the same principle which induced me to put General Stopford in temporary command at Helles, I relieved the war-worn 29th Division at the same place by the 13th Division under Major-General Shaw. The experiences here gained, in looking after themselves, in forgetting the thousand and one details of peace soldiering, and in grasping the two or three elementary rules of conduct in war soldiering, were, it turned out, to be of priceless advantage to the 13th Division throughout the heavy fighting of the following month.

And now it was time to determine a date for the great venture. The moon would rise on the morning of the 7th at about 2 a.m. A day or two previously the last reinforcements, the 53rd and 54th Divisions, were due to arrive. The first day of the attack was fixed for August 6th.

Once the date was decided a certain amount of ingenuity had to be called into play, so as to divert the attention of the enemy from my main strategical conception. This—I repeat for the sake of clearness—was:—

- (1) To break out with a rush from Anzac and cut off the bulk of the Turkish Army from land communication with Constantinople.
- (2) To gain such a command for my artillery as to cut off the bulk of the Turkish Army from sea traffic, whether with Constantinople or with Asia.
- (3) Incidentally, to secure Suvla Bay as a winter base for Anzac and all the troops operating in the northern theatre.

My schemes for hoodwinking the Turks fell under two heads: First, strategical diversions, meant to draw away enemy reserves not yet committed to the peninsula. Secondly, tactical diversions meant to hold up enemy reserves already on the peninsula. Under the first heading came a surprise landing by a force of 300 men on the northern shore of the Gulf of Xeros; demonstrations by French ships opposite Mitylene along the Syrian coast; concentration at Mitylene; inspections at Mitylene by the Admiral and myself; making to order of a whole set of maps of Asia in Egypt, as well as secret service work, most of which bore fruit. Amongst the tactical diversions were a big containing attack at Helles. Soundings, registration of guns, etc., by monitors between Gaba Tepe and Kum Tepe. An attack to be carried out by Anzac on Lone Pine trenches, which lay in front of their right wing and as far distant as the local terrain would admit from the scene of the real

battle. Thanks entirely to the reality and vigour which the Navy and the troops threw into them, each one of these ruses was, it so turned out, entirely successful, with the result that the Turks, despite their excellent spy system, were caught completely off their guard at dawn on August 7th.

Having settled upon the manner and time of the diversions, orders had to be issued for the main operation. And here I must pause a moment to draw your Lordship's attention to the extraordinary complexity of the staff work caused by the unique distribution of my forces. Within the narrow confines of the positions I held on the peninsula it was impossible to concentrate even as much as one-third of the fresh troops about to be launched to the attack. Nor could Mudros and Imbros combined absorb the whole of the remainder. The strategic concentration which precedes a normal battle had in my case to be a very wide dispersion. Thus of the forces destined for my offensive, on the day before the battle, part were at Anzac, part at Imbros, part at Mudros, and part at Mitylene. These last three detachments were separated respectively by 14, 60, and 120 miles of sea from the arena into which they were simultaneously to appear. To ensure the punctual arrival of all these masses of inexperienced troops at the right moment and spot, together with their material, munitions, stores, supplies, water, animals, and vehicles, was a prodigious undertaking, demanding not only competence, but self-confidence; and I will say for my General Staff that I believe the clearness and completeness of their orders for this concentration and landing will hereafter be studied as models in military academies. The need for economy in sea transport, the awkwardness and restriction of open beaches, the impossibility of landing guns, animals, or vehicles rapidly—all these made it essential to create a special, separate organization for every single unit taking part in the adventure. A pack mule corps to supply 80,000 men had also to be organized for that specific purpose, until such time as other transport could be landed.

As to water, that element of itself was responsible for a whole chapter of preparations. An enormous quantity had to be collected secretly, and as secretly stowed away at Anzac, where a high-level reservoir had to be built, having a holding capacity of 30,000 gallons, and fitted out with a regular system of pipes and distribution tanks. A stationary engine was brought over from Egypt to fill that reservoir. Petroleum tins, with a carrying capacity of 80,000 gallons, were got together, and fixed up with handles, etc., but the collision of the "Moorgate" with another vessel delayed the arrival of large numbers of these, just as a breakdown in the stationary engine upset for a while the well-laid plan of the high-level reservoir. But Anzac was ever resourceful in face of misadventures, and when the inevitable accidents arose it was not with folded hands that they were met.

Turning to Suvla Bay, it was believed that good wells and springs existed both in the Biyuk, Anafarta Valley, and in Suvla Plain. But nothing so vital could possibly be left to hearsay, and although, as it turned out, our information was perfectly correct, yet the War Office were asked to despatch with each reinforcing division water receptacles for pack transport, at the rate of half a gallon per man.

The sheet-anchor on which hung the whole of these elaborate schemes was the Navy. One tiny flaw in the perfect mutual trust and confidence animating the two services would have wrecked the whole enterprise. Experts at a distance may have guessed as much; it was self-evident to the rawest private on the spot. But with men like Vice-Admiral de Robeck, Commodore Roger Keyes, Rear-Admiral Christian, and Captain F. H. Mitchell at our backs, we soldiers were secured against any such risk, and it will be seen how perfect was the precision the sailors put into their job.

The hour was now approaching, and I waited for it with as much confidence as is possible, when to the inevitable uncertainties of war are to be added those of the weather. Apart from feints, the first blow was to be dealt in the southern zone.

In that theatre I had my own Poste de Commandement. But upon August 6th attacks in the south were only to form a subsidiary part of one great concerted attack. Anzac was to deliver the knock-down blow; Helles and Suvla were complementary operations. Were I to commit myself at the outset to any one of these three theatres I must lose my sense of proportion. Worse, there being no lateral communication between them, as soon as I landed at one I was cut off from present touch with both of the others. At Imbros I was 45 minutes from Helles, 40 minutes from Anzac, and 50 minutes from Suvla. Imbros was the centre of the cable system, and thence I could follow each phase of the triple attack and be ready with my two divisions of reserve to throw in reinforcements where they seemed most to be required. Therefore I decided to follow the opening moves from General Headquarters.

At Helles the attack of the 6th was directed against 1,200 yards of the Turkish front opposite our own right and right centre, and was to be carried out by the 88th Brigade of the 29th Division. Two small Turkish trenches enfilading the main advance had, if possible, to be captured simultaneously, an affair which was entrusted to the 42nd Division.

After bombardment the infantry assaulted at 3.50 p.m. On the left large sections of the enemy's line were carried, but on our centre and right the Turks were encountered in masses, and the attack, pluckily and perseveringly as it was pressed, never had any real success. The 1st Battalion, Essex Regiment, in particular, forced their way into the crowded enemy trench opposite them, despite the most determined resistance, but, once in, were subjected to the heaviest musketry fire from both flanks, as well as in reverse, and were shattered by showers of bombs. Two separate resolute attacks were made by the 42nd Division, but both of them recoiled in face of the unexpected volume of fire developed by the Turks.

After dark, officer's patrols were sent out to ascertain the exact position of affairs. Heavy Turkish counter-attacks were being pressed against such portions of the line we still retained. Many of our men fought it out where they stood to the last, but by nightfall none of the enemy's line remained in our possession.

Our set-back was in no wise the fault of the troops. That ardour which only dashed itself to pieces against the enemy's strong entrenchments and numerous, stubborn defenders on August 6th would, a month earlier, have achieved notable success. Such was the opinion of all. But the *moral*, as well as the strength of the Turks, had had time to rise to great heights since our last serious encounters with them on June 21st and 28th, and on July 12th. On those dates all ranks had felt, as an army feels, instinctively, yet with certitude, that they had fairly got the upper hand of the enemy, and that, given the wherewithal, they could have gone on steadily advancing. Now that self-same, half-beaten enemy were again making as stout a resistance as they had offered us at our original landing!

For this recovery of the Turks there were three reasons: one moral, one material, and one fortuitous.

- (1) The news of the enemy's advance on the eastern front had come to hand and had been advertised to us on posters from the Turkish trenches before we heard about it from home.
- (2) Two new divisions had come down south to Helles to replace those we had most severely handled.
- (3) The enemy trenches selected for our attack were found to be packed with troops and so were their communication trenches, the reason being, as explained to us by prisoners, that the Turkish commander had meant to launch from them an attack upon us. We had, in fact, by a coincidence as strange as it was unlucky, anticipated a Turkish offensive by an hour or two at most!

Sure enough, next morning, the enemy in their turn attacked the left of the line from which our own troops had advanced to the assault. A few of them gained a footing in our trenches and were all killed or captured. The remainder were driven back by fire.

As the aim of my action in this southern zone was to advance if I could, but in any case to contain the enemy and prevent him reinforcing to the northwards, I persevered on the 7th with my plans, notwithstanding the counter-attack of the Turks, which was actually in progress. My objective this time was a double line of Turkish trenches on a front of about 800 yards between the Mal Tepe Dere and the west branch of the Kanli Dere. After a preliminary bombardment the troops of the 125th Brigade on the right and the 129th on the left made the assault at 9.40 a.m. From the outset it was evident that the enemy were full of fight and in great force, and that success would only be gained after a severe struggle. On the right and on the centre the first enemy line was captured, and small parties pushed on to the second line, where they were unable to maintain themselves for long. On the left but little ground was gained, and by 11 a.m. what little had been taken had been relinquished. But in the centre a stiff battle raged all day up and down a vineyard some 200 yards long by 100 yards broad on the west of the Krithia road. A large portion of the vineyard had been captured in the first dash, and the East Lancashire men in this part of the field gallantly stood their ground here against a succession of vigorous counter-attacks. The enemy suffered very severely in these counter-attacks, which were launched in strength and at short intervals. Both our brigades had also lost heavily during the advance and in repelling the fierce onslaughts of the enemy, but, owing to the fine endurance of the 6th and 7th Battalions of the Lancashire Fusiliers, it was found possible to hold the vineyard through the night, and a massive column of the enemy which strove to overwhelm their thinned ranks was shattered to pieces in the attempt.

On August 8th Lieut.-General Sir F. J. Davies took over command of the VIIIth Army Corps, and Major-General W. Douglas reverted to the command of the 42nd Division. For two more days his troops were called upon to show their qualities of vigilance and power of determined resistance, for the enemy had by no means yet lost hope of wresting from us the ground we had won in the vineyard. This unceasing struggle was a supreme test for battalions already exhausted by 48 hours' desperate fighting and weakened by the loss of so many good leaders and men; but the peculiar grit of the Lancastrians was equal to the strain, and they did not fail. Two specially furious counter-attacks were delivered by the Turks on August 8th, one at 4.40 a.m. and another at 8.30 p.m., where again our bayonets were too much for them. Throughout the night they made continuous bomb attacks, but the 6th Lancashire Fusiliers and the 4th East Lancashire Regiment stuck gamely to their task at the eastern corner of the vineyard. There was desperate fighting also at the northern corner, where the personal bravery of Lieut. W. T. Forshaw, 1/9th Manchester Regiment, who stuck to his post after his detachment had been relieved (an act for which he has since been awarded the V.C.), was largely instrumental in the repulse of three very determined onslaughts.

By the morning of August 9th things were quieter, and the sorely tried troops were relieved. On the night of the 12th-13th the enemy made one more sudden, desperate dash for their vineyard—and got it! But, on the 13th, our bombers took the matter in hand. The Turks were finally driven out; the new fire trenches were wired and loopholed, and have since become part of our line.

These two attacks had served their main purpose. If the local successes were not all that had been hoped for, yet a useful advance had been achieved, and not only had they given a fresh, hard fighting enemy more than he had bargained for, but they had actually drawn down Turkish reinforcements to their area. And how

can a commander say enough for the troops who, aware that their task was only a subsidiary one, fought with just as much vim and resolution as if they were storming the battlements of Constantinople.

I will now proceed to tell of the assault on Chunuk Bair by the forces under General Birdwood, and of the landing of the IXth Corps in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay. The entire details of the operations allotted to the troops to be employed in the Anzac area were formulated by Lieut.-General Birdwood, subject only to my final approval. So excellently was this vital business worked out on the lines of the instructions issued that I had no modifications to suggest, and all these local preparations were completed by August 6th in a way which reflects the greatest credit, not only on the Corps Commander and his staff, but also upon the troops themselves, who had to toil like slaves to accumulate food, drink, and munitions of war. Alone the accommodation for the extra troops to be landed necessitated an immense amount of work in preparing new concealed bivouacs, in making interior communications, and in storing water and supplies, for I was determined to put on shore as many fighting men as our modest holding at Anzac could possibly accommodate or provision. All the work was done by Australian and New Zealand soldiers almost entirely by night, and the uncomplaining efforts of these much-tried troops in preparation are, in a sense, as much to their credit as their heroism in the battles that followed. Above all, the water problem caused anxiety to the Admiral, to Lieut.-General Birdwood, and to myself. The troops to advance from Suvla Bay across the Anafarta valley might reckon on finding some wells—it was certain, at least, that no water was waiting for us on the crests of the ridges of Sari Bair! Therefore, first, several days' supply had to be stocked into tanks along the beach and thence pumped up into other tanks half-way up the mountains; secondly, a system of mule transport had to be worked out, so that in so far as was humanly possible, thirst should not be allowed to overcome the troops after they had overcome the difficulties of the country and the resistance of the enemy.

On the nights of August 4th, 5th, and 6th the reinforcing troops were shipped into Anzac very silently at the darkest hours. Then, still silently, they were tucked away from enemy aeroplanes or observatories in their prepared hiding places. The whole sea route lay open to the view of the Turks upon Achi Baba's summit and Battleship Hill. Aeroplanes could count every tent and every ship at Mudros or at Imbros. Within rifle fire of Anzac's open beach hostile riflemen were looking out across the *Ægean* no more than twenty feet from our opposing lines. Every modern appliance of telescope, telegraph, wireless, was at the disposal of the enemy. Yet the instructions worked out at General Headquarters in the minutest detail (the result of conferences with the Royal Navy, which were attended by Brig.-General Skeen, of General Birdwood's Staff) were such that the scheme was carried through without a hitch. The preparation of the ambush was treated as a simple matter by the services therein engaged, and yet I much doubt whether any more pregnant enterprise than this of landing so large a force under the very eyes of the enemy, and of keeping them concealed there three days, is recorded in the annals of war.

The troops now at the disposal of General Birdwood amounted in round numbers to 37,000 rifles and 72 guns, with naval support from two cruisers, four monitors and two destroyers. Under the scheme these troops were to be divided into two main portions. The task of holding the existing Anzac position, and of making frontal assaults therefrom, was assigned to the Australian Division (plus the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades and two battalions of the 40th Brigade); that of assaulting the Chunuk Bair ridge was entrusted to the New Zealand and Australian Division (less the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades), to the 13th Division (less five battalions), and to the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade and to the Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade. The 29th Brigade of the 10th Division (less one battalion) and the 38th Brigade were held in reserve.

The most simple method of developing this complicated series of operations will be first to take the frontal attacks from the existing Anzac position, and afterwards to go on to the assault on the more distant ridges. During August 4th, 5th and 6th the works on the enemy's left and centre were subjected to a slow bombardment, and on the afternoon of August 6th an assault was made upon the formidable Lone Pine entrenchment. Although, in its essence, a diversion to draw the enemy's attention and reserves from the grand attack impending upon his right, yet, in itself, Lone Pine was a distinct step on the way across to Maidos. It commanded one of the main sources of the Turkish water supply, and was a work, or, rather a series of works, for the safety of which the enemy had always evinced a certain nervousness. The attack was designed to heighten this impression.

The work consisted of a strong *point d'appui* on the south-western end of a plateau, where it confronted, at distances varying from 60 to 120 yards, the salient in the line of our trenches named by us the Pimple. The entrenchment was evidently very strong; it was entangled with wire, and provided with overhead cover, and it was connected by numerous communication trenches with another *point d'appui* known as Johnston's Folly on the north, as well as with two other works on the east and south. The frontage for attack amounted at most to some 220 yards, and the approaches lay open to heavy enfilade fire, both from the north and from the south.

The detailed scheme of attack was worked out with care and forethought by Major-General H. B. Walker, commanding 1st Australian Division, and his thoroughness contributed, I consider, largely to the success of the enterprise.

The action commenced at 4.30 p.m. with a continuous and heavy bombardment of the Lone Pine and adjacent trenches, H.M.S. "Bacchante" assisting by searching the valleys to the north-east and east, and the monitors by shelling the enemy's batteries south of Gaba Tepe. The assault had been entrusted to the 1st Australian Brigade (Brig.-General N. M. Smyth), and punctually at 5.30 p.m. it was carried out by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Australian Battalions, the 1st Battalion forming the Brigade reserve. Two lines left their trenches simultaneously, and were closely followed up by a third. The rush across the open was a regular race against death, which came in the shape of a hail of shell and rifle bullets from front and from either flank. But the Australians had firmly resolved to reach the enemy's trenches, and in this determination they became for the moment invincible. The barbed wire entanglement was reached and was surmounted. Then came a terrible moment, when it seemed as though it would be physically impossible to penetrate into the trenches. The overhead cover of stout pine beams resisted all individual efforts to move it, and the loopholes continued to spit fire. Groups of our men then boldly lifted up the beams and individual soldiers leaped down into the semi-darkened galleries amongst the Turks. By 5.47 p.m. the 3rd and 4th Battalions were well into the enemy's vitals, and a few minutes later the reserves of the 2nd Battalion advanced over their parapets, and driving out, killing or capturing the occupants, made good the whole of the trenches. The reserve companies of the 3rd and 4th Battalions followed, and at 6.20 p.m. the 1st Battalion (in reserve) was launched to consolidate the position.

At once the Turks made it plain, as they have never ceased to do since, that they had no intention of acquiescing in the capture of this capital work. At 7 p.m. a determined and violent counter-attack began, both from the north and from the south. Wave upon wave the enemy swept forward with the bayonet. Here and there a well-directed salvo of bombs emptied a section of a trench, but whenever this occurred the gap was quickly filled by the initiative of the officers and the gallantry of the men.

The enemy allowed small respite. At 1.30 that night the battle broke out afresh. Strong parties of Turks swarmed out of the communication trenches, preceded by showers of bombs. For seven hours these counter-attacks continued. All this time consolidation was being attempted, although the presence of so many Turkish prisoners hampered movement and constituted an actual danger. In beating off these desperate counter-attacks very heavy casualties were suffered by the Australians. Part of the 12th Battalion, the reserve of the 3rd Brigade, had therefore to be thrown into the *mêlée*.

Twelve hours later, at 1.30 p.m. on the 7th, another effort was made by the enemy, lasting uninterruptedly at closest quarters till 5 p.m., then being resumed at midnight and proceeding intermittently till dawn. At an early period of this last counter-attack the 4th Battalion were forced by bombs to relinquish a portion of a trench, but later on, led by their commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel McNaghten, they killed every Turk who had got in.

During August 8th advantage was taken of every cessation in the enemy's bombing to consolidate. The 2nd Battalion, which had lost its commanding officer and suffered especially severely, was withdrawn and replaced by the 7th Battalion, the reserve to the 2nd Infantry Brigade.

At 5 a.m. on August 9th the enemy made a sudden attempt to storm from the east and south-east after a feint of fire attack from the north. The 7th Battalion bore the brunt of the shock, and handled the attack so vigorously that by 7.45 a.m. there were clear signs of demoralization in the enemy's ranks. But, although this marked the end of counter-attacks on the large scale, the bombing and sniping continued, though in less volume, throughout this day and night, and lasted till August 12th, when it at last became manifest that we had gained complete ascendancy. During the final grand assault our losses from artillery fire were large, and ever since the work has passed into our hands it has been a favourite daily and nightly mark for heavy shells and bombs.

Thus was Lone Pine taken and held. The Turks were in great force and very full of fight, yet one weak Australian brigade, numbering at the outset but 2,000 rifles, and supported only by two weak battalions, carried the work under the eyes of a whole enemy division, and maintained their grip upon it like a vice during six days' successive counter-attacks. High praise is due to Brig.-General N. M. Smyth and to his battalion commanders. The irresistible dash and daring of officers and men in the initial charge were a glory to Australia. The stout-heartedness with which they clung to the captured ground in spite of fatigue, severe losses, and the continual strain of shell fire and bomb attacks, may seem less striking to the civilian; it is even more admirable to the soldier. From start to finish the artillery support was untiring and vigilant. Owing to the rapid, accurate fire of the 2nd New Zealand Battery, under Major Sykes, several of the Turkish onslaughts were altogether defeated in their attempts to get to grips with the Australians. Not a chance was lost by these gunners, although time and again the enemy's artillery made direct hits on their shields. The hand-to-hand fighting in the semi-obscurity of the trenches was prolonged and very bitterly contested. In one corner eight Turks and six Australians were found lying as they had bayoneted one another. To make room for the fighting men the dead were ranged in rows on either side of the gangway. After the first violence of the counter-attacks had abated, 1,000 corpses—our own and Turkish—were dragged out from the trenches.

For the severity of our own casualties some partial consolation may be found in the facts, first, that those of the enemy were much heavier, our guns and machine-guns having taken toll of them as they advanced in mass formation along the reserve slopes; secondly, that the Lone Pine attack drew all the

local enemy reserves towards it, and may be held, more than any other cause, to have been the reason that the Suvla Bay landing was so lightly opposed, and that comparatively few of the enemy were available at first to reinforce against our attack on Sari Bair. Our captures in this feat of arms amounted to 134 prisoners, seven machine-guns, and a large quantity of ammunition and equipment.

Other frontal attacks from the existing Anzac positions were not so fortunate. They fulfilled their object in so far as they prevented the enemy from reinforcing against the attack upon the high ridges, but they failed to make good any ground. Taken in sequence of time, they included an attack upon the work known as German Officer's Trench, on the extreme right of our line, at midnight on August 6th-7th, also assaults on the Nek and Baby 700 trenches opposite the centre of our line, delivered at 4.30 a.m. on the 7th. The 2nd Australian Brigade did all that men could do; the 8th Light Horse only accepted their repulse after losing three-fourths of that devoted band who so bravely sallied forth from Russell's Top. Some of the works were carried, but in these cases the enemy's concealed machine-guns made it impossible to hold on. But all that day, as the result of these most gallant attacks, Turkish reserves on Battleship Hill were being held back to meet any dangerous development along the front of the old Anzac line, and so were not available to meet our main enterprise, which I will now endeavour to describe.

The first step in the real push—the step which above all others was to count—was the night attack on the summits of the Sari Bair ridge. The crest line of this lofty mountain range runs parallel to the sea, dominating the underfeatures contained within the Anzac position, although these fortunately defile the actual landing-place. From the main ridge a series of spurs run down towards the level beach, and are separated from one another by deep, jagged gullies choked up with dense jungle. Two of these leading up to Chunuk Bair are called Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere; another deep ravine runs up to Koja Chemen Tepe (Hill 305), the topmost peak of the whole ridge, and is called the Aghyl Dere.

It was our object to effect a lodgment along the crest of the high main ridge with two columns of troops, but, seeing the nature of the ground and the dispositions of the enemy, the effort had to be made by stages. We were bound, in fact, to undertake a double subsidiary operation before we could hope to launch these attacks with any real prospect of success.

1. The right covering force was to seize Table Top, as well as all other enemy positions commanding the foothills between the Chailak Dere and the Sazli Beit Dere ravines. If this enterprise succeeded it would open up the ravines for the assaulting columns, whilst at the same time interposing between the right flank of the left covering force and the enemy holding the Sari Bair main ridge.

2. The left covering force was to march northwards along the beach to seize a hill called Damakjelik Bair, some 1,400 yards north of Table Top. If successful it would be able to hold out a hand to the 9th Corps as it landed south of Nibrunesi Point, whilst at the same time protecting the left flank of the left assaulting column against enemy troops from the Anafarta valley during its climb up the Aghyl Dere ravine.

3. The right assaulting column was to move up the Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere ravines to the storm of the ridge of Chunuk Bair.

4. The left assaulting column was to work up the Aghyl Dere and prolong the line of the right assaulting column by storming Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe), the summit of the whole range of hills.

To recapitulate, the two assaulting columns, which were to work up three ravines to the storm of the high ridge, were to be preceded by two covering columns. One of these was to capture the enemy's positions commanding the foothills, first to open the mouths of the ravines, secondly to cover the right flank of another covering force whilst it marched along the beach. The other covering column was to strike far out to the north until, from a hill called Damajelik Bair, it could at the same time facilitate the landing of the IXth Corps at Nibrunesi Point, and guard the left flank of the column assaulting Sari Bari from any forces of the enemy which might be assembled in the Anafarta valley.

The whole of this big attack was placed under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, General Officer Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division. The two covering and the two assaulting columns were organized as follows:—

Right covering column, under Brig.-General A. H. Russell.—New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment, the Maori Contingent and New Zealand Field Troop.

Right assaulting column, under Brig.-General F. E. Johnston.—New Zealand Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one company New Zealand Engineers.

Left covering column, under Brig.-General J. H. Travers.—Headquarters 40th Brigade, half the 72nd Field Company, 4th Battalion, South Wales Borderers, and 5th Battalion, Wiltshire Regiment.

Left assaulting column, under Brig.-General (now Major-General) H. V. Cox.—20th Indian Infantry Brigade, 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one company New Zealand Engineers.

Divisional Reserve.—6th Battalion, South Lancashire Regiment, and 8th Battalion, Welsh Regiment (Pioneers), at Chailak Dere, and the 39th Infantry Brigade and half 72nd Field Company at Aghyl Dere.

The right covering column, it will be remembered, had to gain command of the Sazli Beit Dere and the Aghyl Dere ravines, so as to let the assaulting column arrive intact within striking distance of the Chunuk Bair ridge. To achieve this object it had to clear the Turks off from their right flank positions upon Old No. 3 Post and Table Top.

Old No. 3 Post, connected with Table Top by a razor back, formed the apex of a triangular piece of hill sloping gradually down to our No. 2 and No. 3 outposts. Since its recapture from us by the Turks on 30th May, working parties had done their best with unstinted material to convert this commanding point into an impregnable redoubt. Two lines of fire trench, very heavily entangled, protected its southern face—the only one accessible to us—and, with its head cover of solid timber baulks and its strongly revetted outworks, it dominated the approaches of both the Chailak Dere and the Sazli Beit Dere.

Table Top is a steep-sided, flat-topped hill, close on 400 feet above sea-level. The sides of the hill are mostly sheer and quite impracticable, but here and there a ravine, choked with scrub, and under fire of enemy trenches, gives precarious foothold up the precipitous cliffs. The small plateau on the summit was honey-combed with trenches, which were connected by a communication alley with that under-feature of Sari Bair, known as Rhododendron Spur.

Amongst other stratagems the Anzac troops, assisted by H.M.S. "Colne," had long and carefully been educating the Turks how they should lose Old No. 3 Post, which could hardly have been rushed by simple force of arms. Every night, exactly at 9 p.m., H.M.S. "Colne" threw the beam of her searchlight on to the redoubt, and opened fire upon it for exactly ten minutes. Then, after a ten minutes' interval,

came a second illumination and bombardment, commencing always at 9.20 and ending precisely at 9.30 p.m.

The idea was that, after successive nights of such practice, the enemy would get into the habit of taking the searchlight as a hint to clear out until the shelling was at an end. But on the eventful night of the 6th, the sound of their footsteps drowned by the loud cannonade, unseen as they crept along in that darkest shadow which fringes a searchlight's beam—came the right covering column. At 9.30 the light switched off, and instantly our men poured out of the scrub jungle and into the empty redoubt. By 11 p.m. the whole series of surrounding entrenchments were ours!

Once the capture of Old No. 3 Post was fairly under way, the remainder of the right covering column carried on with their attack upon Bauchop's Hill and the Chailak Dere. By 10 p.m. the northernmost point, with its machine-gun, was captured, and by 1 o'clock in the morning the whole of Bauchop's Hill, a maze of ridge and ravine, everywhere entrenched, was fairly in our hands.

The attack along the Chailak Dere was not so cleanly carried out—made, indeed, just about as ugly a start as any enemy could wish. Pressing eagerly forward through the night, the little column of stormers found themselves held up by a barbed-wire erection of unexampled height, depth and solidity, which completely closed the river bed—that is to say, the only practicable entrance to the ravine. The entanglement was flanked by a strongly-held enemy trench running right across the opening of the Chailak Dere. Here that splendid body of men, the Otago Mounted Rifles, lost some of their bravest and their best, but, in the end, when things were beginning to seem desperate, a passage was forced through the stubborn obstacle with most conspicuous and cool courage by Captain Shera and a party of New Zealand Engineers, supported by the Maoris, who showed themselves worthy descendants of the warriors of the Gate Pah. Thus was the mouth of the Chailak Dere opened in time to admit of the unopposed entry of the right assaulting column.

Simultaneously the attack on Table Top had been launched under cover of a heavy bombardment from H.M.S. "Colne." No general on peace manoeuvres would ask troops to attempt so break-neck an enterprise. The flanks of Table Top are so steep that the height gives an impression of a mushroom shape—of the summit bulging out over its stem. But just as faith moves mountains, so valour can carry them. The Turks fought bravely. The angle of Table Top's ascent is recognized in our regulations as "impracticable for infantry." But neither Turks nor angles of ascent were destined to stop Russell or his New Zealanders that night. There are moments during battle when life becomes intensified, when men become supermen, when the impossible becomes simple—and this was one of those moments. The scarp heights were scaled, the plateau was carried by midnight. With this brilliant feat the task of the right covering force was at an end. Its attacks had been made with the bayonet and bomb only; magazines were empty by order; hardly a rifle shot had been fired. Some 150 prisoners were captured as well as many rifles and much equipment, ammunition, and stores. No words can do justice to the achievement of Brig.-General Russell and his men. There are exploits which must be seen to be realised.

The right assaulting column had entered the two southerly ravines—Sazli Beit Dere and Chailak Dere—by midnight. At 1.30 a.m. began a hotly-contested fight for the trenches on the lower part of Rhododendron Spur, whilst the Chailak Dere column pressed steadily up the valley against the enemy.

The left covering column, under Brig.-General Travers, after marching along the beach to No. 3 Outpost, resumed its northerly advance as soon as the attack on Bauchop's Hill had developed. Once the Chailak Dere was cleared the column moved by the mouth of the Aghyl Dere, disregarding the enfilade fire from sections

of Bauchop's Hill still uncaptured. The rapid success of this movement was largely due to Lieut.-Colonel Gillespie, a very fine man, who commanded the advance guard consisting of his own regiment, the 4th South Wales Borderers, a corps worthy of such a leader. Every trench encountered was instantly rushed by the Borderers until, having reached the predetermined spot, the whole column was unhesitatingly launched at Damakjelic Bair. Several Turkish trenches were captured at the bayonet's point, and by 1.30 a.m. the whole of the hill was occupied, thus safeguarding the left rear of the whole of the Anzac attack.

Here was an encouraging sample of what the New Army, under good auspices, could accomplish. Nothing more trying to inexperienced troops can be imagined than a long night march exposed to flanking fire, through a strange country, winding up at the end with a bayonet charge against a height, formless and still in the starlight, garrisoned by those spectres of the imagination, worst enemies of the soldier.

The left assaulting column crossed the Chailak Dere at 12.30 a.m., and entered the Aghyl Dere at the heels of the left covering column. The surprise, on this side, was complete. Two Turkish officers were caught in their pyjamas; enemy arms and ammunition were scattered in every direction.

The grand attack was now in full swing, but the country gave new sensations in cliff climbing, even to officers and men who had graduated over the goat tracks of Anzac. The darkness of the night, the density of the scrub, hands and knees progress up the spurs, sheer physical fatigue, exhaustion of the spirit caused by repeated hairbreadth escapes from the hail of random bullets—all these combined to take the edge off the energies of our troops. At last, after advancing some distance up the Aghyl Dere, the column split up into two parts. The 4th Australian Brigade struggled, fighting hard as they went, up to the north of the northern fork of the Aghyl Dere, making for Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe). The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade scrambled up the southern fork of the Aghyl Dere and the spurs north of it to the attack of a portion of the Sari Bair ridge known as Hill Q.

Dawn broke and the crest line was not yet in our hands, although, considering all things, the left assaulting column had made a marvellous advance. The 4th Australian Infantry Brigade was on the line of the Asma Dere (the next ravine north of the Aghyl Dere) and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade held the ridge west of the farm below Chunuk Bair and along the spurs to the north-east. The enemy had been flung back from ridge to ridge; an excellent line for the renewal of the attack had been secured, and (except for the exhaustion of the troops) the auspices were propitious.

Turning to the right assaulting column, one battalion, the Canterbury Infantry Battalion, clambered slowly up the Sazli Beit Dere. The remainder of the force, led by the Otago Battalion, wound their way amongst the pitfalls and forced their passage through the scrub of the Chailak Dere, where fierce opposition forced them ere long to deploy. Here, too, the hopeless country was the main hindrance, and it was not until 5.45 a.m. that the bulk of the column joined the Canterbury Battalion on the lower slopes of Rhododendron Spur. The whole force then moved up the spur, gaining touch with the left assaulting column by means of the 10th Gurkhas, in face of very heavy fire and frequent bayonet charges. Eventually they entrenched on the top of Rhododendron Spur, a quarter of a mile short of Chunuk Bair—*i.e.*, of victory.

At 7 a.m. the 5th and 6th Gurkhas, belonging to the left assaulting column, had approached the main ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair, whilst, on their left, the 14th Sikhs had got into touch with the 4th Australian Brigade on the southern watershed of the Asma Dere. The 4th Australian Brigade now received orders to leave half a battalion to hold the spur, and, with the rest of its strength, plus the 14th Sikhs, to assault Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe). But by this time the enemy's

opposition had hardened, and his reserves were moving up from the direction of Battleship Hill. Artillery support was asked for and given, yet by 9 a.m. the attack of the right assaulting column on Chunuk Bair was checked, and any idea of a further advance on Koja Chemen Tepe had to be, for the moment, suspended. The most that could be done was to hold fast to the Asma Dere watershed whilst attacking the ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair, an attack to be supported by a fresh assault launched against Chunuk Bair itself.

At 9.30 a.m. the two assaulting columns pressed forward whilst our guns pounded the enemy moving along the Battleship Hill spurs. But in spite of all their efforts their increasing exhaustion, as opposed to the gathering strength of the enemy's fresh troops, began to tell—they had shot their bolt. So all day they clung to what they had captured and strove to make ready for the night. At 11 a.m. three battalions of the 39th Infantry Brigade were sent up from the general reserve to be at hand when needed, and, at the same hour, one more battalion of the reserve was despatched to the 1st Australian Division to meet the drain caused by all the desperate Lone Pine fighting.

By the afternoon the position of the two assaulting columns was unchanged. The right covering force were in occupation of Table Top, Old No. 3 Post, and Bauchop Hill, which General Russell had been ordered to maintain with two regiments of Mounted Rifles, so that he might have two other regiments and the Maori contingent available to move as required. The left covering force held Damakjelic Bair. The forces which had attacked along the front of the original Anzac line were back again in their own trenches. The Lone Pine work was being furiously disputed. All had suffered heavily and all were very tired.

So ended the first phase of the fighting for the Chunuk Bair ridge. Our aims had not fully been attained, and the help we had hoped for from Suvla had not been forthcoming. Yet I fully endorse the words of General Birdwood when he says: "The troops had performed a feat which is without parallel."

Great kudos is due to Major-Generals Godley and Shaw for their arrangements; to Generals Russell, Johnston, Cox, and Travers for their leading; but most of all, as every one of these officers will gladly admit, to the rank and file for their fighting. Nor may I omit to add that the true destroyer spirit with which H.M.S. "Colne" (Commander Claude Seymour, R.N.) and H.M.S. "Chelmer" (Commander Hugh T. England, R.N.) backed us up, will live in the grateful memories of the Army.

In the course of this afternoon (August 7th) reconnaissances of Sari Bair were carried out and the troops were got into shape for a fresh advance in three columns, to take place in the early morning.

The columns were composed as follows:—

Right column, Brig.-General F. E. Johnston.—26th Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), Auckland Mounted Rifles, New Zealand Infantry Brigade, two battalions 13th Division, and the Maori contingent.

Centre and left columns, Major-General H. V. Cox.—21st Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), 4th Australian Brigade, 39th Infantry Brigade (less one battalion), with 6th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment attached, and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade.

The right column was to climb up the Chunuk Bair ridge; the left column was to make for the prolongation of the ridge north-east to Koja Chemen Tepe, the topmost peak of the range.

The attack was timed for 4.15 a.m. At the first faint glimmer of dawn observers saw figures moving against the sky-line of Chunuk Bair. Were they our own men, or were they the Turks? Telescopes were anxiously adjusted; the

light grew stronger; men were seen climbing up from our side of the ridge; they *were* our own fellows—the topmost summit was ours!

On the right General Johnston's column, headed by the Wellington Battalion and supported by the 7th Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, the Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment, the 8th Welsh Pioneers, and the Maori Contingent, the whole most gallantly led by Lieut.-Colonel W. G. Malone, had raced one another up the steep. Nothing could check them. On they went, until, with a last determined rush, they fixed themselves firmly on the south-western slopes and crest of the main knoll known as the height of Chunuk Bair. With deep regret I have to add that the brave Lieut.-Colonel Malone fell mortally wounded as he was marking out the line to be held. The 7th Gloucesters suffered terrible losses here. The fire was so hot that they never got a chance to dig their trenches deeper than some six inches, and there they had to withstand attack after attack. In the course of these fights every single officer, company sergeant-major, or company quartermaster-sergeant, was either killed or wounded, and the battalion by mid-day consisted of small groups of men commanded by junior non-commissioned officers or privates. Chapter and verse may be quoted for the view that the rank-and-file of an army cannot long endure the strain of close hand-to-hand fighting unless they are given confidence by the example of good officers. Yet here is at least one instance where a battalion of the New Army fought right on, from mid-day till sunset, without *any* officers.

In the centre the 39th Infantry Brigade and the 29th Indian Brigade moved along the gullies leading up to the Sari Bair ridge—the right moving south of the farm on Chunuk Bair, the left up the spurs to the north-east of the farm against a portion of the main ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair, and the col to the north of it. So murderous was the enemy's fire that little progress could be made, though some ground was gained on the spurs to the north-east of the farm.

On the left the 4th Australian Brigade advanced from the Asma Dere against the lower slopes of Abdul Rahman Bair (a spur running due north from Koja Chemen Tepe) with the intention of wheeling to its right and advancing up the spur. Cunningly-placed Turkish machine-guns and a strong entrenched body of infantry were ready for this move, and the brigade were unable to get on. At last, on the approach of heavy columns of the enemy, the Australians, virtually surrounded, and having already suffered losses of over 1,000, were withdrawn to their original position. Here they stood at bay, and, though the men were by now half dead with thirst and with fatigue, they bloodily repulsed attack after attack delivered by heavy columns of Turks.

So stood matters at noon. Enough had been done for honour and much ground had everywhere been gained. The expected support from Sulva hung fire, but the capture of Chunuk Bair was a presage of victory; even the troops who had been repulsed were quite undefeated—quite full of fight—and so it was decided to hold hard as we were till nightfall, and then to essay one more grand attack, wherein the footing gained on Chunuk Bair would this time be used as a pivot.

In the afternoon the battle slackened, excepting always at Lone Pine, where the enemy were still coming on in mass, and being mown down by our fire. Elsewhere the troops were busy digging and getting up water and food, no child's play, with their wretched lines of communication running within musketry range of the enemy.

That evening the New Zealand Brigade, with two regiments of New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the Maoris, held Rhododendron Spur and the south-western

slopes of the main knoll of Chunuk Bair. The front line was prolonged by the columns of General Cox and General Monash (with the 4th Australian Brigade). Behind the New Zealanders were the 38th Brigade in reserve, and in rear of General Monash two battalions of the 40th Brigade. The inner line was held as before, and the 29th Brigade (less two battalions), had been sent up from the general reserve, and remained still further in rear.

The columns for the renewed attack were composed as follows:—

No. 1 column, Brig.-General F. E. Johnston.—26th Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), the Auckland and Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiments, the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and two battalions of the 13th Division.

No. 2 column, Major-General H. V. Cox.—21st Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), 4th Australian Brigade, 39th Brigade (less the 7th Gloucesters, relieved), with the 6th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment attached, and the Indian Infantry Brigade.

No. 3 column, Brig.-General A. H. Baldwin, commanding 38th Infantry Brigade.—Two battalions each from the 38th and 29th Brigades and one from the 40th Brigade.

No. 1 column was to hold and consolidate the ground gained on the 6th, and, in co-operation with the other columns, to gain the whole of Chunuk Bair, and extend to the south-east. No. 2 column was to attack Hill Q on the Chunuk Bair ridge, and No. 3 column was to move from the Chailak Dere, also on Hill Q. This last column was to make the main attack, and the others were to co-operate with it.

At 4.30 a.m. on August 9th the Chunuk Bair ridge and Hill Q were heavily shelled. The naval guns, all the guns on the left flank, and as many as possible from the right flank (whence the enemy's advance could be enfiladed), took part in this cannonade, which rose to its climax at 5.15 a.m., when the whole ridge seemed a mass of flame and smoke, whence huge clouds of dust drifted slowly upwards in strange patterns on to the sky. At 5.16 a.m. this tremendous bombardment was to be switched off on to the flanks and reverse slopes of the heights.

General Baldwin's column had assembled in the Chailak Dere, and was moving up towards General Johnstone's headquarters. Our plan contemplated the massing of this column immediately behind the trenches held by the New Zealand Infantry Brigade. Thence it was intended to launch the battalions in successive lines, keeping them as much as possible on the high ground. Infinite trouble had been taken to ensure that the narrow track should be kept clear, guides also were provided; but in spite of all precautions the darkness, the rough scrub-covered country, its sheer steepness, so delayed the column that they were unable to take full advantage of the configuration of the ground, and, inclining to the left, did not reach the line of the farm—Chunuk Bair till 5.15 a.m. In plain English, Baldwin, owing to the darkness and the awful country, lost his way—through no fault of his own. The mischance was due to the fact that time did not admit of the detailed careful reconnaissance of routes which is so essential where operations are to be carried out by night.

And now, under that fine leader, Major C. G. L. Allanson, the 6th Gurkhas of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade pressed up the slopes of Sari Bair, crowned the heights of the col between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q, viewed far beneath them the waters of the Hellespont, viewed the Asiatic shores along which motor transport was bringing supplies to the lighters. Not only did this battalion, as well as some of the 6th South Lancashire Regiment, reach the crest, but they began to attack down the far side of it, firing as they went at the fast retreating enemy. But the fortune of war was against us. At this supreme moment Baldwin's

column was still a long way from our trenches on the crest of Chunuk Bair, whence they should even now have been sweeping out towards Q along the whole ridge of the mountain. And instead of Baldwin's support came suddenly a salvo of heavy shell. These falling so unexpectedly among the stormers threw them into terrible confusion. The Turkish commander saw his chance; instantly his troops were rallied and brought back in a counter-charge, and the South Lancashires and Gurkhas, who had seen the promised land and had seemed for a moment to have held victory in their grasp, were forced backwards over the crest and on to the lower slopes whence they had first started.

But where was the main attack—where was Baldwin? When that bold but unlucky commander found he could not possibly reach our trenches on the top of Chunuk Bair in time to take effective part in the fight he deployed for attack where he stood, *i.e.*, at the farm to the left of the New Zealand Brigade's trenches on Rhododendron Spur. Now his men were coming on in fine style and, just as the Turks topped the ridge with shouts of elation, two companies of the 6th East Lancashire Regiment, together with the 10th Hampshire Regiment, charged up our side of the slope with the bayonet. They had gained the high ground immediately below the commanding knoll on Chunuk Bair, and a few minutes earlier would have joined hands with the Gurkhas and South Lancashires and, combined with them, would have carried all before them. But the Turks by this time were lining the whole of the high crest in overwhelming numbers. The New Army troops attacked with a fine audacity, but they were flung back from the height and then pressed still further down the slope, until General Baldwin had to withdraw his command to the vicinity of the farm, whilst the enemy, much encouraged, turned their attention to the New Zealand troops and the two New Army battalions of No. 1 column still holding the south-west half of the main knoll of Chunuk Bair. Constant attacks, urged with fanatical persistence, were met here with a sterner resolution, and although, at the end of the day, our troops were greatly exhausted, they still kept their footing on the summit. And if that summit meant much to us, it meant even more to the Turks. For the ridge covered our landing places, it is true, but it covered not only the Turkish beaches at Kilia Leman and Maidos, but also the Narrows themselves and the roads leading northward to Bulair and Constantinople.

That evening our line ran along Rhododendron Spur up to the crest of Chunuk Bair, where about 200 yards were occupied and held by some 800 men. Slight trenches had hastily been dug, but the fatigue of the New Zealanders and the fire of the enemy had prevented solid work being done. The trenches in many places were not more than a few inches deep. They were not protected by wire. Also many officers are of opinion that they had not been well sited in the first instance. On the South African system the main line was withdrawn some twenty-five yards from the crest instead of being actually on the crestline itself, and there were not even look-out posts along the summit. Boer skirmishers would thus have had to show themselves against the skyline before they could annoy. But here we were faced by regulars taught to attack in mass with bayonet or bomb. And the power of collecting overwhelming numbers at very close quarters rested with whichever side held the true skyline in force. From Chunuk Bair the line ran down to the Farm and almost due north to the Asma Dere southern watershed, whence it continued westward to the sea near Asmak Kuyu. On the right the Australian Division was still holding its line and Lone Pine was still being furiously attacked. The 1st Australian Brigade was now reduced from 2,900 to 1,000, and the total casualties up to 8 p.m. on the 9th amounted to about 8,500. But the troops were still in extraordinary good heart, and nothing could damp their keenness. The only discontent shown was by men who were kept in reserve.

During the night of the 9th-10th, the New Zealand and New Army troops on Chunuk Bair were relieved. For three days and three nights they had been ceaselessly fighting. They were half dead with fatigue. Their lines of communication, started from sea level, ran across trackless ridges and ravines to an altitude of 800 ft., and were exposed all the way to snipers' fire and artillery bombardment. It had become imperative, therefore, to get them enough food, water, and rest; and for this purpose it was imperative also to withdraw them. Chunuk Bair, which they had so magnificently held, was now handed over to two battalions of the 13th Division, which were connected by the 10th Hampshire Regiment with the troops at the farm. General Sir William Birdwood is emphatic on the point that the nature of the ground is such that there was no room on the crest for more than this body of 800 to 1,000 rifles.

The two battalions of the New Army chosen to hold Chunuk Bair were the 6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the 5th Wiltshire Regiment. The first of these arrived in good time and occupied the trenches. Even in the darkness their commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel Levinge, recognized how dangerously these trenches were sited, and he began at once to dig observation posts on the actual crest and to strengthen the defences where he could. But he had not time given him to do much. The second battalion, the Wiltshires, were delayed by the intricate country. They did not reach the edge of the entrenchment until 4 a.m., and were then told to lie down in what was believed, erroneously, to be a covered position.

At daybreak on Tuesday, August 10th, the Turks delivered a grand attack from the line Chunuk Bair—Hill Q against these two battalions, already weakened in numbers, though not in spirit, by previous fighting. First our men were shelled by every enemy gun, and then, at 5.30 a.m., were assaulted by a huge column, consisting of no less than a full division plus a regiment of three battalions. The North Lancashire men were simply overwhelmed in their shallow trenches by sheer weight of numbers, whilst the Wilts, who were caught out in the open, were literally almost annihilated. The ponderous mass of the enemy swept over the crest, turned the right flank of our line below, swarmed round the Hampshires and General Baldwin's column, which had to give ground, and were only extricated with great difficulty and very heavy losses.

Now it was our turn. The warships and the New Zealand and Australian Artillery, the Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade, and the 69th Brigade Royal Field Artillery, were getting the chance of a lifetime. As the successive solid lines of Turks topped the crest of the ridge gaps were torn through their formation, and an iron rain fell on them as they tried to re-form in the gullies.

Not here only did the Turks pay dearly for their recapture of the vital crest. Enemy reinforcements continued to move up Battleship Hill under heavy and accurate fire from our guns, and still they kept topping the ridges and pouring down the western slopes of the Chunuk Bair, as if determined to regain everything they had lost. But once they were over the crest they became exposed not only to the full blast of the guns, naval and military, but also to a battery of ten machine-guns belonging to the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which played upon their serried ranks at close range until the barrels were red hot. Enormous losses were inflicted, especially by these ten machine-guns; and, of the swarms which had once fairly crossed the crest line, only the merest handful ever straggled back to their own side Chunuk Bair.

At this same time strong forces of the enemy (forces which I had reckoned would have been held back to meet our advance from Suvla Bay) were hurled against the Farm and the spurs to the north-east, where there arose a conflict so deadly that it may be considered as the climax of the four days' fighting for the ridge. Portions of our line were pierced, and the troops driven clean down the hill. At the foot of the hill the men were rallied by Staff-Captain Street, who was there

supervising the transport of food and water. Without a word, unhesitatingly, they followed him back to the Farm, where they plunged again into the midst of that series of struggles in which generals fought in the ranks and men dropped their scientific weapons and caught one another by the throat. So desperate a battle cannot be described. The Turks came on again and again, fighting magnificently, calling upon the name of God. Our men stood to it, and maintained, by many a deed of daring, the old traditions of their race. There was no flinching. They died in the ranks where they stood. Here Generals Cayley, Baldwin, and Cooper and all their gallant men achieved great glory. On this bloody field fell Brig.-General Baldwin, who earned his first laurels on Cæsar's Camp, at Ladysmith. There, too, fell Brig.-General Cooper, badly wounded; and there, too, fell Lieut.-Colonel M. H. Nunn, commanding the 9th Worcestershire Regiment; Lieut.-Colonel H. G. Levinge, commanding the 6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment; and Lieut.-Colonel J. Carden, commanding the 5th Wiltshire Regiment.

Towards this supreme struggle the absolute last two battalions from the general reserve were now hurried, but by 10 a.m. the effort of the enemy was spent. Soon their shattered remnants began to trickle back, leaving a track of corpses behind them, and by night, except prisoners or wounded, no live Turk was left upon our side of the slope.

That same day, August 10th, two attacks, one in the morning and the other in the afternoon, were delivered on our positions along the Asma Dere and Damakjelic Bair. Both were repulsed with heavy loss by the 4th Australian Brigade and the 4th South Wales Borderers, the men of the New Army showing all the steadiness of veterans. Sad to say, the Borderers lost their intrepid leader, Lieut.-Colonel Gillespie, in the course of this affair.

By evening the total casualties of General Birdwood's force had reached 12,000, and included a very large proportion of officers. The 13th Division of the New Army, under Major-General Shaw, had alone lost 6,000 out of a grand total of 10,500. Baldwin was gone, and all his staff. Ten commanding officers out of thirteen had disappeared from the fighting effectives. The Warwicks and the Worcesters had lost literally every single officer. The old German notion that no unit would stand a loss of more than 25 per cent. had been completely falsified. The 13th Division and the 29th Brigade of the 10th (Irish) Division had lost more than twice that proportion, and, in spirit, were game for as much more fighting as might be required. But physically, though Birdwood's forces were prepared to hold all they had got, they were now too exhausted to attack—at least until they had rested and reorganized. So far they *had* held on to all they had gained, excepting only the footholds on the ridge between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q, momentarily carried by the Gurkhas, and the salient of Chunuk Bair itself, which they had retained for forty-eight hours. Unfortunately, these two pieces of ground, small and worthless as they seemed, were worth, according to the ethics of war, 10,000 lives, for by their loss or retention they just marked the difference between an important success and a signal victory.

At times I had thought of throwing my reserves into this stubborn central battle, where probably they would have turned the scale. But each time the water troubles made me give up the idea, all ranks at Anzac being reduced to one pint a day. True thirst is a sensation unknown to the dwellers in cool, well-watered England. But at Anzac, when mules with water "pakhals" arrived at the front, the men would rush up to them in swarms, just to lick the moisture that had exuded through the canvas bags. It will be understood, then, that until wells had been discovered under the freshly-won hills, the reinforcing of Anzac by even so much as a brigade was unthinkable.

The grand coup had not come off. The Narrows were still out of sight and beyond field gun range. But this was not the fault of Lieut.-General Birdwood or any of the officers and men under his command. No mortal can command success; Lieut.-General Birdwood had done all that mortal man can do to deserve it. The way in which he worked out his instructions into practical arrangements and dispositions upon the terrain reflect high credit upon his military capacity. I also wish to bring to your Lordship's notice the valuable services of Major-General Godley, commanding the New Zealand and Australian Division. He had under him at one time a force amounting to two divisions, which he handled with conspicuous ability. Major-General F. C. Shaw, commanding 13th Division, also rose superior to all the trials and tests of these trying days. His calm and sound judgment proved to be of the greatest value throughout the arduous fighting I have recorded.

As for the troops, the joyous alacrity with which they faced danger, wounds and death, as if they were some new form of exciting recreation, has astonished me—old campaigner as I am. I will say no more, leaving Major-General Godley to speak for what happened under his eyes:—"I cannot close my report," he says, "without placing on record my unbounded admiration of the work performed, and the gallantry displayed, by the troops and their leaders during the severe fighting involved in these operations. Though the Australian, New Zealand, and Indian units had been confined to trench duty in a cramped space for some four months, and though the troops of the New Armies had only just landed from a sea voyage, and many of them had not been previously under fire, I do not believe that any troops in the world could have accomplished more. All ranks vied with one another in the performance of gallant deeds, and more than worthily upheld the best traditions of the British Army."

Although the Sari Bair ridge was the key to the whole of my tactical conception, and although the temptation to view this vital Anzac battle at closer quarters was very hard to resist, there was nothing in its course or conduct to call for my personal intervention.

The conduct of the operations which were to be based upon Suvla Bay was entrusted to Lieut.-General The Hon. Sir F. Stopford. At his disposal was placed the IXth Army Corps, less the 13th Division and the 29th Brigade of the 10th Division.

We believed that the Turks were still unsuspecting about Suvla and that their only defences near that part of the coast were a girdle of trenches round Lala Baba and a few unconnected lengths of fire trench on Hill 10 and on the hills forming the northern arm of the bay. There was no wire. Inland a small work had been constructed on Yilghin Burnu (locally known as Chocolate Hills), and a few guns had been placed upon these hills, as well as upon Ismail Oglu Tepe, whence they could be brought into action either against the beaches of Suvla Bay or against any attempt from Anzac to break out northwards and attack Chunuk Bair. The numbers of the enemy allotted for the defence of the Suvla and Ejelmer areas (including the troops in the Anafarta villages, but exclusive of the general reserves in rear of the Sari Bair) were supposed to be under 4,000. Until the Turkish version of these events is in our hands it is not possible to be certain of the accuracy of this estimate. All that can be said at present is that my Intelligence Department were wonderfully exact in their figures as a rule and that, in the case in question, events, the reports made by prisoners, etc., etc., seem to show that the forecast was correct.

Arrangements for the landing of the IXth Corps at Suvla were worked out in minute detail by my General Headquarters Staff in collaboration with the staff of Vice-Admiral de Robeck, and every precaution was taken to ensure that the destination of the troops was kept secret up to the last moment.

Whilst concentrated at the island of Imbros the spirit and physique of the 11th Division had impressed me very favourably. They were to lead off the landing. From Imbros they were to be ferried over to the Peninsula in destroyers and motor-lighters. Disembarkation was to begin at 10.30 p.m., half an hour later than the attack on the Turkish outposts on the northern flank at Anzac, and I was sanguine enough to hope that the elaborate plan we had worked out would enable three complete brigades of infantry to be set ashore by daylight. Originally it had been intended that all three brigades should land on the beach immediately south of Nibrunesi Point, but in deference to the representations of the Corps Commander, I agreed, unfortunately, as it turned out, to one brigade being landed inside the bay.

The first task of the IXth Corps was to seize and hold the Chocolate and Ismail Oglu Hills, together with the high ground on the north and east of Suvla Bay. If the landing went off smoothly, and if my information regarding the strength of the enemy were correct, I hoped that these hills, with their guns, might be well in our possession before daybreak. In that case I hoped, further, that the first division which landed would be strong enough to picket and hold all the important heights within artillery range of the bay, when General Stopford would be able to direct the remainder of his force, as it became available, through the Anafartas to the east of the Sari Bair, where it should soon smash the mainspring of the Turkish opposition to Anzacs.

On July 22nd I issued secret instructions and tables showing the number of craft available for the IXth Corps commander, their capacity, and the points whereat the troops could be disembarked; also what numbers of troops, animals, vehicles, and stores could be landed simultaneously. The allocation of troops to the ships and boats was left to General Stopford's own discretion, subject only to naval exigencies, otherwise the order of the disembarkation might not have tallied with the order of his operations.

The factors governing the hour of landing were: First, that no craft could quit Kephalos Bay before dark (about 9 p.m.); secondly, that nothing could be done which would attract the attention of the enemy before 10 p.m., the moment when the outposts on the left flank of the Anzac position were to be rushed.

General Stopford next framed his orders on these secret instructions, and after they had received my complete approval he proceeded to expound them to the general officer commanding 11th Division and general officer commanding 10th Division, who came over from Mudros for the purpose.

As in the original landing, the luck of calm weather favoured us, and all the embarkation arrangements at Kephalos were carried out by the Royal Navy in their usual ship-shape style. The 11th Division was to be landed at three places, designated and shown on the map as A, B, and C. Destroyers were told off for these landing-places, each destroyer towing a steam lighter and picket-boat. Every light was to be dowsed, and as they neared the shore the destroyers were to slip their motor-lighters and picket-boats, which would then take the beach and discharge direct on to it. The motor-lighters were new acquisitions since the first landing, and were to prove the greatest possible assistance. They moved five knots an hour under their own engines, and carried 500 men, as well as stores of ammunition and water. After landing their passengers they were to return to the destroyers, and in one trip would empty them also. Ketches with service launches and transport lifeboats were to follow the destroyers and anchor at the entrance of the bay, so that in case of accidents or delays to any one of the motor-lighters a picket-boat could be sent at once to a ketch to pick up a tow of lifeboats and take the place of a disabled motor-lighter. These ketches and tows were afterwards to be used for evacuating the wounded.

H.M.S. "Endymion" and H.M.S. "Theseus," each carrying a thousand men, were also to sail from Imbros after the destroyers, and, lying off the beach, were to discharge their troops directly the motor-lighters—three to each ship—were ready to convey the men to the shore, *i.e.*, after they had finished disembarking their own loads and those of the destroyers. When this was done—*i.e.*, after three trips—the motor-lighters would be free to go on transporting guns, stores, mules, etc.

The following crafts brought up the rear :—

- (1) Two ketches, each towing four horse-boats carrying four 18-pounder guns and twenty-four horses.
- (2) One ketch, towing horse-boats with forty horses.
- (3) The sloop "Aster," with 500 men, towing a lighter containing eight mountain guns.
- (4) Three ketches, towing horse-boats containing eight 18-pounder guns and seventy-six horses.

Water-lighters, towed by a tank steamer, were also timed to arrive at A beach at daylight. When they had been emptied they were to return at once to Kephalos to refill from the parent water-ship.

A specially fitted-out steamer, the "Prah," with stores (shown by our experience of April 25th to be most necessary)—*i.e.*, water-pumps, hose, tanks, troughs, entrenching tools, and all ordnance stores requisite for the prompt development of wells or springs—was also sent to Suvla.

So much detail I have felt bound, for the sake of clearness, to give in the body of my despatch. The further detail, showing numbers landed, etc., etc., will be found in the appendix and tables attached.

When, originally, I conceived the idea of these operations, one of the first points to be weighed was that of the water supply in the Biyuk Anafarta valley and the Suvla plain. Experience at Anzac had shown quite clearly that the whole plan must be given up unless a certain amount of water could be counted upon, and, fortunately, the information I received was reassuring. But, in case of accidents, and to be on the safe side, so long ago as June had I begun to take steps to counter the chance that we might, from one cause or another, find difficulty in developing the wells. Having got from the War Office all that they could give me, I addressed myself to India and Egypt, and eventually from these three sources I managed to secure portable receptacles for 100,000 gallons, including petrol tins, milk cans, camel tanks, water bags, and pakhals.

Supplementing these were lighters and water-ships, all under naval control. Indeed, by arrangement with the Admiral, the responsibility of the Army was confined to the emptying of the lighters and the distribution of the water to the troops, the Navy undertaking to bring the full lighters to the shore to replace the empty ones, thus providing a continuous supply.

Finally, 3,700 mules, together with 1,750 water carts, were provided for Anzac and Suvla—this in addition to 950 mules already at Anzac. Representatives of the Director of Supplies and Transport at Suvla and Anzac were sent to allot the transport which was to be used for carrying up whatever was most needed by units ashore, whether water, food or ammunition.

This statement, though necessarily brief, will, I hope, suffice to throw some light upon the complexity of the arrangements thought out beforehand in order, so far as was humanly possible, to combat the disorganization, the hunger and the thirst which lie in wait for troops landing on a hostile beach.

On the evening of August 6th the 11th Division sailed on its short journey from Imbros (Kephalos) to Suvla Bay and, meeting with no mischance, the landing took place, the brigades of the 11th Division getting ashore practically

simultaneously; the 32nd and 33rd Brigades at B and C beaches, the 34th at A beach.

The surprise of the Turks was complete. At B and C the beaches were found to be admirably suited to their purpose, and there was no opposition. The landing at A was more difficult, both because of the shoal water and because there Turkish pickets and sentries—the normal guardians of the coast—were on the alert and active. Some of the lighters grounded a good way from the shore, and men had to struggle towards the beach in as much as four feet six inches of water. Ropes in several instances were carried from the lighters to the shore to help to sustain the heavily accoutred infantry. To add to the difficulties of the 34th Brigade the lighters came under flanking rifle fire from the Turkish outposts of Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba. The enemy even, knowing every inch of the ground, crept down in the very dark night on to the beach itself, mingling with our troops and getting between our firing line and its supports. Fortunately the number of these enterprising foes was but few, and an end was soon put to their activity on the actual beaches by the sudden storming of Lala Baba from the south. This attack was carried out by the 9th West Yorkshire Regiment and the 6th Yorkshire Regiment, both of the 32nd Brigade, which had landed at B beach and marched up along the coast. The assault succeeded at once and without much loss, but both battalions deserve great credit for the way it was delivered in the inky darkness of the night.

The 32nd Brigade was now pushed on to the support of the 34th Brigade, which was held up by another outpost of the enemy on Hill 10 (117 R and S), and it is feared that some of the losses incurred here were due to misdirected fire. While this fighting was still in progress the 11th Battalion, Manchester Regiment, of the 34th Brigade, was advancing northwards in very fine style, driving the enemy opposed to them back along the ridge of the Karakol Dagh towards the Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Beyond doubt these Lancashire men earned much distinction, fighting with great pluck and grit against an enemy not very numerous perhaps, but having an immense advantage in knowledge of the ground. As they got level with Hill 10 it grew light enough to see, and the enemy began to shell. No one seems to have been present who could take hold of the two brigades, the 32nd and 34th, and launch them in a concerted and cohesive attack. Consequently there was confusion and hesitation, increased by gorse fires lit by hostile shell, but redeemed, I am proud to report, by the conspicuously fine, soldierly conduct of several individual battalions. The whole of the Turks locally available were by now in the field, and they were encouraged to counter-attack by the signs of hesitation, but the 9th Lancashire Fusiliers and the 11th Manchester Regiment took them on with the bayonet, and fairly drove them back in disorder over the flaming Hill 10.

As the infantry were thus making good, the two Highland Mountain batteries and one battery, 59th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, were landed at B beach. Day was now breaking, and with the dawn sailed into the bay six battalions of the 10th Division, under Brig.-General Hill, from Mitylene.

Here perhaps I may be allowed to express my gratitude to the Royal Navy for their share in this remarkable achievement, as well as a very natural pride at staff arrangements, which resulted in the infantry of a whole division and three batteries being landed during a single night on a hostile shore, whilst the arrival of the first troops of the supporting division, from another base distant 120 miles, took place at the very psychological moment when support was most needed, namely, at break of dawn.

The intention of the Corps Commander was to keep the 10th Division on the left, and with it to push on as far forward as possible along the Kiretch

Tepe Sirt towards the heights above Ejelmer Bay. He wished, therefore, to land these six battalions of the 10th Division at A beach and, seeing Brig.-General Hill, he told him that as the left of the 34th Brigade was being hard pressed he should get into touch with General Officer Commanding 11th Division, and work in support of his left until the arrival of his own Divisional General. But the naval authorities, so General Stopford reports, were unwilling, for some reason not specified, to land these troops at A beach, so that they had to be sent in lighters to C beach, whence they marched by Lala Baba to Hill 10, under fire. Hence were caused loss, delay and fatigue. Also the angle of direction from which these fresh troops entered the fight was not nearly so effective.

The remainder of the 10th Division, three battalions (from Mudros), and with them the General Officer Commanding, Lieut.-General Sir B. Mahon, began to arrive, and the naval authorities having discovered a suitable landing place near Ghazi Baba, these battalions were landed there, together with one battalion of the 31st Brigade, which had not yet been sent round to C beach. By this means it was hoped that both the brigades of the 10th Division would be able to rendezvous about half a mile to the north-west of Hill 10.

After the defeat of the enemy round and about Hill 10, they retreated in an easterly direction towards Sulajik and Kuchuk Anafarta Ova, followed by the 34th and 32nd Brigades of the 11th Division and by the 31st Brigade of the 10th Division, which had entered into the fight, not, as the Corps Commander had intended, on the left of the 11th Division, but between Hill 10 and the Salt Lake. I have failed in my endeavours to get some live human detail about the fighting which followed, but I understand from the Corps Commander that the brunt of it fell upon the 31st Brigade of the 10th (Irish) Division, which consisted of the 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 6th Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers, the last-named battalion being attached to the 31st Brigade.

By the evening General Hammersley had seized Yilghin Burnu (Chocolate Hills) after a fight for which he specially commends the 6th Lincoln Regiment and the 6th Border Regiment. At the same time he reported that he was unable to make any further progress towards the vital point, Ismail Oglu Tepe. At night-fall his brigade and the 31st Brigade were extended from about Hetman Chair through Chocolate Hills, Sulajik, to near Kuchuk Anafarta Ova.

This same day Sir B. Mahon delivered a spirited attack along the Kiretch Tepe Sirt ridge, in support of the 11th Battalion Manchester Regiment, and, taking some small trenches en route, secured and established himself on a position extending from the sea about 135 p., through the high ground about the p. of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, to about 135 Z. 8. In front of him, on the ridge, he reported the enemy to be strongly entrenched. The 6th Royal Munster Fusiliers have been named as winning special distinction here. The whole advance was well carried out by the Irishmen over difficult ground, against an enemy—500 to 700 Gendarmerie—favoured by the lie of the land.

The weather was very hot, and the new troops suffered much from want of water. Except at the southernmost extremity of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt ridge, there was no water in that part of the field, and although it existed in some abundance throughout the area over which the 11th Division was operating, the Corps Commander reports that there was no time to develop its resources. Partly this seems to have been owing to the enemy's fire; partly to a want of that *nous* which stands by as second nature to the old campaigner; partly it was inevitable. Anyway, for as long as such a state of things lasted, the troops became dependent on the lighters and upon the water brought to the beaches in tins, pakhals, etc.

Undoubtedly the distribution of this water to the advancing troops was a matter of great difficulty, and one which required not only well-worked-out schemes from Corps and Divisional Staffs, but also energy and experience on the part of those who had to put them into practice. As it turned out, and judging merely by results, I regret to say that the measures actually taken in regard to the distribution proved to be inadequate, and that suffering and disorganization ensued. The disembarkation of artillery horses was therefore at once, and rightly postponed by the Corps Commander, in order that mules might be landed to carry up water.

And now General Stopford, recollecting the vast issues which hung upon his success in forestalling the enemy, urged his divisional commanders to push on. Otherwise, as he saw, all the advantages of the surprise landing must be nullified. But the divisional commanders believed themselves, it seems, to be unable to move. Their men, they said, were exhausted by their efforts of the night of the 6th-7th and by the action of the 7th. The want of water had told on the new troops. The distribution from the beaches had not worked smoothly. In some cases the hose had been pierced by individuals wishing to fill their own bottles; in others, lighters had grounded so far from the beach that men swam out to fill batches of water-bottles. All this had added to the disorganization inevitable after a night landing, followed by fights here and there with an enemy scattered over a country to us unknown. These pleas for delay were perfectly well founded. But it seems to have been overlooked that the half-defeated Turks in front of us were equally exhausted and disorganized, and that an advance was the simplest and swiftest method of solving the water trouble and every other sort of trouble. Be this as it may, the objections overbore the Corps Commander's resolution. He had now got ashore three batteries (two of them mountain batteries), and the great guns of the ships were ready to speak at his request. But it was lack of artillery support which finally decided him to acquiesce in a policy of going slow which, by the time it reached the troops, became translated into a period of inaction. The divisional generals were, in fact, informed that, "in view of the inadequate artillery support," General Stopford did not wish them to make frontal attacks on entrenched positions, but desired them, so far as was possible, to try and turn any trenches which were met with. Within the terms of this instruction lies the root of our failure to make use of the priceless daylight hours of August 8th.

Normally, it may be correct to say that in modern warfare infantry cannot be expected to advance without artillery preparation. But in a landing on a hostile shore the order has to be inverted. The infantry must advance and seize a suitable position to cover the landing, and to provide artillery positions for the main thrust. The very existence of the force, its water supply, its facilities for munitions and supplies, its power to reinforce, must absolutely depend on the infantry being able instantly to make good sufficient ground without the aid of the artillery, other than can be supplied for the purpose by *floating* batteries.

This is not a condition that should take the commander of a covering force by surprise. It is one already foreseen. Driving power was required, and even a certain ruthlessness, to brush aside pleas for a respite for tired troops. The one fatal error was inertia. And inertia prevailed.

Late in the evening of the 7th the enemy had withdrawn the few guns which had been in action during the day. Beyond half a dozen shells dropped from very long range into the bay in the early morning of the 8th, no enemy artillery fired that day in the Suvla area. The guns had evidently been moved back, lest they should be captured when we pushed forward. As for the entrenched positions, these, in the ordinary acceptance of the terms, were non-existent. The General Staff Officer, whom I had sent on to Suvla early in the morning of the 8th, reported by telegraph the absence of hostile gun-fire, the small amount of rifle fire, and the

enemy's apparent weakness. He also drew attention to the inaction of our own troops, and to the fact that golden opportunities were being missed. Before this message arrived at general headquarters I had made up my mind, from the Corps Commander's own reports, that all was not well at Suvla. There was risk in cutting myself adrift, even temporarily, from touch with the operations at Anzac and Helles; but I did my best to provide against any sudden call by leaving Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, my chief of the general staff, in charge, with instructions to keep me closely informed of events at the other two fronts; and, having done this, I took ship and set out for Suvla.

On arrival at about 5 p.m. I boarded H.M.S. "Jonquil," where I found corps headquarters, and where General Stopford informed me that the General Officer commanding 11th Division was confident of success in an attack he was to make at dawn next morning (the 9th). I felt no such confidence. Beyond a small advance by a part of the 11th Division between the Chocolate Hills and Ismail Oglu Tepe, and some further progress along the Kiretch Tepe Sirt ridge by the 10th Division, the day of the 8th had been lost. The commander of the 11th Division had, it seems, ordered strong patrols to be pushed forward so as to make good all the strong positions in advance which could be occupied without serious fighting; but, as he afterwards reported, "little was done in this respect." Thus a priceless twelve hours had already gone to help the chances of the Turkish reinforcements, which were, I knew, both from naval and aerial sources, actually on the march for Suvla. But when I urged that even now, at the eleventh hour, the 11th Division should make a concerted attack upon the hills, I was met by a *non possumus*. The objections of the morning were no longer valid; the men were now well rested, watered, and fed. But the divisional commanders disliked the idea of an advance by night, and General Stopford did not care, it seemed, to force their hands.

So it came about that I was driven to see whether I could not, myself, put concentration of effort and purpose into the direction of the large number of men ashore. The Corps Commander made no objection. He declared himself to be as eager as I could be to advance. The representations made by the divisional commanders had seemed to him insuperable. If I could see my way to get over them no one would be more pleased than himself.

Accompanied by Commodore Roger Keyes and Lieut.-Colonel Aspinall, of the Headquarters General Staff, I landed on the beach, where all seemed quiet and peaceful, and saw the commander of the 11th Division, Major-General Hammersley. I warned him the sands were running out fast, and that by dawn the high ground to his front might very likely be occupied in force by the enemy. He saw the danger, but declared that it was a physical impossibility, at so late an hour (6 p.m.) to get out orders for a night attack, the troops being very much scattered. There was no other difficulty now, but this was insuperable; he could not recast his orders or get them round to his troops in time. But one brigade, the 32nd, was, so General Hammersley admitted, more or less concentrated and ready to move. The General Staff Officer of the division, Colonel Neil Malcolm, a soldier of experience, on whose opinion I set much value, was consulted. He agreed that the 32nd Brigade was now in a position to act. I, therefore, issued a direct order that, even if it were only with this 32nd Brigade, the advance should begin at the earliest possible moment, so that a portion at least of the 11th Division should anticipate the Turkish reinforcements on the heights and dig themselves in there upon some good tactical point.

In taking upon myself the serious responsibility of thus dealing with a detail of divisional tactics I was careful to limit the scope of the interference. Beyond directing that the one brigade which was reported ready to move at once should try and make good the heights before the enemy got on to them I did nothing,

and said not a word calculated to modify or in any way affect the attack already planned for the morning. Out of the thirteen battalions which were to have advanced against the heights at dawn, four were now to anticipate that movement by trying to make good the key of the enemy's position at once and under cover of darkness.

I have not been able to get a clear and coherent account of the doings of the 32nd Brigade; but I have established the fact that it did not actually commence its advance till 4 a.m. on August 9th. The reason given is that the units of the brigade were scattered. In General Stopford's despatch he says that, "One company of the 6th East Yorks Pioneer Battalion succeeded in getting to the top of the hill north of Anafarta Sagir, but the rest of the battalion and the 32nd Brigade were attacked from both flanks during their advance, and fell back to a line north and south of Sulajik. Very few of the leading company or the Royal Engineers who accompanied it got back, and that evening the strength of the battalion was nine officers and 380 men."

After their retirement from the hill north of Anafarta Sagir (which commanded the whole battlefield) this 32nd Brigade then still marked the high-water level of the advance made at dawn by the rest of the division. When their first retirement was completed they had to fall back further, so as to come into line with the most forward of their comrades. The inference seems clear. Just as the 32nd Brigade in their advance met with markedly less opposition than the troops who attacked an hour and a half later, so, had they themselves started earlier, they would probably have experienced less opposition. Further, it seems reasonable to suppose that had the complete division started at 4 a.m. on the 9th, or, better still, at 10 p.m. on the 8th, they would have made good the whole of the heights in front of them.

That night I stayed at Suvla, preferring to drop direct cable contact with my operations as a whole to losing touch with a corps battle which seemed to be going wrong.

At dawn, on the 9th, I watched General Hammersley's attack, and very soon realised, by the well-sustained artillery fire of the enemy (so silent the previous day), and by the volume of the musketry, that Turkish reinforcements had arrived; that with the renewed confidence caused by our long delay the guns had been brought back; and that, after all, we were forestalled. This was a bad moment. Our attack failed; our losses were very serious. The enemy's enfilading shrapnel fire seemed to be especially destructive and demoralizing, the shell bursting low and all along our line. Time after time it threw back our attack just as it seemed upon the point of making good. The 33rd Brigade at first made most hopeful progress in its attempt to seize Ismail Oglu Tepe. Some of the leading troops gained the summit, and were able to look over on to the other side. Many Turks were killed here. Then the centre seemed to give way. Whether this was the result of the shrapnel fire or whether, as some say, an order to retire came up from the rear, the result was equally fatal to success. As the centre fell back the steady, gallant behaviour of the 6th Battalion, Border Regiment, and the 6th Battalion, Lincoln Regiment, on either flank was especially noteworthy. Scrub fires on Hill 70 did much to harass and hamper our troops. When the 32nd Brigade fell back before attacks from the slopes of the hill north of Anafarta Sagir and from the direction of Abrijka they took up the line north and south through Sulajik. Here their left was protected by two battalions of the 34th Brigade, which came up to their support. The line was later on prolonged by the remainder of the 34th Brigade and two battalions of the 159th Brigade of the 53rd Division. Their right was connected with the Chocolate Hills by the 33rd Brigade on the position to which they had returned after their repulse from the upper slopes of Ismail Oglu Tepe.

Some of the units which took part in this engagement acquitted themselves very bravely. I regret I have not had sufficient detail given me to enable me to mention them by name. The Divisional Commander speaks with appreciation of one freshly-landed battalion of the 53rd Division, a Hereford battalion, presumably the 1/1st Herefordshire, which attacked with impetuosity and courage between Hetman Chair and Kaslar Chair, about Azma Dere, on the extreme right of his line.

During the night of the 8th-9th and early morning of the 9th the whole of the 53rd (Territorial) Division (my general reserve) had arrived and disembarked. I had ordered it up to Suvla, hoping that by adding its strength to the 9th Corps General Stopford might still be enabled to secure the commanding ground round the bay. The infantry brigades of the 53rd Division (no artillery had accompanied it from England) reinforced the 11th Division.

On August 10th the Corps Commander decided to make another attempt to take the Anafarta ridge. The 11th Division were not sufficiently rested to play a prominent part in the operation, but the 53rd Division, under General Lindley, was to attack, supported by General Hammersley. On the 10th there were one brigade of Royal Field Artillery ashore, with two mountain batteries, and all the ships' guns were available to co-operate. But the attack failed, though the Corps Commander considers that seasoned troops would have succeeded, especially as the enemy were showing signs of being shaken by our artillery fire. General Stopford points out, however, and rightly so, that the attack was delivered over very difficult country, and that it was a high trial for troops who had never been in action before, and with no regulars to set a standard. Many of the battalions fought with great gallantry, and were led forward with much devotion by their officers. At a moment when things were looking dangerous two battalions of the 11th Division (not specified by the Corps Commander) rendered very good service on the left of the Territorials. At the end of the day our troops occupied the line hill east of Chocolate Hill—Sulajik, whilst the enemy—who had been ably commanded throughout—were still receiving reinforcements, and, apart from their artillery, were three times as strong as they had been on August 7th.

Orders were issued to the General Officer Commanding IXth Corps to take up and entrench a line across the whole front from near the Azma Dere, through the knoll east of the Chocolate Hill, to the ground held by the 10th Division about Kiretch Tepe Sirt. General Stopford took advantage of this opportunity to reorganize the divisions, and, as there was a gap in the line between the left of the 53rd Division and the right of the 10th Division, gave orders for the preparation of certain strong points to enable it to be held.

The 54th Division (infantry only) arrived, and were disembarked on August 11th and placed in reserve. On the following day—August 12th—I proposed that the 54th Division should make a night march in order to attack, at dawn on the 13th, the heights Kavak Tepe—Teke Tepe. The Corps Commander having reason to believe that the enclosed country about Kuchuk Anafarta Ova and the north of it was held by the enemy, ordered one brigade to move forward in advance, and make good Kuchuk Anafarta Ova, so as to ensure an unopposed march for the remainder of the division as far as that place. So that afternoon the 163rd Brigade moved off, and, in spite of serious opposition, established itself about the A. of Anafarta (188m. 4 and 7), in difficult and enclosed country. In the course of the fight, creditable in all respects to the 163rd Brigade, there happened a very mysterious thing. The 1/5th Norfolks were on the right of the line, and found themselves for a moment less strongly opposed than the rest of the brigade. Against the yielding forces of the enemy Colonel Sir H.

Beauchamp, a bold, self-confident officer, eagerly pressed forward, followed by the best part of the battalion. The fighting grew hotter, and the ground became more wooded and broken. At this stage many men were wounded or grew exhausted with thirst. These found their way back to camp during the night. But the Colonel, with 16 officers and 250 men, still kept pushing on, driving the enemy before him. Amongst these ardent souls was part of a fine company enlisted from the King's Sandringham estates. Nothing more was ever seen or heard of any of them. They charged into the forest, and were lost to sight or sound. Not one of them ever came back.

The night march and projected attack were now abandoned, owing to the Corps Commander's representations as to the difficulties of keeping the division supplied with food, water, etc., even should they gain the height. General Birdwood had hoped he would soon be able to make a fresh attack on Sari Bair, provided that he might reckon on a corresponding vigorous advance to be made by the 11th and 54th Divisions on Ismail Oglu Tepe. On August 13th I so informed General Stopford. But when it came to business, General Birdwood found he could not yet carry out his new attack on Sari Bair—and, indeed, could only help the IXth Corps with one brigade from Damakjelik Bair. I was obliged, therefore, to abandon this project for the nonce, and directed General Stopford to confine his attention to strengthening his line across his present front. To straighten out the left of this line General Stopford ordered the General Officer Commanding the 10th Division to advance on the following day (August 15th), so as to gain possession of the crest of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt, the 54th Division to co-operate.

The 30th and 31st Infantry Brigades of the 10th Irish Division were to attack frontally along the high ridge. The 162nd Infantry Brigade of the 54th Division were to support on the right. The infantry were to be seconded by a machine-gun detachment of the Royal Naval Air Service, by the guns of H.M.S. "Grampus" and H.M.S. "Foxhound" from the Gulf of Saros, by the Argyll Mountain Battery, the 15th Heavy Battery, and the 58th Field Battery. After several hours of indecisive artillery and musketry fighting, the 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers charged forward with loud cheers, and captured the whole ridge, together with eighteen prisoners. The vigorous support rendered by the naval guns was a feature of this operation. Unfortunately, the point of the ridge was hard to hold, and means for maintaining the forward trenches had not been well thought out. Casualties became very heavy, the 5th Royal Irish Fusiliers having only one officer left, and the 5th Inniskilling Fusiliers also losing heavily in officers. Reinforcements were promised, but before they could arrive the officer left in command decided to evacuate the front trenches. The strength of the Turks opposed to us was steadily rising, and had now reached 20,000.

On the evening of August 15th General Stopford handed over command of the IXth Corps.

The units of the 10th and 11th Divisions had shown their mettle when they leaped into the water to get more quickly to close quarters, or when they stormed Lala Baba in the darkness. They had shown their resolution later when they tackled the Chocolate Hills and drove the enemy from Hill 10 right back out of rifle range from the beaches.

Then had come hesitation. The advantage had not been pressed. The senior commanders at Suvla had had no personal experience of the new trench warfare; of the Turkish methods; of the paramount importance of time. Strong, clear leadership had not been promptly enough applied. These were the reasons which induced me, with your Lordship's approval, to appoint Major-General H. de B. De Lisle to take over temporary command.

I had already seen General De Lisle on his way from Cape Helles, and my formal instructions—full copy in Appendix—were handed to him by my Chief of the General Staff. Under these he was to make it his most pressing business to get the Corps into fighting trim again, so that as big a proportion of it as possible might be told off for a fresh attack upon Ismail Oglu Tepe and the Anafarta spur. At his disposal were placed the 10th Division (less one brigade), the 11th Division, the 53rd and 54th Divisions—a force imposing enough on paper, but totalling, owing to casualties, under 30,000 rifles.

The fighting strength of ourselves and of our adversaries stood at this time at about the following figures:—Lieut.-General Birdwood commanded 25,000 rifles, at Anzac; Lieut.-General Davies, in the southern zone, commanded 23,000 rifles; whilst the French corps alongside of him consisted of some 17,000 rifles. The Turks had been very active in the south, doubtless to prevent us reinforcing Anzac or Suvla; but it is doubtful if there were more than 35,000 of them in that region. The bulk of the enemy were engaged against Anzac or were in reserve in the valleys east and north of Sari Bair. Their strength was estimated at 75,000 rifles.

The Turks then, I reckoned, had 110,000 rifles to our 95,000, and held all the vantages of ground; they had plenty of ammunition, also drafts wherewith to refill ranks depleted in action within two or three days. My hopes that these drafts would be of poor quality had been every time disappointed. After weighing all these points, I sent your Lordship a long cable. In it I urged that if the campaign was to be brought to a quick, victorious decision, large reinforcements must at once be sent out. Autumn, I pointed out, was already upon us, and there was not a moment to be lost. At that time (August 16th) my British divisions alone were 45,000 under establishment, and some of my fine battalions had dwindled down so far that I had to withdraw them from the fighting line. Our most vital need was the replenishment of these sadly depleted ranks. When that was done I wanted 50,000 fresh rifles. From what I knew of the Turkish situation, both in its local and general aspects, it seemed, humanly speaking, a certainty that if this help could be sent to me *at once* we could still clear a passage for our fleet to Constantinople.

It may be judged, then, how deep was my disappointment when I learnt that the essential drafts, reinforcements, and munitions could not be sent to me, the reason given being one which prevented me from any further insistence. So I resolved to do my very best with the means at my disposal, and forthwith reinforced the northern wing with the 2nd Mounted Division (organized as dismounted troops) from Egypt and the 29th Division from the southern area. These movements, and the work of getting the IXth Corps and attached divisions into battle array took time, and it was not until the 21st that I was ready to renew the attack—an attack to be carried out under very different conditions from those of August 7th and 8th.

The enemy's positions were now being rapidly entrenched, and, as I could not depend on receiving reinforcing drafts, I was faced with the danger that if I could not drive the Turks back I might lose so many men that I would find myself unable to hold the very extensive new area of ground which had been gained. I therefore decided to mass every available man against Ismail Oglu Tepe, a *sine qua non* to my plans whether as a first step towards clearing the valley, or, if this proved impossible, towards securing Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove from shell fire.

The scheme for this attack was well planned by General De Lisle. The 53rd and 54th Divisions were to hold the enemy from Sulajik to Kiretch Tepe Sirt, while the 29th Division and 11th Division stormed Ismail Oglu Tepe. Two brigades, 10th Division, and the 2nd Mounted Division, were retained in Corps Reserve. I arranged that General Birdwood should co-operate by swinging forward his left

flank to Susuk Kuyu and Kaiajik Aghala. Naturally I should have liked still further to extend the scope of my attack by ordering an advance of the IXth Corps all along their line, but many of the battalions had been too highly tried, and I felt it was unwise to call upon them for another effort so soon. The attack would only be partial, but it was an essential attack if any real progress was to be made. Also, once the Anafarta ridge was in my hands the enemy would be unable to reinforce through the gap between the two Anafartas, and then, so I believed, my left would find no difficulty in getting on.

My special objective was the hill which forms the south-west corner of the Anafarta Sagir spur. Ismail Oglu Tepe, as it is called, forms a strong natural barrier against an invader from the Ægean who might wish to march direct against the Anafartas. The hill rises 350 feet from the plain, with steep spurs jutting out to the west and south-west, the whole of it covered with dense holly oak scrub, so nearly impenetrable that it breaks up an attack and forces troops to move in single file along goat tracks between the bushes. The comparatively small number of guns landed up to date was a weakness, seeing we had now to storm trenches, but the battleships were there to back us, and as the bombardment was limited to a narrow front of a mile, it was hoped the troops would find themselves able to carry the trenches, and that the impetus of the charge would carry them up to the top of the crest. Our chief difficulty lay in the open nature and shallow depth of the ground available for the concentration for attack. The only cover we possessed was the hill Lala Baba, 200 yards from the sea, and Yilghin Burnu, half a mile from the Turkish front, the ground between these two being an exposed plain. The 29th Division, which was to make the attack on the left, occupied the front trenches during the preceding night; the 11th Division, which was to attack on the right, occupied the front trenches on the right of Yilghin Burnu.

By some freak of nature Suvla Bay and plain were wrapped in a strange mist on the afternoon of August 21st. This was sheer bad luck, as we had reckoned on the enemy's gunners being blinded by the declining sun and upon the Turkish trenches being shown up by the evening light with singular clearness, as would have been the case on ninety-nine days out of a hundred. Actually we could hardly see the enemy lines this afternoon, whereas out to the westward targets stood out in strong relief against the luminous mist. I wished to postpone the attack, but for various reasons this was not possible, and so, from 2.30 p.m. to 3 p.m. a heavy but none too accurate artillery bombardment from land and sea was directed against the Turkish first line of trenches, whilst twenty-four machine-guns in position on Yilghin Burnu did what they could to lend a hand.

At 3 p.m. an advance was begun by the infantry on the right of the line. The 34th Brigade of the 11th Division rushed the Turkish trenches between Hetman Chair and Aire Kavak, practically without loss, but the 32nd Brigade, directed against Hetman Chair and the communication trench connecting that point with the south-west corner of the Ismail Oglu Tepe spur, failed to make good its point. The brigade had lost direction in the first instance, moving north-east instead of east, and though it attempted to carry the communication trench from the north-east with great bravery and great disregard of life, it never succeeded in rectifying the original mistake. The 33rd Brigade, sent up in haste with orders to capture this communication trench at all costs, fell into precisely the same error, part of it marching north-east and part south-east to Susuk Kuyu.

Meanwhile the 29th Division, whose attack had been planned for 3.30 p.m., had attacked Scimitar Hill (Hill 70) with great dash. The 87th Brigade, on the left, carried the trenches on Scimitar Hill, but the 86th Brigade were checked and upset by a raging forest fire across their front. Eventually, pressing on, they found themselves unable to advance up the valley between the two spurs, owing to the

failure of the 32nd Brigade of the 11th Division on their right. The brigade then tried to attack eastwards, but were decimated by a cross fire of shell and musketry from the north and south-east. The leading troops were simply swept off the top of the spur, and had to fall back to a ledge south-west of Scimitar Hill, where they found a little cover. Whilst this fighting was in progress the 2nd Mounted Division moved out from Lala Baba in open formation to take up a position of readiness behind Yilghin Burnu. During this march they came under a remarkably steady and accurate artillery fire. The advance of these English yeomen was a sight calculated to send a thrill of pride through anyone with a drop of English blood running in their veins. Such superb martial spectacles are rare in modern war. Ordinarily it should always be possible to bring up reserves under some sort of cover from shrapnel fire. Here, for a mile and a half, there was nothing to conceal a mouse, much less some of the most stalwart soldiers England has ever sent from her shores. Despite the critical events in other parts of the field, I could hardly take my glasses from the yeomen; they moved like men marching on parade. Here and there a shell would take toll of a cluster; there they lay; there was no straggling; the others moved steadily on; not a man was there who hung back or hurried. But such an ordeal must consume some of the battle-winning fighting energy of those subjected to it, and it is lucky indeed for the Turks that the terrain, as well as the lack of trenches, forbade us from letting the 2nd Mounted Division loose at close quarters to the enemy without undergoing this previous too heavy baptism of fire.

Now that the 11th Division had made their effort, and failed, the 2nd South Midland Brigade (commanded by Brig.-General Earl of Longford) was sent forward from its position of readiness behind Yilghin Burnu, in the hope that they might yet restore the fortunes of the day. This brigade, in action for the first time, encountered both bush fires and musketry without flinching, but the advance had in places to be almost by inches, and the actual close attack by the Yeomen did not take place until night was fast falling. On the left they reached the foremost line of the 20th Division, and on the right also they got as far as the leading battalions. But, as soon as it was dark, one regiment pushed up the valley between Scimitar Hill and Hill 100 (on Ismail Oglu Tepe), and carried the trenches on a small knoll near the centre of this horseshoe. The regiment imagined it had captured Hill 100, which would have been a very notable success, enabling as it would the whole of our line to hang on and dig in. But when the report came in some doubt was felt as to its accuracy, and a reconnaissance by staff officers showed that the knoll was a good way from Hill 100, and that a strongly-held semi-circle of Turkish trenches (the enemy having been heavily reinforced) still denied us access to the top of the hill. As the men were too done, and had lost too heavily to admit of a second immediate assault, and as the knoll actually held would have been swept by fire at day-break, there was nothing for it but to fall back under cover of darkness to our original line. The losses in this attack fell most heavily on the 20th Division. They were just under 5,000.

I am sorry not to be able to give more detail as to the conduct of individuals and units during this battle. But the 2nd South Midland Brigade has been brought to my notice, and it consisted of the Bucks Yeomanry, the Berks Yeomanry, and the Dorset Yeomanry. The Yeomanry fought very bravely, and on personal, as well as public, grounds I specially deplore the loss of Brig.-General Earl of Longford, K.P., M.V.O., and Brig.-General P. A. Kenna, V.C., D.S.O., A.D.C.

The same day, as pre-arranged with General Birdwood, a force consisting of two battalions of New Zealand Mounted Rifles, two battalions of the 20th Irish Brigade, the 4th South Wales Borderers, and 20th Indian Infantry Brigade, the

whole under the command of Major-General H. V. Cox, was working independently to support the main attack.

General Cox divided his force into three sections; the left section to press forward and establish a permanent hold on the existing lightly-held outpost line covering the junction of the 11th Division with the Anzac front; the centre section to seize the well at Kabak Kuyu, an asset of utmost value, whether to ourselves or the enemy; the right section to attack and capture the Turkish trenches on the north-east side of the Kaiajik Aghala.

The advance of the left section was a success; after a brisk engagement the well at Kabak Kuyu was seized by the Indian Brigade, and, by 4.30, the right column, under Brig.-General Russell, under heavy fire, effected a lodgment on the Kaiajik Aghala, where our men entrenched, and began to dig communications across the Kaiajik Dere towards the lines of the 4th Australian Brigade south of the Dere. A pretty stiff bomb fight ensued, in which General Russell's troops held their own through the night against superior force. At 6 a.m. on the morning of August 22nd, General Russell, reinforced by the newly-arrived 18th Australian Battalion, attacked the summit of the Kaiajik Aghala. The Australians carried 150 yards of the trenches, losing heavily in so doing, and were then forced to fall back again owing to enfilade fire, though in the meantime the New Zealand Mounted Rifles managed, in spite of constant counter-attacks, to make good another 80 yards. A counter-attack in strength launched by the Turks at 10 a.m., was repulsed; the new line from the Kaiajik Aghala to Susuk Kuyu was gradually strengthened, and eventually joined on to the right of the IXth Army Corps, thereby materially improving the whole situation. During this action the 4th Australian Brigade, which remained facing the Turks on the upper part of the Kaiajik Aghala, was able to inflict several hundred casualties on the enemy as they retreated or endeavoured to reinforce.

On August 21st we had carried the Turkish entrenchments at several points, but had been unable to hold what we had gained except along the section where Major-General Cox had made a good advance with Anzac and Indian troops. To be repulsed is not to be defeated, as long as the commander and his troops are game to renew the attack. All were eager for such a renewal of the offensive; but clearly we would have for some time to possess our souls in patience, seeing that reinforcements and munitions were short, that we were already outnumbered by the enemy, and that a serious outbreak of sickness showed how it had become imperative to give a spell of rest to the men who had been fighting so magnificently and so continuously. To calculate on rest, it may be suggested, was to calculate without the enemy. Such an idea has no true bearing on the feelings of the garrison of the Peninsula. That the Turks should attack had always been the earnest prayer of all of us, just as much after August 21st as before it. And now that we had to suspend progress for a bit, work was put in hand upon the line from Suvla to Anzac, a minor offensive routine of sniping and bombing was organized, and, in a word, trench warfare set in on both sides.

On August 24th Lieut.-General the Hon. J. H. G. Byng, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O, assumed command of the IXth Army Corps.

The last days of the month were illumined by a brilliant affair carried through by the troops under General Birdwood's command. Our object was to complete the capture of Hill 60 north of the Kaiajik Aghala, commenced by Major-General Cox on August 21st. Hill 60 overlooked the Biyuk Anafarta valley, and was therefore tactically a very important feature.

The conduct of the attack was again entrusted to Major-General Cox, at whose disposal were placed detachments from the 4th and 5th Australian Brigades, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, and the 5th Connaught Rangers. The advance was timed to take place at 5 p.m. on August 27th, after

the heaviest artillery bombardment we could afford. This bombardment seemed effective; but the moment the assailants broke cover they were greeted by an exceeding hot fire from the enemy field guns, rifles, and machine-guns, followed after a brief interval by a shower of heavy shell, some of which, most happily, pitched into the trenches of the Turks. On the right the detachment from the 4th and 5th Australian Brigades could make no headway against a battery of machine-guns which confronted them. In the centre the New Zealanders made a most determined onslaught, and carried one side of the topmost knoll. Hand-to-hand fighting continued here till 9.30 p.m., when it was reported that nine-tenths of the summit had been gained. On the left the 250 men of the 5th Connaught Rangers excited the admiration of all beholders by the swiftness and cohesion of their charge. In five minutes they had carried their objective, the northern Turkish communications, when they at once set to and began a lively bomb-fight along the trenches against strong parties which came hurrying up from the enemy supports and afterwards from their reserves. At midnight fresh troops were to have strengthened our grip upon the hill, but before that hour the Irishmen had been out-bombed, and the 9th Australian Light Horse, who had made a most plucky attempt to recapture the lost communication trench, had been repulsed. Luckily, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles refused to recognise that they were worsted. Nothing would shift them. All that night and all next day, through bombing, bayonet charges, musketry, shrapnel, and heavy shell, they hung on to their 150 yards of trench. At 1 a.m. on August 29th the 10th Light Horse made another attack on the lost communication trenches to the left, carried them, and finally held them. This gave us complete command of the underfeature, an outlook over the Anafarta Sagir valley, and safer lateral communications between Anzac and Suvla Bay.

Our casualties in this hotly contested affair amounted to 1,000. The Turks lost out of all proportion more. Their line of retreat was commanded from our Kaiajik Dere trenches, whence our observers were able to direct artillery fire equally upon their fugitives and their reinforcements. The same observers estimated the Turkish casualties as no less than 5,000. Three Turkish machine-guns and forty-six prisoners were taken, as well as three trench mortars, 300 Turkish rifles, 60,000 rounds of ammunition, and 500 bombs. Four hundred acres were added to the territories of Anzac. Major-General Cox showed his usual forethought and wisdom. Brig.-General Russell fought his men splendidly.

My narrative of battle incidents must end here. From this date onwards up to the date of my departure on October 7th the flow of munitions and drafts fell away. Sickness, the legacy of a desperately trying summer, took heavy toll of the survivors of so many arduous conflicts. No longer was there any question of operations on the grand scale, but with such troops it was difficult to be down-hearted. All ranks were cheerful; all remained confident that, so long as they stuck to their guns, their country would stick to them, and see them victoriously through the last and greatest of the crusades.

On October 11th your Lordship cabled asking me for an estimate of the losses which would be involved in an evacuation of the peninsula. On October 12th I replied in terms showing that such a step was to me unthinkable. On October 16th I received a cable recalling me to London for the reason, as I was informed by your Lordship on my arrival, that His Majesty's Government desired a fresh, unbiassed opinion, from a responsible Commander, upon the question of early evacuation.

In bringing this dispatch to a close I wish to refer gratefully to the services rendered by certain formations, whose work has so far only been recognised by a sprinkling of individual rewards.

Much might be written on the exploits of the Royal Naval Air Service, but these bold flyers are laconic, and their feats will mostly pass unrecorded. Yet let

me here thank them, with their Commander, Colonel F. H. Sykes, of the Royal Marines, for the nonchalance with which they appear to affront danger and death, when and where they can. So doing, they quicken the hearts of their friends on land and sea—an asset of greater military value even than their bombs or aerial reconnaissances, admirable in all respects as these were.

With them I also couple the *Service de l'Aviation* of the *Corps Expéditionnaire d'Orient*, who daily wing their way in and out of the shrapnel under the distinguished leadership of M. le Capitaine Césari.

The Armoured Car Division (Royal Naval Air Service) have never failed to respond to any call which might be made upon them. Their organization was broken up; their work had to be carried out under strange conditions—from the bows of the "River Clyde," as independent batteries attached to infantry divisions, etc., etc.—and yet they were always cheerful, always ready to lend a hand in any sort of fighting that might give them a chance of settling old scores with the enemy.

Next I come to the Royal Artillery. By their constant vigilance, by their quick grasp of the key to every emergency, by their thundering good shooting, by hundreds of deeds of daring, they have earned the unstinted admiration of all their comrade services. Where all fought so remarkably the junior officers deserve a little niche of their own in the Dardanelles record of fame. Their audacity in reconnaissance, their insouciance under the hottest of fires, stand as a fine example not only to the Army, but to the nation at large.

A feature of every report, narrative or diary I have read has been a tribute to the stretcher bearers. All ranks, from Generals in command to wounded men in hospital, are unanimous in their praise. I have watched a party from the moment when the telephone summoned them from their dug-out to the time when they returned with their wounded. To see them run lightheartedly across fire-swept slopes is to be privileged to witness a superb example of the hero in man. No braver corps exists, and I believe the reason to be that all thought of self is instinctively flung aside when the saving of others is the motive.

The services rendered by Major-General (temporary Lieut.-General) E. A. Altham, C.B., C.M.G., Inspector-General of Communications, and all the departments and services of the lines of communication assured us a life-giving flow of drafts, munitions, and supplies. The work was carried out under unprecedented conditions, and is deserving, I submit, of handsome recognition.

With General Altham were associated Brig.-General (temporary Major-General) C. R. R. McGrigor, C.B., at first Commandant of the Base at Alexandria and later Deputy Inspector-General of Communications, and Colonel T. E. O'Leary, Deputy Adjutant-General, 3rd Echelon. Both of these officers carried out their difficult duties to my entire satisfaction.

My Military Secretary, Lieut.-Colonel S. H. Pollen, has displayed first-class ability in the conduct of his delicate and responsible duties.

Also I take the opportunity of my last dispatch to mention two of my Aides-de-Camp—Major F. L. Markgill-Crichton-Maitland, Gordon Highlanders, Lieut. Hon. G. St. J. Brodrick, Surrey Yeomanry.

I have many other names to bring to notice for distinguished and gallant service during the operations under review, and these will form the subject of a separate communication.

And now, before affixing to this dispatch my final signature as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, let me first pay tribute to the everlasting memory of my dear comrades who will return no more. Next, let me thank each and all, Generals, Staff, Regimental Leaders, and rank and file, for their wonderful loyalty, patience, and self-sacrifice. Our progress was constant, and if it was painfully slow—they know the truth. So I bid them all farewell with a special God-speed to the campaigners who have served with me right through

from the terrible yet most glorious earlier days—the incomparable 29th Division; the young veterans of the Naval Division; the ever-victorious Australians and New Zealanders; the stout East Lancs, and my own brave fellow-countrymen of the Lowland Division of Scotland.

I have the honour to be, your Lordship's most obedient servant,

IAN HAMILTON,

General, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor of the JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

From COLONEL EDWARD MATTHEY, C.B., V.D. (retired), late Lieut.-Colonel Commandant, London Rifle Brigade.

The 44th Regiment during the Retreat from Cabul in 1842.

31a, Weymouth Street, W.,

January 10th, 1916.

Dear Sir,—

I hope you will not mind my bringing the following under your notice with regard to the splendid article upon the above episode in the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL of November, 1915.

My very old and esteemed friend, Mrs. J. S. Sellon, is the only surviving child of the late Captain Thomas Alexander Souter, of the 44th Regiment, who saved the Colours of his regiment in the retreat from Cabul.

Mrs. Sellon is naturally very much interested in this article, so I procured a copy of No. 440 for her, by the courtesy of your staff.

In this article all her father's letters are signed J. H. Souter, which is incorrect as to his initials.

My object in bringing this under your notice, which I do under Mrs. Sellon's authorization, is to know whether a correction could be made as to this in the next number of the JOURNAL under an "Erratum," because it does seem a pity for so excellent a record, which this is, to be incorrect in any detail.

The Colours, saved by Captain Souter and bearing his bloodstains, now hang over the regimental tablet erected to the memory of those of the 44th Regiment who perished during the retreat, in Alverstone Church, Gosport.

At the request of Brig.-General Shelton, Captain Souter entrusted the Colours he had saved to him. Captain Souter afterwards exchanged into the 22nd Regiment, and died on the voyage to England.

I may add that Mrs. Sellon "would be glad to communicate with Mrs. de Wend, as she thinks she would be pleased to know of the gratification the publication of the documents and letters concerning the 44th Regiment, in which she is so much interested, has given to one born in the regiment, and whose father so distinguished himself."

Trusting you will excuse this long letter,

I am,

Dear Sir,

Yours faithfully,

EDWARD MATTHEY.

PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY.

December, 1915—February, 1916.

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It is not often that we find so important and so eminently informing a work published at a price which places it within the reach of those who can best appreciate the value of the teachings it contains and conveys. Within a compass which is comparatively small, considering the great and increasing importance of the matter with which this book deals, the author traces the use, or the intended use, of railways from the early days of their introduction up to the outbreak of hostilities in August, 1914; and he reminds us, opportunely enough, that it was a German writer on industrial and mechanical development who, as far back as 1833, was the first to make certain definite proposals for the use of railways for strategical purposes. Writing generally, he showed how much more speedily the concentration of troops could be effected by rail than by road, and that there would be a saving not only in point of time but in actual physical strain; while writing more particularly of the advantage of the laying down of special railways, he tried to convince his countrymen that a railway from Maintz to Wesel would go far in the prevention of a French invasion of Germany, by reason of the rapidity with which troops for its frustration could be concentrated at the spot threatened. Those views were not actually derided, but the general consensus of contemporary military opinion seemed to be that, while railways might serve armies in the transport of supplies of all kinds, they would be of comparatively small assistance in the actual movement of troops. The idea, however, was later more favourably considered, and less than ten years afterwards—in 1842—a scheme was already elaborated for covering Germany with a network of strategic railways, which should not only serve the whole country, but which would permit of war being conducted on two fronts at the same time—France and Russia—a scheme, the aggressive character of which did not fail of detection and discussion in the French Chamber. It was, however, in the war of 1859 that railways really played a novel part, strategically and tactically, although full advantage was not taken of their employment; but without the help afforded by railways, and had it not been for the manner in which they were exploited and developed, Mr. Pratt is of opinion that the War of Secession could hardly have been fought at all. Thenceforward the author traces the increased use of railways in every war of importance that has followed; he devotes a chapter to a detailed consideration of Germany's strategical railways, and others to a statement of her far-seeing policy of railway expansion for military purposes in South Africa and in Asiatic Turkey. Finally, there are some notes of real value on the Indian frontier railways and on the development of railways in connection with the defence of Australia. The whole book is full of up-to-date information of an invaluable character, conveyed in an eminently readable and attractive style.

Prussian Memories, 1864-1914. By Poultney Bigelow, M.A., F.R.G.S.:
G. P. Putnam's Sons.

From the dates included in the title of this book it will be readily apparent that the author's acquaintance with Prussia is one of long standing, and that it has endured up to quite modern times. At the early age of eight Mr. Poultney Bigelow was sent to a boarding school at Bonn, where the British and the American boarders fought with one another, but combined their forces against the German day scholars; and if in the days of his early youth and budding manhood Prussia was not actually his "spiritual home," it was the country in which he was mainly educated, one where he counts many friends from the Kaiser downwards, but a country in regard to which he cherishes no illusions of any sort or kind. He gives us in this book a rather different picture of the Kaiser than that which is usually presented to us. He, Prince Henry, and Poultney Bigelow played together as children in the huge emptinesses of the New Palace at Potsdam, and the future Kaiser seems to have been a manly lad, generous, warm-hearted, and fond of the mother, whom we have been led to believe he treated latterly with harshness and disrespect. He was brought up as might have been an English Prince, but as he grew older he yielded to the power of the all-pervading Prussianism, and took rather after his grandfather than after Frederick the Noble; and when, after an interval of twelve years, the author once again found himself in Berlin, it was the capital of a very different Prussia than that which he had left, and which underwent fresh changes when, four years later, William II. became Emperor. Mr. Bigelow gives us much information about the Berlin of those days and about the dominating character of the young Kaiser; the errors of German diplomacy; and the skilful manipulation of the Press, the university, the schools, of the whole machinery of public patronage, which have permitted William II. to inaugurate a war "unexampled for trickery and barbarity," while retaining his popularity and causing his people to believe that such an act is patriotic.

Mr. Poultney Bigelow tells us of the tactful manners of Prussian bureaucracy; he contrasts Prussian and British colonization methods, and he tells us plainly of the debt which America at this moment owes to Britain for the part she has played in this war. He is no enemy of Germany, but, as he tells us, "the English-speaking world is my home," and nations love those with whom they have fought; but they love most those who have fought them fairly. It is pleasant to find one who knows Germany so well expressing approval so hearty of the part we are playing in this great struggle; and pleasant and typical, too, to read what he has written on the flyleaf of the copy of his book which he has given to the Library of this Institution: "From a Life-Member—a Yankee—one of the many who love England, because without the dear old Mother Country there would have been no Yankees."

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
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